Coleman v. Reed et al

Filing 121

ORDER denying 108 defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 12/1/2017. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
STEVEN M. COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
and
CHEROKEE INSURANCE COMPANY,
as subrogee of Freestates Trucking, LLC,
Intervenor Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD WILLIAM REED, and
SUNWEST MUD COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants.
AND
DONALD WILLIAM REED,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVEN M. COLEMAN,
Counter-Defendant,
and
UNIVERSAL SPECIALIZED, INC.,
d/b/a ECONOMY TRANSPORT, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CIV-15-1014-M

ORDER
Before the Court is defendants Donald William Reed (“Reed”) and Sunwest Mud
Company, Inc.’s (“Sunwest Mud”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed November 1,
2017. On November 17, 2017, plaintiff Steven M. Coleman (“Coleman”) filed his response.
Based upon the parties’ submissions, the Court makes its determination.
I.

Introduction
This action arises out of a tractor-trailer collision that occurred on September 20, 2014.

Coleman was driving a tractor-trailer, hauling an oversized windmill tower midsection; Reed, on
behalf of Sunwest Mud, was driving an unloaded tractor and flatbed trailer. Either Coleman or
Reed crossed the center line, and the tractor-trailers collided. On September 17, 2015, Coleman
filed the instant action. Reed and Sunwest Mud now move this Court for partial summary
judgment.
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving
party is entitled to summary judgment where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. When applying this standard, [the Court] examines
the record and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1071-72
(10th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Furthermore, the non-movant has a
2

burden of doing more than simply showing there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of
law.” Neustrom v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 156 F.3d 1057, 1066 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
III.

Discussion
Defendants move this Court for partial summary judgment as to Coleman’s damages for

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and replacement cost value and as to Coleman’s
employment law claims against Sunwest Mud.

In his response, Coleman states that he is

withdrawing any property damage claims previously asserted. Accordingly, the Court finds
defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to the replacement cost value damages is now
moot. In his response, Coleman also states that he never asserted any employment law claims
against Sunwest Mud. Accordingly, the Court finds defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment as to Coleman’s employment law claims is moot.
Thus, the only remaining issue is whether defendants are entitled to summary judgment as
to Coleman’s damages for PTSD. The parties agree that under Oklahoma law, there must be a
physical injury suffered before mental anguish injuries can be asserted. See Ellington v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co. of Tulsa, Inc., 717 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1986). Defendants assert that Coleman has
admitted that he is not making a claim for personal injury and does not allege any “physical
suffering” connected with the collision. Defendants further assert that Coleman’s deposition
testimony regarding a leg and hip injury from the collision should not be considered as it is
contradicted by the discovery responses provided by Coleman. Coleman contends that simply
3

because he is not seeking compensation for his physical injuries does not mean that he did not
suffer an injury from the collision. Coleman further states that he has timely supplemented his
interrogatory responses to specifically state that he did suffer physical injuries from the collision.
Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Coleman and viewing all reasonable inferences in Coleman’s favor, the Court
finds that there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Coleman suffered a physical injury
from the collision. In his deposition, Coleman specifically testifies that his leg and hip were
injured in the collision. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendants are not entitled to summary
judgment as to Coleman’s damages for PTSD.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES defendants’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment [docket no. 108].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of December, 2017.

4