Chavez v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER -- Having reviewed the medical evidence of record, the transcript of the administrative hearing, the decision of the ALJ, and the pleadings and briefs of the parties, the undersigned magistrate judge REVERSES the Commissioner's decision and REMANDS the matter for further administrative development. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shon T. Erwin on 8/15/16. (mc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MATILDA FLORES CHAVEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
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Case No. CIV-15-1103-STE
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying
Plaintiff’s application for benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner has
answered and filed a transcript of the administrative record (hereinafter TR. ____). The
parties have consented to jurisdiction over this matter by a United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The parties have briefed their positions, and the matter is now at issue. Based on
the Court’s review of the record and the issues presented, the Court REVERSES the
Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS the matter for further administrative
development.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits was denied initially and on
reconsideration. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an
unfavorable decision. (TR. 19-30). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review. (TR. 3-5). Thus, the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the
Commissioner.
II.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process required by agency
regulations. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since September 30, 2010, the alleged onset date. (TR. 21).
At step two, the ALJ determined that Ms. Chavez had the following severe impairments:
diabetes mellitus, obesity, depression, and borderline intellectual functioning. (TR. 21).
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal
any of the presumptively disabling impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (TR. 21).
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work of
housekeeper. (TR. 29). The ALJ further found Plaintiff had the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to:
[O]ccasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10
pounds, stand and/or walk at least 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, sit for
at least 6 hours. She is limited to simple repetitive tasks, can relate to
supervisors and coworkers only superficially, and should not work with the
public.
(TR. 23).
Even though the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant
work, he proceeded to step five. There, he presented the limitations from the RFC to a
vocational expert (VE) to determine whether there were other jobs Plaintiff could
perform. (TR. 52). Given the limitations, the VE identified two jobs from the Dictionary
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of Occupational Titles. (TR. 53). Thus, in an alternative step five finding, the ALJ
adopted the testimony of the VE and concluded that Ms. Chavez was not disabled based
on her ability to perform the identified jobs. (TR. 30).
III.
ISSUES PRESENTED
On appeal, Plaintiff alleges: (1) a failure to adequately consider her obesity in
assessing the RFC and (2) an erroneous credibility analysis.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final “decision to determin[e] whether the
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the
correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir.
2010). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
While the court considers whether the ALJ followed the applicable rules of law in
weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, the court does not reweigh the
evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Bowman v.
Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted).
V.
ERROR IN THE CONSIDERATION OF OBESITY
As alleged by Ms. Chavez, the ALJ failed to adequately consider the effects of
Plaintiff’s obesity when assessing the RFC.
A.
ALJ’s Duty to Consider Obesity
Social Security Ruling 02–1p states that the effects of obesity must be
considered throughout the sequential evaluation process. See Policy Interpretation
Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Obesity, 2000 WL 628049 at *1, 3 (Sept. 12,
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2002) (SSR 02-1p). At step two, obesity will be found to be a “severe” impairment
when, alone, or in combination with another medically determinable impairment, it
significantly limits an individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
Id. at *4. At step three, the Listing of Impairments with regard to the Musculoskeletal
System references obesity and explains that “[t]he combined effects of obesity with
musculoskeletal impairments can be greater than the effects of each of the impairments
considered separately.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Pt. A, 1.00(Q).
At step four, when assessing an individual’s RFC, the ALJ “must consider any
additional and cumulative effects of obesity.” Id. For example, fatigue may affect an
obese individual’s ability to sustain work activity and the combined effects of obesity
with other impairments might be greater than may be expected without obesity. SSR
02-1p at *6. However, “[o]besity in combination with another impairment may or may
not increase the severity or functional limitations of the other impairment.” Id.
Therefore, “[a]ssumptions about the severity or functional effects of obesity combined
with other impairments [will not be made],” and the ALJ “will evaluate each case based
on the information in the case record.” Id.
B.
Error in the ALJ’s Consideration of Obesity
At the administrative hearing in December 2013, Plaintiff testified that she was 5’
3” tall and weighed approximately 190 pounds, which was her normal weight. (TR. 45).
Plaintiff’s testimony is consistent with the records submitted by various medical
personnel which reflect Ms. Chavez’ weight between 187 and 204 pounds during the
disability period. (TR. 232, 251, 259, 290, 292, 297, 323, 328). Ms. Chavez’ weight
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translated to a body mass index (BMI) ranging between 33.1 and 36.1—levels which
are consistent with “obesity” as defined by the SSA. SSR-02-1p at *2.
At step two, the ALJ expressly found that Plaintiff’s obesity was a severe
impairment. (TR. 21). As a result of this finding, the ALJ was obligated to address the
functional restrictions associated with the obesity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii),
(c), (e), (g). Further, in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ was required “to give
adequate consideration to the effect of [Plaintiff’s] obesity in combination with her other
severe impairments.” SSR 02-1p at *6.
The ALJ mentions Plaintiff’s weight three times in the opinion. First, in
summarizing Ms. Chavez’ testimony, the ALJ stated: “The claimant is 5’ 3” tall and
weighs 190 pounds.” (TR. 24). Next, in a summary of a report form a consultative
physician, the ALJ noted “Examination revealed the claimant was 5’ 3” tall with a weight
of 198 pounds[.]” (TR. 24). Finally, in assessing Plaintiff’s complaints concerning
medication side effects, the ALJ stated: “The claimant reported that her main complaint
at the consultative examination was side effects from her medications; however, the
claimant was 5’ 3” tall with a weight of 198 pounds.” (TR. 27). The first two statements
are merely recitations of reports regarding Ms. Chavez’ weight and the third statement
seems to discount Ms. Chavez’ complaints regarding medication side effects based on
her height and weight, although the Court is not convinced regarding the ALJ’s
explanation. In any event, these three statements represent the entirety of the ALJ’s
consideration of Plaintiff’s obesity.
As stated, Plaintiff’s BMI which ranged from 33.1 to 36.1 classified her as obese
for purposes of the sequential evaluation process. SSR 02-1p at *2. Upon such
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classification, the ALJ was required to analyze the functional loss and limitations caused
by the obesity, both alone and in combination with other impairments. See SSR 02-1p
at *6. Although the ALJ accepted Plaintiff’s obesity as a severe impairment, the ALJ did
not specifically identify “any functional limitations resulting from the obesity in the RFC
assessment,” or adequately explain why there were no such limitations, as required.
See id. at *6-*7; TR. 23.
Nor did the ALJ address whether Plaintiff’s obesity affected or exacerbated her
other severe impairments of diabetes mellitus, depression, or borderline intellectual
functioning, as instructed by SSR 02-1p. See SSR 02-1p at *3 (“Obesity may also cause
or contribute to mental impairments such as depression.”), *4 (requiring ALJ to
“consider the possibility of coexisting or related conditions, especially as the level of
obesity increases”).
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s obesity was
adequate because: (1) Plaintiff did not claim obesity as a disabling impairment, (2)
Plaintiff formerly worked as a groundskeeper, (3) no doctor had assessed limitations
based on obesity, and (4) the ALJ had given “great weight” to an opinion from a state
agency physician who had considered Plaintiff’s obesity. (ECF No. 26:6-8). Alternatively,
Ms. Colvin argues that even if the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s obesity had been deficient,
any error was harmless in light of the fact that the RFC restricted Plaintiff to light work,
which adequately accounted for any limitations owing to obesity. None of Defendant’s
arguments are persuasive.
First, Plaintiff’s failure to expressly allege obesity as a disabling impairment is
irrelevant in light of the ALJ’s determination that the obesity was a severe impairment
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at step two. In light of the step two finding, the ALJ was required to consider the effect
of the obesity throughout the remainder of the disability process. See SSR 02-1-p at *1;
see also Grotendorst v. Astrue, 370 Fed. Appx. 879, 883 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that
“all medically determinable impairments, severe or not, must be taken into account at
[the] later steps.”) (emphasis in original); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2) (requiring that all
medically determinable impairments be considered when assessing the RFC).
Second, Plaintiff’s former employment as a groundskeeper was “medium” work,
as acknowledged by the Commissioner, and would have no bearing on Plaintiff’s current
ability to perform “light” work, as set forth in the RFC assessment. (TR. 23).
Third, the absence of limitations assessed by physicians tied directly to Plaintiff’s
obesity does not excuse the ALJ’s duty to make an independent assessment and explain
his findings. See SSR 02-1p at *1, *3, *7; see also Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208,
1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting claim that an RFC for medium work was supported by a
lack of diagnostic tests showing the claimant could not occasionally lift 50 pounds,
noting that “the absence of [such] evidence is not evidence.”) (brackets in original).
Furthermore, the ALJ is charged with considering the effects of obesity in combination
with the claimant’s other impairments, both severe and non-severe. See SSR 02-1p at
*6. Thus the absence of limitations assessed by physicians and tied to obesity alone
would be insufficient to excuse the ALJ’s duty to consider the combined effects of
obesity with other impairments.
Fourth, Ms. Colvin correctly notes that the ALJ gave “great weight” to a state
agency physician’s opinion which had mentioned Plaintiff’s BMI. (TR. 282) But in
discussing this record, the ALJ did not note the BMI reference, and the ALJ did not
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expressly rely upon—or reject—that portion of the physician’s opinions in assessing the
RFC. (TR. 25, 28). In the absence of the ALJ’s explicit reliance on that portion of the
physician’s opinion, the Court is not permitted to supply such a post hoc rationale.
Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court may not
create post hoc rationalizations to explain the Commissioner’s treatment of evidence
when that treatment is not apparent from the Commissioner’s decision itself.”); Hackett
v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) (the Court should not “engage in an
impermissible reweighing of the evidence” or “substitute [its] judgment for that of the
Commissioner.”).
Finally, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the functional
effects of obesity was harmless in light of the fact that the ALJ limited Plaintiff to light
work, which, according to the Commissioner, properly accounted for any limitations
from obesity. As noted by Ms. Colvin, the ALJ did limit Plaintiff to light work, stating that
she could “occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry 10
pounds, stand and/or walk at least 6 hours in an 8 hour workday, [and] sit for at least 6
hours.” (TR. 23). But neither the ALJ nor this Court is permitted to assume that these
restrictions reflect consideration of Plaintiff’s obesity. As noted by the SSA, the ALJ may
“not make assumptions about the severity or functional effects of obesity combined
with other impairments” because “[o]besity in combination with another impairment
may or may not increase the severity or functional limitations of the other impairment.”
SSR 02-1p at *6. Rather, the ALJ must “explain how he reached his conclusions on
whether obesity caused any physical or mental limitations.” Baker v. Barnhart, 84 Fed.
Appx. 10, 14 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Hamby v. Astrue,
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260 Fed. Appx. 108 (10th Cir. 2008); DeWitt v. Asture, 381 Fed. Appx., 786 (10th Cir.
2010). See also Smith v. Colvin, 625 Fed. Appx. 896 (10th Cir. 2015).1
In sum, the ALJ provided no discussion of the effect of obesity on Plaintiff’s other
severe impairments. The ALJ’s failure to discuss the functional limitations that may be
caused by Plaintiff’s obesity, either alone or in combination with other impairments, is
an error that undermines the RFC finding and warrants remand.
VI.
ERROR IN THE CREDIBILITY ANALYSIS
As alleged by Ms. Chavez, the ALJ’s credibility determination was legally faulty
and lacked substantial evidence. As a result, remand is appropriate on this allegation of
error.
A.
ALJ’s Duty to Evaluate Allegations of Pain/Credibility
Social Security regulations require a two-step process to evaluate a claimant’s
allegations of pain. First, the adjudicator must consider whether there is an underlying
medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the
individuals’ pain. Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms
in Disability Claims: Assessing the Credibility of an Individual’s Statements, 1996 WL
374186, at *2 (July 2, 1996) (SSR 96-7p). Second, the adjudicator must evaluate the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the
extent to which the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to perform basic work
activities. Id. In doing so, the ALJ must make a finding on the claimant’s credibility
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In Smith, cited by the Commissioner (ECF No. 26:7-8), unlike the Baker, Hamby, and DeWitt cases, all
unpublished, the Court found the ALJ’s discussion of claimant’s obesity adequate, stating that it declined
to impose a requirement on the ALJ to “note the absence of any evidence that her obesity resulted in
additional functional limitations or exacerbated any other impairment.” Smith at 899. Although Smith is
more recent, it provides little in the way of detailed guidance, thus the undersigned finds the earlier cases
persuasive.
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based on a consideration of the entire case record, including the individual’s own
statements about the symptoms. Id. When evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s
allegations, the ALJ must consider factors including:
1.
The individual’s daily activities;
2.
The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the individual's
pain or other symptoms;
3.
Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
4.
The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication
the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other
symptoms;
5.
Treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has
received for relief of pain or other symptoms;
6.
Any measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used
to relieve pain or other symptoms; and
7.
Any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations
and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
Id. at 3.
It is not enough for the ALJ to simply recite the factors, although he need not
undergo a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence. SSR 96-7p at *4;
Qualls v. Apfel, 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000). However, in considering the
factors, the ALJ must “set[ ] forth the specific evidence he relie[d] on in evaluating the
claimant’s credibility.” Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012).
The ALJ must give specific reasons for the credibility finding, and must be sufficiently
specific regarding the weight given to the individual’s statements and the reasons for
that weight. SSR 96-7p at *4. It is not sufficient to make a conclusory statement that
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“the individual’s allegations have been considered” or that “the allegations are (or are
not) credible.” Id.
B.
Plaintiff’s Allegations of Pain and Related Limitations
At the hearing, Ms. Chavez stated that she suffered from daily pain in her back,
knees, shoulders, arms, and feet which caused her difficulties in walking, bending,
sitting, and kneeling. (TR. 41). Specifically, Plaintiff stated that her knees would often
swell and “give up,” rendering her unable to walk. (TR. 41). Ms. Chavez also stated that
she suffered from swelling and numbness in her right hand and arm which limited her
ability to lift anything on that side. (TR. 42). Additionally, Plaintiff stated that she
suffered from diabetic neuropathy which caused numbness and swelling in her feet.
(TR. 42-43). For the pain, Plaintiff stated that she took muscle relaxers and
“inflammation medication” and for the neuropathy, she took Metformin. (TR. 41, 43).
According to Ms. Chavez, the medications caused side effects including dizziness, lightheadedness, nausea, and headaches. (TR. 45).
Ms. Chavez also testified that her physical impairments limited her ability to dress
herself and prohibited her from cooking and cleaning. (TR. 44). Plaintiff also stated that
because of her pain, she was only able to: (1) stand for approximately 20-25 minutes at
a time, (2) walk for approximately 10 minutes or one-half block, (3) sit in one position
comfortably for approximately 10-15 minutes, and (4) lift a small purse. (TR. 47-49).
C.
Error in the ALJ’s Credibility Determination
In evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably expected
to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these
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symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this
decision.
(TR. 24). The ALJ then summarized the medical evidence, including findings from a
consultative physical examination, a consultative psychological examination, opinions
from state agency consultants, and Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Reinschmiedt. (TR.
24, 27). The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, which the ALJ
described as:
not limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of
disabling symptoms and limitations. At one point or another in the record,
. . . the claimant has reported that she has no problem with personal
care, and she cooks, drives and goes shopping.
(TR. 25). The ALJ then cited a lack of medical records to substantiate Plaintiff’s
allegations that she suffered from pain and side effects from her medications to an
extent which would prevent work. The ALJ stated:
With regard to medication side effects, although the claimant has alleged
various side effects from the use of the medications, the medical records,
such as office treatment notes, do not corroborate these allegations.
...
The record fails to demonstrate the presence of any pathological clinical
signs, significant medical findings, or any neurological abnormalities,
which would establish the existence of a pattern of pain of such severity
as to prevent the claimant from engaging in any work on a sustained
basis. X-ray of the right wrist revealed no fractures or dislocations.
Cervical spine x-rays revealed no evidence of traumatic injury, but there
was degenerative discogenic disease from C4-5 through the C6-7 levels.
(TR. 27) (internal citation omitted). In conclusion, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s
credibility, citing: (1) “inconsistencies regarding the claimant’s physical limitations and
the objective medical evidence,” including a lack of x-ray findings and medical records
to support Plaintiff’s allegations of pain and medication side effects and (2) her previous
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work as a housekeeper and groundskeeper. (TR. 27). The ALJ also references Ms.
Chavez’ complaints regarding her side effects from medication, but the Court cannot
discern whether the ALJ had accepted or discounted the allegations. See infra. Ms.
Chavez challenges the ALJ’s reference to her daily activities as “taken out of context”
and argues that the ALJ’s remaining rationales are legally insufficient and lack
substantial evidence. Ms. Chavez is correct.
First, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s statement that “the claimant has reported that
she has no problem with personal care, and she cooks, drives and goes shopping.” (TR.
25). As noted by Plaintiff, the ALJ’s statement is not entirely accurate, as it omits details
related to Plaintiff’s abilities in these areas. For example, in two function reports, Ms.
Chavez stated that: (1) she needed to be reminded to bathe and had trouble getting in
and out of the bathtub, (2) her children helped her prepare meals and her “cooking”
was limited to microwaving food, (3) she had to use a wheelchair while shopping, and
(4) she never drove by herself, and when she did drive, it was only a short distance to
the “quick shop.” (TR. 152, 153, 156, 172-174).
In Sitsler v. Astrue, 410 Fed. Appx. 112 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2011) (unpublished
op.), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this this type of selective and
misleading review of Plaintiff’s daily activities is impermissible. In Sitsler, the claimant
argued that the ALJ mischaracterized the extent of his daily activities, ignoring
particular qualifications and limitations. Sitsler, 410 Fed. Appx. at 117. In discounting
the plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ relied on the plaintiff’s activities of daily living, stating
that he could care for his personal needs, care for his small children, perform household
chores, drive, and go shopping. Id. at 114. In contrast, however, the record actually
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reflected that the claimant had to have help in caring for his children, he only made
simple meals, his ability to perform household chores was limited to a few minutes, his
shopping was limited, and he drove very little. Id. at 117. Noting that the ALJ’s analysis
was “selective and misleading,” the Court stated that “an ALJ cannot use
mischaracterizations of a claimant’s activities to discredit his claims of disabling
limitations.” Id.; see Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1462, 1464 (10th Cir. 1987)
(noting that the ALJ improperly based his conclusion that claimant could do light work
on a mischaracterization of his activities).
As in Sitsler, the ALJ here mischaracterized the extent of Ms. Chavez’ daily
activities, ignoring the numerous qualifications and limitations she consistently reported.
Thus, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s evaluation of plaintiff's credibility was flawed
by his selective review of the evidence.
Second, the ALJ cites “inconsistencies regarding the claimant’s physical
limitations and the objective medical evidence,” including a lack of x-ray findings and
medical records to support Plaintiff’s allegations of pain and medication side effects.
The Tenth Circuit has stated that “the absence of an objective medical basis for the
degree of severity of pain may affect the weight to be given to the claimant’s subjective
allegations of pain, but a lack of objective corroboration of the pain’s severity cannot
justify disregarding those allegations.” Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 165 (10th Cir.
1987).
Under this rubric, the ALJ was entitled to rely on the lack of x-ray findings to
substantiate the Plaintiff’s allegations of pain to the degree she alleged. See TR. 27
(ALJ’s finding that the inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s functional limitations and allegations
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“yield[ed] [ ] a partial allegation credibility assumption.”) However, the record only
contained x-rays of Ms. Chavez’ right wrist and back. TR. 314-15. Thus, while the ALJ
was entitled to cite those findings in connection with Ms. Chavez’ allegations of wrist
and back pain, the x-rays would not account for Ms. Chavez’ complaints of severe pain
in her knees, arms, shoulders, and feet. (TR. 41). The ALJ failed to discuss those
allegations, and in any event he could not have relied on an absence of x-rays to
support a dismissal of such pain. See Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1223 (10th
Cir. 2004) (noting that “the absence of [such] evidence is not evidence.”) (brackets in
original).
Finally, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s prior employment and her allegations
concerning side effects from her medications. The ALJ stated:
The claimant alleges that she is unable to work because she has
osteoarthritis in the knees. Her past work was that of a groundskeeper
prior to filing disability. Her other job was that of a housekeeper.
The claimant reported that her main complaint at the consultative
examination was side effects from her medications; however the claimant
[sic] 5’ 3” tall with a weight of 198 pounds. The assessment was chronic
knee pain, chronic right wrist pain, diabetes mellitus, hypertension and
hyperlipidemia.
(TR. 27). Although the ALJ cited Ms. Chavez’ prior work, he has not affirmatively relied
on the work as a basis to discount her allegations that she now suffers from disabling
pain. And although the ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s reports of medication side effects, his
subsequent references to Ms. Chavez’ weight and findings from the consultative
examiner do not clearly link to her allegations of side effects. In both circumstances,
the Court will not speculate regarding the ALJ’s intentions and will therefore refrain
from deciding one way or the other, whether the explanations are sufficient. Grogan v.
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Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court may not create
post hoc rationalizations to explain the Commissioner’s treatment of evidence when that
treatment is not apparent from the Commissioner’s decision itself.”)
VII.
SUMMARY
In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ erred in failing to consider the functional
effects of Plaintiff’s obesity, both singly, and in combination with Plaintiff’s other
impairments. Additionally, the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility by
mischaracterizing her daily activities and otherwise failing to provide substantial
evidence for his findings. These errors warrant remand for further consideration of: (1)
the functional effects of Plaintiff’s obesity at all steps of the disability determination
process and (2) Plaintiff’s allegations of pain and related limitations.
ORDER
Having reviewed the medical evidence of record, the transcript of the
administrative hearing, the decision of the ALJ, and the pleadings and briefs of the
parties, the undersigned magistrate judge REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and
REMANDS the matter for further administrative development.
ENTERED on August 15, 2016.
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