Washington-Walker v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents et al

Filing 16

ORDER denying 7 defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim, OADA claim, FMLA claim, and ADA claim and finding defendants' Motion to Dismiss moot as to plaintiff's Title VII race discrimination claim and punitive damages claim (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 4/13/2016. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DANELLE WASHINGTON-WALKER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
)
BOARD OF REGENTS, d/b/a,
)
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA HEALTH )
SCIENCES CENTER AT OKLAHOMA
)
CITY,
)
DORINDA G. EATON, In her individual )
capacity,
)
JOSEPH A. YOUNG, In his individual
)
capacity,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. CIV-15-1158–M

ORDER
Before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, filed October 21, 2015. On February 12,
2016, plaintiff filed her response, and on March 4, 2016, defendants filed their reply.
I.

Background
Plaintiff was employed by University of Oklahoma Health Science Center in the patient

account department. On October 21, 2013, she was terminated. On August 11, 2015, plaintiff filed
this action in the District Court of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma, alleging (1) discrimination
based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”),
against defendant University of Oklahoma Board of Regents (“University”); (2) discrimination and
denial of reasonable accommodation and interactive process due to a real or perceived disability in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (“ADA”), and/or the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), against the University; (3) discrimination in
violation of the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (“OADA”) against the University; and (4)

violation of and interference with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) against
defendants Dorinda G. Eaton (“Eaton”) and Joseph A. Young (“Young”). Defendants removed this
action to this Court on October 14, 2015. Defendants now move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.
II.

Standard for Dismissal
Regarding the standard for determining whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the United States Supreme Court has held:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that
are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further,
“where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 679 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, “[a] pleading that offers labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does
a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at
678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A court “must determine whether the complaint
sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief
under the legal theory proposed.” Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). Finally, “[a] court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint
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presumes all of plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
III.

Discussion
A.

Title VII race discrimination claim

In her response, plaintiff voluntarily dismisses her claim of discrimination under Title VII.
Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s Title VII race discrimination claim is
now moot.
B.

Rehabilitation Act claim

To state a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she
is disabled under the Rehabilitation Act; (2) that she is “otherwise qualified” for her position; (3)
that she was discriminated against by the defendant; and (4) that the position exists as part of a
program or activity receiving assistance. See McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir.
2004). Defendants assert that plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to support the conclusion that
she was otherwise qualified for the position or that she was terminated solely because of her
disability.
Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, and presuming all of plaintiff’s factual
allegations are true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds
plaintiff has set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a Rehabilitation Act claim against the
University. Specifically, the Court finds plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts showing that she is
otherwise qualified for her position. For example, plaintiff alleges that she received good
performance evaluations and improved and complimentary emails regarding her performance. See
Petition at ¶ 49. Additionally, the Court finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support

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the conclusion that she was terminated solely because of her disability. Accordingly, the Court finds
that plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim should not be dismissed.
C.

OADA claim

To establish a prima facie claim of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) she
is a disabled person within the meaning of the law; (2) she was qualified, with or without reasonable
accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) she was terminated because
of her disability. See Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011).
Defendants assert that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead the second element. Having carefully
reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff has set forth sufficient factual
allegations to state an OADA claim against the University. Specifically, as set forth above, the
Court finds plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts showing that she was qualified to perform the
essential functions of her job. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s OADA claim should not
be dismissed.
D.

FMLA claim

Defendants assert that plaintiff’s FMLA claim against Eaton and Young fails because Eaton
and Young are not “employers” as defined under the FMLA. Specifically, defendants contend that
Eaton and Young do not have the requisite responsibility or stature within the hierarchy of the
University to warrant the imposition of personal liability under the FMLA.
The FMLA defines employer as follows:
(A) In general
The term “employer” –
(i) means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry
or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more
employees for each working day during each of 20 or more

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calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar
year;
(ii) includes –
(I) any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the
interest of an employer to any of the employees of
such employer; and
(II) any successor in interest of an employer;
(iii) includes any “public agency”, as defined in section
203(x) of this title; and
(iv) includes the Government Accountability Office and the
Library of Congress.
(B) Public agency
For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iii), a public agency shall be
considered to be a person engaged in commerce or in an industry or
activity affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4).
The Tenth Circuit has not squarely ruled on whether a public employee can be held
individually liable under the FMLA. Other circuit courts of appeal are split on this question.
Compare Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2003), and Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding individual public employees are not “employers” under the FMLA), with
Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Prob. and Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012), Modica v. Taylor,
465 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2006), and Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding individual
public employees can satisfy the definition of “employer” in the FMLA). Lacking express Tenth
Circuit guidance, district courts in Oklahoma have followed the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits and
held that individual public employees can satisfy the definition of “employer” in the FMLA. See
Owens v. City of Barnsdall, No. 13-CV-749-TCK-PJC, 2014 WL 2197798, at *6 (N.D. Okla. May
27, 2014); Roberts v. LeFlore Cny. Hosp. Auth., No. CIV-13-189-KEW, 2014 WL 1270422, at *3-4
(E.D. Okla. March 26, 2014); Jeffers v. Redlands Comm. Coll. Bd. of Regents, No. CIV-11-1237HE, 2012 WL 137412, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 18, 2012). This Court agrees with the reasoning of
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these Oklahoma district courts, as well as the reasoning set forth by the Third, Fifth, and Eighth
Circuits, and finds that a public employee sued in his or her individual capacity may be found to be
an “employer” under the FMLA if that individual “acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an
employer to any of the employees of such employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I).
Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, and presuming all of plaintiff’s factual
allegations are true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds
plaintiff has set forth sufficient factual allegations to state a FMLA claim against Eaton and Young
in their individual capacities. While the complaint is not as detailed as would be ideal in making
the determination, the Court concludes it is sufficient to state a plausible claim. Specifically, the
Court finds that plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts showing that Eaton and Young had the
requisite responsibility to be deemed an “employer” under the FMLA. Plaintiff alleges that Eaton
was her direct manager and Young was her supervisor and that they had authority over persons like
plaintiff. Further, the Court finds that the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint shows that Eaton and
Young had the power to fire employees and to control the conditions of employment. Accordingly,
the Court finds that plaintiff’s FMLA claim should not be dismissed.
E.

ADA claim

Defendants assert that the University is immune from plaintiff’s ADA claim. Plaintiff
contends that the University waived its immunity when it removed this action to this Court.
The Tenth Circuit addressed this exact issue in Estes v. Wyoming Department of
Transportation, 302 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2002). In Estes, the plaintiff brought an ADA claim, as
well as state law claims, against the Wyoming Department of Transportation in state court. The
defendant removed the case to federal court, stating that it was not waiving any constitutional

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challenges to the district court’s jurisdiction. The district court concluded that Congress validly
abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity for violations of Title I of the ADA, and the defendant
appealed to the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit held that Congress did not validly abrogate the
States’ sovereign immunity from suit under Title I of the ADA but further held that the defendant
had waived its sovereign immunity for the ADA claim when it removed the case to federal court.
See id. at 1203-06. As the instant case is indistinguishable from the Estes case, the Court finds that
the University waived its sovereign immunity for the ADA claim when it removed this case to this
Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff’s ADA claim should not be dismissed.
F.

Punitive damages

In her response, plaintiff concedes to dismiss her claims for punitive damages. Accordingly,
the Court finds that defendants’ motion to dismiss as to punitive damages is now moot.
IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss [docket no. 7] as to plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim, OADA claim, FMLA claim, and
ADA claim and FINDS defendants’ Motion to Dismiss MOOT as to plaintiff’s Title VII race
discrimination claim and punitive damages claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 13th day of April, 2016.

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