Myers et al v. Wells Fargo Bank NA

Filing 20

ORDER granting 13 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 9/30/2016. (mb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DONNY W. MYERS and
BRENDA J. MYERS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Trustee for Certificate Holders
of Bears Stearns Asset-Backed
Securities Trust 2005-1, AssetBacked Certificates, Series
2005-1,
Defendant.

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Case No. CIV-16-663-D

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc.
No. 13]. Plaintiffs have filed their response in opposition [Doc. No. 17].1 The
matter is fully briefed and at issue.

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Because Plaintiffs appear pro se, the Court construes their filings liberally. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); United States v. Pinson,
584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). The Court, however, cannot take on the
responsibility of serving as Plaintiffs’ attorney in constructing arguments and
searching the record. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840
(10th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the Court “will not supply additional factual
allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a
plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir.
1997) (citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)).

BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2006, Defendant filed its petition for foreclosure, alleging
Plaintiffs defaulted on a note held by Defendant and thereby entitling it to
foreclose on the subject property. On June 22, 2007, Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment was granted, in part due to Plaintiffs’ failure to respond to the
motion, and judgment was entered in its favor. Plaintiffs filed several motions to
vacate, challenging Defendant’s standing to pursue the foreclosure claim.2 Each
motion was overruled. On October 1, 2014, Plaintiffs appealed to the Oklahoma
Court of Civil Appeals, and on September 24, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s decision. In its order, the court noted that Plaintiffs admitted
Defendant was the present holder and had the right to enforce the note, and such
issue was not in dispute when the trial court granted summary judgment to
Defendant. The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied certiorari.
On June 16, 2016, approximately nine years after the journal entry of
judgment was entered, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court, raising the same
arguments they urged in the underlying state action. See Compl. at 2-3 (“The
Judgment rendered by the Canadian County Court El Reno, Oklahoma is a [v]oid
[judgment]. . . . An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. has absolutely no interest in this action
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The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals noted that, since 2010, Plaintiffs had
attempted to vacate the Journal Entry of Judgment six times.
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whatsoever.” Indeed, Plaintiffs even cite Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as a basis for relief, which governs requests for relief from a judgment
or order. Compl. at 3.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint and
contends Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted
because (1) there is already a final state court judgment directly related to the
foreclosure action referenced in the Complaint and Plaintiffs’ claims are therefore
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine;3 (2) Plaintiff’s challenge to Defendant’s
standing to foreclose has already been reduced to judgment in the state district
court and such claims are therefore barred by the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, and (3) the Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim for
relief. Mot. to Dismiss at 7-8.
STANDARD OF DECISION
To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine involves subject-matter jurisdiction, which the
court can raise on its own. See PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193
(10th Cir. 2010). Thus, Defendant’s argument in this respect falls more properly
under Rule 12(b)(1), which governs challenges to subject matter jurisdiction.
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alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).
Under this standard, “the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this
plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.”
Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007)
(emphasis in original).
DISCUSSION
The Court has reviewed the Complaint, as well as the relevant pleadings
from the underlying state court proceedings, and finds Defendant’s motion should
be granted. “Generally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal
courts ‘from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over claims actually
decided by a state court and claims inextricably intertwined with a prior state-court
judgment.’” PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010)
(citing Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006)). “The
Supreme Court recently clarified the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, stating that it is ‘confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine
acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’”
Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). Consequently, as a general matter, “federal courts do not interfere in state
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court foreclosure proceedings.” Houey v. Carolina First Bank, 890 F. Supp. 2d
611, 620 (W.D.N.C. 2012).
Plaintiffs unquestionably seek review and rejection of the state court
foreclosure proceedings. As noted above, their Complaint challenges Defendant’s
standing to foreclose the subject property, Compl. at 3, as well as the validity of
Defendant’s documentation to foreclose. Id. at 4 (“Plaintiff, homeowner, disputes
the Assignment of Mortgage which assigns the Note, Deed of Trust, and Mortgage
of the real property (the ‘Home’), which is the subject of this action[.]).” Plaintiffs
allege Defendant used fraudulent tactics in its pursuit of the subject property. Id. at
17-21. Plaintiffs also allege their due process rights were violated during the course
of the foreclosure proceedings and Defendant’s actions constituted intentional
infliction of emotional distress and slander of title. Id. at 25-29. These claims are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the Court finds the Complaint should
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Even assuming the Court were to find jurisdiction exists, Plaintiffs’ claims
would still be barred under the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.
See Kemper v. LPR Const. Co., 271 F. App’x 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished) (“Attempts merely to seek relief denied in state court – to relitigate a
state case – are properly dismissed on grounds of res judicata or collateral
estoppel.”); Yancey v. Thomas, 441 F. App’x 552, 557 (10th Cir. 2011)
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(unpublished) (“Under Oklahoma law, ‘[t]he principle of res judicata as claim
preclusion teaches that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties from relitigating not only the adjudicated claim, but also any theories or
issues that were actually decided, or could have been decided, in that action.’”)
(citing Read v. Read, 2001 OK 87, ¶ 15, 57 P.3d 561, 567 n. 18); compare Houey,
890 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (holding that doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded
relitigation of issues determined in state court foreclosure action).
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 13] is GRANTED as set forth
herein. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is hereby dismissed without prejudice. See Brereton
v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ismissals for
lack of jurisdiction should be without prejudice because the court, having
determined that it lacks jurisdiction over the action, is incapable of reaching a
disposition on the merits of the underlying claims.”) (emphasis added, citations
omitted). Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike [Doc. No. 17] and Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 19] are DENIED. A judgment shall be entered
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of September, 2016.

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