Singer Oil Company LLC v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent Inc et al

Filing 176

ORDER denying 169 plaintiff's Motion to Review Clerk's Cost Determination (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 6/7/2018. (ks)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
SINGER OIL COMPANY, LLC, an
Oklahoma limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION
MID-CONTINENT, INC., a foreign
corporation domesticated to do business
in Oklahoma; and
HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES,
INC., a foreign corporation domesticated
to do business in Oklahoma,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-16-768-M

ORDER
Before the Court is plaintiff’s Motion to Review Clerk’s Cost Determination, filed January
18, 2018. On January 25, 2018, defendant Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (“Halliburton”) filed
its response, and on February 5, 2018, defendant Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent Inc.
(“Newfield”) filed its response. Based upon the parties’ submissions, the Court makes its
determination.
On October 6, 2017, the Court granted Halliburton’s motion for summary judgment. On
November 20, 2017, the Court entered judgment in favor of Halliburton and against plaintiff.
Additionally, this case was tried to a jury from November 8, 2017 through November 15, 2017.
After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against Newfield on
plaintiff’s private nuisance claim, negligence claim, and breach of contract claim and awarded
damages in the amount of $257,000.00. On November 20, 2017, the Court entered judgment
consistent with the jury’s verdict. On November 29, 2017, plaintiff filed a Bill of Costs, and

Halliburton filed a Bill of Costs. On January 11, 2018, the Clerk of Court taxed $3,459.01 in costs
in favor of Halliburton and against plaintiff and taxed $6,755.40 in costs in favor of plaintiff and
against Newfield.
Plaintiff now moves this Court to review the Clerk of Court’s taxation of costs.
Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the Clerk erred in granting Halliburton a cost award because
Halliburton was not a prevailing party entitled to costs. Further, in relation to the costs taxed
against Newfield, plaintiff asserts the Clerk erred in failing to grant the entirety of plaintiff’s
prevailing party cost claim otherwise allowed under applicable Oklahoma law.
I.

Halliburton’s Costs
Plaintiff asserts that because Halliburton jointly made an offer to confess judgment with

Newfield and because at trial plaintiff was awarded damages against Newfield in an amount greater
than the offer to confess judgment, Halliburton is not a prevailing party. Plaintiff, however, cites
to absolutely no case law to support its assertion. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, as
well as Oklahoma’s statutory and case law, the Court finds that plaintiff’s assertion is without
merit. Even if two defendants make a joint offer to confess judgment, when determining whether
a defendant is a prevailing party, that defendant must be viewed individually. In the case at bar,
judgment was rendered in favor of Halliburton and against plaintiff. See November 20, 2017
Judgment [docket no. 135]. Thus, the Court finds that Halliburton is the prevailing party and was
entitled to an award of costs. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Clerk of Court did not err in
granting Halliburton a cost award.
II.

Plaintiff’s Costs
Plaintiff asserts that the Clerk of Court’s cost determination is too low and is contrary to

law. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the Clerk should have followed substantive Oklahoma law

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and that pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1101.1, plaintiff is entitled to a wide range of reasonably
allowable costs, specifically expert witness fees.1
Because federal procedural law governs the taxation of costs, any
discretion afforded the trial court would arise under federal law,
namely Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), and not under state law. That discretion
is constrained by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920. Crawford Fitting
Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 107 S.Ct. at 2498-99. In the absence of an
explicit statutory authorization, a trial court has no discretion under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) to tax the actual costs of expert witness fees. Id.
Chaparral Res., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 849 F.2d 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 1988).
While Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1101.1 makes the award of reasonable litigation costs
mandatory, and thus provides statutory authority, any state law which provides for an award of
expert witness fees is preempted by federal statute, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1821. “Congress has
definitely prescribed its own requirement with respect to the fees of witnesses. The Congress has
dealt with the subject comprehensively, and has made no exception of the fees of expert witnesses.
Its legislation must be deemed controlling, and excludes the application in the federal courts of
any different state practice.” Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 444, 447 (1932)
(citations omitted). Thus, the Court finds that the actual costs of expert witness fees may not be
taxed as costs. The Court, therefore, finds the Clerk of Court did not err in failing to award costs
for expert witness fees in this case.

Upon review of plaintiff’s motion, it appears that the only specific costs plaintiff alleges should
have been awarded are plaintiff’s expert witness fees.
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III.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s Motion to Review Clerk’s

Cost Determination [docket no. 169].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of June, 2018.

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