Singer Oil Company LLC v. Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent Inc et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part plaintiffs Motion to Recover AttorneyFees 144 and 147 (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Vicki Miles-LaGrange on 6/8/2018. (ks)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
SINGER OIL COMPANY, LLC, an
Oklahoma limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION
MID-CONTINENT, INC., a foreign
corporation domesticated to do business
in Oklahoma; and
HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES,
INC., a foreign corporation domesticated
to do business in Oklahoma,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-16-768-M
ORDER
Before the Court is plaintiff’s First Amended with Correct Affidavit Motion to Recover
Attorney Fees, filed December 1, 2017. On December 15, 2017, defendant Newfield Exploration
Mid-Continent Inc. (“Newfield”) filed its response. On January 2, 2018, plaintiff filed its reply,
and on January 26, 2018, Newfield filed its surreply. Based upon the parties’ submissions, the
Court makes its determination.
In this case, plaintiff alleged that one of its vertical wells had been impacted by the
completion of a horizontal well owned and operated by Newfield. This case was tried to a jury
from November 8, 2017 through November 15, 2017. After deliberation, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of plaintiff and against Newfield on plaintiff’s private nuisance claim, negligence
claim, and breach of contract claim and awarded damages in the amount of $257,000.00. On
November 20, 2017, the Court entered judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff now
moves this Court to award it attorney fees in the amount of $226,990.50.1
“The right to recover attorneys’ fees is substantive and therefore determined by state law
in diversity cases.” Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 26 F.3d 1508, 1520 (10th Cir. 1994)
(internal citation omitted). Under Oklahoma law, attorney fees may be awarded only when
authorized by statute or under the terms of an enforceable contract. See Burrows Constr. Co. v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Stephens Cty., 704 P.2d 1136, 1137 n.2 (Okla. 1985). Okla. Stat. tit. 12,
§ 940(A) provides:
In any civil action to recover damages for the negligent or willful
injury to property and any other incidental costs related to such
action, the prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable attorney’s
fees, court costs and interest to be set by the court and to be taxed
and collected as other costs of the action.
Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 940(A). Newfield does not dispute that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees
pursuant to § 940(A) based upon plaintiff prevailing on its negligence claim.
Regarding an award of attorney fees, the amount of fees must be grounded on the
touchstone of reasonableness. Under Oklahoma law, the reasonableness of attorney fees is
determined using the following Burk2 factors: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions presented, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the
customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client
or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience,
In its surreply, Newfield states that its counsel had several conversations with plaintiff’s counsel
and that plaintiff has agreed to reduce its request to remove time entries incurred for other cases,
as well as a few other minor items which were initially included, and this agreement reduces
plaintiff’s fee request to $226,990.50.
2
State ex rel. Burk v. City of Okla. City, 598 P.2d 659 (Okla. 1979).
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reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. See Burk,
598 P.2d at 661.
Newfield does not object to the reasonableness of plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate of $275.
Newfield, however, does object to the number of hours expended by plaintiff’s counsel. Newfield
contends that the amount of hours expended by plaintiff’s counsel is excessive. Newfield further
contends that certain categories of time for which plaintiff is seeking attorney fees are not
recoverable.
First, Newfield asserts that plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees for time incurred in
unsuccessfully pursuing claims against defendant Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
(“Halliburton”). On October 6, 2017, the Court granted Halliburton’s motion for summary
judgment. On November 20, 2017, the Court entered judgment in favor of Halliburton and against
plaintiff.
A defendant should not be required to compensate a plaintiff for
attorney hours devoted to the case against other defendants . . . who
are found not to be liable.
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Because Halliburton is a separate defendant who prevailed in this case, the Court finds
that plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees for any time incurred by plaintiff’s counsel in pursuing
plaintiff’s claims against Halliburton. Having reviewed plaintiff’s attorney’s time entries, the
Court finds plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees for the 48.74 hours ($13,403.50) plaintiff’s
counsel spent solely working on plaintiff’s claims against Halliburton.
Second, Newfield asserts that plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees for the majority of time
incurred before the lawsuit began. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that
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plaintiff is only entitled to recover attorney fees for the time incurred before the lawsuit began that
directly relates to the filing of this litigation. Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s attorney’s time
entries, the Court finds plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees for the 10.01 hours ($2,752.75)
plaintiff’s counsel spent before the lawsuit began on matters not directly related to the filing of
this litigation.
Third, Newfield asserts that plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees for its voluntarily
dismissed ultrahazardous claim. In the parties’ Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice of
Plaintiff’s Ultrahazardous and Inherently Dangerous Activity Claim for Strict Liability [docket no.
50], the parties state that all parties are to bear their own attorney fees in relation to this claim.
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff may not recover attorney fees for any time spent on its
ultrahazardous claim. Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s attorney’s time entries, the Court finds
plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees for the 11.5 hours ($3,162.50) plaintiff’s counsel spent on
plaintiff’s ultrahazardous claim.
Fourth, Newfield asserts that plaintiff cannot recover attorney fees for time incurred
learning about the law. The Tenth Circuit has held:
time spent reading background material designed to familiarize an
attorney with an area of law is presumptively unreasonable. When
counsel is inexperienced, a losing party should not be obligated to
pay for that counsel’s legal education.
Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff may not recover attorney fees for any time spent by its
counsel familiarizing himself with an area of law. Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s attorney’s
time entries, the Court finds plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees for the 12.6 hours ($3,465.00)
plaintiff’s counsel spent familiarizing himself with areas of law.
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Fifth, Newfield asserts that a small number of plaintiff’s counsel’s time entries for
conferences and/or mediations do not reflect the actual amount of time spent at the conferences
and/or mediations. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that these
entries should be reduced. Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s attorney’s time entries, the Court
finds that the award of attorney fees should be reduced by 12.17 hours ($3,346.75).
Finally, Newfield asserts that the apportionment rule forbids plaintiff from recovering for
fees incurred in pursuing its failed claims and non-fee bearing claims. Under Oklahoma law,
[i]n a case involving multiple claims where prevailing party attorney
fees are authorized for only one claim, the law dictates that the court
“apportion” the fees so that attorney fees are awarded only for the
claim for which there is authority to make the award.
Tsotaddle v. Absentee Shawnee Hous. Auth., 20 P.3d 153, 162 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000). Further,
“Oklahoma does not have an ‘inextricably intertwined’ theory upon which attorney fees do not
have to be apportioned if the claims are closely related.” Combs v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 551 F.3d
991, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 2008). Finally, “[a]n attorneys’ fee applicant bears the burden of proving
that the time and labor for which he seeks compensation are reasonable and that they relate to a
claim for which fees are recoverable.” Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d
1533, 1553 (10th Cir. 1996).
As set forth above, plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees only as to its negligence claim
against Newfield. Accordingly, the Court must apportion the fees so that attorney fees are awarded
only for plaintiff’s negligence claim. Further, plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the attorney
fees it seeks are related to its negligence claim.
Having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that plaintiff, in neither
its motion nor its reply, has set forth a sufficient apportionment of the requested attorney fees so
that attorney fees will be awarded only for plaintiff’s negligence claim and that this Court,
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therefore, must apportion the requested fees. In addition to the reductions set forth above, the
Court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorney fees for any time spent on its failed
claims and non-fee bearing claims.3 Having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s attorney’s time entries,
the Court finds plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees for the 44.43 hours ($12,218.25) plaintiff’s
counsel spent on plaintiff’s failed claims and non-fee bearing claims.
Additionally, having reviewed plaintiff’s counsel’s time entries, the Court finds plaintiff
has failed to meet its burden of proving that all of the attorney fees it seeks are related to its
negligence claim. The Court finds that while a great deal of discovery, pretrial work, trial
preparation, and trial time would involve issues that related to plaintiff’s negligence claim, as well
as plaintiff’s other claims, there would be some issues, and hence time spent on these issues, which
would only relate to plaintiff’s failed claims and non-fee bearing claims. Plaintiff has made no
real attempt to apportion the time entries, i.e., reducing the amount by a certain percentage, to
account for these issues. Accordingly, in light of the above, the Court finds that a general 15%
reduction will be used to further apportion to account for time spent on failed claims and non-fee
bearing claims.4
In its motion for attorney fees, plaintiff requests, as a form of equitable fee enhancement,
that an hourly rate of $400 be applied to plaintiff’s counsel, instead of plaintiff’s counsel’s typical
hourly rate of $275. Upon review of the parties’ submissions, and being intimately familiar with
The Court would note that not all the time spent in relation to the parties’ Consent and Release
Agreement should be excluded. Throughout this litigation, Newfield argued that based upon the
Consent and Release Agreement, plaintiff could only bring a breach of contract claim and could
not assert its negligence claim. Any time spent responding to this argument would be compensable
as it directly impacts the viability of plaintiff’s negligence claim.
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Based upon the above reductions, the total attorney fees is $188,641.75. The general 15%
reduction will be taken from this amount and results in a total attorney fee award of $160,345.49.
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this case and the work of counsel in this case, the Court finds that plaintiff’s requested
enhancement is not appropriate.
Finally, having carefully reviewed the parties’ submissions, and having considered all of
the Burk factors, the Court finds that an award of attorney fees in the amount of $160,345.49 is
reasonable. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART plaintiff’s Motion to Recover Attorney
Fees [docket nos. 144 and 147] and AWARDS plaintiff its attorneys’ fees against defendant
Newfield Exploration Mid-Continent Inc. in the amount of $160,345.49.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of June, 2018.
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