Guthrie v. Hall et al

Filing 57

ORDER granting 37 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 11/19/2018. (mb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
OTIS ANDRE GUTHRIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CPL DANIEL T. HALL,
BADGE 342, individually,
and CITY OF MUSTANG,
Defendants.

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Case No.: CIV-16-1148-D

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants CPL Daniel T. Hall (“CPL Hall”)
and City of Mustang’s (“Mustang”) Motion for Summary Judgement [Doc. No. 37].
Plaintiff Otis Andre Guthrie (“Guthrie”) has filed his Response [Doc. No. 51] and
Defendants have Replied [Doc. No. 54]. 1 The matter is fully briefed and at issue.
This lawsuit arises from a traffic stop of Guthrie by CPL Hall. Guthrie received
tickets for speeding and an expired tag and was arrested for driving under the influence.
Guthrie alleges that CPL Hall violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in
that: (1) CPL Hall did not have reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop; (2) there was

1

Guthrie filed a corrected Response [Doc. No. 51] subsequent to filing an incorrectly saved
version [Doc. No. 49]. The originally filed version [Doc. No. 49] included the Declaration
of Otis Andre Guthrie [Doc. 49-1]. Guthrie’s declaration was not attached to the corrected
Response [Doc. No. 51]. However, because both the Response [Doc. No. 51] and
Defendants’ Reply reference it, the Court accepts the declaration as if it were attached
correctly.

no probable cause for the arrest; (3) CPL Hall discriminated against him based on his race;
and (4) CPL Hall subjected him to malicious prosecution. Complaint [Doc. No. 1] at 7, 8,
10-13. Guthrie alleges that Mustang violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Complaint at 13-14. Guthrie brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant
CPL Hall asserts he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity,
and Defendant Mustang moves for summary judgment. The following material facts are
undisputed and, along with all reasonable inferences, are viewed in the light most favorable
to Guthrie.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
CPL Hall observed Guthrie driving his pickup truck traveling eastbound in the area
of the 2200 block of E. S.H. 152 in the City of Mustang on October 4, 2014. CPL Hall
estimated Guthrie’s speed as 53 mph in a 45 mph zone. When CPL Hall’s RADAR
indicated Guthrie’s speed was 56 mph, he initiated a traffic stop. During the traffic stop,
Hall noticed the smell of alcohol and observed Guthrie to have slurred speech and
bloodshot, watery eyes. Based on these observations, CPL Hall asked Guthrie if he had
consumed any alcohol and Guthrie answered in the affirmative.
CPL Hall then conducted various field sobriety tests. First, he administered the
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) test and observed Nystagmus in both eyes. Next,
CPL Hall started to administer a walk and turn test but stopped when Guthrie informed
him of his medical condition and vertigo. Guthrie was then asked to perform the one-leg
stand test and CPL Hall determined that he did not successfully complete the test. Guthrie
admits in his deposition that he did not complete the one-leg test as directed. Based on
2 

Guthrie’s admission of having consumed alcohol, the odor of alcohol, Guthrie’s slurred
speech and bloodshot watery eyes, and Guthrie’s performance during the field sobriety
tests, CPL Hall determined that Guthrie was intoxicated. CPL Hall arrested Guthrie for
driving under the influence of alcohol, excessive speed, and an expired license tag.
At the time of the traffic stop, Guthrie had a passenger, Michael Eugene Young
(“Young”), a white male. Guthrie indicated it would be acceptable for CPL Hall to allow
Young to drive his truck from the scene. Before he was allowed to do so, Young was asked
if he had consumed any alcohol and answered that he had had four beers. CPL Hall
administered the HGN test and observed no Nystagmus. Based on the HGN test and the
lack of strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, or slurred speech, CPL Hall determined that
Young was not intoxicated and released Guthrie’s vehicle to Young.
Guthrie was then transported to the Mustang City Jail, booked and offered a
Intoxilyzer test which he refused to take. On October 5, 2014, Guthrie was released from
the Mustang City Jail. Guthrie demanded a jury trial in the municipal court and on April
9, 2015, the Mustang Municipal Court dismissed Guthrie’s case and transferred it to the
Canadian County District Court for prosecution. On June 1, 2015, an Information was
filed in Canadian County, Oklahoma District Court charging Guthrie with driving under
the influence, speeding, and driving with an expired tag. On February 10, 2016, the charges
were dismissed.
STANDARD OF DECISION
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
3 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Winton, 818 F. 3d 1103,
1105 (10th Cir. 2016). “An issue is ‘genuine’ if there is sufficient evidence on each side
so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way” and “[a]n issue of fact is
‘material’ if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). If the
movant carries the burden of demonstrating an absence of a dispute as to material fact, “the
nonmovant must then go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts” that would be
admissible in evidence and that show a genuine issue for trial.” Martin v. City of Oklahoma
City, 180 F. Supp. 3d 978, 983 (W.D. Okla. 2016) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106
S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144
F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir.1998).)
The Court's inquiry must be whether the evidence, when viewed “through the
prism of the substantive evidentiary burden,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, “presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. Although the Court views all
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party at the summary judgement stage,
“there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
“[I]n opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party ‘cannot rest
on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion.’” Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d
4 

1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir.
1988)). The nonmoving party “must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a
properly supported motion for summary judgment. This is true even where the evidence is
likely to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff has had a full
opportunity to conduct discovery.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.
DISCUSSION
Guthrie brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 9183 based on violations of his Fourth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.
Specifically, Guthrie alleges that CPL Hall violated his Fourth Amendment rights to
freedom from unreasonable seizure, warrantless arrest without probable cause, and
malicious prosecution. Complaint [Doc. No. 1] at ¶ 58, 60 and 62. He alleges violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law on the grounds that he was
treated differently than his white passenger. Complaint at ¶ 60. Guthrie further alleges
that Mustang violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Complaint at ¶ 66.
I.

Qualified Immunity
The purpose of qualified immunity is “to insulate public officials ‘from undue

interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.’” Swanson
v. Town of Mountain View, Colo., 577 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified
immunity is intended to “protect ‘government officials performing discretionary functions’
and shield[] them from ‘liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
5 

have known.’” Id. (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). “The protection of qualified
immunity applies regardless of whether the government official's error is ‘a mistake of law,
a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” Pearson, 555
U.S. at 231 (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d
1068 (2004) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507,
98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), for the proposition that qualified immunity covers
“mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law”)).
CPL Hall asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to Guthrie’s
Constitutional claims against him. In order to establish a §1983 claim against an individual
defendant asserting a qualified immunity defense, Guthrie bears the burden of
demonstrating facts that: (1) “make out a violation of a constitutional right” and (2) “the
right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009);
see Martin v. City of Oklahoma City, 180 F. Supp. 3d 978, 986 (W.D. Okla. 2016).
The pertinent question is whether “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional
right?” Koch v. City of Del City, CIV-07-371-D, 2010 WL 1329819, at *5 (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 29, 2010), aff'd, Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). Although the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, the “record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his
heavy two-part burden; otherwise, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”
Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir.2001). Summary judgment based on
6 

qualified immunity is appropriate if the law did not put the “officer on notice that his
conduct would be clearly unlawful.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir.
2007).
A. Traffic Stop
The Tenth Circuit recognizes that “[a] traffic stop is justified at its inception if an
officer has (1) probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, or (2) a reasonable
articulable suspicion that a particular motorist has violated any of the traffic or equipment
regulations of the jurisdiction.” United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir.
2009). “A reasonable suspicion analysis is based upon the ‘totality of the circumstances,’
and ‘officers [may] draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that
might well elude an untrained person.’” Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198,
1206–07 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct.
744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted in original).
“[T]he likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause,
and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.”
Vondrak, 535 F.3d at 1207. Stated more simply, “reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” United States
v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).
Although Guthrie’s Complaint asserts that CPL Hall lacked reasonable suspicion to
initiate the traffic stop, Guthrie’s Response argues only that CPL Hall violated his Fourth
7 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by initiating a traffic stop without probable cause.2
[Doc. No. 51] at 16-17. CPL Hall asserts in his Motion that the traffic stop was justified
because he had reasonable suspicion. CPL Hall need only demonstrate either probable
cause or reasonable suspicion. See Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134. The undisputed facts in
this case demonstrate that CPL Hall did have reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation at
the time he stopped Guthrie.
CPL Hall’s sworn declaration states that he observed Guthrie’s “pickup truck
traveling eastbound” in the 2200 block of E. S.H. 152 and that he:
estimated the speed of the truck to be about 53 mph in a posted 45 mph zone.
I activated the RADAR unit in my patrol car which indicated the speed of
the truck to be 56 mph with a clear and steady tone, which can be heard in
the dash-cam video.
Declaration of Daniel T. Hall [Doc. No. 37-1] at ¶ 4. Observed speeding is a reasonable
articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Winder, 557 F.3d at 1135 (citing Mecham v.
Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007). Likewise, a visual estimate of speed and/or
RADAR readings are sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. U.S. v.

2

Guthrie also argues for the first time in his Response that the traffic stop for speeding was
pretextual, as CPL Hall stopped him only after observing his race. Response at 16. The
Complaint asserts a Fourteenth Amendment violation based on Guthrie’s allegedly
different treatment from that of his white passenger. Because a pretext claim related to the
initial traffic stop is not raised in his Complaint, the court will not address it. However, the
Court notes that the dash-cam video [Doc. No. 37-3] unequivocally demonstrates that
Guthrie’s race cannot be discerned from the time his vehicle is first caught on camera
through the pursuit and until Guthrie is pulled over. No reasonable jury could view the
video and determine that CPL Hall could identify Guthrie’s race prior to pulling him over.
8 

Ludwig, 641 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Circuit 2011); U.S. v. Vercher, 358 F.3d 1257, 1262-63
(10th Circuit 2011).
To refute this evidence, Guthrie simply asserts that he was not speeding and that
CPL Hall cannot produce evidence of the RADAR reading. 3 Response at 16. Guthrie
points to his declaration in which he attests, “I was not speeding.” Declaration of Otis
Andre Guthrie [Doc. No. 49-1] at ¶ 10. However, the question for purposes of the
constitutionality of the traffic stop and whether CPL Hall is entitled to qualified immunity
regarding that stop is not whether Guthrie was actually speeding but whether CPL Hall
had reasonable suspicion that Guthrie was speeding. “An officer's reasonable mistake of
fact does not a constitutional violation make.” United States v. Cunningham, 630 Fed.
Appx. 873, 876 (10th Cir. 2015).
The Tenth Circuit has observed that “reasonable suspicion may exist even if it is
more likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” Mocek v. City of
Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 923 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. McHugh, 639

3

Guthrie makes much about the lack of dash-cam video evidence of the RADAR reading,
stating without evidentiary support that CPL Hall’s statement regarding the RADAR
reading is false. Response at 6-7. CPL Hall attests in his sworn declaration that the
“RADAR readings are not reflected on the dash-cam video because the City’s RADAR
units are not connected to the patrol cars’ dash-cam recording systems.” CPL Hall
Declaration at ¶22. Guthrie presents no evidence to refute this. Instead, Guthrie simply
asserts that CPL Hall’s statement is untrue. Response at 7. Guthrie has had ample
opportunity to conduct discovery as to the RADAR unit but instead relies on his own
unsupported assertions that the L-3 Mobile-Vision Inc., system in CPL Hall’s patrol
vehicle “records the dash cam, radar information, speed and other information.” Guthrie
Declaration at ¶12.

9 

F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted in original). As noted
in Winder, “[p]olice errors, in this context, are simply unavoidable, as reasonable suspicion
involves ‘probabilities’ rather than ‘hard certainties.’” Winder, 557 F.3d at 1134 (citing
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. 690); see also, Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1120
(10th Cir.2007) (“Law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that
probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.”).4
The burden is on Guthrie to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate CPL Hall
did not have reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and, therefore, violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by stopping him. Guthrie has failed to meet his burden. CPL Hall is
entitled to qualified immunity as to Guthrie’s Fourth Amendment claims arising from the
initial traffic stop for speeding.
B. Sobriety Tests
CPL Hall asserts qualified immunity in connection with the sobriety tests he
conducted on Guthrie. Defendants are correct in noting that despite CPL Hall’s reasonable
suspicion justifying the traffic stop for speeding, reasonable suspicion is likewise required
to justify the sobriety tests. As with the traffic stop for speeding, Guthrie bears the burden
of demonstrating there is insufficient evidence that CPL Hall had reasonable suspicion of
intoxication to justify the field sobriety tests. In opposition to CPL Hall’s assertion of

4

The Court notes that Guthrie admits in his deposition that he does not know how fast he
was driving. Guthrie Deposition at 141, lns 22-23. In Wilson, 66 Fed.Appx. at 795, n.5,
the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that “less than definitive knowledge [that] [does] not cast
sufficient doubt on what the officer reasonably believed at the time,” may be insufficient
to avoid summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
10 

qualified immunity, Guthrie admits he “had half a beer that afternoon” and simply argues
without evidentiary support that CPL Hall could not have smelled alcohol on his breath.
Response at 19; Guthrie Declaration at ¶ 22.
The Tenth Circuit held in Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198, 1207 (10th
Cir. 2008), that a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity in conducting field
sobriety tests where the only factual basis for the officer conducting the tests was a
plaintiff’s “statement that he ‘had one beer three hours ago.’” As in Vondrak, it is
undisputed that Guthrie admitted consuming alcohol. Doc. No. 49-1 at ¶ 22. Based on
Vondrak, Guthrie’s admission alone gave CPL Hall reasonable suspicion to conduct the
sobriety tests. However, CPL Hall has presented additional uncontroverted evidence
beyond Guthrie’s admission. CPL Hall attests that he also smelled alcohol on Guthrie’s
breath during his investigation of Guthrie’s alleged speeding. Guthrie’s unsupported
assertion that CPL Hall “could not have possibly smelled alcohol on Plaintiff” is
insufficient to controvert CPL Hall’s sworn declaration. Response at 18.
Accordingly, CPL Hall is entitled to qualified immunity as to the field sobriety tests
and Defendants’ Motion is granted.
C. The Arrest
“When a warrantless arrest is the subject of a § 1983 action, the officer is entitled to
qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed
to make the arrest.” Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's Dept., 500 F.3d 1185, 1191
(10th Cir.2007); York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Robertson, 500 F.3d at 1191). “Probable cause to arrest exists only when the ‘facts and
11 

circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.’” United States v.
Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Untied States v. Edwards, 242
F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir. 2001). The burden is on Guthrie to show that “it would have been
clear to a reasonable officer that probable cause was lacking under the circumstances.”
Martin v. City of Oklahoma City, 180 F.Supp.3d 978, 990 (W.D. Okla. 2016) (quoting
Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Circuit 2012) (internal quotation omitted)).
However, “[p]robable cause does not require facts sufficient for a finding of guilt.”
Valenzuela, 365 F.3d at 896 (quoting United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1088 (10th
Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted in original). In assessing “whether probable
cause to arrest exists, the [Court] evaluate[s] ... the circumstances as they would have
appeared to prudent, cautious and trained police officers.” United States v. Chavez, 660
F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051
(10th Cir.1999) (quotation omitted in original); see also, Trujillo v. Rio Arriba Cty. ex rel.
Rio Arriba Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 319 F.R.D. 571, 628 (D.N.M. 2016) (“The probable cause
inquiry depends on ‘facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.’”) (quoting
J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo Cty., CIV 12-0128 JB/LAM, 2014 WL 3421037, at *101
(D.N.M. July 8, 2014), aff'd, J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo Cty., 806 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir.
2015) (quoting Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Guthrie argues that CPL Hall lacked probable cause based on the following
assertions: (1) his eyes were not bloodshot and watery; (2) the dash-cam video
12 

demonstrates his speech was not slurred; (3) CPL Hall did not consider Guthrie’s medical
conditions during his administration of the sobriety tests; and, (4) there is no corroborating
evidence to support CPL Hall’s sworn declaration that he failed the HGN sobriety test.
Response at 19-20. Examination of the uncontroverted evidence reveals that Guthrie has
failed to present any evidence to support these assertions, and fails to establish CPL Hall
lacked probable cause for the arrest.
CPL Hall attests in his declaration that Guthrie’s eyes were bloodshot and watery.
CPL Hall Declaration at ¶ 7; Motion at 2 (Material Fact No. 5). Guthrie states in his
Response that his own declaration contests this fact. However, upon review of Guthrie’s
declaration, the Court finds no such testimony. Plaintiff fails to cite any evidence to
effectively controvert CPL Hall’s evidence as to his bloodshot and watery eyes.
Uncontested facts are deemed admitted. See LCvR 56.1(e) (Stating that “material facts set
forth in the statement of materials facts of the movant may be deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the nonmovant using the
procedures set forth in this rule.”).
Next, Guthrie asserts the dash-cam video demonstrates his voice was not slurred.
After reviewing the dash-cam video, the Court finds the video is not dispositive as to the
nature of Guthrie’s speech. Reasonable jurors could disagree upon viewing the video.
However, the dash-cam video evidence, as well as CPL Hall’s sworn declaration, clearly
establish that CPL Hall did, in fact, consider Guthrie’s medical condition and medication
during the administration of the sobriety tests. CPL Hall Declaration at ¶ 15; Dash-Cam
Video at 00:19:46. CPL Hall altered his course in conducting the sobriety test when
13 

Guthrie informed him of his medical condition and ended the “walk and turn” part of the
test prior to its completion. CPL Hall Declaration at ¶ 15; Dash-Cam Video at 00:19:46 –
00:19:57.
“Awareness of a disability does not, however, necessarily vitiate probable cause,”
it merely “‘inform[s] the probable cause calculus.” Trujillo, 319 F.R.D. at 632 (internal
quotations omitted). The Trujillo court determined that probable cause existed for an
arrest, despite the effects of a disability on specific sobriety tests, based on the “smell of
alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, [the] admission to drinking two beers, and [the]
failure of the HGN test.” Id. As in this case, “[t]here is no evidence that Trujillo's disability
affected these observations, unlike the walk and turn test.” Id. Guthrie makes no assertion
that his blood pressure and vertigo affected the state of his eyes, the smell of his breath, or
his failure of the one-leg stand and HGN tests.5
The Tenth Circuit has found probable cause even where a medical condition was
determined post-arrest to be the actual cause of the arrestee’s intoxication indicators. Rife
v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety, 854 F.3d 637, 643, 645 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied
sub nom. Dale v. Rife, 138 S. Ct. 364, 199 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017), and cert. denied sub nom.
Jefferson v. Rife, 138 S. Ct. 364, 199 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2017). In Rife, the Tenth Circuit,
considering all of the other tests and observations, held that an officer could reasonably
conclude that the arrestee was intoxicated and that probable cause existed even though a
suspect’s symptoms of a medical condition mimicked those of intoxication. Rife, 854 F.3d

5

Guthrie admits that he did not complete the one-leg stand test as directed. Guthrie
Declaration at ¶ 31.
14 

at 646. As in Trujillo, the sobriety tests and observed indicia of intoxication were sufficient
for purposes of determining probable cause. Id.
Finally, Guthrie’s reliance on a lack of evidence corroborating CPL Hall’s sworn
declaration that he failed the HGN test, is misplaced. As noted, some aspects of CPL Hall’s
declaration do find corroboration, such as what CPL Hall was able to observe prior to the
stop, the use of the Radar devise and its indicator tones, and the administration of certain
field sobriety tests.

Nevertheless, Guthrie bears the burden to “present affirmative

evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 257. CPL Hall’s declaration as to the failure of the HGN test is not effectively
controverted.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that: (1) CPL Hall detected the odor of alcohol on
Guthrie’s breath; (2) CPL Hall observed Guthrie’s eyes to be bloodshot and watery; (3)
Guthrie admitted he consumed alcohol; (4) Guthrie failed at least two sobriety tests; and,
(5) CPL Hall considered Guthrie’s medical condition during the sobriety tests. Based on
these facts alone, the Court finds that probable cause existed to arrest Guthrie for driving
under the influence of alcohol. In fact, probable cause has been found based on a less
robust factual record. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-69, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (finding "there was plainly probable cause" to arrest a driver who
smelled of alcohol and had bloodshot watery eyes.); Chavez, 660 F.3d at 1224 (admission
of consuming alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, and failed sobriety tests were sufficient
to establish probable cause).

15 

Based on the totality of the circumstances, CPL Hall had probable cause to arrest
Guthrie for driving while intoxicated. Therefore, Guthrie has failed to shoulder his burden
to establish that Defendant CPL Hall violated any constitutional right by initiating the
traffic stop or arresting him. CPL Hall is entitled to qualified immunity.
D. Malicious Prosecution
Guthrie bases his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against CPL Hall on his
alleged wrongful arrest. Guthrie argues that the arrest “set in motion events that [CPL
Hall] knew or should have known would violate [his] rights” and, therefore, “Defendant
Hall was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s rights being violated.” Response at 22.
When addressing § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, the Tenth Circuit “uses the
common law elements of malicious prosecution as the starting point of [the] analysis;
however, the ultimate question is whether plaintiff has proven the deprivation of a
constitutional right.” Shed v. Oklahoma Dep't of Human Servs., 729 Fed. Appx. 653, 656
(10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Novitsky, v. City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007).
491 F.3d at 1257 (internal quotation marks omitted); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279,
1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ‘ultimate question’ is the existence of a constitutional
violation.” (citing Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10y Cir. 1996). The elements
of a § 1983 claim are: “(1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued confinement or
prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) there was no
probable cause to support the original arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4)
the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.” Id. at 1258. Shed
v. Oklahoma Dep't of Human Servs., 729 Fed. Appx. 653, 656 (10th Cir. 2018).
16 

As discussed above, Guthrie has failed to establish that CPL Hall deprived him of a
constitutional right when he arrested Guthrie for driving while intoxicated and, therefore
his claim necessarily fails. CPL Hall had probable cause to support the original arrest.
While “[i]t is conceivable that a wrongful arrest could be the first step towards a malicious
prosecution,” there is no wrongful arrest in this case. Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556,
1564 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir.1996)).
However, the Court notes that Guthrie also fails to establish several of the other
elements of his § 1983 claim. Guthrie fails to demonstrate a causal connection between
CPL Hall and the decision to initiate criminal proceedings against Guthrie. The Tenth
Circuit stated in Taylor that “[t]he principal player in carrying out a prosecution—in ‘the
formal commencement of a criminal proceeding,’...—is not [the] police officer but
prosecutor.” Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1563 n.8 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 280, 114 S. Ct. 807, 816 n. 5, 127 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring)). Nor does Guthrie offer any evidence of malice. Although
Guthrie asserts that CPL Hall “deliberately and maliciously made false statements” in his
report, he provides no supporting evidence.
For these reasons, CPL Hall is entitled to qualified immunity on Guthrie’s malicious
prosecution claim.
II.

Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Guthrie asserts a claim for violation of his right to equal protection pursuant to the

Fourteenth Amendment based on CPL Hall “treating him differently from the white

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passenger in Mr. Guthrie’s vehicle.”6 Complaint at ¶ 60. Guthrie appears to base his
argument on a belief that his white passenger should have also been arrested. Complaint
at ¶¶ 43-45; Response at 24-25.
The “Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race.” United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1263 (10th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135
L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). A selective enforcement claim may still arise even where there is no
Fourth Amendment violation because the constitutional basis of such claims is the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. In order to
establish a claim for selective enforcement of the law:
A defendant “challenging alleged racial discrimination in traffic stops and
arrests must present evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that
the law enforcement officials involved were motivated by a discriminatory
purpose and their actions had a discriminatory effect.” Marshall, 345 F.3d at
1168.
United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006). The
discriminatory purpose need not be the only purpose, but it must be a motivating factor in
the decision. Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg'l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003)
(citing Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 485 (10th Cir.1996)); see also, Alcarez-Arellano,
441 F.3d at 1264. This is a demanding standard, as “judicial interference with lawenforcement discretion ‘might induce police officers to protect themselves against false

6

Guthrie argues for the first time in his Response that the traffic stop was pretextual and
motivated solely by Guthrie’s race. Response at 23-24. Because this claim is not stated in
his Complaint, it is disregarded.
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accusations in ways that are counterproductive to fair and effective enforcement of the
laws.” Id. at 1264 (quoting Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital, 345 F.3d 1157,
1167 (2003)).
Guthrie alleges specific ways in which he and his white passenger were treated
differently by CPL Hall. Response at 24-25. However, Guthrie presents no evidence at all
that CPL Hall was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Instead, Guthrie relies entirely
on his own subjective belief that he was stopped and arrested because of his race. Response
at 24. Although Guthrie relies on Marshall’s acknowledgment that “a police officer's
pattern of traffic stops and arrests, his questions and statements to the person involved, and
other relevant circumstances may support an inference of discriminatory purpose” in this
context, Guthrie presents no such evidence. Response at 23.
Guthrie admits in his deposition testimony that CPL Hall was “as cordial as he
would be with anybody,” was polite, was not rude, and was not unprofessional towards
him. Deposition of Otis Andre Guthrie [Doc. No. 37-4] at 143, lns 3-16. Guthrie mentions
no racially derogatory comments or behavior in his deposition, declaration, or Response.
Instead, Guthrie relies only on the allegedly different ways he was treated as compared to
his white passenger. Reliance on different treatment alone is insufficient to meet the
burden of establishing a motivating discriminatory purpose. See Barwick v. Behnke, 548
Fed.Appx. 516, 519 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that an arrestee failed to show any evidence
of discriminatory motive behind the officers’ actions where he relied only on the fact that
he was fighting with a white man who was not arrested, the police checked only his
criminal history, and only one witness was interviewed).
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To the extent Guthrie attempts to rely on statistics, his data indicates only the
percentage of the City of Mustang’s population that is African American. Response at 17,
n.2, and 23. He provides no evidentiary support for any connection between that statistic
and CPL Hall’s treatment of him, instead relying on an unsupported assertion that “it is the
custom and practice of Mustang to pursue people of color.” Response at 23. To the extent
he points to the dash-cam video as evidence of a racially motivated stop, the Court has
determined that no reasonable jury could find that his race was ascertainable prior to the
traffic stop.
Guthrie has failed to present any evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer
that CPL Hall was motivated by a racially discriminatory intent or purpose in his treatment
of him. CPL Hall is entitled to summary judgment on Guthrie’s § 1983 claim for violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law.
III.

Sixth Amendment Claim Against Mustang
Guthrie asserts that the City of Mustang’s two-tier court system denied him his Sixth

Amendment right to a jury trial. The undisputed facts establish that when Guthrie
demanded a jury trial in the City of Mustang’s municipal court, the judge dismissed the
charges and they were then forwarded to the Canadian County District Court for
prosecution. After this transfer, the charges were eventually dismissed without trial. Based
on the fact that Guthrie was never subjected to a non-jury trial, he fails to establish his
claim for violation of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, and Mustang is entitled to
summary judgment.

20 

Moreover, Guthrie’s argument that transfer to the Canadian County District Court
was improper likewise fails to carry his claim past summary judgment. Defendants
correctly observe that Oklahoma employs a two-tier court system. A municipal court judge
may hear cases for which the prosecution seeks “imposition of a fine of more than Two
Hundred Dollars ($200.00), excluding court costs, or imprisonment, or both such fine and
imprisonment” where both the defendant and the municipality waive a jury trial. Okla.
Stat. tit. § 27-119(A) (2006).7 Pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 11, § 27-1292(A) (2005):
an appeal may be taken from a final judgment of the municipal court by the
defendant by filing in the district court in the county where the situs of the
municipal government is located, within ten (10) days from the date of the
final judgment, a notice of appeal and by filing a copy of the notice with the
municipal court. In case of an appeal, a trial de novo shall be had, and there
shall be a right to a jury trial if the sentence imposed for the offense was a
fine of more than Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) and costs.
As noted by the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court “has said that such a [two-tier
court] procedure affords an accused ‘the absolute right to have his guilt determined by a
jury composed and operating in accordance with the Constitution.’” Id. at 1294 (quoting
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, supra, Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 625, 96 S.Ct.
2781, 2785, 49 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976)). In M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 12931294 (10th Cir. 1983), the Tenth Circuit recognized there was no violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial where Kansas’ two-tier court system provided a defendant
the right to appeal a decision by a municipal judge to the district court where the case is
tried de novo by jury if requested. In concluding that these two-tier court systems comply

7

The Court relies on the versions of the statutes in effect at the time of the events relevant
to Guthrie’s claims.
21 

with the right to jury trial, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that some compliant two-tier
systems “provide a jury only in the second tier but allow an accused to by-pass the first”
as is the case here. Id. (citing Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 620).
Guthrie does not respond to Defendants’ argument regarding Oklahoma’s two-tier
court system; he simply restates that Mustang denied him a trial by jury and failed to
comply with Okla. Stat. tit. 11 § 27-119 (2006). In this case, Guthrie requested a jury trial
in the municipal court. The municipal court then transferred his charges to the Canadian
County District Court where he would have received a trial by jury had his charges not
been dismissed. In compliance with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, Guthrie
was allowed to by-pass the first tier of the two-tier court system in order to provide him a
jury trial, as requested. Defendant Mustang is entitled to summary judgment as to
Guthrie’s Sixth Amendment claim.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 37] is GRANTED in its entirety, as set forth herein. Judgment will
be entered in favor of Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 19th day of October, 2018.

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