Thomas v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Filing
18
OPINION AND ORDER. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Signed by Honorable Charles Goodwin on 09/10/2018. (jb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DAVID THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. CIV-17-358-G
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David Thomas brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial
review of the portion of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) denying Plaintiff’s applications for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and for
supplemental security income (“SSI”) under the Title XVI of the Social Security Act, id.
§§ 1381-1383f. Upon review of the administrative record (Doc. No. 9, hereinafter “R. _”),1
and the arguments and authorities submitted by the parties, the Court affirms the
Commissioner’s decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
Plaintiff protectively filed his DIB application on March 17, 2014, and protectively
filed his SSI application on March 19, 2014. R. 19, 178-81, 182-88. In both applications,
Plaintiff alleged a disability-onset date of July 20, 2009. R. 19, 178, 182, 206. Plaintiff
With the exception of the administrative record, references to the parties’ filings use the
page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic filing system.
1
subsequently amended his alleged onset date to August 21, 2010 (his 50th birthday). R.
19, 34. Following denial of the applications initially and on reconsideration, a hearing was
held before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on March 7, 2016. R. 32-61, 112-16, 11720, 123-25, 126-28. In addition to Plaintiff, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the
hearing. R. 56-60. The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision on April 18, 2016. R.
15-27.
The Commissioner of Social Security uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to
determine entitlement to disability benefits. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th
Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his amended onset date. R. 21. At step two,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the severe medically determinable impairment of
diabetes mellitus (“DM”). R. 21. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the nonsevere
impairments of hypertension, gastroesophageal reflux disease, hyperlipidemia, osteoarthritis,
tinnitus, and obesity. R. 22. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s condition did not
meet or equal any of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 22-23.
The ALJ next assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) based on all
of his medically determinable impairments. R. 23-26. The ALJ found that since his
amended onset date, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of light work. R. 23. At
step four, the ALJ, relying on the VE’s testimony, determined that Plaintiff was incapable
of performing his past relevant work as a newspaper pressman and a welder/fabricator. R.
26.
2
At step five, the ALJ considered whether there are jobs existing in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff—in view of his age, education, work
experience, and RFC—could perform. R. 26-27. Relying upon the VE’s testimony,
Section 204.00 of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, and Social Security Ruling 85-15,
the ALJ found that prior to August 20, 2015, a finding of “not disabled” was directed by
Medical-Vocational Rule 202.14. R. 26-27; see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P app. 2, tbl.2
r. 202.14. The ALJ further found Plaintiff disabled beginning on August 20, 2015, when
Plaintiff turned 55 years old, by direct application of Medical-Vocational Rule 202.06. R.
27; see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P app. 2, tbl.2 r. 202.06.
Plaintiff’s request for review by the SSA Appeals Council was denied on February
3, 2017, and the partially favorable determination of the ALJ stands as the Commissioner’s
final decision. See R. 1-6; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to determining
whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and
whether correct legal standards were applied. Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th
Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A decision is not based on substantial
evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere scintilla
of evidence supporting it.” Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court “meticulously examine[s] the record as a
3
whole,” including any evidence “that may undercut or detract from the ALJ’s findings,”
“to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (internal
quotation marks omitted). While a reviewing court considers whether the Commissioner
followed applicable rules of law in weighing particular types of evidence in disability
cases, the court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of
the Commissioner. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) improperly rejecting opinions from two
of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, (2) failing to explain the weight given to the opinions of
state-agency reviewing physicians, and (3) not taking into consideration Plaintiff’s obesity
when formulating the RFC. See Pl.’s Br. (Doc. No. 13) at 15-27.
I.
WHETHER THE ALJ IMPROPERLY REJECTED TWO TREATING-PHYSICIAN OPINIONS
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by giving “little weight” to the opinions of
Plaintiff’s treating physicians Juan Maldonado, MD, and Jay Carroll Belt, DO. See Pl.’s
Br. at 16-20.
A. The Treating-Physician Rule
Specific SSA regulations govern the consideration of opinions by “acceptable
medical sources.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, .1513(a); id. §§ 416.902, .913(a) (2016).
The Commissioner generally gives the highest weight to the medical opinions of a “treating
source,” which includes a physician who has provided the claimant “with medical
treatment or evaluation” during a current or past “ongoing treatment relationship” with the
4
claimant. Id. §§ 404.1502, 416.902; see id. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2); Langley v.
Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004).
When considering the medical opinion of a claimant’s treating physician, the ALJ
must first determine whether the opinion should be given “controlling weight” on the
matter to which it relates. See Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003);
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). The opinion of a treating physician must be
given controlling weight if it is both “‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques’” and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence
in the record. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *2
(July 2, 1996));2 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
A treating-physician opinion not afforded controlling weight is still entitled to
deference. See Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300; SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (“In many
cases, a treating source’s medical opinion will be entitled to the greatest weight and should
be adopted, even if it does not meet the test for controlling weight.”). If the ALJ has
determined that the medical opinion of a treating physician is not entitled to controlling
weight, the ALJ must determine what lesser weight should be afforded the opinion. See
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300-01; Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119. In this second inquiry, the
determination of how much deference to afford a treating-physician opinion not entitled to
controlling weight should be made in view of a prescribed set of regulatory factors:
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination;
2
Social Security Ruling 96-2p has been rescinded for claims filed on or after March 27,
2017. See Rescission of Social Security Rulings 96-2p, 96-5p, and 06-3p, 82 Fed. Reg.
15263-01 (Mar. 27, 2017).
5
(2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, including the treatment
provided and the kind of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to
which the physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4)
consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not
the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and
(6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to support or
contradict the opinion.
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). The ALJ’s decision “‘must be sufficiently specific
to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating
source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300
(quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5).
B. The Opinions of Dr. Maldonado and Dr. Belt
The record reflects that Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Maldonado in 2008-2009 and in
2015-2016, primarily for issues related to Plaintiff’s DM, blood pressure, cholesterol, and
left hip. R. 293-300, 326-30. In June 2014, Dr. Maldonado examined Plaintiff and
completed a Medical Source Statement (“MSS”) regarding Plaintiff’s RFC. R. 318-23 (Ex.
4F), 324 (Ex. 5F). In the MSS Dr. Maldonado assessed Plaintiff as able to stand and walk
less than 2 hours during an 8-hour day, able to sit about 2 hours during an 8-hour day, and
able to lift and carry ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently. R. 324.
Dr. Maldonado further opined that Plaintiff would be absent from work more than three
days per month because of his treatment or impairments and would be off-task at work
25% or more of the workday. R. 324.
Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Belt from 2010 to 2014 for similar issues. R. 301-15.
In March 2014, Dr. Belt completed an MSS and assessed Plaintiff as being able to sit or to
6
stand and walk for less than 2 hours during an 8-hour day. R. 316 (Ex. 3F). Dr. Belt opined
that Plaintiff could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. R. 316.
Like Dr. Maldonado, Dr. Belt found that Plaintiff would be absent from work more than
three days per month and would be off-task 25% or more of the workday. R. 316.
C. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Treating Physicians’ Opinions
In the written decision, the ALJ discussed these treating physicians’ treatment
records and gave “little weight” to each of their MSS opinions. R. 22, 23-24, 25-26.
Regarding Dr. Maldonado’s MSS, the ALJ stated:
Dr. Maldonado is an examining and treating acceptable medical source.
However, his opinion is largely inconsistent with his scant treatment notes of
record, which revealed a normal physician examination in February 2016,
less some left ankle edema (Exhibit 6F, 3). In addition, his opinion is
inconsistent with Dr. Belt’s examinations of the claimant, which merely
revealed abdominal tenderness (Exhibit 2F). Moreover, his opinion is
inconsistent with Dr. Boatman’s assessment, who . . . specializes in surgery
(Exhibit 7A, 9). Finally, his opinion is also largely inconsistent with the
claimant’s reported level of functioning, as cited above. For these reasons,
Dr. Maldonado’s opinion is given little weight.
R. 25.
The ALJ similarly assessed Dr. Belt’s MSS:
Dr. Belt is a treating acceptable medical source. However, his opinion is
largely inconsistent with his scant treatment notes of record, which revealed
only abdominal tenderness (Exhibit 2F, 5). In addition, his opinion is
inconsistent with his conservative treatment of the claimant, as Dr. Belt
merely prescribed Metformin and advised the claimant to diet and exercise
(Ex. 2F, 4). Therefore, like Dr. Maldonado, Dr. Belt’s opinion is
unsupported by his physical examinations of the claimant and his
conservative treatment of the claimant. Moreover, his opinion is inconsistent
with Dr. Boatman’s assessment, who . . . specializes in surgery (Exhibit 7A,
9). Finally, his opinion is also inconsistent with the claimant’s reported level
of functioning, as cited above. For these reasons, Dr. Belt’s opinion is given
little weight.
7
R. 25-26.
The ALJ additionally assigned great weight to the opinions of state-agency medical
consultants “J.S.,” DO, and Karl Boatman, MD. R. 25. These physicians each reviewed
the medical evidence and opined that Plaintiff was able to perform light work without
additional limitations or restrictions. R. 69-70, 80-81, 93-94, 105-06.
D. Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by assigning little weight to the opinions of
treating physicians Dr. Maldonado and Dr. Belt. See Pl.’s Br. at 16. According to Plaintiff,
the ALJ did not consider the similarities between the opinions of Dr. Maldonado and Dr.
Belt, did not mention objective findings supporting these opinions, and selectively
reviewed the record, “mentioning the parts favorable to her position, and ignoring those
parts which were not.” Id. at 18-20 (citing Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 681 (10th
Cir. 2004) (“It is improper for the ALJ to pick and choose among medical reports, using
portions of evidence favorable to his position while ignoring other evidence.”)).
The ALJ’s assessment of the evidence, and her reliance on this assessment in
weighing the above-mentioned treating-source opinions, is supported by substantial
evidence. When an ALJ rejects a treating physician’s opinion, he or she must articulate
“specific, legitimate reasons” for doing so. Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211, 1213
(10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In weighing the opinion of Dr.
Maldonado, the ALJ noted that he was a treating physician but also found that the extreme
restrictions assessed by Dr. Maldonado were inconsistent with the physician’s own
8
treatment records, the physical examination conducted by Dr. Belt, the opinion of
reviewing physician Dr. Boatman, and with Plaintiff’s self-reported activities of daily
living. R. 25. In assigning Dr. Belt’s opinion little weight, the ALJ offered similar
reasoning, finding that Dr. Belt’s opinion was also inconsistent with the physician’s
treatment notes, his conservative treatment of Plaintiff’s conditions, and the opinion of Dr.
Boatman. R. 25.
As explained above, an ALJ is only required to give controlling weight to a treating
physician’s opinion if the opinion is both well supported and “not inconsistent with other
substantial evidence in the record.” Drapeau, 255 F.3d at 1213. The ALJ’s finding of
multiple inconsistencies between the MSS opinions and the remainder of the record
constitutes a specific and legitimate reason for rejection that complies with the
requirements of the treating-physician rule. See id.; Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1300; 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c)(3), (c)(4), 416.927(c)(3), (c)(4). The possibility of drawing two different
conclusions from the same facts “does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings
from being supported by substantial evidence,” and the Court may not “displace the
agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would
justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Lax v.
Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ improperly cited the “scant” treating record
provided by Drs. Maldonado and Belt when weighing their opinions. R. 25; see Pl.’s Br.
at 19. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that it was inappropriate for the ALJ to use Plaintiff’s
9
limited treatment history to support her findings, given Plaintiff’s testimony that he had
been without health insurance since 2009 and, since that time, had only sought treatment
when he needed to refill his prescriptions. R. 55. Plaintiff argues that this inability to
afford consistent treatment affected the volume of medical evidence in the record. See Pl.’s
Br. at 19.
Social Security Ruling 16-3p establishes that an ALJ “will not find an individual’s
symptoms inconsistent with the evidence in the record” on the basis that “the frequency or
extent of the treatment sought by the individual is not comparable with the degree of the
individual’s subjective complaints” without considering possible reasons why the
individual may not have sought treatment, such as an inability to afford treatment. SSR
16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *9-10 (Oct. 25, 2017); see also Alarid v. Colvin, 590 F. App’x
789, 793 (10th Cir. 2014). In this case, there is no indication that the ALJ relied upon any
failure by Plaintiff to seek treatment as a basis to discount Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
R. 24. The ALJ’s reference to a “scant” treatment record is a reasonable observation of the
limited relationship Plaintiff had with each of the treating physicians and, consequently, a
proper comment regarding the information upon which each physician could base his
opinion. See R. 293-95, 326-28 (records showing Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Maldonado six
times between 2008 and 2016), 304-08 (records showing Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Belt
five times between 2010 and 2014); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i), 416.927(c)(2)(i)
(prescribing that generally “the more times [the claimant has] been seen by a treating
source, the more weight we will give to the source’s medical opinion”).
10
II.
WHETHER THE ALJ PROPERLY WEIGHED THE REVIEWING PHYSICIANS’ OPINIONS
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly support her assignment of great
weight to the opinions of state-agency reviewing physicians Dr. J.S. and Dr. Boatman. See
Pl.’s Br. at 20-23. As noted above, both of these physicians found that Plaintiff was able
to perform a full range of light work. R. 69-70, 80-81, 93-94, 105-06. In addressing these
opinions, the ALJ stated:
The State agency medical consultants are acceptable medical sources. In
addition, they are familiar with the disability evaluation process and its
requirements. Further, their opinions are largely consistent with the evidence
as a whole, which revealed only intermittent neuropathy, intermittent edema,
and abdominal tenderness (Exhibits 2F; 4F; 6F). Supportively, the claimant
was also observed with full musculoskeletal strength and a normal gait
during the consultative medical exam (Exhibit 4F). Moreover, the claimant
was recently observed in February 2016 without any neurological deficits
(Exhibit 6F, 3).
Notably, the State agency assessments are also consistent with the claimant’s
reported level of functioning, as he reportedly completes numerous activities
of daily living without assistance, including mowing the lawn (See Exhibits
4E; 9E). Finally, Dr. Boatman also specializes in surgery, which bolsters the
probative value of his assessment. For these reasons, the collective opinions
of Drs. Boatman and J.S. are accorded great weight.
R. 25.
Plaintiff raises several challenges to the ALJ’s assessment of these opinions. First,
Plaintiff argues that the reviewing physicians’ familiarity with the disability process “adds
little value to their opinions” and that familiarity with Social Security regulations “does not
equal a familiarity with a particular claimant.” Pl.’s Br. at 21-22. Plaintiff asserts that
nonexamining, nontreating sources such as Drs. J.S. and Boatman are “presumably entitled
to less weight” than treating and examining sources. Id. at 22.
11
The relevant guidance explains that “the opinions of physicians or psychologists
who do not have a treatment relationship with the individual are weighed by stricter
standards, based to a greater degree on medical evidence, qualifications, and explanations
for the opinions, than are required of treating sources.” SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at
*2 (July 2, 1996). Thus, the opinions of state-agency medical consultants “can be given
weight only insofar as they are supported by evidence in the case record.” Id. Here, the
ALJ’s discussion meets these requirements. The ALJ cited multiple items of specific
evidence in the record that were consistent with Dr. Boatman’s and Dr. J.S.’s opinions.
See R. 25. The ALJ’s mention of the physicians’ familiarity with the process recognized
that she must consider their conclusions, but there is no indication from the written decision
that the ALJ felt improperly “bound by” these physicians’ findings. SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL
374180, at *2 (“Because State agency medical . . . consultants . . . are experts in the Social
Security disability programs, the rules . . . require [ALJs] and the Appeals Council to
consider their findings of fact about the nature and severity of an individual’s
impairment(s) as opinions of nonexamining physicians . . . .”).
Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ failed to explain why Dr. Boatman’s specialty
in surgery would enhance the probative value of his opinion and that the ALJ’s focus on
this specialization resulted in her improperly “weigh[ing] the treating physicians’ opinions
against Dr. Boatman, not Dr. Boatman’s opinion against the treating physicians.” Pl.’s Br.
at 22-23 (quoting Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004)). Although
the ALJ did not provide a thorough discussion of this factor, the ALJ was required only to
“explain[] the weight” given to Dr. Boatman’s opinion, and she did so. SSR 96-6p, 1996
12
WL 374180, at *2. The medical issues upon which Dr. Boatman opined are not so
obviously unrelated to a surgery specialization as to show evident error by the ALJ. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(5), 416.927(c)(5); Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166
(10th Cir. 2012) (“The more comprehensive the ALJ’s explanation, the easier our task; but
we cannot insist on technical perfection.”); R. 93-94, 105-06. And because Dr. J.S. and
Dr. Boatman assessed identical restrictions, Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ’s
emphasis on Dr. Boatman’s surgical background had any material effect on the ALJ’s RFC
determination. Plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ improperly examined the treating
physicians’ opinions “to see if they outweigh[ed]” Dr. Boatman’s opinion. Hamlin, 365
F.3d at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
III. WHETHER THE ALJ FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER PLAINTIFF’S OBESITY IN
ASSESSING HIS RFC
An ALJ must consider the limiting effects of both severe and nonsevere
impairments in determining the claimant’s RFC.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(e),
416.945(e). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the impact of Plaintiff’s
nonsevere impairment of obesity in assessing his RFC. See Pl.’s Br. at 23. Specifically,
Plaintiff cites Social Security Ruling 02-1p to argue that Plaintiff’s body mass index places
him at increased risk for developing symptoms related to his obesity. Plaintiff contends
that two of his impairments, DM and hypertension, can be exacerbated by obesity, and
cites treatment notes from Dr. Maldonado indicating that Plaintiff was obese. See id. at
25-26; SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002).
13
The ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff “did not allege any functional limitations”
due to his obesity, and Plaintiff does not dispute that finding in this action. R. 22; see Pl.’s
Br. at 27. Further, Plaintiff did not “testify that his weight contributed to his inability to
engage in activities in any way,” “points to no omitted functional limitation that was
necessary in light of [his] obesity,” and “has not shown that [his] obesity alone, or in
combination with other impairments, resulted in any further limitations” or prevented him
from performing light work. Briggs v. Astrue, 221 F. App’x 767, 771 (10th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Bryant v. Berryhill, No. CIV-15-1151-HE, 2017 WL
401263, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 30, 2017); Smith v. Colvin, 625 F. App’x 896, 899 (10th
Cir. 2015). The ALJ considered the impact of Plaintiff’s musculoskeletal issues on his
RFC, noting that despite Plaintiff’s complaints of edema and lower-back pain, physical
examinations revealed full musculoskeletal strength, a normal gait, and no neurological
deficits. R. 24-25; cf. Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 948 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding
that ALJ adequately discussed possible ramifications of claimant’s obesity where he
addressed “lack of marked arthritic pain, joint deformity, or musculoskeletal impairment”).
Plaintiff’s argument is essentially an argument “that for each piece of evidence the ALJ
discussed in formulating her RFC,” the ALJ was “also required to note the absence of any
evidence that [Plaintiff’s] obesity resulted in additional functional limitations or
exacerbated any other impairment”—a proposition that has been rejected by the Tenth
Circuit. Smith, 625 F. App’x at 899. Plaintiff has not shown reversible error in the ALJ’s
consideration of his obesity impairment in the RFC assessment.
14
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. A separate judgment shall be
entered.
ENTERED this 10th day of September, 2018.
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?