Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Jones-Atchison et al

Filing 42

ORDER granting 18 Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 4/11/2018. (mb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
HARTFORD LIFE AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEISHA JONES-ATCHISON, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-17-654-D

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Hartford Life and Accident
Insurance Company’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Doc. No. 18]. The motion is
unopposed. Upon review, the Court finds Hartford’s motion should be granted as
follows.
BACKGROUND
Hartford is the carrier of a group policy (the “Policy”) with basic life insurance
benefits and other coverages not relevant to this action for its policy holder—
Siemens Corporation (“Siemens”). David Lamare Atchison II (“Mr. Atchinson”)
was employed by Siemens and was a participant in the Policy. Mr. Atchison died
after being shot by an unknown person(s) on January 8, 2017. His wife, Keisha
Jones-Atchison, submitted a claim for benefits payable on Mr. Atchison’s death.
However, Mr. Atchison’s father, David Lamare Atchison, Sr., submitted a

Preference Beneficiary Affidavit (“PBA”). In the PBA, Mr. Atchison, Sr. claimed
entitlement to some or all of the Policy’s benefits, by way of the Policy’s succession
provision.
To date, there have been no arrests in connection with the death of Mr.
Atchison, although court filings in this case state that Ms. Jones-Atchison has not
been ruled out as a suspect and the circumstances surrounding Mr. Atchison death
remain unclear.1 Citing the existence of competing claims to the Policy proceeds,
Hartford filed this interpleader action under Rule 22, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. On October 19, 2017, the Court granted Hartford permission to deposit
the proceeds into the Clerk’s registry and discharge it from this action [Doc. No. 22].
Hartford now seeks an attorney’s fee award of $7,511.50 from the deposit as
reimbursement of its fees incurred in bringing this action.
STANDARD OF DECISION
The prevailing principle in interpleader actions is that it is within the
discretion of the court to award the stakeholder costs, including reasonable
attorney’s fees, out of the deposited fund. Melton v. White, 848 F.Supp. 1513, 1514
(W.D. Okla. 1994). The Court normally taxes such fees in favor of a stakeholder

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Although Ms. Jones-Atchison and the decedent had no children, see Compl. ¶ 23
[Doc. No. 1], on April 5, 2018, Anitra Haag, Amber Smith, and Kristie Hall sought
to intervene in this action, claiming Mr. Atchison was the biological father of their
children, L.M.H., I.E.S., and J.H., respectively [Doc. No. 41].
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who: (1) is “disinterested,” i.e., does not itself claim entitlement to any of the
interpleader fund; (2) does not appear to be culpable; (3) concedes its liability in full;
(4) deposits the disputed fund in court; and (5) seeks discharge. Irwin v. Principal
Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1278 (D. Kan. 2005). It is undisputed that
Hartford has met these requirements.
In the present action, there has been no allegation Hartford was culpable in
causing the controversy over the Policy proceeds. Moreover, Hartford has
disclaimed any interest, conceded liability, deposited the proceeds and has been
discharged from this lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court finds Hartford is entitled to an
award of its reasonable attorney’s fees to be paid out of the deposited funds.
DISCUSSION
In determining reasonable attorney’s fees, the starting point for determining
the amount of a reasonable fee is the “lodestar” figure – “the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Assocs., LLC, 616 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10th Cir.
2010) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)). If a party is seeking
compensation for services of a non-lawyer, such as a legal assistant, the Court must
scrutinize the reported hours and suggested rates in the same manner. Case v. Unified
School Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 1998). The party seeking an
award of fees has the burden of proving both the number of hours spent and
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reasonableness of the hourly rates. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant,
Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1233 (10th Cir. 2000). Once this burden is met, a claimant is
entitled to the presumption this lodestar amount reflects a “reasonable” fee.
Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998).
Once the Court determines the lodestar, it must then determine whether any
upward or downward adjustments should be made to the lodestar “to account for the
particularities of the suit and its outcome.” Zinna v. Congrove, 680 F.3d 1236, 1242
(10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). In assessing whether adjustments should be
made, courts often consider the twelve factors set out in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., which include:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill required; (4) preclusion of other employment;
(5) the customary fee in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the
nature and relationship of the professional relationship with the client;
and (12) awards in similar cases.
488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The Tenth Circuit has approved these factors
for determining reasonableness. Brown v. Phillips Petro. Co., 838 F.2d 451 (10th
Cir. 1988). It is rare that all factors are met. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor
Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 853 (10th Cir. 1993). Although these factors may be
considered, the court does not need to consider “the factors [ ] subsumed within the
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initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9. The lodestar calculation is meant to be the primary
consideration when awarding fees rather than the Johnson factors. Anchondo, 616
F.3d at 1103 (citing Perdue v. Kenny A ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010)).
As stated, Hartford seeks $7,511.50 in attorney’s fees. In support, it submits
time records showing its attorneys and paralegals spent 33.2 hours working on this
matter. Jodi Dishman was the primary attorney in the matter, and she submitted time
records showing 10.2 hours spent litigating the case. Andrew Morris, the other
attorney in this matter, submitted records showing he expended 20.9 hours.
Paralegals Cynthia McHale and Bre Little spent .8 and 1.3 hours working on the
case, respectively.
Upon review, counsel’s time records describe with particularity the tasks
performed and time spent on them. The Court has examined the fee statement for
duplication of services, excessive time billing for particular tasks, use of too many
attorneys, unnecessary performance of clerical tasks by lawyers, and other work
deemed unnecessary or irrelevant, and finds counsel has made adequate reductions
and no additional reduction is required.
Next, the Court finds that the hourly rates in this matter are reasonable. In
setting the hourly rate, “the court should establish, from the information provided to
it and from its own analysis of the level of performance and skill of each lawyer
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whose work is to be compensated, a billing rate for each lawyer based upon the norm
for comparable private firm lawyers in the area in which the court sits, calculated as
of the time the court awards fees.” Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir. 1983)). A
reasonable hourly rate comports with rates “prevailing in the community for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.”
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984). The focus of the inquiry is on the
rates of lawyers of comparable skill and experience. Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr.,
163 F.3d 1186, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998). The Court may consider counsel’s customary
rate, but it is not conclusive evidence. Id. at 1203. The court may also consider the
quality of representation. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555. If the court does not have before
it adequate evidence of prevailing market rates, the court may, in its discretion, “use
other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish the rate.” Lippoldt
v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Case, 157 F.3d at 1257).
For Dishman, Hartford requests an hourly rate of $305. For Mr. Morris, it
requests an hourly rate of $200. Hartford also requests an hourly rate of $105 for
paralegals McHale and Little. Mr. Morris has submitted an affidavit outlining
counsel’s respective experience and skill and their customary rates for services.
Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff has presented substantial evidence that the
requested rates are in line with the prevailing market rates for lawyers of comparable
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skill and experience practicing in the Oklahoma City area (i.e., Western District of
Oklahoma). Accordingly, the Court calculates the lodestar as $7,511.50. Moreover,
the Court finds that the no adjustment to the lodestar is warranted because the factors
either are subsumed by the lodestar calculation or are rendered neutral by the
particular nature of an interpleader action, to wit:
1.

Time and Labor Required

This issue was adequately addressed through the lodestar calculation.
2.

Novelty and Difficulty of Questions Presented

Under the circumstances of this case, this factor is not applicable.
3.

Skills Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly

Plaintiff’s counsel submitted thorough and extensive briefing addressing the
factual and legal issues involved in this case. The approved hourly rate in the lodestar
analysis reflects the expertise of counsel. Thus, this factor is neutral.
4.

Preclusion of Other Employment

Under the circumstances of this case, this factor is not applicable.
5.

Customary Fee

This issue was adequately addressed through the lodestar calculation.
6.

Whether the Fee is Fixed or Contingent

This issue was adequately addressed through the lodestar calculation.
7.

Time Limitations Imposed
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Under the circumstances of this case, this factor is not applicable.
8.

Amount Involved and Results Obtained

Under the circumstances of this case, this factor is not applicable.
9.

Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys

As discussed supra, the skill and experience of Hartford’s counsel is reflected
in the reasonable hourly rates in the Court’s lodestar analysis. This factor is neutral.
10.

Undesirability of the Case

Under the circumstances of this case, this factor is not applicable.
11.

Nature and Length of Professional Relationship with the Client

The meaning of this factor and its effect on the calculation of a reasonable
attorney’s fee is unclear and “the courts applying this factor typically state that this
particular standard is irrelevant or immaterial.” See, e.g., Fox v. Pittsburg State
Univ., No. 14-CV-2606-JAR, 2017 WL 2735475, at *18 (D. Kan. June 26, 2017)
(citation omitted). This factor is thus neutral.
12.

Awards in Similar Cases

Under the circumstances of this case, this factor is not applicable.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. No. 18] is GRANTED as set
forth herein. Plaintiff is awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,511.50. Such

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amount shall be paid by the Clerk of the Court from the interpleader funds on deposit
in this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of April 2018.

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