Schauf v. Rios et al
Filing
65
ORDER granting 61 Motion to Dismiss. The Court also amends its March 2, 2018, order (Doc. 30) to dismiss Plaintiffs claim against DefendantBarrett for the reasons discussed herein, as more fully set out. Signed by Honorable David L. Russell on 7/11/18. (jw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
MICHAEL SHAUF, guardian of the
person and estate of Daniel Lee Boling, II,
an incapacitated adult,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD WILSON, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. CIV-17-713-R
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Michael Plume’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint, Doc. 61. The facts and relevant legal standards are well-documented
for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against the remaining Lawton
Correctional Facility (“LCF”) Defendants, and the Court hereby incorporates the background
and standards sections of the Court’s March 2, 2018, order dismissing Defendants Rios and
Pitman. Doc. 30, at 1–6. To briefly recap, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are responsible for
classifying a violent inmate, Randy Mounce, as “medium-security” and celling him with
Daniel Boling, who Mounce beat into an indefinite coma. See Second Amended Complaint,
Doc. 44. To hold Defendants responsible for Boling’s injury under the Eighth Amendment,
Plaintiff must satisfy three Section 1983 elements: (1) objective harm, (2) culpable state of
mind equating to “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm,” and (3)
personal involvement, or an “affirmative link” between the prison official’s conduct and the
1
violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (internal quotations omitted);
Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff amended his complaint to add an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim
against Defendant Michael Plume, LCF’s Unit Manager who screened Mounce upon arrival
at LCF and designated him as “Random Eligible/Unrestricted” on the cell assessment form.
Doc. 44, at 2, 4–5. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible Eighth Amendment
claim against Defendant Plume because he does not meet the “deliberate indifference” prong.
For the same reasons, the Court also reconsiders its prior order and dismisses Defendant Carol
Barrett from this suit.
I. Defendant Plume
Defendant Plume could not have deliberately ignored a “substantial risk of serious
harm” if he did not think that by designating Mounce as “Random Eligible/Unrestricted,” the
risk to Mounce’s cellmates was substantial or the harm would be serious. Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 828; Doc. 44, at 2. The Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard is equivalent
to recklessness—“the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37. “There exists no precise definition of those types of conditions
of confinement that violate the first prong of the Farmer test by ‘posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.’” Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting id. at 834).
“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,
while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of
punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
2
To determine Defendant Plume’s deliberate indifference, the Court begins by peeling
back the “labels and conclusions” and “formulaic recitation of the elements” in Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint and by “viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint as true and in the light most favorable to” Plaintiff, the non-moving party.1
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). Plaintiff’s alleges that when Defendant Plume
conducted Mounce’s LCF intake screening on December 19, 2014, he knew that Mounce
(1) battered two inmates in 1998, (2) threatened an inmate in 2004, (3) stabbed an inmate “S”
in September 2009, and (4) tested positive for methamphetamine upon arrival at LCF in
December 2014. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547; see Doc. 44, at 3–4, 7. Notably, the “transfer
packet that accompanied Mounce to LCF”—the one Plume apparently relied on in labeling
Mounce “Random Eligible/Unrestricted”—“did not contain information about [Mounce’s]
January, 2013 stabbing” of another inmate. Doc. 44, at 4–5. Nor could Plume have known
about any of Mounce’s subsequent violent incidents at LCF that occurred after Plume
screened Mounce. See id.
Because Mounce’s most recent violent misconduct was over five years prior to his
transfer to LCF and exposure to Defendant Plume, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that
Defendant Plume was “both . . . aware of facts from which [an] inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and “dr[e]w th[at] inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
1
The Court disregards Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Plume “recklessly failed to properly screen and
document the misconduct of Inmate Mounce to include violent misconduct or the threat of violent misconduct,
and to recommend maximum security or isolation for Mounce” and that “[t]he willful or reckless failure to
perform the foregoing duties and responsibilities constituted deliberate indifference to the safety and well being
of Boling.” Doc. 44, at 7.
3
837. Pleading an inmate’s positive drug test and remote history of violence makes the risk of
violence “conceivable,” not “plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. After all, “[p]risons, by
definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated
proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 526 (1984). Inmates will always pose some risk to each other. Nonetheless, Plaintiff must
plausibly allege that Plume actually knew the risk was substantial in this case. For example,
Plaintiff met this standard against Defendants Williams and Wilson by alleging that they knew
about Mounce’s 2013 stabbing or violent misconduct at LCF, but regarding Defendant Plume,
Plaintiff failed to “nudge[] [his] claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”
Robbins v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see Doc. 30, at 13–21, 23–24; Doc. 44, at 2–3, 5–9.
Plaintiff responds mainly with two meritless arguments to defeat dismissal: that
Defendant Plume’s “misclassification directly led to Mounce being housed with Boling” and
that dismissal on the basis of failure to plead deliberate indifference impermissibly “requires
evidence relating to the actor’s state of mind” before discovery has occurred. Doc. 63, at 7–9
& n.1. The first argument is beside the point—there may be an “affirmative link” between
Plume’s conduct and the Eighth Amendment violation, but that has no bearing on the
deliberate-indifference prong. In other words, Plume may have bungled Mounce’s intake
screening and caused, even knowingly, Mounce to be housed with potential victim-cellmates.
But unless Plume actually “dr[e]w the inference” that doing so posed a “substantial risk of
serious harm,” his personal involvement is insufficient. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
4
Plaintiff’s second argument distorts the Twombly and Iqbal standard for Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal. The Court is not asking Plaintiff to know Defendant’s state of mind before deposing
him. Plaintiff instead must allege facts that make Defendant’s deliberately indifferent state of
mind “plausible” before “unlock[ing] the doors of discovery.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556;
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Admittedly, this is no easy task at this stage for
somebody in Plaintiff’s position, but it is a necessary one. Conclusory allegations about
Defendant Plume’s state-of-mind, paired with Plume’s knowledge about Mounce’s violent
conduct over five years prior, does not make it plausible that Plume was “deliberate[ly]
indifferen[t] to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828; see Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 686 (“[T]he Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory
statements without reference to its factual context.”). Sensitive not to use Section 1983
liability to hold prison officials responsible for merely negligent misclassifications of inmates,
the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Plume. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (“[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere
negligence.”).
II. Defendant Barrett
For the same reasons, the Court also reconsiders its prior order denying Defendant
Carol Barrett’s motion to dismiss. See Doc. 30, at 24–25. Plaintiff’s allegations against Barrett
and Plume are nearly indistinguishable, save for the fact that during Mounce’s transfer to
LCF, Barrett filled out Mounce’s “Custody Assessment Scale form,” whereas Plume
“conducted the intake screening and cell assessment form.” Doc. 44, at 2. Excluding
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, he alleges that both Barrett and Plume (1) had limited
5
knowledge about Mounce’s misconduct history (a recent positive drug test and violent acts
from over five years prior) and (2) mischaracterized Mounce’s security risk in an LCF transfer
form, which (3) caused Mounce to be housed in general population (and eventually with
Boling). Doc. 44, at 2, 4–5, 7.2
The court originally found Barrett’s deliberate indifference plausible because “specific
facts are not necessary” to show deliberate indifference. Doc. 30, at 24–25 (quoting Lane v.
Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007); see id. at 24 (quoting Doc. 3, at 5) (“Barrett
‘recklessly omitted several relevant facts’ on the form that ‘would have increased’ Mounce’s
security level.”). That conclusion was wrong. No matter what facts Barrett omitted and how
personally involved she was with Mounce’s placement, Plaintiff does not allege that Barrett
possessed enough facts about Mounce’s dangerousness to appreciate a “substantial risk of
serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for
relief against Defendant Barrett.
III. Conclusion
Defendant Plume’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 61) is GRANTED. The Court also
amends its March 2, 2018, order (Doc. 30) to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant
Barrett for the reasons discussed herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11th day of July 2018.
2
Plaintiff has not changed his allegations against Defendant Barrett between his first and second amended
complaints. See Docs. 3, 44
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?