Franco v. Goodwill Shops South LLC et al

Filing 14

ORDER denying as set forth herein 7 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 12/18/17. (ml)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DAISY FRANCO,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOODWILL SHOPS SOUTH, LLC
GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF
CENTRAL OKLAHOMA, INC.,
Defendants.

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Case No. CIV-17-897-D

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Daisy Franco’s Motion to Strike Affirmative
Defenses [Doc. No. 7]. Defendants Goodwill Shops South, LLC and Goodwill
Industries of Central Oklahoma, Inc. (occasionally referred to herein collectively as
“Goodwill”) have filed their Response [Doc. No. 8] and Plaintiff has replied [Doc.
No. 9]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff contends she was discriminated against and wrongfully terminated
because of her race. She moves to strike Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses Nos. 2,
3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 as legally insufficient pursuant to Rule 12(f), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which state:
2.

All employment decisions regarding Plaintiff were made and
based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

3.

Plaintiff’s gender, race, national origin and/or color were neither
a determining nor motivating factor in any employment action
taken by Goodwill.

4.

Plaintiff was, at all relevant times, an employee at will.

5.

Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because
Goodwill acted at all times in compliance with applicable
employment laws, its own policies prohibiting discrimination
and retaliation, and in good faith.

7.

Goodwill is entitled to an offset for any benefits or other wages,
income, or remunerations received by Plaintiff.

8.

Plaintiff’s claims for relief are barred to the extent they exceed
that available under applicable federal law.

9.

Goodwill did not engage in any unlawful discriminatory practice,
or act at any time with malice or with reckless disregard or
indifference to any of Plaintiff’s protected rights.

10.

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is barred to the extent it is
in violation of the Constitution of the United States and any other
applicable law.

11.

Goodwill reserves the right to assert additional defenses that
become apparent during the course of this lawsuit.

See Answer at 5-6 [Doc. No. 3].
Plaintiff argues the aforementioned defenses are largely general denials of
wrongdoing. Plaintiff also contends Affirmative Defense No. 8 is improperly
hypothetical and Affirmative Defense No. 11 is improper since any amendment to

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the Answer must comply with Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
Defendants, in response, state the defenses provide Plaintiff with adequate notice,
do not prejudice Plaintiff and, if anything, are specific denials mislabeled as
affirmative defenses. 2
STANDARD OF DECISION
Rule 12(f) grants the Court authority to “strike an insufficient defense, or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter.” Id. However, motions to
strike are a severe remedy, and as such are generally disfavored. See United States
v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 462 (W.D. Okla. 1987); Sender v. Mann, 423 F. Supp.
2d 1155, 1163 (D. Colo. 2006). Nor should a defense be stricken “if there is any real
doubt about its validity, and ‘the benefit of the doubt should be given to the
pleader.’” Id. (quoting Bobbitt v. Victorian House, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 734, 736-37

1

Although Plaintiff states her belief that the pleading standard set forth in Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 663
(2009) applies, she has abandoned that argument as “unnecessary” and bases her
motion only on notice pleading standards. See Mot. at 4. The parties acknowledge
that the Tenth Circuit has yet to address whether the heightened pleading standards
set forth in Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative defenses and that district courts
within the circuit, as well as those within this district, have reached divergent
conclusions on the matter. However, this Court has consistently “concluded that the
Twombly/Iqbal standard does not apply with the same force to affirmative defenses.”
Wilson v. Lady Di Food Groups Holding, LLC, No. CIV-16-1424-D, 2017 WL
1458783, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 24, 2017) (citing Holt v. Roy Blackwell Enter., Inc.,
No. CIV-15-326-D, 2016 WL 319894, *3 n. 3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 26, 2016)).
2

Defendants withdraw Affirmative Defense No. 11.
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(N.D. Ill. 1982)). This rule acknowledges that “the very possibility of waiver makes
it important (and certainly prudent) to plead all appropriate affirmative defenses,”
and “the cautious pleader is fully justified in setting up as affirmative defenses
anything that might possibly fall into that category, even though that approach may
lead to pleading matters as affirmative defenses that could have been set forth in
simple denials.” Bobbitt, 532 F.Supp. at 736.
Therefore, motions to strike “should be denied unless the challenged
allegations have no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of
the controversy and may cause some sort of significant prejudice to one or more of
the parties to the action.” Wilson v. Lady Di Food Groups Holding, LLC, No. CIV16-1424-D, 2017 WL 1458783, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 24, 2017) (quoting 5C
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1382 (3d
ed. 2004)); see also Holt v. Roy Blackwell Enterprises, Inc., No. CIV-15-326-D,
2016 WL 319894, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 26, 2016) (citations omitted). As stated in
Henson v. Supplemental Health Care Staffing Specialists, No. CIV-09-397-HE,
2009 WL 10671291 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2009), an “abbreviated statement of the
defense, considered in context with the complaint to which the defenses are
addressed, will sufficiently apprise a party of the nature of the defense for pleading
purposes.” Id. at *1.

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DISCUSSION
The defenses at issue either state (1) Defendants’ position with regard to
certain elements of Plaintiff’s claims, such as non-discriminatory reasons for
Plaintiff’s termination (Affirmative Defenses Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9) or (2) the availability
of certain remedies (Affirmative Defenses Nos. 7, 8, and 10). In Wilson and Holt,
cited supra, this Court declined to strike similar defenses (which alleged nondiscriminatory motivations and the availability of particular remedies) on the basis
that those defenses “contain[ed] sufficient detail to indicate the relationship of the
defense to the claims asserted and to avoid undue prejudice” to the plaintiff. See
Wilson, 2017 WL 1458783 at *2; Holt, 2016 WL 319894 at *3. That same rationale
applies here.
Indeed, Plaintiff’s Motion reflects her clear understanding of the relationship
of the defenses to her claims. With respect to Affirmative Defenses Nos. 3, 5, 7, 9
and 10, Plaintiff’s Motion states that, if true, said defenses would preclude success
on her claims because they deny discriminatory reasons for Defendants’
employment decisions. See Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff does not assert any prejudice
related to these defenses. Likewise, Plaintiff expresses her understanding that
Affirmative Defense No. 4 asserts a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for her
termination, similar to Affirmative Defenses Nos. 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10. See Mot. at 6-7.

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Affirmative Defense No. 2 also cites legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
Defendants’ employment decisions.
Based on its review of Defendants’ Answer, the Court finds there is sufficient
detail to indicate the relationship of the challenged defenses to the claims asserted
and to avoid undue prejudice to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses [Doc. No. 7] is DENIED as
set forth herein. 3
IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of December 2017.

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As noted, Defendants have withdrawn Affirmative Defense No. 11.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion with respect to that issue is considered moot.
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