Agrawal v. Courts of Oklahoma et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 7 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable Timothy D. DeGiusti on 7/9/2018. (mb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KRIS K. AGRAWAL,
Plaintiff,
v.
COURTS OF OKLAHOMA
and RICHARD V. OGDEN,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-18-396-D
ORDER
Kris Agrawal, proceeding pro se,1 filed the present suit alleging violations of
his civil rights related to a wage claim and collection action in the District Court of
Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, which is currently presided over by Defendant, Judge
Richard Ogden. Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 7], to
which Plaintiff has filed his response in opposition [Doc. No. 10]. The matter is fully
briefed and at issue.
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts of this case are not foreign to the Court. On two prior
occasions (Agrawal v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Labor, No. CIV-16-3-D and Agrawal v.
Ogden, et al., CIV-17-1364-D), the Court has had an opportunity to review the
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Because Plaintiff appears pro se, the Court liberally construes his submissions, but
will not act as his advocate in constructing his arguments and searching the record.
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
factual and procedural history leading to the present dispute. Stated briefly,
Christopher Holland filed a wage claim in the Oklahoma Department of Labor
(ODOL) against Plaintiff seeking payment of unpaid wages. The administrative law
judge (ALJ) assigned to the case found for Holland and entered judgment in his
favor. The ALJ’s decision was subsequently reviewed and affirmed by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court. See Agrawal v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Labor, 2015 OK 67,
364 P.3d 618. In both federal cases, the Court dismissed each action on the basis that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevented review of Plaintiff’s claims, since both
actions unquestionably sought federal review and rejection of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s decision affirming the Department of Labor’s award of unpaid
wages to Holland. See Agrawal v. Ogden, No. CIV-17-1364-D, 2018 WL 1370616,
at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 16, 2018); Agrawal v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Labor, No. CIV16-3-D, 2016 WL 7324089, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 15, 2016).
Mr. Agrawal’s current action alleges that Judge Ogden violated his due
process rights by presiding over a state court action (Agrawal, et al. v. Oklahoma
Dep’t of Labor, et al., No. CJ-2010-5857) in “violation” of an automatic stay and
refusing to disqualify himself upon request.2 In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff asks
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The Court has taken judicial notice of these proceedings, which derive from
Agrawal’s “Petition for Review and Appeal of Oklahoma Department of Labor
Order.” In that action, Agrawal again challenges the ODOL’s wage award to
Holland, alleging that certain orders entered by the ODOL were “based upon perjury
of Chris Holland” and were in violation of “both due process and the rules and
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that “[if] this Court [finds] Judge Ogden violated [Plaintiff’s] due process rights …
he should have been disqualified.” Compl. ¶ 13. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Ogden moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s action
on the basis that (1) he enjoys absolute immunity from suit; (2) Plaintiff has not set
forth the requisite showing for an injunction; and (3) declaratory relief is
unavailable.
STANDARD OF DECISION
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction takes
one of two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States,
790 F.3d 1143, 1148 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2015). A facial attack questions the sufficiency
of the complaint’s allegations. Id. In reviewing a facial attack, a district court must
accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Id. In a factual attack, the moving
party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint and challenge the facts
upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. Id. When reviewing a factual attack
on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of
the complaint’s factual allegations. Id. Instead, the court has wide discretion to allow
affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed
procedures of the Oklahoma Department of Labor.” See Petition at 1. Recently, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to assume original jurisdiction over Agrawal’s
request that Judge Ogden disqualify himself. See Agrawal v. Ogden, No. 116, 832
(Okla. Apr. 16, 2018).
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jurisdictional facts. Id. Here, Judge Ogden’s allegations constitute a factual attack
because they challenge the facts upon which Agrawal bases subject matter
jurisdiction.
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
enough allegations of fact, taken as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009); see also Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir.
2012). Under this standard, “the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff
could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the
complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable
likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519
F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider,
493 F.3d 1174, 1177 10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original)).
DISCUSSION
Even assuming the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations, judges have absolute
judicial immunity for acts taken in their judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 360 (1978). This doctrine has only two exceptions. “First, a judge is not
immune from liability for ... actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.”
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). “Second, a judge is not immune for actions,
though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 12. To
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this end, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was
in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump, 435 U.S.
at 356-57. “[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where
the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Id. at 356.
Here, Agrawal has not set forth any facts suggesting Judge Ogden did not act
in his judicial capacity. He asserts in his complaint Judge Ogden “disregarded the
Bankruptcy Law, like all other Judges in the State of Oklahoma.” Compl. ¶ 3.
Agrawal also alleges bias and unconstitutional deprivation of his rights to due
process; but given the standard of proof required to negate a judicial immunity
defense, the Court cannot say Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to show Judge Ogden
took action “in complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Having found dismissal
appropriate on this basis, the Court declines to consider Defendant’s remaining
arguments.
Moreover, upon reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds sua sponte Agrawal
has not shown any basis for proceeding against the “Courts of Oklahoma” since (1)
the Oklahoma courts are not suable entities, (2) Oklahoma courts constitute “arms
of the state” and are shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and/or (3)
Oklahoma district courts are sub-entities of their respective counties, and Plaintiff
has not shown that the execution of the policies or customs of any county deprived
him of any rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Hines v.
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Oklahoma, No. CIV-07-197-R, 2007 WL 3046458, at *18 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 17,
2007) (dismissing suit against, inter alia, the Oklahoma Seventh Judicial District
Court and Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for aforementioned reasons);
compare Jones v. 7th Judicial Dist. Court, No. 6:06cv214, 2006 WL 2385287, at *3
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2006) (“The ‘court system’ as a whole, like the individual courts,
is not a suable entity in its own name.”) (citation omitted); Emmerick v. Wisconsin,
No. 11-cv-860, 2012 WL 1135930, at *2 (W.D. Wisc. Apr. 4, 2012) (finding no
authority holding a county court may be sued as a separate entity); J.B. v.
Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 923 (10th Cir. 1997) (party seeking to impose
civil rights liability on county must identify a policy or custom that caused the
plaintiff’s injury). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Complaint in this regard as
well.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as set forth
herein. A judgment shall be issued forthwith.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of July 2018.
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