Copeland v. Lawton City of et al
Filing
127
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 119 Defendants City of Lawton, James Smith, William Torres, Abe Woelfel, Kolton Jones, and Nicolas Chilcote's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (as more fully set out). Signed by Honorable Patrick R Wyrick on 5/25/2021. (ks)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LEBRON COPELAND,
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Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF LAWTON, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. CIV-18-00558-PRW
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants City of Lawton, James Smith, William Torres, Abe
Woelfel, Kolton Jones, and Nicolas Chilcote’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (Dkt. 119) (the “Motion” or the “Motion to Dismiss”). For the reasons
set forth below, the Court GRANTS THE MOTION IN PART and DENIES IT IN
PART.
Background
According to the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 118), the facts are as follows. Lebron
Copeland was involved in a traffic collision in the early morning hours of March 15, 2017,
and was promptly arrested for driving under the influence. At the time of his arrest,
Copeland was exhibiting hemispheric weakness and was unable to walk or stand.
Officers immediately transported Copeland to Comanche County Hospital. There,
a physician performed a computed tomography scan and an examination. The scan revealed
no abnormalities and Copeland reported no back or neck pain. The treating physician
1
determined Copeland had a high blood alcohol concentration but was otherwise stable and
released him to Officer Nicolas Chilcote of the Lawton Police Department.
Copeland was wheelchair-bound upon his release from the hospital, still unable to
walk or stand. As Chilcote brought Copeland to his police cruiser, Copeland informed
Chilcote of his continued inability to use his legs, prompting Chilcote to bring Copeland
back into the emergency room for further examination. An emergency room physician
quickly reiterated, however, that the earlier scan revealed nothing that would cause
paralysis and chalked the ailment up to intoxication.
Copeland was then taken to the Lawton City Jail. Upon arrival, he was ordered to
exit the patrol vehicle, but he was still unable to walk or stand, so officers and jailers put
him in a wheelchair. At this point, Copeland was lifted up, again instructed to walk, and
then dropped, falling into a heap on the ground. Unsuccessful in their effort to coax
ambulation, the officers and jailers returned him to the wheelchair and brought him inside.
A jailer then wheeled Copeland to the entrance of his cell. Once there, the jailer
informed Copeland that the wheelchair could not enter the cell, implying that Copeland
would need to enter unassisted. Copeland responded that he could not feel parts of his body
and was still unable to walk. The jailer proclaimed that Copeland was simply faking injury
so he could return to the hospital and, out of frustration, proceeded to toss Copeland
halfway on to the bunk. At this point, Copeland lost consciousness.
He slipped back into consciousness sometime later. Still hanging half off the bunk,
Copeland attempted to reposition himself, but, with no feeling in his lower extremities, he
fell, hitting his head on the bars of the cell. Copeland again fell unconscious.
2
Later that afternoon, an officer brought Copeland back to Comanche Memorial
Hospital to address his continued hemispheric weakness and newly emergent back and
neck pain. A second computed tomography scan was conducted. As before, the scan
revealed no abnormalities. Copeland was given discharge instructions about cervical
sprains and returned to police custody.
As he left Comanche Memorial Hospital, Copeland complained to the transporting
officer that he had no control over the right side of his body. Unphased, and believing
Copeland to be simply malingering based on the fresh medical clearance, the officer
attempted to stand Copeland in front of his wheelchair, causing him to immediately
crumple to the ground. The officer then placed Copeland back in the wheelchair, brought
him to the patrol car, and threw him into the rear of the vehicle.
Upon his return to the Lawton City Jail, Copeland was again thrown into his cell,
this time on to the floor. There, he languished for hours, denied assistance in going to the
bathroom and his insulin and other medications. After lying on the floor for some hours
covered in his own urine and feces, employees on the subsequent shift lifted him on to the
bunk.
At around 12:30 PM on March 16, 2017, Copeland was transferred to Comanche
County Jail. He was again handled roughly, again deprived of medical care, and again
denied assistance in going to the bathroom.
Several hours after that, Copeland was brought before the Honorable Kenny Harris
in the Comanche County Courthouse. He was covered in urine and feces, had his pants
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slung halfway down to his knees, and was clad with only a single shoe. Judge Harris
released the disheveled Copeland on bond.
Copeland then went to Southwestern Medical Center. There, physicians performed
another computed tomography scan. This time, the scan revealed several fractures: of the
C3, C4, and C5 vertebrae. Copeland’s lower-body paralysis persists to this day.
Based on these allegations, on June 7, 2018, Copeland sued the City of Lawton; the
Comanche County Facilities Authority; James T. Smith in his individual and official
capacities; Kenny Stradley in his individual and official capacities; ten unnamed
individuals in their individual capacities; Officer William Torres in his individual capacity;
Officer Abe Woefel in his individual capacity; Officer Kolton Jones in his individual
capacity; Officer Nicolas Chilcote in his individual capacity; and William Hobbs in his
individual and official capacities. He asserts nine claims in total: six under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, two sounding in negligence, and one under the Oklahoma Constitution.
Now, the City of Lawton, Smith, Torres, Woelfel, Jones, and Chilcote (together,
“Defendants”) ask the Court to reaffirm the earlier dismissal of several of these claims and
to dismiss anew the claims against the City of Lawton pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). 1
The Court will address the Motion to Dismiss in steps. First, it will state the
applicable standard of review. Then, it will turn to the discrete arguments raised by the
1
See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Br. in Supp. (Dkt. 119).
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parties, elaborate on the specific claims at issue, discuss the applicable law, and resolve the
matter.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and viewed “in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.” 2 While a complaint need not recite “detailed factual allegations,”
“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of [her] entitle[ment] to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” 3 The pleaded facts must establish that the claim is plausible. 4
Discussion
I.
The Previously Dismissed Claims
Defendants begin by noting that the Amended Complaint (Dkt. 118) does not reflect
the earlier dismissal of certain claims and parties, and then ask the Court to reaffirm these
dismissals. In response, Copeland makes clear that his intention was not to relitigate these
claims or rejoin these parties. Given that these claims and parties were, in fact, dismissed,
and that Copeland acknowledges these earlier dispositions and disavows any pretense of
relitigating these issues, the Court finds that these matters are not in dispute and therefore
warrant no further discussion.
2
Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting David v.
City & County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir. 1996)).
3
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (alteration in original).
4
Id.
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II.
A Procedural Question: Whether the Failure to Raise an Available Argument in
an Earlier Motion to Dismiss Precludes the Later Raising of that Argument
Copeland makes a threshold, procedural argument in an effort to foreclose
consideration of the balance of the Motion to Dismiss that the Court must necessarily
address before turning to the substantive arguments. Namely, Copeland argues that the City
of Lawton could have raised its current arguments in an earlier motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim but failed to do so. Therefore, he continues, it is precluded from raising
those arguments now.
Copeland’s argument is without merit and contrary to the law in this circuit. An
argument that could have been raised in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but
was not, remains available. 5
III.
The City of Lawton’s Potential Liability as a Municipality
a. The Parties’ Arguments on Motion to Dismiss
Now, the Court turns to the City of Lawton’s chief, substantive contention: that
Copeland has failed to allege enough facts to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
it as a municipality.
The Amended Complaint (Dkt. 118) is robustly generic and, as a result, thoroughly
vague in its legal statements and theories. But, at a high level, Copeland appears to assert
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the City of Lawton based on the use of excessive force
See Albers v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 701–04 (10th
Cir. 2014) (finding a district court’s consideration of an argument that could have been
raised in an earlier motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim but was not was harmless
error because that argument could be presented in a motion for judgment on the pleadings
or at trial).
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and the inadequate administration of medical care. He seems to allege that the use of
excessive force and deprivation of medical care are the predictable consequence of certain
affirmative municipal customs, policies, and practices or, alternatively, are the product of
a culpable failure to train or supervise. Copeland’s scattershot pleading distills to four
distinct legal theories: that an affirmative municipal custom, policy, or practice of using
excessive force caused his injuries; that a culpable failure to train or supervise with respect
to the use of excessive force caused his injuries; that an affirmative municipal custom,
policy, or practice of withholding adequate medical care caused his injuries; and that a
culpable failure to train or supervise with respect to the administration of adequate medical
care caused his injuries.
In the Motion to Dismiss, the City of Lawton argues that these claims against it, as
a municipality, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. As to the theories premised on an affirmative municipal custom, policy, or
practice, the City of Lawton argues that Copeland has failed to adequately identify such a
municipal custom, policy, or practice and, even if he has, he has failed to adequately allege
that it caused his injuries. As to the theories premised on a culpable failure to train or
supervise, the City of Lawton argues that Copeland has failed to allege that it disregarded
a known or obvious consequence of its inaction and, even if he has adequately done so, he
has failed to adequately allege that such inaction caused his injuries.
b. The Law on Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The applicable law is as follows. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides the cause
of action for the claims at issue, provides in relevant part:
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section if the
governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person
‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” 6 “But, under § 1983, local governments are
responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’” 7 “They are not vicariously liable under § 1983
for their employees’ actions.” 8
To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts
showing that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation and that a
municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind that constitutional deprivation. 9
A plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful
municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights must also demonstrate
that the municipal action was taken with “deliberate indifference” as to its known or
obvious consequences. 10
6
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)).
7
Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)) (citing Monell, 436
U.S., at 665–683).
8
Id. (citing Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 691; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989);
Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (collecting cases)).
9
Myers v. Okla. Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1318 (10th Cir. 1998).
10
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997); see also City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989).
8
A “policy or custom,” in this context, can take the form of (1) a formal regulation
or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that,
although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and
well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions of
employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by such final
policymakers of the decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority
was delegated subject to these policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure to
adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate
indifference to the injuries that may be caused. 11
Causation, meanwhile, is established if the challenged policy or practice is shown
to be “closely related to the violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected right.” 12 “This
requirement is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that the municipality was the ‘moving force’
behind the injury alleged.” 13
Finally, the “deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality
has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to
result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard
the risk of harm.” 14
11
Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting BrammerHoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2010)).
12
Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013).
13
Id. (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).
14
Quintana v. Santa Fe Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 973 F.3d 1022, 1034 (10th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998)).
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c. Assessing the Sufficiency of Copeland’s Allegations in the Amended
Complaint
With this legal framework in mind, the Court finds that Copeland has adequately
alleged facts sufficient to sustain his theory that an affirmative municipal custom, policy,
or practice of using excessive force caused his injuries. As to the existence of a municipal
custom, policy, or practice, Copeland asserts that the City of Lawton has an informal but
widespread practice of using excessive force against restrained suspects that pose no threat
or potential threat to officers or jailers. To that end, he alleges that he was forcefully thrown
into his cell and a police cruiser several times by several different officers and jailers over
the course of his approximately thirty-six hours in custody. Taken together, these
allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege an informal municipal custom at this juncture.
As for causation, the Court can infer that the aforementioned informal practice was
the moving force behind the alleged unconstitutional use of force by virtue of the ubiquity
and frequency of the use of such force. The Court therefore rejects the City of Lawton’s
argument that Copeland has not alleged facts sufficient to show the requisite municipal
custom, policy, or practice and causation.
The Court also finds that Copeland has adequately alleged facts sufficient to sustain
his theory that a culpable failure to train or supervise with respect to the use of excessive
force caused his injuries. As explained earlier, to sustain a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
predicated on a failure to adequately train or supervise, a claimant must demonstrate that
such failure results from “deliberate indifference” to the injuries that may result. Such
“deliberate indifference” is shown where the municipality has actual or constructive notice
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that its failure to train or supervise is substantially certain to result in a constitutional
violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm. Copeland
has adequately alleged deliberate indifference for much the same reason that he has
adequately alleged an informal municipal custom: He has pleaded facts demonstrating a
recurrent and widespread use of excessive force. If there is, indeed, such use of excessive
force, then it is reasonable to infer that those in charge were or should have been aware of
it. That is enough to establish deliberate indifference at this stage.
As to causation, the Court is satisfied, for purposes of this early inquiry into the
sufficiency of the complaint, that additional training about, or supervision over, the use of
force could have curbed these excesses. The Court therefore rejects the City of Lawton’s
argument that Copeland has insufficiently alleged facts showing deliberate indifference
and causation as to this claim.
As for the claim that an affirmative municipal custom, policy, or practice of
withholding medical care caused his injuries, however, the Court finds the Amended
Complaint deficient. Copeland rattles off a boilerplate list of supposed municipal customs,
policies, and practices that purportedly deprive detainees of adequate medical care. For
example, he alleges the City of Lawton has a custom, policy, or practice of “[u]ntimely
medical examinations and treatment,” of “[u]nderstaffing . . . medical personnel,” and of
disallowing “transport to off-site [medical] providers.” But Copeland fails to provide any
facts in support of these allegations. He points to no formal regulation or policy statement
or evidence of other instances of like deprivation demonstrating an informal custom
amounting to a permanent, well-settled, and widespread practice. Likewise, he points to no
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decision of an employee with final policymaking authority or any ratification by a final
policymaker of the decisions of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to
that policymaker’s review and approval. In effect, Copeland merely describes the purported
constitutional violation and proclaims it to be standard municipal operating procedure. But
under Iqbal and Twombly, that is not enough. 15
In fact, Copeland effectively alleges the opposite—that there is a custom, policy, or
practice of providing timely medical assistance. According to Copeland, an officer brought
him to the hospital immediately after his car accident. After that, as he was being brought
from the hospital to the jail, the transporting officer turned around to bring him back to the
emergency room for a second time. Then, later, he was brought back to the hospital for a
third time.
And even if Copeland did provide sufficient facts to nudge his allegation that there
was a municipal custom, policy, or practice of withholding adequate medical care across
the line to plausibility, there is no allegation of fact or reasonable inference that such
custom, policy, or practice caused the deprivation of medical care of which he now
complains. Rather, to the extent he was deprived of medical treatment, that deprivation is
the product of successive clearances given by medical professionals who may have been
negligent in clearing him. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Copeland’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983
15
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (Although for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we
“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
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claims against the City of Lawton predicated on a theory of a municipal custom, policy, or
practice of withholding adequate medical care.
Copeland’s claim that a culpable failure to train or supervise with respect to the
administration of adequate medical care caused his injuries fares no better. As mentioned
earlier, to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 resting on a theory of failure to
train or supervise, a claimant must furnish facts sufficient to allege, among other things,
deliberate indifference. Again, deliberate indifference is shown where the municipality has
actual or constructive notice that its failure to train or supervise is substantially certain to
result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard
the risk of harm. Here, Copeland avers that “Defendants knew and/or it was obvious” that
the failure to adequately train or supervise staff “with respect to the proper assessment,
classification[,] and treatment of inmates with serious medical needs including head and
neck trauma” and with respect to the identification, assessment, and reaction to emergent
medical situations “posed an excessive risk to the health and safety of inmates.” Defendants
nevertheless “disregarded th[ese] known and/or obvious risk[s],” Copeland continues. But,
unlike with his excessive force claim, he mentions no pattern of similar incidents that
should have alerted policymakers to the likely prospect of further constitutional violations
absent ameliorative training or supervision, and he provides no facts that would suggest
that policymakers actually knew of ongoing or prospective constitutional violations that
could be rectified with such training or supervision. In effect, Copeland relies solely on
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legal conclusions couched as factual allegations and the bald assertion that “it was obvious”
to supply the requisite deliberate indifference. But, again, that is not enough. 16
And even if the Court were to accept Copeland’s argument that the risk posed by
these failures to train “was obvious,” and therefore deliberate indifference is alleged, what
is not obvious is how additional training or supervision “with respect to the proper
assessment, classification[,] and treatment of inmates with serious medical needs including
head and neck trauma” and the identification, assessment, and reaction to emergent medical
situations would have made any difference in the face of the successive opinions of medical
professionals. In other words, Copeland’s claim that a culpable failure to train caused him
to be deprived of adequate medical treatment also fails because he does not plausibly allege
causation, as is necessary to state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as
to the claims of municipal liability against the City of Lawton predicated on the deprivation
of adequate medical care and DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to the claims of
municipal liability against the City of Lawton predicated on the use of excessive force.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of May 2021.
16
See id.
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