Johnson v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER -- The Court has reviewed the medical evidence of record, the transcript of the administrative hearing, the decision of the ALJ, and the pleadings and briefs of the parties. Based on the forgoing analysis, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shon T. Erwin on 1/31/19. (mc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LINDA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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Case No. CIV-18-601-STE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying Plaintiff’s
applications for benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner has answered
and filed a transcript of the administrative record (hereinafter TR. ____). The parties have
consented to jurisdiction over this matter by a United States magistrate judge pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The parties have briefed their positions, and the matter is now at issue. Based on
the Court’s review of the record and the issues presented, the Court AFFIRMS the
Commissioner’s decision.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initially and on reconsideration, the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s

applications for benefits. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued
an unfavorable decision. (TR. 25-42). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

review. (TR. 3-5). Thus, the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the
Commissioner.
II.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process required by agency

regulations. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520 & 416.920. At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since June 2, 2013, her alleged onset date. (TR. 27). At step
two, the ALJ determined that Ms. Johnson had the following severe impairments:
schizoaffective disorder, depressive type; unspecified anxiety disorder; obesity; status
post C5-C6 cervical fusion and status post anterior cervical fusion at C5-C7; degenerative
changes at C4-C5; cervical radiculopathy; disc space narrowing with hypertrophic change
of the lumbar spine; and history of stimulant use disorder (methamphetamine). (TR. 27).
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal
any of the presumptively disabling impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1 (TR. 29).
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Johnson was unable to perform any past
relevant work. (TR. 40). Even so, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had retained the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to:
[P]erform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)
except that the claimant can perform simple and routine tasks consistent
with unskilled work, with relatively few changes in workplace tasks,
processes and practices, involving no interaction with the general public and
no more than occasional, superficial interaction with coworkers and
supervisors (interaction that is brief, succinct, and task oriented); can
perform tasks not in a fast paced, high volume production criteria
environment, with the learning of tasks provided with clear written
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instructions, reinforced by demonstration; and the claimant will do best
working with things and data rather than people.
(TR. 32). At the hearing, the ALJ presented the RFC limitations to a vocational expert
(VE) to determine whether there were other jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform. (TR. 91-92). Given the limitations, the VE identified three jobs from the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). (TR. 92). At step five, the ALJ adopted the
testimony of the VE and concluded that Ms. Johnson was not disabled based on her ability
to perform the identified jobs. (TR. 41-42).
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final “decision to determin[e] whether the

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the
correct legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir.
2010). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
While the court considers whether the ALJ followed the applicable rules of law in
weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, the court will “neither reweigh
the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.” Vigil v. Colvin, 805
F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV.

ISSUES PRESENTED
On appeal, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ committed legal error in her evaluation of two

medical opinions.

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V.

NO ERROR IN THE ALJ’S EVALUATION OF MEDICAL OPINIONS
Ms. Johnson alleges that the ALJ erred in her evaluation of opinions from State

Agency psychologist, Dr. Barbara St. Clair and treating psychiatrist, Dr. Blanca Osorio.
The Court disagrees.
A.

The ALJ’s Duties in Evaluating Medical Opinions

Regardless of its source, the ALJ has a duty to evaluate every medical opinion in
the record. Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c) & 416.927(c). The weight given each opinion will vary according to the
relationship between the claimant and medical professional. Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215.
For example, in evaluating a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ must follow a two-pronged
analysis. First, the ALJ must determine, then explain, whether the opinion is entitled to
controlling weight. Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004).
This analysis, in turn, consists of two phases. First, an ALJ must consider whether
the opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques” and consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Policy
Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Giving Controlling Weight to Treating Source
Medical Opinions, 1996 WL 374188, at 2 (July 2, 1996) (SSR 96-2p) (internal quotations
omitted). If controlling weight is declined, the ALJ must assess the opinion under a series
of factors which are considered when assessing any medical opinion, regardless of its
source. These factors include: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the
frequency of examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship;
including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or testing performed; (3)

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the degree to which the physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4)
consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the
physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6) other
factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to support or contradict the opinion.

Krausner v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 2011); 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1527(c) &
416.927(c).
Although the ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor, the reasons stated must
be “sufficiently specific” to permit meaningful appellate review. See Oldham v. Astrue,
509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). If the ALJ rejects an opinion completely, he must
give “specific, legitimate reasons” for doing so. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300
(10th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
B.

No Error in the Evaluation of Dr. St. Clair’s Opinion

The ALJ properly considered and evaluated the medical opinions from Dr. St. Clair.
1.

Dr. St. Clair’s Opinion and the ALJ’s Related Findings

On September 14, 2015, Dr. St. Clair performed a mental status examination on
Ms. Johnson, as a consultant for the Social Security Administration. (TR. 1384-1390). Dr.
St. Clair diagnosed Plaintiff with Schizoaffective Disorder, Depressive type and
Unspecified Anxiety Disorder. (TR. 1389). Relevant to the current appeal, Dr. St. Clair
rated Plaintiff’s abilities in two work-related areas. (TR. 1390).
Regarding Plaintiff’s ability to understand, carry out, and remember simple
instructions, Dr. St. Clair stated that Ms. Johnson had “mild difficulty with short term
memory which may interfere with carrying out instructions accurately.” (TR. 1390). To

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compensate for this difficulty, however, Dr. St. Clair suggested “repeating instructions or
giving instructions in written form[.]” (TR. 1390). Regarding Plaintiff’s ability to deal with
changes in a routine work setting, Dr. St. Clair stated that Ms. Johnson “may have
difficulty with the rigors and demands often found in the work place due to emotional
lability and mental inertia. [Plaintiff] would have minimal difficulty adjusting to changes
in a routine work setting.” (TR. 1390). 1
In the administrative decision, the ALJ recited Dr. St. Clair’s opinions, practically
verbatim,2 and noted her specific findings regarding Plaintiff’s:
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mild difficulty with short term memory and

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minimal difficulty adjusting to changes in a routine work setting.

(TR. 39). The ALJ then accorded the opinions “partial weight,” stating:
The undersigned accords partial weight to Dr. St. Claire’s [sic] opinion to
the extent it is consistent with the findings herein. However, some of her
opinion is vague, including that she does not define the terms mild and
minimal difficulty in any work related functional terms. Moreover, Dr. St.
Claire [sic] indicates that the claimant only may have difficulty with the
rigors and demands often found in the workplace. Dr. St. Claire’s [sic]
examination findings are generally consistent with the limitations noted in
the residual functional capacity above, including that the claimant
demonstrated the ability to think abstractly when interpreting simple
proverbs or metaphors, but had difficulty when the constructs became more
novel and complex in nature. However, she demonstrated strength in her
ability to problem solve everyday situations, and her social judgment

Dr. St. Clair also rated Plaintiff’s abilities to manage her finances and respond to supervision,
co-workers, and work pressures in a work setting, TR. 1389-1390, but Plaintiff does not challenge
this portion of the psychologist’s opinion.
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(TR. 36-37).

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appeared adequate. Additionally, her estimated intelligence was in the
average range, and she appeared to have an adequate knowledge base.
(TR. 39).
2.

Plaintiff’s Allegations of Error and the Court’s Analysis

Ms. Johnson presents three challenges to the ALJ’s rationales for according Dr. St.
Clair’s opinion only “partial weight.” (ECF No. 13:3-7). None of the theories are valid.3
Plaintiff initially takes issue with the fact that the ALJ deemed Dr. St. Clair’s opinion
as “vague,” because she failed to define the terms “mild” when referring to Plaintiff’s
short-term memory and “minimal” when describing Plaintiff’s difficulty adjusting to
changes in a routine work setting. Ms. Johnson states: “There was absolutely no reason
for Dr. St. Claire [sic] to define the terms “mild” and “minimal,” because she was already
using these terms in relation to Social Security terminology, and the ALJ should have
known this.” (ECF No. 13:4-5). The Court rejects this argument for two reasons.
First, Plaintiff neither provides a legal basis for her argument, nor defines the terms
“in relation to Social Security terminology” in a way which would have undermined the
ALJ’s conclusion. See Keyes–Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012)
(“We will consider and discuss only those contentions that have been adequately briefed
for review.”).

In her challenge to the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. St. Clair’s opinions, Plaintiff also states “there
should have been corresponding limitations related to this finding[.]” (ECF No. 13:7). The Court
will not address this statement, as Plaintiff fails to identify a particular “finding” or explain what
limitations she believes the ALJ had wrongly omitted. See Kirkpatrick v. Colvin, 663 F. App’x at
649 (noting that “it isn’t [the Court’s] obligation to search the record and construct a party’s
arguments.”); Murphy v. Astrue, 2011 WL 2144610, at * 6 (W.D. Okla. May 14, 2011) (rejecting
allegation of error for “failure to develop the factual—and legal—bases for [the] argument.”).
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Second, the import of the ALJ’s rationale deeming Dr. St. Clair’s opinion as “vague”
was that she “d[id] not define the terms mild and minimal difficulty in any work related

functional terms.” (TR. 39) (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit has held that an ALJ
may properly reject a medical opinion as “vague” where the opinion “did not contain an
assessment of the nature or severity of [the claimant’s] physical limitations or any
information about what type of activities he could perform.” See Marshall v. Astrue, 315
F. App’x 757, 760, n. 2 (10th Cir. 2009). This is precisely what the ALJ did in the instant
case and the Court finds no error.
Next, Ms. Johnson challenges the portion of the ALJ’s opinion which stated that
“Dr. St. Claire [sic] indicates that the claimant only may have difficulty with the rigors and
demands often found in the workplace.” (ECF No. 13:5-6) (citing TR. 39). Specifically,
Ms. Johnson argues that the ALJ erroneously omitted Dr. St. Clair’s findings which stated
that Plaintiff’s difficulties with workplace rigors were due to the fact that Plaintiff suffered
from “emotional lability and mental inertia.” (ECF No. 13:5). Plaintiff contends that this
portion of Dr. St. Clair’s opinion “provides support for why Dr. St. Clair is making her
opinion,” and the ALJ’s omission of the underlying cause resulted in an improper finding
that the opinion was “vague.” (ECF No. 13:5).
The Court agrees that the ALJ omitted the portion of Dr. St. Clair’s opinion which
stated that Ms. Johnson’s difficulty with the rigors and demands of the workplace was
because she had suffered from emotional lability and mental inertia. Compare TR. 36 with
TR. 1390. However, the ALJ did not omit this portion of the opinion in an effort to
thereafter conclude that the opinion was vague. The ALJ’s vagueness rationale was based

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on the fact that Dr. St. Clair had not defined Ms. Johnson’s “minimal difficulty” in dealing
with workplace rigors and demands in any specific work-related terms, not because Dr.
St. Clair had failed to support her opinion. As discussed, the ALJ’s rationale was proper
and the Court will not disturb this finding. See supra, Marshall.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Dr. St. Clair’s opinion was “not in the least bit vague,”
but instead supported by the findings of Ms. Johnson’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Blanca
Osorio. (ECF No. 13:6) (emphasis in original). In support, Plaintiff states: (1) Dr. Osorio
noted that Plaintiff was “labile and anxious looking[,] [t]herefore Dr. Osorio is finding that
Ms. Johnson is emotionally unstable” and (2) Dr. Osorio noted that Plaintiff “has frequent
panic attacks” which “support[s] Dr. St. Claire’s [sic] critical finding that Ms. Johnson will
have difficulty with the rigors and demands often found in the work place due to
emotional lability and mental inertia.” (ECF No. 13:6). The Court rejects Plaintiff’s
argument.
Ms. Johnson makes unfounded assumptions regarding Dr. Osorio’s statement that
Plaintiff was “labile and anxious looking.” Without support, Ms. Johnson boldly asserts
that this finding equates to a conclusion that Dr. Osorio had deemed Plaintiff “emotionally
unstable.” Indeed, the Court finds nothing in Dr. Osorio’s records indicating she had
rendered such an opinion. See TR. 1335-1357. Also, again without support, Plaintiff states
that Dr. Osorio’s findings of “frequent panic attacks” somehow equates to a finding that
Plaintiff would suffer difficulty with workplace rigors and demands. But neither Dr. St.
Clair nor Dr. Osorio had made such a finding. To accept Plaintiff’s arguments would
require the Court to re-weigh the evidence, which it will not do. See Vigil v. Colvin, 805

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F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that the court will “neither reweigh the evidence
nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
C.

No Error in the Evaluation of Dr. Osorio’s Opinion

The ALJ properly considered and evaluated the medical opinions from Dr. Osorio.
1.

Dr. Osorio’s Opinion and the ALJ’s Related Findings

The record contains evidence that Dr. Osorio provided psychiatric care to Plaintiff
from May 13, 2014 through June 26, 2015. (TR. 1335-1357). On July 8, 2015, Dr. Osorio
completed a “Mental Capacity Assessment,” (MCA) which evaluated Plaintiff’s limitations
in five work-related areas. (TR. 701-704).
In the administrative decision, the ALJ summarized a portion of Dr. Osorio’s
treatment notes, along with some of Dr. Osorio’s specific opinions set forth in the MCA.
(TR. 35, 38). The ALJ then completely rejected the MCA, stating:
[T]he opinion expressed is quite conclusory, providing very little explanation
of the evidence relied on in forming that opinion. Moreover, the opinion is
inconsistent with Dr. Osorio’s treatment notes that reflect that the claimant
had essentially normal examination findings as noted above, with the only
slightly abnormal finding being that the claimant had fair insight and
judgment. As such, no weight is accorded to this opinion.
(TR. 38-39).
2.

Plaintiff’s Allegations of Error and the Court’s Analysis

As stated, if an ALJ fails to accord controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion,
she must evaluate the opinion, utilizing a series of factors. See 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1527(c) &
416.927(c). Although the ALJ need not explicitly discuss each factor, the reasons stated
must be “sufficiently specific” to permit meaningful appellate review. See Oldham v.

Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). If the ALJ rejects an opinion completely,
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she must give “specific, legitimate reasons” for doing so. Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d
1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). In seemingly inconsistent
arguments, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “failed to weigh any of the pertinent factors”
and then also erred with respect to the factors she did discuss. (ECF No. 13:11). The
Court disagrees.
The Court first concludes that the ALJ properly assessed Dr. Osorio’s opinion
utilizing the framework referenced above. In support of rejecting the MCA, the ALJ stated
that the opinion was conclusory and inconsistent with the psychiatrist’s treating records.
(TR. 38-39). These rationales were specific and legitimate and the Court finds no error.

See Marshall, 315 F. App’x at 761 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming ALJ’s rejection of treating
physician’s opinion which focused only on the consistency between the opinion and the
entire medical record, noting that “[a]lthough the ALJ’s discussion could and should have
been more thorough, … [the ALJ] stated adequate reasons for rejecting [the treating
physician’s] opinion.”) (citing Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007)
(declining to require the ALJ to apply and make specific findings concerning all six
factors).
Next, Ms. Johnson challenges each of the ALJ’s rationales, but the Court finds no
merit in Plaintiff’s arguments.
First, Plaintiff states that the ALJ improperly concluded that Dr. Osorio’s opinion
was “conclusory, providing very little explanation of the evidence relied on in forming that
opinion.” (ECF No. 13:8) (citing TR. 38). In support, and without reference to any specific
piece of evidence, Ms. Johnson simply states: “Dr. Osorio is a treating physician and her

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corresponding treating records in the medical evidence of record (MER) corroborate her
[MCA] findings.” (ECF No. 13:8). Even if Plaintiff had cited evidence which supported the
MCA findings, Plaintiff’s argument misses the mark. The ALJ’s first rationale, regarding
the conclusory nature of the MCA and that document’s lack of evidentiary explanation
had nothing to do with whether Dr. Osorio’s treatment records had supported the MCA.
That discussion was reserved for the ALJ’s second rationale, which Plaintiff separately
challenges. See ECF No. 13:8-10. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ had
properly relied on the lack of supporting explanation within the MCA to reject that opinion.

See Castellano v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994);
(“A treating physician’s opinion may be rejected if his conclusions are not supported by
specific findings.”); Kellogg v. Barnhart, 33 F. App’x 459, 461 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting
that the ALJ did not err in rejecting a treating source’s opinion that was “conclusory and
unsupported.”).
Second, Plaintiff states that the ALJ’s finding regarding Dr. Osorio’s opinion as
inconsistent with her treatment notes is “just false.” (ECF No. 13:8-9). In support, Ms.
Johnson cites: (1) treatment records from Dr. Osorio which document Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints; (2) Dr. Osorio’s diagnoses of Major Depressive Disorder and Panic Disorder;
(3) treatment notes from Dr. Osorio which stated that Ms. Johnson was “labile and
anxious looking” with her mood/affect “not good;” and (4) the fact that Dr. Osorio had
prescribed medication for Ms. Johnson. (ECF No. 13:9-10). Although accurate, these
representations of the record do not render “false” the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Osorio’s MCA
as inconsistent with her treatment notes.

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In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ stated: “Moreover, the [MCA] opinion is
inconsistent with Dr. Osorio’s treatment notes that reflect that the claimant had
essentially normal examination findings as noted above, with the only slightly abnormal
finding being that the claimant had fair insight and judgment. As such, no weight is
accorded to this opinion.” (TR. 38-39). The “essentially normal examination findings as
noted above” referenced the ALJ’s summary of Dr. Osorio’s treatment notes, which found
Plaintiff to have:
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been alert and oriented;

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made good eye contact;

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been cooperative, with good hygiene, and normal speech;

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exhibited a coherent and linear thought process/thought content; and

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denied suicidal and homicidal ideation.

(TR. 35, 38). Following her reliance on these “essentially normal findings,” the ALJ noted
that the “only slightly abnormal finding” was Dr. Osorio’s notation that Plaintiff had
exhibited “fair insight and judgment.” Thus, after weighing the evidence, the ALJ: (1)
rejected Dr. Osorio’s MCA, finding that it was inconsistent with her treatment notes and
(2) explained her conclusion, relying on specific evidence of record. Accordingly, the Court
affirms the ALJ’s second rationale rejecting Dr. Osorio’s MCA as “specific and legitimate”
and “sufficiently specific” to permit meaningful appellate review. To accept Plaintiff’s
argument to reach a different conclusion would involve a re-weighing of the evidence,
which the Court cannot do. See supra, Vigil.

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ORDER
The Court has reviewed the medical evidence of record, the transcript of the
administrative hearing, the decision of the ALJ, and the pleadings and briefs of the parties.
Based on the forgoing analysis, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
ENTERED on January 31, 2019.

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