Reynolds v. Bridges

Filing 27

ORDER adopting 23 Report and Recommendation and denying 15 Motion to Dismiss. This action remains referred consistent with the initial case referral. Signed by Judge David L. Russell on 3/6/2025. (tb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
FRANK M. REYNOLDS,
Petitioner,
v.
CARRIE BRIDGES,
Respondent.

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Case No. CIV-24-641-R

ORDER
This matter is before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation issued
by United States Magistrate Judge Chris M. Stephens [Doc. No. 23]. Petitioner filed a
Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 1] challenging a
criminal judgment of the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Respondent filed
a Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 15] arguing that the Petition was untimely.
Judge Stephens recommends that Respondent’s Motion be denied because, although
Petitioner filed his Petition one day after the limitations period, he is entitled to equitable
tolling for a period of seven days, which renders his filing timely.
Respondent did not file an objection to the Report and has therefore waived
further review of all issues addressed in the Report. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d
656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. 2121 East 30th Street, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th
Cir. 1996). Although the Report concluded that the Petition was not time-barred, Petitioner
has filed a partial Objection [Doc. No. 26] which requires the Court to make a de novo

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determination of those portions of the Report to which a specific objection is made. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
Petitioner objects to Judge Stephen’s conclusion that the period of time that elapsed
while Petitioner’s improperly filed First Application for Post-Conviction Relief (FAPCR)
was pending is not subject to equitable tolling. As Judge Stephens explained in his Report,
equitable tolling of the limitations period may be appropriate “when a prisoner actively
pursues judicial remedies but files a defective pleading during the statutory period.” Burger
v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1141 (10th Cir. 2003). However, to warrant equitable tolling in
that situation, a petitioner must generally make “reasonable, diligent efforts to comply with
procedural rules.” Loftis v. Chrisman, 812 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2016). Judge
Stephens concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that it was reasonable for him to
believe that his FAPCR was properly filed and that Petitioner should have been aware that
his filing lacked the required verification page.
In his Objection, Petitioner contends that he did not receive a complete copy of his
FAPCR, which prevented him from identifying any defects in the filing. The state court
docket sheet reflects that a copy of the FAPCR was sent to Petitioner and, further,
Oklahoma’s procedural rules are clear that a post-conviction action “is commenced by
filing a verified ‘application for post-conviction relief.’” Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1081.
Plaintiff’s FAPCR did not comply with this rule and the Court is not persuaded that he has
met his burden of showing that it was reasonable for him to believe his filing was sufficient
to ensure state court review or that he acted with the requisite diligence in filing his

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FAPCR. The Court therefore agrees with Judge Stephens that equitable tolling for the
period that the FAPCR was pending is not warranted.
But the Petition is timely regardless. Judge Stephens recommends that the
limitations period be equitably tolled for the seven-day period that Petitioner was waiting
for prison officials to respond to his request for financial information, which would render
the Petitioner timely filed. Neither party objects to this recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 28] is therefore ADOPTED and
Respondent’s Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss Habeas Corpus Petition as Time-Barred
Under the Statute of Limitations [Doc. No. 15] is DENIED. This action remains referred
consistent with the initial case referral.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of March, 2025.

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