United States of America v. Hadlock

Filing 65

ORDER: Plaintiffs have presented evidence of a prima facie case that Defendant violated the FHAA. Defendant has not offered any evidence to meet her burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 48 is GRANTED. Please access entire text by document number hyperlink. Ordered and Signed on 01/27/10 by Magistrate Judge Mark D. Clarke. (rsm)

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FILED" 10 JAN 2714:Q(JusDc-ORt1 I N T H E UNITED STATES DISTRICT C O U R T F O R T H E DISTRICT O F O R E G O N M E D F O R D DIVISION UNITED STATES O F AMERICA, Case N u m b e r C V 0 8 - 3 0 7 4 - C L Plaintiff and F A I R H O U S I N G COUNCIL OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Intervenor v. ORDER VIRGINIA RUTH H A D L O C K Defendant. C l a r k e , M a g i s t r a t e Judge: P l a i n t i f f U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a and P l a i n t i f f - I n t e r v e n o r F a i r H o u s i n g o f O r e g o n ( " P l a i n t i f f s " ) b r i n g t h i s a c t i o n a g a i n s t D e f e n d a n t V i r g i n i a R u t h H a d l o c k ( " D e f e n d a n t " ) for violation o f t h e federal F a i r Housing Act, Title VIII o f the Civil Rights Act o f 1968, as a m e n d e d b y the F a i r H o u s i n g Amendments Act o f 1988 ("FRAA"), and the Oregon F a i r H o u s i n g Act. P l a i n t i f f s a l s o a l l e g e u n l a w f u l t r a d e p r a c t i c e s and n e g l i g e n c e u n d e r O r e g o n law. (CompI. i n Intervention ("CompI.") ~ 1.) T h e y seek monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief. This court has j u r i s d i c t i o n under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for claims arising u n d e r t h e laws o f the United States, under 42 U . S . c . § 3612(0) for violation o f t h e Fair Housing Act, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for supplemental jurisdiction o f state law claims. Plaintiffs filed this motion for partial summary judgment! arguing there are no genuine issues o f material fact as to whether Defendant violated the FHAA, specifically statute 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (c). (Mem. in Supp. o f PIs.' Joint Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("PIs.' Mem.") 2.) F o r the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion (#48) is granted. I. Standards for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56(c), summary judgment "should be rendered, i f the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter o f l a w . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002). T h e c o u r t c a n n o t w e i g h the evidence o r d e t e n n i n e the truth b u t m a y o n l y d e t e n n i n e w h e t h e r there is a genuine issue o f fact. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 7 9 6 , 8 0 0 (9th Cir. 2002). A n issue o f fact is genuine " ' i f the evidence is such that a reasonable j u r y could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The moving party must carry the initial burden o f proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). The moving party meets this burden b y identifying for the court portions o f the record on file which demonstrate the absence o f any genuine issue o f material fact. Id.; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane). In assessing ! T h e court does not address Plaintiffs' claims for violation o f Oregon Fair Housing Act, unlawful trade p r a c t i c e s , a n d negligence. whether a p a r t y has m e t its burden, the court views the evidence in the light m o s t favorable to the n o n - m o v i n g party. A l l e n v. C i t y o f Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995). All reasonable inferences are drawn i n favor o f the non-movant. Gibson v. C o u n t y o f Washoe, 290 F . 3 d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002). I f the m o v i n g p a r t y meets its burden w i t h a properly supported motion, the b u r d e n t h e n shifts to the opposing p a r t y to present specific facts w h i c h show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes", 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995); see A n d e r s o n v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 & n A (1986). S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t s h o u l d b e g r a n t e d for t h e m o v a n t , i f a p p r o p r i a t e , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y s i g n i f i c a n t p r o b a t i v e e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g to support t h e opposing party's theory o f the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First C o m m e r c e Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 9 9 1 , 9 9 3 - 9 4 (9th Cir. 1980); First Nat'l B a n k v. Cities Servo Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968). Conclusory allegations, unsupported b y factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F . 2 d 1 0 4 0 , 1 0 4 5 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 9 ) . I n s t e a d , t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y m u s t , b y a f f i d a v i t o r as o t h e r w i s e provided b y Rule 56, designate specific facts w h i c h show there is a genuine issue for trial. D e v e r e a u x , 2 6 3 F . 3 d a t 1076. II. Facts Defendant owns at least three single-family dwellings that she has rented to various individuals o v e r the p a s t several years. She is involved i n the renting o f these dwellings and c o l l e c t i n g rent. (PIs.' Concise Statement o f Facts i n Supp. o f Pis.' Joint M o t i o n for Partial Summ. J. ("CSMF") ,-r 1.) O n approximately June 7, 2007, Ms. Jennifer J o h n s o n Stevens contacted D e f e n d a n t a n d Order 3 inquired about one o f h e r recently advertised rentals. (CSMF ~ 3.) Plaintiffs assert that at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n , D e f e n d a n t a s k e d Ms. S t e v e n s i f s h e h a d a n y c h i l d r e n a n d f u r t h e r t o l d h e r t h a t s h e w a s n o t r e n t i n g to a n y o n e w i t h c h i l d r e n . ( C S M F ~ 4 . ) D e f e n d a n t d e n i e s t h e s e a l l e g a t i o n s e x p l a i n i n g t h a t she does n o t r e c a l l w i t h c l a r i t y t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . S h e a d m i t s t h a t s h e a l w a y s asks p r o s p e c t i v e r e n t e r s t h e n u m b e r o f p e o p l e t h a t w i l l b e l i v i n g i n t h e rental. (Def.'s R e s p o n s e to PIs.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("RCSMF") ~ 4.) Shortly after this c o n v e r s a t i o n , M s . S t e v e n s c o n t a c t e d the F a i r H o u s i n g C o u n c i l o f O r e g o n ( " F H C O " ) b e c a u s e s h e w a s c o n c e r n e d t h a t D e f e n d a n t w a s d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a g a i n s t r e n t e r s w i t h c h i l d r e n . ( C S M F ~ 5.) T h e F H C O is a p r i v a t e , n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n l o c a t e d i n P o r t l a n d , O r e g o n , w h i c h p r o m o t e s e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y i n t h e renting, p u r c h a s i n g , financing, a n d a d v e r t i s i n g o f h o u s i n g a n d e l i m i n a t i o n o f a l l f o r m s o f i l l e g a l h o u s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . T h e F H C O a t t e m p t s to e l i m i n a t e h o u s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b y i n v e s t i g a t i n g allegations o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d c o n d u c t i n g t e s t i n g o f h o u s i n g f a c i l i t i e s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y h o u s i n g is p r o v i d e d . ( C S M F ~ ~ 6 - 7 . ) T h e F H C O c o n d u c t e d t e s t i n g o f D e f e n d a n t ' s p r a c t i c e s from J u l y 2 6 t h r o u g h J u l y 2 8 , 2 0 0 7 , to d e t e r m i n e i f v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e F H A A h a d o c c u r r e d o r w e r e o c c u r r i n g . ( C S M F ~ ~ 8 - 9 . ) As p a r t o f its i n v e s t i g a t i o n , s e v e r a l t e s t e r s c a l l e d D e f e n d a n t i n q u i r i n g a b o u t r e n t a l p r o p e r t y . Tester G a m m a2 reported that Defendant asked the age o f his son. H e reported that Defendant stated, "I don't k n o w about that. About having a son there at the house." ( C S M F ~ 10.) P l a i n t i f f s also a r g u e D e f e n d a n t t o l d a H U D i n v e s t i g a t o r t h a t s h e " w o u l d n ' t h a v e a n e i g h t y e a r - o l d kid live there because he would b e bringing kids to the house all the time and n o b o d y w a s going to b e there." Defendant also stated that "the kids would b u m up the house" and did n o t w a n t 2 T e s t e r s w e r e a s s i g n e d p s e u d o n y m s f o r s e c u r i t y p u r p o s e s . (Aff. o f D e n n i s S t e i n m a n i n S u p p . o f P I s . ' J o i n t M o t i o n for P a r t i a l Summ. 1., Ex. 3, ~ 6.). Order 4 children at the h o u s e alone. ( C S M F ~10.) T e s t e r A l p h a c a l l e d t o i n q u i r e a b o u t a r e n t a l for h e r s e l f a n d h e r e i g h t y e a r - o l d d a u g h t e r . D e f e n d a n t t o l d A l p h a t h a t s h e h a d a o n e b e d r o o m h o u s e a n d " w o u l d n ' t c a r e for a c h i l d l e f t a l o n e . " S h e a s k e d A l p h a w h o w o u l d c a r e for t h e c h i l d w h i l e s h e w a s a t w o r k . A f t e r l e a m i n g t h a t A l p h a ' s m o t h e r w o u l d w a t c h h e r c h i l d , D e f e n d a n t a s k e d for t h e n a m e a n d e m p l o y m e n t s t a t u s o f A l p h a ' s m o t h e r . ( C S M F ~ 11.) T e s t e r B e t a c a l l e d i n q u i r i n g a b o u t a rental, a n d she w a s a s k e d h o w m a n y w e r e i n h e r family. U p o n l e a r n i n g t h a t B e t a w a s s i n g l e , D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t a s k a n y f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s a b o u t f a m i l y . D e f e n d a n t a l s o n o t e d i n d e s c r i b i n g t h e h o u s e , "It's j u s t a s m a l l h o u s e . I w o n ' t r e n t t o f a m i l i e s . " ( C S M F ~ 12.) D e f e n d a n t r e s p o n d e d s i m i l a r l y w h e n t e s t e r E p s i l o n c a l l e d a b o u t a rental. D e f e n d a n t a s k e d a b o u t t h e n u m b e r o f p e o p l e i n E p s i l o n ' s family, a n d u p o n h e a r i n g E p s i l o n w a s s i n g l e , D e f e n d a n t n o t e d , " [ g J o o d b e c a u s e it's n o g o o d f o r c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e i t ' s j u s t a o n e b e d r o o m . " I n o t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h i n v e s t i g a t o r s , D e f e n d a n t h a s also s a i d t h a t t h e h o u s e w a s n o t g o o d f o r c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e o f t h e h e a v y t r a f f i c o n M a i n S t r e e t . ( C S M F ~ 13.) D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e c o n v e r s a t i o n s o n l y s h o w t h a t s h e is c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e w e l f a r e o f children. S h e d e n i e s t h a t h e r c o m m e n t s e x p r e s s a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y attitude. ( R C S M F ~ 7.) S h e e x p l a i n s t h a t s h e w a s o n l y e x p r e s s i n g h e r p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s a n d d i d n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e , p o i n t i n g o u t that s h e still invited callers to view the house. ( R C S M F ~ 10.) F H C O f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e U.S. D e p a r t m e n t o f H o u s i n g a n d U r b a n D e v e l o p m e n t ( " H O O " ) a l l e g i n g t h a t D e f e n d a n t d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t families w i t h c h i l d r e n i n t h e r e n t a l o f h e r properties o n J u l y 2 8 , 2 0 0 7 . O n January 16, 2008, a H O O investigator interviewed D e f e n d a n t Order 5 and her husband Fred Hadlock, who is now deceased. In that interview Defendant confirmed that she feared a young child would burn her house, and she admitted to telling this fear to one tester. (CSMF ~ 16.) P l a i n t i f f United States filed its complaint in U.S. District, District o f Oregon, on July 9, 2008, and Plaintiff-Intervenor FHCO filed its motion to intervene on September 2 3 , 2 0 0 8 . Parties soon began discovery. At a deposition held on April 29, 2009, Defendant explained that she did not want to rent to a man and his child because she is concerned about pedophiles. She has this fear even though she has not had a problem with pedophiles on any o f her properties. Also at deposition, Defendant admitted that she has never been interested in renting her 2234 Main Street property to families, noting that it is right next door to her. She stated, "I would not rent to them [renters with children], that's put it plain; I would not rent to them, no." (CSMF ~ 18.) She also later confirmed that she has rented to many families in the past. (RCSMF ~ 13.) Discovery was completed on July 13, 2009, and Plaintiffs filed this motion for partial summary judgment on August 2 4 , 2 0 0 9 . The court heard oral argument on January 19, 2010. III. FHAA Protects the Class o f Familial Status from Housing Discrimination FHAA prohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing o f dwellings based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, familial status, and handicap. Familial status discrimination refers to discrimination against parents or other custodial persons domiciled with children under the age o f 1 8 . 4 2 U.S.C. § 3604; see City o f Edmunds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 728 n. 1 (1995). Persons who do not own more than three dwellings are exempted from this act. 42 U . S . c . § 3603(b). Order 6 Specifically it is unlawful (a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making o f a b o n a fide offer, o r to refuse to negotiate for the sale o r rental of, o r otherwise make available o r deny, a dwelling to any person because o f race, color, religion, sex, familial status, o r national ongm. (c) To make, print o r publish, o r cause to be made, printed, o r published any notice, statement o r advertisement, with respect to the sale o r rental o f a dwelling t h a t i n d i c a t e s a n y p r e f e r e n c e , l i m i t a t i o n o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b a s e d o n race, c o l o r , religion, sex, handicap, familial status, o r national origin, o r an intention to m a k e a n y s u c h p r e f e r e n c e , limitation, o r discrimination. 42 U . S . c . § 3604(a) & (c). T h e C o d e o f F e d e r a l R e g u l a t i o n s further e x p l a i n s t h a t " s t e e r i n g p r a c t i c e s " a r e p r o h i b i t e d u n d e r t h e F H A A . T h e s e i n c l u d e " [ d ] i s c o u r a g i n g the p u r c h a s e o r r e n t a l o f d w e l l i n g b e c a u s e o f . . . familial status . . . b y exaggerating drawbacks or failing to i n f o n n any person o f desirable features o f a d w e l l i n g o r o f a c o m m u n i t y , n e i g h b o r h o o d , o r d e v e l o p m e n t . " 2 4 C.F.R. § lOO.70(c)(2). Also prohibited is "[c]ommunicating to any prospective purchaser that he o r she w o u l d n o t b e c o m f o r t a b l e o r c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e x i s t i n g residents o f a c o m m u n i t y , n e i g h b o r h o o d o r development because o f . . . familial status." 24 C.F.R. § lOO.70(c)(3). I t is unlawful to express to "prospective sellers o r renters o r any other persons a preference for o r limitation o n any purchaser o r renter because o f . . . familial status." 24 C.F.R. § lOO.75(c)(2). The F H A A protects all persons, whether o r not they are prospective renters. As the Supreme Court explained i n Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,"Congress has thus conferred o n all 'persons' a legal right to truthful infonnation about available housing." 455 U.S. 3 6 3 , 3 7 4 (1982). Havens addressed the issue o f standing and d e t e n n i n e d that testers have standing to sue for violations u n d e r the act. '''Testers' are individuals who, without intent to rent o r purchase a home o r apartment, pose as renters o r purchasers for the purpose o f collecting evidence o f Order 7 unlawful steering practices." Id. Thus, the FHAA is violated when any person, including testers, is discouraged from renting a dwelling because o f familial status or is subject to discriminatory statements: "[t]hat the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention o f buying or renting a home, does not negate the fact o f injury within the meaning o f [the FHAA]." Id. Fair Housing Organizations, such as the FHCO, have standing to sue so long as the organization can demonstrate (1) frustration o f its organizational mission and (2) diversion o f resources to combat the particular housing discrimination in question. Fair Housing o f Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 8 9 9 , 9 0 5 (9th Cir.2002). To prove a defendant violated the FHAA, a party shows that the housing policy o f t h e defendant is facially discriminatory, for example that the policy applies less favorably to a protected group, such as familial class. Community House Inc. v. City o f Boise, Idaho, 468 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006). To establish a familial status claim under the FHAA, a plaintiff must present evidence (1) that defendant made a statement, (2) that statement was made with respect to the sale or rental o f a dwelling, and (3) the statement indicated a preference, a limitation, or discrimination against the plaintiff on the basis o f the status as a parent. White v. HUD, 475 F.3d 8 9 8 , 9 0 4 (7th Cir. 2007); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). To determine whether a statement indicates impermissible discrimination on the basis o f familial status, an ordinary listener standard is used. The Seventh Circuit explained in Jancik v. Dept. o f Housing and Urban Development, "the statute is violated i f an ad for housing suggests to an ordinary reader that a particular protected group is preferred or dispreferred for the housing in question." 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). No showing o f subjective intent is necessary to establish Order 8 a violation. Id. "[A] p l a i n t i f f need not prove the malice o r discriminatory animus o f a defendant to m a k e out a case o f intentional discrimination where the defendant expressly treats someone p r o t e c t e d b y t h e F H A A i n a d i f f e r e n t m a n n e r t h a n o t h e r s . . . . Thus, a p l a i n t i f f m a k e s o u t a p r i m a facie c a s e o f i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n u n d e r t h e F H A A m e r e l y b y s h o w i n g t h a t a p r o t e c t e d group has b e e n subjected to explicitly differential -- i.e. discriminatory -- treatment." Bangerter v. Orem C i t y Ordinance, 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995). Policies that are facially neutral may violate the act. " I f the result o f this policy is a disparate impact o n a protected class, facial neutrality will not save the restriction from violating the act." United States v. Badgett, 976 F.2d 1176, 1179 (8th Cir. 1992) citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). I n Badgett, the Eighth Circuit found a p r i m a facie case for discrimination where the leasing agent o f an apartment complex volunteered discouraging information to a potential renter who was o f a protected class. Specifically, the agent told the mother that the complex had no playground and there were no other children to b e playmates for a prospective renter's child. Badgett, 976 F.2d at 1180. Given the evidence, it was understandable w h y a prospective renter did not want to view the units. T h e N i n t h C i r c u i t h a s r e c o g n i z e d two c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h facial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n m a y be acceptable.: (1) the restriction benefits the protected class o r (2) the restriction responds to l e g i t i m a t e s a f e t y c o n c e r n s r a i s e d b y t h e i n d i v i d u a l s affected, r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g b a s e d o n stereotypes. Community House, 468 F.3d at 1125. IV. Defendant Violated the FHAA With Discriminatory Statements and Policies P l a i n t i f f s p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t D e f e n d a n t has v i o l a t e d t h e F H A A t h r o u g h h e r discriminatory statements and policies. Even when taking all the evidence i n the light m o s t Order 9 favorable to the Defendant, Defendant has not met her burden to show there is a genuine issue o f material fact. A. Defendant Is Subject to FHAA and FHCO Has Standing to Sue As a preliminary matter, Defendant is subject to the FRAA. She is i n the business o f renting dwellings because she has been engaged i n transactions o f renting, such as collecting m o n t h l y rent o v e r at least the last twelve months. She does not meet the exemption p r o v i d e d i n the F H A A because owns three or more dwellings in addition to h e r own. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) & (c); (Aff. o f Dennis Steinman in Supp. o f PIs.' Joint Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Steinman Aff."); Ex 1 . 8 - 1 1 . ) I n addition, the F R C O has standing to sue. I t has demonstrated b o t h factors required b y the N i n t h Circuit o f frustration. See Fair Housing Counsel o f Marin County, 285 F.3d at 905. I n an a f f i d a v i t , M o l o y G o o d , t h e E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r o f t h e F H C O , a s s e r t e d t h a t D e f e n d a n t ' s practices and policies have frustrated the organization's mission to promote equal opportunity in t h e r e n t i n g , p u r c h a s i n g , f i n a n c i n g a n d a d v e r t i s i n g o f housing. H e d e c l a r e d , [a]s a result o f having to conduct the tests FHCO suffered injury to its ability to c a r r y f o r w a r d its m i s s i o n o f e l i m i n a t i n g h o u s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h e n f o r c e m e n t a n d e d u c a t i o n . F H C O h a s s u f f e r e d a d r a i n o n its r e s o u r c e s from b o t h a diversion o f its resources and frustration o f its mission. FHCO suffered e c o n o m i c d a m a g e s i n s t a f f p a y i n the a m o u n t o f $ 6 , 5 6 9 . 0 0 . A d d i t i o n a l l y F H C O p r o j e c t s $ 1 8 , 6 2 0 . 0 0 in f r u s t r a t i o n o f m i s s i o n damages, n a m e l y r e m e d i a l e d u c a t i o n a n d o u t r e a c h i n c l u d i n g b r o c h u r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d local a r e a l a n d l o r d training. ( S t e i n m a n A f f . , E x . 2 , ~ 6.) B. Defendant Violated § 3604(c) in Making Discriminatory Statements Plaintiffs have provided evidence that Defendant made statements with respect to h e r r e n t a l p r o p e r t y t h a t i n d i c a t e d an u n l a w f u l p r e f e r e n c e i n h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h p o t e n t i a l r e n t e r s , Order 10 testers, investigators, and at deposition. A n ordinary listener would conclude that Defendant d i s p r e f e r r e d f a m i l i e s i n h e r rentals. Defendant made many discriminatory statements. The first statement at issue here, was in a conversation Defendant had with Ms. Johnson Stevens. Defendant told her that she would not rent to families that Plaintiffs began investigating her policies. (Steinman Aff., Ex. 4 ("Stevens Decl. If), ~ 3.) I n the following investigation b y the F R e D , Defendant treated callers w i t h f a m i l i e s d i f f e r e n t l y b y a s k i n g s p e c i f i c , p e r s o n a l q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e i r families. G a m m a reported that Defendant asked about his marital status and the age o f his son. She made the statement, "I don't know about that. About having a son there at the house." (Steinman Aff., Ex. 5, Ex. A.) G a m m a explained that Defendant reiterated her concern about having a child i n the house, adding that it was only one bedroom. Defendant also asked who would b e caring for the child w h e n G a m m a was at work, wanting to know the name when she heard it might be Gamma's mother. (Steinman Aff., Ex. 5, Ex. A.) Defendant treated prospective renters who did not have families differently. When a tester o f the same age and sex called, Defendant did not inquire about his family o r ask personal questions once she learned that he was not a parent. Also notably absent were any statements to discourage h i m from renting. (Steinman Aff., Ex. 6, Ex. A.) Tester Alpha who was a single mother had a similar experience as G a m m a had w i t h Defendant. Defendant told her that she would not care for a child left home alone and wanted to k n o w t h e n a m e o f t h e p e r s o n w h o w o u l d w a t c h h e r child. A l p h a t o l d h e r i t w o u l d l i k e l y b e h e r mother, and Defendant asked for her name and place o f employment. (Steinman Aff., Ex. 7, Ex. A.) Order 11 Tester B e t a h a d a different experience when asking about the rental for o n l y herself, D e f e n d a n t d i d n o t a s k a n y further questions. H o w e v e r , B e t a r e p o r t e d t h a t D e f e n d a n t m a d e t h e statement, "It's j u s t a small house. I won't rent to families." (Steinman Aff., Ex. 8, Ex. A.) Defendant made a similar statement to tester Epsilon. She reported Defendant said the house was "no good for children because it's j u s t one bedroom." (Steinman Aff., Ex. 9, Ex. A.) Defendant also made discriminatory statements to HOO investigators. Defendant e x p l a i n e d t h a t s h e w a s c o n c e r n e d a b o u t a c h i l d p o t e n t i a l l y s e t t i n g fires, a n d s h e a s s e r t e d o n e o f h e r properties was n o t good for children because o f the heavy traffic. (Steinman Aff., Ex. 12 , ~~ 9 & 11 .) P l a i n t i f f s also o f f e r e d e v i d e n c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s t h a t D e f e n d a n t m a d e d u r i n g h e r deposition. She stated, "I never have been interested in renting to children. It's right n e x t door to me." (Steinman Aff., Ex. 1, 19.) She also stated that she would n o t choose to rent to families: "I w o u l d n o t rent to them, that's p u t it plain; I would not rent to them, no." (Steinman Aff., Ex. 1, 19.) c. D e f e n d a n t V i o l a t e d § 3 6 0 4 ( a ) b y W i t h h e r D i s c r i m i n a t o r y Policies P l a i n t i f f s p r o v i d e d evidence that D e f e n d a n t used a discriminatory p o l i c y w h e n r e n t i n g h e r property. In conversations with potential renters, Defendant made statements to discourage f a m i l i e s from r e n t i n g . Defendant stressed the small size o f the rental property to prospective renters with f a m i l i e s , s u g g e s t i n g t h e r e n t a l s w e r e n o t a p p r o p r i a t e for them. F o r i n s t a n c e , w h e n s h e t a l k e d with G a m m a about his son, she stressed that the house only had one bedroom. (Steinman Aff., Ex. 5, Ex. A.) She unequivocally told Epsilon that the house was no good for families because it Order 12 only h a d o n e bedroom. (Steinman Aff., Ex. 9, Ex. A.) She also explained at h e r deposition h e r b e l i e f t h a t t h e h o u s e w a s n o t a p p r o p r i a t e for c h i l d r e n b e c a u s e o f t h e s p e e d i n g c a r s o n M a i n Street. (Hadlock Depo. 16.) A l s o p r o v i d e d w a s e v i d e n c e t h a t D e f e n d a n t t a l k e d a b o u t h e r d i s p r e f e r e n c e o f f a m i l i e s to h e r s t e p - c h i l d r e n a n d step-grandchildren. 3 H e r s t e p s o n M i c h a e l H a d l o c k declared, " m a n y o f t h e conversations w i t h R u t h had to do w i t h damage that was done to the rental properties b y tenants. R u t h s a i d to m e o n m o r e t h a n o n e o c c a s i o n , ' I f I c a n k e e p k i d s o u t o f m y r e n t a l s , I ' m g o i n g t o d o it.'" (Steinman Aff., Ex. 10 ("Michael Hadlock Decl.") ~ 5.) Mr. Hadlock also reported that she has said, "I j u s t w o n ' t rent to families with rug rats. They are destructive." (Michael H a d l o c k Dec!. ~ 5.) D e f e n d a n t ' s step-granddaughter Heidi T e n a r e m e m b e r e d s i m i l a r conversations. Ms. T e n a e x p l a i n e d t h a t she h a d t a l k e d w i t h D e f e n d a n t about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e n t i n g o n e o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s for h e r s e l f and h e r two children. Ms. T e n a reported that Ms. Hadlock refused to s h o w h e r the h o u s e s t a t i n g , " t h e h o u s e is n o g o o d f o r y o u b e c a u s e y o u h a v e k i d s . I t ' s n o t b i g e n o u g h f o r y o u a n d y o u r k i d s . " ( S t e i n m a n A f f . , Ex. I I ( " T e n a D e c ! . " ) ~ 4 . ) O n a l a t e r o c c a s i o n , D e f e n d a n t t a l k e d w i t h M s . T e n a a b o u t h e r s e a r c h for t e n a n t s for o n e rental. D e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t s h e h a d possible renters but would n o t rent to them because "[i]t's a one b e d r o o m house and I w on't r e n t t h a t p l a c e to s o m e o n e w i t h c h i l d r e n . " ( T e n a D e c l . ~ 5.) P l a i n t i f f s a s s e r t t h a t n o t o n l y d i d D e f e n d a n t d i s c o u r a g e p o t e n t i a l families b y t e l l i n g t h e m 3 D e f e n d a n t argues that evidence from Mr. H a d l o c k and Ms. T e n a s h o u l d n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d b e c a u s e o f t h e i r s t a i n e d r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Mrs. H a d l o c k . " D e f e n d a n t has n e v e r b e e n c l o s e w i t h t h e t w o s o n s o f h e r l a t e h u s b a n d , nor with any o f their children. As such few conversations and fewer visits ever t o o k place. The distance since F r e d Hadlock, Sr.'s death have illustrated this, as the sons o f Mr. Hadlock, Sr. have raised legal issues with Mrs. Hadlock's b e i n g a l l o w e d a n y i n h e r i t a n c e f r o m h e r l a t e h u s b a n d . " ( D e f . ' s M e m . 14.) D e f e n d a n t d e n i e s t h e s e c o n v e r s a t i o n s t o o k place, she only offers h e r denial as evidence to dispute. Even i f the court did n o t consider these statements, however, the decision w o u l d b e the same. Order 13 they would not b e comfortable in a small one bedroom but she also failed to point out the close proximity to schools. To potential renters with children, this would b e a desirable feature o f t h e house. Prohibited actions under the FHAA include steering practices such as discouraging renters because o f familial status b y exaggerating drawbacks or failing to inform any person o f desirable features. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(2). Plaintiffs have met their initial burden o f proof. Given this evidence, no reasonable j u r o r could find in favor o f Defendant. D. Defendant Has Not Shown a Genuine Issue o f M a t e r i a l Fact To survive on summary judgment, Defendant must offer evidence that there is a genuine issue o f material fact. Defendant generally provides unsupported arguments that she is not subject to the FHAA and that her statements were not discriminatory because she never intended to discriminate. This does not meet the Defendant's burden. Defendant asserts that her policies are not discriminatory but even i f the court deemed them to be, they would meet an exception. The Ninth Circuit has recognized a facially discriminatory policy may be permissible when the restrictions protect the protected class o r when the restrictions respond to a legitimate safety concern. In Community House, the Ninth Circuit found that the City had not provided support to establish that the policy at issue benefitted the protected class. The City argued that providing a mens-only homeless facility m a y discriminate against women, but it was permissible because it was for the safety o f the protected class, which here was women and families. The City offered only an affidavit from one individual who had been working with the homeless population. 468 F.3d at 1126. The court n o t e d , " t h e C i t y d i d n o t s u b m i t a s i n g l e p o l i c e report, i n c i d e n t report, o r any o t h e r d o c u m e n t a t i o n Order 14 that supported any safety concerns." Id. Defendant offers little more than her personal opinion here to support h e r argument that h e r p o l i c y p r o t e c t s families. " D e f e n d a n t ' s r e n t a l p r a c t i c e s a n d q u e s t i o n s w e r e c o n d u c t e d for t h e safety and welfare o f Defendant and h e r renters . . . . Defendant's practices boil d o w n to a concern for t h e s a f e t y o f p e o p l e , i n p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d r e n , w h i c h r e s i d e i n h e r h o u s e s . " ( D e f . ' s M e m . i n Supp. o f Def.'s Resp. to PIs.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mem.") 15.) Further, h e r suggestion that the first amendment allows her to make discriminatory statements while conducting her business o f renting houses is also unsupported b y any law. The F H A A and a c c o m p a n y i n g regulations clearly p r o h i b i t d i s c r i m i n a t o r y statements m a d e w i t h respect to rentals. The court does n o t read any unlawful limitation on an individual's First A m e n d m e n t r i g h t s i n t h e FHAA. Plaintiffs showed that Defendant made these discriminatory statements. H e r attempts to j u s t i f y them are unconvincing and do not show a genuine issue o f material fact. Defendant argues that she did n o t discriminate because she never intended the statements to b e discriminatory. "Defendant has never refused to rent to anyone, nor has she m a d e a serious statement that she would not rent to families." (Def.'s Mem. 2.) She asserts that over the fifty years i n w h i c h s h e h a s b e e n i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f r e n t i n g p r o p e r t y , s h e h a s c o n s i d e r e d e a c h a p p l i c a n t "solely o n legally permissible grounds." (Def.'s Mem. 5.) She also believes that h e r policies o f asking renters about their families and "steering" them to the appropriate properties are simply an effective b u s i n e s s practices. I n t h e 5 0 + y e a r s D e f e n d a n t h a s r e n t e d h o u s e s , she has d e v e l o p e d t h e p r a c t i c e o f a s k i n g t h e s i z e o f t h e r e n t e r ' s party. I f a r e n t e r h a s a l a r g e p a r t y , D e f e n d a n t m a y steer them towards one o f h e r larger rentals. I f the person is single, she m a y steer t h e m toward a smaller rental. I n any event, any potential renter is free to view and Order 15 rent any unit they wish. Defendant simply tries to assist potential renters locate a unit suitable to their needs. ( D e f . ' s M e m . 2.) Defendant, however, ignores the law. Even i f Defendant believed that she did not make discriminatory statements and even i f she believed she only considered applicants on legally permissible grounds, the standard is whether an ordinary person would view it that way. As already discussed, the intent o f these statements does not matter, and the Plaintiffs only have to show there was "explicitly differential treatment." See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501. Plaintiffs have done so here. Individuals o f the protected class o f familial status were asked different questions, discouraged from renting, and subject o f discriminatory statements to others. Defendant has not offered any evidence suggesting there is a genuine issue o f material fact. v. Conclusion Plaintiffs have presented evidence o f a prima facie case that Defendant violated the FHAA. Defendant has not offered any evidence to meet her burden o f showing a genuine issue o f material fact. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (#48) is granted. DATED this 2 2 d a y o f January, 2010. --"- Mark D. Clarke U n i t e d States M a g i s t r a t e J u d g e Order 16

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