Thomas v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 29

ORDER: Granting Application for Fees Pursuant to EAJA 26 . Please access entire text by document number hyperlink. Ordered and Signed on 12/08/2015 by Magistrate Judge Mark D. Clarke. (rsm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MICHAEL ALLAN THOMAS,

Civ. No. 1: 14-cv-00987-CL

Plaintiff,

ORDER
v.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

CLARKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Michael Allan Thomas ("Plaintiff') moves the Court for an award of $8,291.16
in attorney's fees, expenses, and costs under the Equal Access Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. §
2412( d). 1 Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner (the "Commissioner")
opposes Plaintiffs motion. Having reviewed the record and considered the specifics of this case,
the Court concludes Plaintiff is entitled to his full request. His motion (#26) is GRANTED.
1

Plaintiff seeks $7,871.72 in attorney's fees, $400 in expenses, and $19.44 in costs.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint (#1) to obtain judicial review of the
Commissioner's final decision denying his application for disability benefits. On July 30, 2015,
this Court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded for further administrative
proceedings. The Court instructed the Commissioner's Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to
determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to a closed period of disability. On October 28, 2015,
Plaintiffs attorney filed an application (#26) for EAJA fees. The Commissioner asks (#27) the
Court to reduce Plaintiffs requested award by 70 percent.
LEGAL STANDARD

A prevailing party in an action against the United States is entitled to an award of
attorney's fees and costs under EAJA unless the government demonstrates that its position in the
litigation was "substantially justified" or that "special circumstances make an award unjust." 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A). An EAJA fee award must be reasonable. Sorenson v. JI;Jink, 239 F.3d
1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001). In determining whether a fee is reasonable, the Court considers the
hours expended, the reasonableness of the hourly rate charged, and the results obtained. Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1998)

(applying Hensley to cases involving EAJA). If the requested fees are not shown to be
reasonable, then the Court may reduce the award. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Atkins, 154 F.3d
at 988.
DISCUSSION
It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a prevailing party. Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255,

1257 (9th Cir. 2001) ("An applicant for disability benefits becomes a prevailing party for the
purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and remanded regardless of

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whether disability benefits ultimately are awarded."). Accordingly, the Court will award his fee
request if it finds (1) the government has neither shown that its position was "substantially
justified" nor demonstrated that special circumstances render the requested award unjust, and (2)
the requested fees are reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d
791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002). The Commissioner has not demonstrated that its position in denying
Plaintiffs application was "substantially justified" or that it would be unjust to grant Plaintiffs
requested award. It does not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. Rather,
it asserts that $8,291.16 2 is not a reasonable award for this case.
EAJA expressly provides for an award of "reasonable" attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)A). The starting point in determining a reasonable attorney's fee is the lodestar figure:
the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1145 & n.2 (Hensley applicable to fee award.

under EAJA); Atkins, 154 F.3d at 988 (considering attorney's fee award under EAJA). Here, the
Commissioner does not dispute the reasonableness of Plaintiffs counsel's hourly rate. It does,
however, challenge the number of hours charged. The Commissioner argues 41.5 hours is
unreasonable in light of the results obtained. Plaintiff alleged seven errors, and the Court rejected
all but one. Plaintiff requested an award of benefits, but the Court remanded for further
proceedings on a limited issue. The Commissioner asks the Court to reduce Plaintiffs award by
70 percent to account for this "limited success[.]" Def. Resp., at 4.
The U.S. Supreme Court counsels against the Commissioner's suggestion:
Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover
a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours
reasonably expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of
exceptional success an enhanced award may be justified. In these
2

Defendant incorrectly states that Defendant asks for $8,291.16 in attorney's fees. This total includes
costs and expenses. Plaintiff requests $7,871.72 in attorney's fees.

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circumstances the fee award should not be reduced simply because the
plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. Litigants
in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and
the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient
reason for reducing a fee. The result is what matters.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (internal citations omitted). The Commissioner is correct that Plaintiff

did not succeed on all of his arguments, or convince the Court to remand for immediate payment
of benefits. However, Plaintiff did prevail on an important issue that required remand for further
proceedings, an alternate form of relief sought by Plainti±I. The Court considers this to be an
excellent result. Accordingly, no reduction based on limited success is warranted. Having
independently reviewed Plaintiffs petition for other possible concerns, the Court finds the
amount requested to be reasonable.
Plaintiff assigned any EAJA fees to his attorney. Pl.'s Mot, Ex. C. Therefore, the amount
of this award shall be paid to Plaintiffs attorney upon verification that Plaintiff has no debt,
which qualifies for offset against the award pursuant to the Treasury Offset Program. See Astrue
v. Ratliff 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010). IfPlaintiffhas no such debt, then a check shall be made out

to Plaintiffs attorney, and mailed to Plaintiffs attorney. If Plaintiff has a debt, then a check for
the remaining funds, after any offset of the debt, shall be made to Plaintiff and mailed to

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Plaintiffs attorney. Plaintiffs attorney's mailing address is as follows: Donis R. Barnes Esq., at
Tacoma Injury Law Group Inc., P.S., P.O. Box 1113, Tacoma, WA 98401-1113.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing analysis, Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney's Fees (#26)
GRANTED in full.

United States Magistrate Judge

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IS