Dominguez v. Nooth
Filing
24
Order. Petitioner's petition (#1) is denied. Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a judgment dismissing this proceeding with prejudice. Certificate of Appealability is denied, as petitioner has not made substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Signed on 12/3/13 by Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken. Copy of order and judgment sent to Pro Se petitioner. (rh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
JOSE DOMINGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
2:13-cv-00234-AA
ORDER
MARK NOOTH,
Respondent.
AIKEN, District Judge.
Petitioner is in the custody of the Oregon Department of
Corrections after a stipulated facts trial convictions for
Rape in the First Degree, Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree
and Assault in the Fourth Degree.
Petitioner directly appealed his convictions,
but the
Oregon Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on petitioner's
motion and petitioner did not petition for
review by the
Oregon Supreme Court. Exhibits 106 - 109.
Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Post-conviction
Relief (Exhibit 101), but the Umatilla County Circuit Court
1 - ORDER
dismissed the petition on petitioner's motion. Exhibit 113.
Petitioner appealed and the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed
without opinion. And the Oregon Supreme Court denied review.
Exhibits 114 - 118.
Petitioner
filed
a
petition
alleging four grounds for relief.
under
28
Petition
U.S.C.
§
2254
(#1). Respondent
now moves to deny relief and dismiss this proceeding. Response
( #21) .
In Ground One, petitioner alleges that he was denied his
right of appeal.
However,
as noted above, petitioner filed
direct appeals of his convictions but subsequently moved to
dismiss the appeals and the Oregon Court of Appeals granted
petitioners motion. Exhibit 109.
Petitioner also appealed the PCR trial court judgment and
the appeal was considered by the Oregon Court of Appeals.
Exhibits 114, 118.
Accordingly, petitioner's claim in Ground One fails as a
factual matter.
In Ground Four petitioner "wonders if his file was padded
using other peoples names/cases to make me look bad." and asks
the court to "check this and see."
Petitioner's
Petition (#1) p. 7.
speculation that his
file may have been
"padded" is unsupported by any specific allegation of fact or
any evidence in the record before the court.
2 - ORDER
Accordingly,
Ground Four fails to state a claim for relief. See, Jones v.
Gomez,
66
F.3d
199,
204-05
(9th
Cir.
1995)
["conclusory
allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific
facts do not warrant habeas relief"].
In Ground Two petitioner alleges that his trial counsel
was inadequate because in he represented to the court that
petitioner had agreed to a stipulated facts trial.
In Ground
Four petitioner alleges that his convictions were obtained by
"stipulated facts
he
did not
sign"
and that
he
"did not
understand the whole process."
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1966 (AEDPA), habeas corpus relief may "not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in
state court proceedings," unless the adjudication:
1. resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
2.) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
evidence presented at the State court proceeding.
28
u.s.c.
The
§
2254 (d).
Supreme Court
has
explained that
in passing
the
AEDPA, Congress intended to change the habeas corpus field by
curbing delays, preventing "re-trials" on federal habeas, and
giving effect to state convictions to the extent permissible
under the law.
3 - ORDER
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000).
In addressing
U.S.C.
§
the
deference
2244(d) (1),
requirements
set
forth
in
28
the Court specifically found that the
"contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of the
AEDPA have independent meanings. Id.
In Lockyer v. Andrade,
538 U.S.
63
(2003)
the Supreme
Court held that "a state court decision is 'contrary to our
clearly established precedent if the state court applies a
rule
that contradicts the governing law set
forth
in our
cases' or 'if the state court confronts a set of facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court
and
nevertheless
precedent."'
arrives
at
a
result
Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73.
The Court
further held that
different
from
our
(citations omitted).
"under the
'unreasonable
application clause,' a federal habeas court may grant the writ
if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts
'unreasonable application'
of the prisoner's case.
The
clause requires the state court
decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous.
The state
court's application of the clearly established law must be
objectively unreasonable."
Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75.
The Andrade court further clarified that under 28 U.S.C.
§
2254(d)
a
state
court's
decision
is
not
necessarily
"objectively unreasonable" even if it is "clear error."
4 - ORDER
"It
is not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent
review of the legal question' is left with a 'firm conviction'
that the state court was erroneous.
the opposite:
We have held precisely
Under§ 2254 (d) (1) 's 'unreasonable application'
clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ
simply
because
judgment
that
that
the
court
relevant
concludes
in
state-court
its
independent
decision
applied
clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.
Rather that application must be objectively unreasonable."
Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76.
It is not an "objectively unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law" for a state court to decline
to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely
established by the Supreme Court. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S.
70, 76-77 (2006).
Even
deference,
incorrect
unless
state-court
they
are
decisions
"contrary
to"
must
or
be
given
"objectively
unreasonable" applications of a Supreme Court holding.
This
is true even if the state courts do not fully articulate their
reasoning.
Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F. 3d 97 6. 982 (9th Cir. 2 000)
["federal court review is not de novo when the state court
does not supply reasoning for its decision, but an independent
review of the record is required to determine whether the
state
court
5 - ORDER
clearly
erred
in
its
application
of
the
controlling federal law."].
Finally,
under
28
U.S.C.
2254(d) (2),
§
"factual
determinations by a state court are presumed to be correct
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." Miller
-el v. Cockrell,
537 U.S.
322, 340
(2003).
The AEDPA thus
sets out a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state
court rulings," which requires that state court decisions be
given the benefit of the doubt.
U.S.
19
(2003)
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537
(per curiam), quoting Lindh v. Murphey,
521
U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997).
Petitioner alleged claims similar to those alleged in
Grounds
Two
and Three
in
his
Amended
Petition
for
Post-
Conviction Relief. Exhibit 110, p. 2.
The state moved to dismiss petitioner's post-conviction
petition
arguing
established that
that
the
evidence
at
the
PCR
trial
petitioner did understand the stipulated
facts proceeding and that his attorney did properly advise him
regarding the sentence he would receive. Exhibit 112, p. 5.
The PCR trial court agreed and allowed the motion to dismiss.
Id, see also, Exhibit 113.
Petitioner has not controverted the state court factual
determinations
with
clear
and
convincing
evidence
to
the
contrary or established that the state court conclusion was
objectively
6 - ORDER
unreasonable.
Accordingly
that
decision
is
entitled to deference by this court.
Moreover, the state court determination is supported by
the record before this court and correct on the merits.
The record reflects that petitioner signed a "waiver of
jury trial"
waiving
acknowledging that
his
associated
right
with
a
to
a
jury
jury
he
understood that
trial
trial.
and
Exhibit
all
119.
the
he
was
rights
Moreover,
petitioner was present at the stipulated facts trial, and told
the trial court that he understood that he was waiving his
right to jury trial.
Exhibit 112, p.
3-4.
Petitioner was
present when his attorney and the prosecutor described the
details of the stipulated facts agreement and the negotiated
sentence.
Exhibit 112,
record
suggest
to
proceedings,
p.
that
petitioner
4-12 I
during
There is nothing in the
the
expressed
course
of
the
trial
any misunderstanding
or
confusion about the stipulated facts trial or the negotiated
sentence.
See
generally,
Exhibit
112.
Under
these
circumstances the PCR court's conclusion that petitioner's PCR
claims
that
his
attorney
failed
to
adequately advise
him
regarding the stipulated facts procedure and that he did not
understand the procedure was not objectively unreasonable and
is correct on the merits.
Based on all of the foregoing, petitioner's Petition (#1)
is denied.
7 - ORDER
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a
judgment dismissing this proceeding with prejudice.
Certificate of
Shou~dpetitioner appea~,
Appea~abi~ity
a certi£icate o£
is denied as petitioner has not made a
the
denia~
o£
a
constitutiona~
appea~abi~ity
substantia~
right.
See,
28
showing o£
U.S. C.
2253(c) (2).
DATED this
~ay
of December, 2013.
Ann Aiken
United State District Judge
8 - ORDER
§
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