Brown v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
24
OPINION & ORDER: The Commissioner's decision is reversed and remanded for additional proceedings. See 17-page opinion & order attached. Signed on 8/10/2016 by Judge Marco A. Hernandez. (mr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
ADAM BROWN,
Plaintiff,
No. 2:15-cv-01109-HZ
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Merrill Schneider
P.O. Box 14490
Portland, Oregon 97293
Attorney for Plaintiff
Billy J. Williams
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
District of Oregon
Janice E. Hebert
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, Oregon 97201-2902
///
1 - OPINION & ORDER
OPINION & ORDER
Kathryn Miller
SPECIAL ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Office of General Counsel
Social Security Administration
701 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 M/S 221A
Seattle, Washington 98104-7075
Attorneys for Defendant
HERNANDEZ, District Judge:
Plaintiff Adam Brown brings this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's
final decision to deny supplemental security income (SSI). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)). I reverse the Commissioner's
decision and remand for additional proceedings.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for SSI on August 23, 2011, alleging an onset date of January 1, 2004.
Tr. 142-47. His application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 59, 73. On August
14, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with counsel for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). Tr. 30-59. On September 11, 2013, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 14-29. The
Appeals Council denied review. 1-5.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges disability based on having back issues, memory issues, a past head
injury, and difficulty reading and writing. Tr. 60, 157. At the time of the hearing, he was thirtyfive years old. Tr. 142. He has completed the eleventh grade and has no past relevant work. Tr.
38-39, 23.
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SEQUENTIAL DISABILITY EVALUATION
A claimant is disabled if unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]" 42 U.S.C. §§
423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(3)(a).
Disability claims are evaluated according to a five-step procedure. See Valentine v.
Comm'r, 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009) (in social security cases, agency uses a five-step
procedure to determine disability). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of proving disability.
Id.
In step one, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is engaged in "substantial
gainful activity." If so, the claimant is not disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140
(1987); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). In step two, the Commissioner determines
whether the claimant has a "medically severe impairment or combination of impairments."
Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 140-41; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If not, the claimant is not
disabled.
In step three, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's impairments, singly or
in combination, meet or equal "one of a number of listed impairments that the [Commissioner]
acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141;
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If so, the claimant is conclusively presumed disabled; if
not, the Commissioner proceeds to step four. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141.
In step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant, despite any
impairment(s), has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform "past relevant work." 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant can perform past relevant work, the claimant
3 - OPINION & ORDER
is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner.
In step five, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant can perform other work.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141-42; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & (f), 416.920(e) & (f). If the
Commissioner meets his burden and proves that the claimant is able to perform other work
which exists in the national economy, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566,
416.966.
THE ALJ’S DECISION
At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since his application date. Tr. 18. Next, at steps two and three, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff has severe impairments of depressive disorder NOS, borderline intellectual functioning,
speech disorder, probable reading and mathematics learning disorder, and mechanical back pain,
but that the impairments do not meet or equal, either singly or in combination, a listed
impairment. Tr. 18-20.
At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (RFC)
to perform medium work, except Plaintiff can perform only simple instructions, procedures, and
tasks, requires verbal instructions, and can have no more than casual and superficial interactions
with co-workers to limit distractions and the impacts of Plaintiff’s speech impediment. Tr. 20.
With this RFC, the ALJ determined, at step five, that Plaintiff is able to perform jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy such as vehicle cleaner, hand packager, and scrap
sorter. Tr. 24.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of benefits only when the
Commissioner's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). "Substantial
evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court considers the record as a whole, including both the evidence
that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Id.; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504
F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). "Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the ALJ's decision must be affirmed." Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591 (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th
Cir. 2007) ("Where the evidence as a whole can support either a grant or a denial, [the court]
may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ's") (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) improperly discounted Plaintiff’s credibility regarding
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff’s symptoms; (2) improperly considered
third-party lay witness statements; and (3) improperly rejected the opinion of Dr. Geoffrey
Bartol, Ph.D who performed Plaintiff’s consultative psychodiagnostic examination. As a result of
the ALJ’s errors, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff benefits is unsupported
by substantial evidence. Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse and remand the ALJ’s decision for a
full and fair consideration. Because I agree with Plaintiff that the ALJ improperly discounted
Plaintiff’s credibility and that the ALJ failed to properly consider third-party statements, I
reverse and remand the ALJ’s decision for further consideration.
5 - OPINION & ORDER
I. Brown’s Credibility
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly made a negative credibility determination
because the ALJ failed to specifically identify “what testimony is not credible and what evidence
undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). An
ALJ analyzes the credibility of a claimant’s testimony in two steps. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at
1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented
objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to
produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The claimant, however, need not show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to
cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably
have caused some degree of the symptom.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if the
claimant meets the first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject her
testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, “clear and convincing
reasons” for doing so. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A court cannot review an ALJ’s credibility finding “if the ALJ fails to specify his or her
reasons for finding [the claimant’s] testimony not credible.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d
487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). An ALJ’s reasoning must be “sufficiently specific,” and “the ALJ must
identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s
complaints.” Id. at 493. “Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must
provide some reasoning in order for [the court] to meaningfully determine whether the ALJ’s
conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 495.
Simply stating a conclusory negative credibility finding and then summarizing evidence
from the record is “not the sort of explanation or the kind of ‘specific reason’ [the court] must
6 - OPINION & ORDER
have in order to review the ALJ’s decision meaningfully.” Id. at 494. The court “cannot discern
the agency’s path [if] the ALJ made only a general credibility finding without providing any
reviewable reasons why she found [the claimant’s] testimony non-credible.” Id. This, in turn,
would require the Court to substitute its own conclusions for the ALJ’s regarding which evidence
points to a negative credibility determination or to “speculate as to the grounds for the ALJ’s
conclusion,” neither of which the court may do. Id. Because the court cannot meaningfully
review an ALJ’s non-credibility determination under the circumstances described above, an
ALJ’s failure to “provide specific reasons for the finding on credibility,” and instead providing
only a conclusory statement that does not identify specific non-credible testimony along with the
evidence in the record that undermines that testimony, constitutes harmful error that requires, if
nothing else, reversal and remand for further proceedings.
Turning to the case at hand, the ALJ’s entire negative credibility determination consists
of a single conclusory statement: “the claimant’s statements . . . are not entirely credible for the
reasons explained in this decision.” Tr. 21. The ALJ never expressly points to specific testimony
to support his negative credibility finding, let alone to evidence in the record that undermines
Plaintiff’s testimony. Instead, the ALJ states his negative credibility finding and then proceeds
immediately to a discussion of third-party statements and medical evidence without providing
any concrete reasons for the credibility finding. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2014) (finding error when an ALJ’s decision states a conclusory negative credibility finding
and then “drifts into a discussion of the medical evidence [while providing] no reasons for the
credibility determination.”).
The government points to references in the ALJ’s decision that arguably support a
negative credibility determination, including Plaintiff’s daily activities, Plaintiff’s prior work
7 - OPINION & ORDER
experience, and possible discrepancies regarding Plaintiff’s history of alcohol consumption. But
those references are randomly dispersed throughout the decision, and the ALJ completely failed
to indicate that those, or any other references, undermined Plaintiff’s credibility or otherwise
supported a negative credibility determination. See id. In fact, the ALJ did not mention
Plaintiff’s credibility a single time after stating his initial negative credibility finding. In order to
affirm the ALJ’s decision, I would be forced to impermissibly draw conclusions from the ALJ’s
opinion, or to substitute my own conclusions regarding what testimony and what evidence
undermines Plaintiff’s credibility. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494. I therefore find that the ALJ’s
failure to adequately justify his negative credibility determination constitutes reversible error.
II. Third-Party Statements
During the disability benefits application process, Plaintiff submitted third-party lay
witness statements from four individuals familiar with Plaintiff’s limitations in support of his
disability claim. Four of the five third-party statements are at issue in this case. 1 The first two
statements are from Plaintiff’s sister, Brenda Brown, who submitted statements in 2011 and
2013. The two statements together mention a wide range of impairments, including back pain,
learning disabilities that make it difficult or impossible for Plaintiff to read or write, ability to
follow only clearly explained verbal instructions, a speech impairment, social anxiety, trouble
focusing and paying attention, inability to manage finances, and difficulty getting along with
others. The statements also note that Plaintiff is able to go for walks and bike rides, helps with
chores, can count change given adequate time, and can cook for himself.
The next statement is from Plaintiff’s friend, Lindsay Brown. Lindsay Brown describes
helping Plaintiff find a job in “firewatching” and another at a wrecking yard, but that Plaintiff
1
Plaintiff did not to take issue with the ALJ’s treatment of the statement submitted by Julia Brown, Plaintiff’s
mother.
8 - OPINION & ORDER
was quickly fired from both. Lindsay Brown states that Plaintiff needs to be told “over and over
what needs to be done,” and references Plaintiff’s “speech problems” and his inability to “do
even the basic things.” Tr. 213. Finally, the statement describes Plaintiff’s problems with
understanding or following simple instructions, and notes that Lindsay Brown has seen no
improvement in Plaintiff’s condition over many years.
The last statement is from Plaintiff’s friend, Douglas Brown. The statement describes
Plaintiff as “mentally challenged” and “drifty.” Tr. 215. The statement also to Plaintiff’s
difficulty staying focused and need for regular retraining in simple tasks. While the statement
notes that Plaintiff is able to stack wood without supervision, Douglas Brown believes that
Plaintiff will be forever unable to support himself or provide the basics needed for his own
survival.
“Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence that an ALJ must
take into account, unless he or she expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives
reasons germane to each witness for doing so.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir.
2001). The ALJ need not discuss each third-party statement individually so long as the ALJ
provides germane reasons for disregarding similar testimony by different witnesses. Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). Germane reasons to discount lay witness testimony
include “where the lay testimony is similar to other testimony that the ALJ validly discounted or
where the testimony is contradicted by more reliable medical evidence that the ALJ credited.” Id.
At 1119.
In this case, the ALJ first summarized Brenda Brown’s statements from both 2011 and
2013. Summarizing the former, the ALJ highlighted the references to Plaintiff’s back pain,
Plaintiff’s daily activities including self-care, cooking, bike riding, housework, and grocery
9 - OPINION & ORDER
shopping, Plaintiff’s ability to follow only verbal instructions, and Plaintiff’s struggle to manage
finances. Summarizing Brenda Brown’s 2013 statement, the ALJ highlighted the references to
Plaintiff’s speech impediment and anxiety in public and group settings. Next, the ALJ noted
Lindsay Brown’s description of Plaintiff’s inability to keep a job and Plaintiff’s great difficulty
with following even simple instructions. Finally, the ALJ noted Douglas Brown’s comment that
Plaintiff worked hard but had difficulty focusing and required close supervision to keep Plaintiff
on task, as well as the comment that Plaintiff could not support himself.
Immediately following these summaries, the ALJ implicitly discounted the statements,
stating that “[t]he statements are generally consistent concerning difficulty in social settings and
obtaining work but [do not] support a finding that the claimant would be unable to sustain simple
work as described in the [RFC].” The ALJ went on to note that Plaintiff’s speech impediment did
not seem especially severe. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to adequately address the
limitations described in the third-party statements.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by failing to ascribe weight to the third-party
statements. ALJs, however, are not required to assign specific weight to third-party lay witness
statements; the applicable regulations and case law require only that the ALJ must take those
statements into account or provide germane reasons for discounting or rejecting the statements.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3), 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3) (2012) (the ALJ “will . . . consider
descriptions and observations of [a claimant’s] impairment(s) . . . provided by . . . family,
neighbors, friends, or other persons.”); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (holding that an ALJ must
“comment” on third-party lay witness statements and provide “germane reasons” for rejecting
those statements, but making no reference to an ALJ’s obligation to ascribe “weight” to those
statements); Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “the ALJ
10 - OPINION & ORDER
was required to consider and comment upon [third-party lay witness statements]” but making no
reference to an ALJ’s obligation to ascribe “weight” to those statements).
This stands in contrast to the regulations regarding medical opinion testimony, to which
the ALJ must ascribe particular weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii) (2012), 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(e)(2)(ii) (2012) (“[T]he [ALJ] must explain in the decision the weight given to . . . any
[medical] opinions from treating sources [and] nontreating sources.”); Rivera v. Colvin, No. 151917, 2016 WL 3452743, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2016) (“In assessing the medical opinion
evidence, the ALJ must explain the weight afforded to each opinion.”). The ALJ in this case did
not err when he discussed the third-party statements without ascribing any particular weight to
those statements.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ effectively rejected the third-party statements because
the ALJ failed to discuss “whether the limitations described [in the statements] were accounted
for in Plaintiff’s RFC.” Pl.’s Opening Brief at 6. While an ALJ can reject or discount, in whole
or in part, third-party statements, the ALJ is required to provide “germane reasons” for doing so.
Lewis, 236 F.3d at 511. This the ALJ did not do. Instead, the ALJ simply determined that the
statements, in the aggregate, “[do not] support a finding that the claimant would be unable to
sustain simple work as described in the [RFC].” Tr. 22. This kind of sweepingly generalized
treatment fails to satisfy the “germane reasons” standard for discounting or rejecting third-party
statements. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114-15. (“[T]he ALJ stated that the rationale for her
credibility determination included reference to the third-party statements submitted in support of
the claimant. This statement establishes that the ALJ reviewed the lay witness testimony in the
record, but it does not provide a reason for discounting the testimony. . . . Under our rule that lay
witness testimony cannot be disregarded without comment, the ALJ erred in failing to explain
11 - OPINION & ORDER
her reasons for disregarding the lay witness testimony, either individually or in the aggregate.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The government insists that the ALJ adequately addressed the 2011 and 2013 statements
provided by Brenda Brown because the ALJ impliedly discounted the statement based on
inconsistencies in the two statements regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms. While the
ALJ’s decision briefly summarizes Brenda Brown’s two statements, the decision fails to
highlight significant discrepancies between them. Moreover, the only impairment described in
Brenda Brown’s statements that the ALJ discusses in any detail is Plaintiff’s speech impediment.
The ALJ determined that the speech impediment did not seem especially pronounced at
Plaintiff’s hearing but that the impediment, along with Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression, “is
accepted to have some impact on social functioning.” Tr. 22. Why the ALJ singled out this single
impairment for further discussion is unclear. But, in any event, discussing one limitation among
the many described in Brenda Brown’s statements does not absolve the ALJ of his responsibility
to provide germane reasons for concluding that Brenda Brown’s statements fail to support
Plaintiff’s disability claim.
The government also contends that the ALJ adequately addressed the statements provided
by Lindsay Brown and Douglas Brown because the ALJ found those statements “vague and not
particularly probative.” But no such language, or anything approximating that sentiment, appears
in the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ briefly summarized Lindsay Brown’s and Douglas Brown’s
statements but failed to comment on the impairments they described or to discuss why those
statements fail to support a finding that Plaintiff is disabled. 2 Again, the ALJ, without analysis or
2
In fact, the ALJ’s summary includes one comment in particular from Lindsay Brown’s statement (“‘[Plaintiff]
can’t do even the basic things’ or follow ‘even the easy direction’”) that directly refutes the ALJ’s conclusion that
the statements do not support a finding that Plaintiff is “unable to sustain simple work.” See Tr. 22. The ALJ makes
no attempt to explain why the comment is either not credible or fails to contradict Plaintiff’s RFC.
12 - OPINION & ORDER
explication, asserted only that the statements, in the aggregate, do not support a finding that
Plaintiff is unable to sustain the kind of work described in the RFC.
Finally, the government would have the Court infer from the structure and content of the
ALJ’s summary of the third-party statements that the ALJ based his decision regarding those
statements on sufficiently germane reasons. While I may, under the right circumstances, draw
inferences from an ALJ’s less-than-crystalline reasoning, Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,
755 (9th Cir. 1989), the reasoning in the decision in this case is too scant to adequately infer how
the ALJ actually determined that the third-party statements fail to support Plaintiff’s disability
claim.
The ALJ committed clear error with his cursory treatment of the third-party statements
submitted in support of Plaintiff’s disability claim. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114 (“lay witness
testimony cannot be disregarded without comment”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
next inquiry is whether the ALJ’s error was harmless. An error is harmless if it is
“inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115. In the context of an
ALJ’s inadequate treatment of third-party statements, an error is inconsequential if “the lay
witness testimony does not describe any limitations not already described by the claimant, and
the ALJ’s well-supported reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony apply equally well to the
lay witness testimony.” Id. at 1117. An ALJ’s inadequate treatment of third-party statements is
not harmless, by contrast, if the ALJ “has not validly rejected the claimant’s . . . testimony,”
because “the [third-party] testimony (if credited by the ALJ) would alter the ALJ’s disability
determination. Id. at 1116.
While the third-party statements in this case may not have described limitations beyond
what the Plaintiff himself described, I have already explained that the ALJ did not make a legally
13 - OPINION & ORDER
sufficient credibility determination with regard to Plaintiff’s own testimony, and, therefore, I
cannot say with confidence that the ALJ’s failure to adequately address the third-party
statements was “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” See Molina, 674
F.3d at 1115; Strutz v. Colvin, No. 14-807, 2015 WL 4727459, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2015)
(“[T]he ALJ did not already provide germane reasons for rejecting similar testimony to that
provided by [a lay witness] regarding [the claimant’s limitations]. Accordingly, the Molina ‘rule’
does not apply. Thus, the ALJ has not provided a germane reason for discounting [the lay
witness] testimony.”). The ALJ’s conclusory treatment of the third-party statements submitted in
support of Plaintiff’s disability claim constitutes reversible error.
III. Dr. Bartol’s Opinion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by rejecting a portion of the
opinion of examining psychologist Dr. Geoffrey Bartol, Ph.D without providing clear and
convincing evidence to explain that rejection. See Lester v. Charter, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he opinion of an examining doctor . . . can only be rejected for specific and
legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.”). Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that (1) the ALJ “effectively rejected” a portion of Dr. Bartol’s opinion because
the ALJ did not explicitly account for Dr. Bartol’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s persistence and
concentration limits in the RFC; and (2) the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to Dr.
Bartol’s opinion. For the reasons explained below, I agree that the ALJ erred in both respects.
Dr. Bartol examined Plaintiff on January 1, 2012. Tr. 222. In his psychodiagnostic
assessment, Dr. Bartol made a number of observations regarding Plaintiff’s various impairments.
Id. at 222-28. Dr. Bartol ultimately concluded that he “could see Plaintiff qualifying” for the
following diagnoses: depressive disorder NOS, alcohol dependence, borderline intellectual
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functioning, mild mental retardation, phonological disorder, reading and mathematics disorder,
and disorder of written expression. Tr. 228. Dr. Bartol commented on Plaintiff’s poor physical
health, probable depression, borderline intellectual functioning, and slight speech impairment.
Tr. 227-28. Dr. Bartol also noted that Plaintiff’s attention, concentration, short-term memory,
abstract reasoning, judgment, and ability to perform simple calculations were all poor. Tr. 22526. Regarding “work related activities,” Dr. Bartol opined that Plaintiff is able to remember and
understand short, simple instructions, although Plaintiff would have difficulty following more
complicated instructions. Tr. 226. In addition, Dr. Bartol found that Plaintiff has moderate-tosignificant “problems sustaining concentration and attention and persisting in a task” due to
Plaintiff’s borderline intellectual functioning, and that Plaintiff has moderate-to-significant
impairment in his “ability to engage in . . . social interactions” due to social anxiety and
borderline intellectual functioning. Id.
The ALJ failed to indicate whether he was adopting or rejecting, either in full or in part,
Dr. Bartol’s opinion. While the ALJ should have been more explicit in that respect, it is apparent
from the RFC’s limitation to “short and simple tasks” with only “verbal instructions” and “no
more than casual and superficial interactions with the public and coworkers” that the ALJ
intended largely to adopt Dr. Bartol’s findings. Nevertheless, the RFC makes no mention of, and
therefore fails to adequately capture, Dr. Bartol’s findings regarding concentration, attention, and
persistence. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n
ALJ's assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration,
persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical
testimony.”); Lee v. Colvin, 80 F.Supp.3d 1137, 1150 (D. Or. 2015) (“To capture restrictions [to
concentration, persistence, and pace], the ALJ's findings must be consistent with the restrictions
15 - OPINION & ORDER
supported in the medical testimony.”). The ALJ effectively ignored limitations identified by Dr.
Bartol that the ALJ has not adequately discredited in order to justify the absence of those
limitations from the RFC. See Lubin v. Comm'r, 507 Fed.Appx. 709, 712 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding that the ALJ erred by accepting, based on medical evidence, that the claimant had
limitations as to concentration, persistence, or pace and then failing to include such limitations in
the RFC); Brink v. Comm'r, 343 F. App'x 211, 212 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Commissioner's
contention that the phrase ‘simple, repetitive work’ encompasses difficulties with concentration,
persistence, or pace [identified by medical evidence] is not persuasive.”).
Concentration, attention, and persistence limits are distinct from complexity limits or the
amount of social interaction that the Plaintiff can handle. The ALJ’s failure to incorporate
Plaintiff’s concentration, attention, and persistence limits as described by Dr. Bartol into the RFC
is reversible error and requires remand for further consideration. Saucedo v. Colvin, No. 122289, 2014 WL 4631225, at *17 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 2014) (“The ALJ must include all restrictions
in the [RFC] determination [including] limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace”) (citing
Lubin, 507 Fed.Appx. at 712); Juarez v. Colvin, No. 13-2506, 2014 WL 1155408, at *7 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 20, 2014) (holding that, given medical evidence of moderate limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace, “the ALJ's RFC determination should have included not
only the limitation to unskilled work, but also a moderate limitation in maintaining
concentration, persistence, and pace”).
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to explain the weight given to Dr.
Bartol’s opinion. Regulations governing an ALJ’s analysis of medical opinions suggest that an
ALJ must expressly ascribe weight to those opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii) (2012), 20
C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2)(ii) (2012) (“[T]he [ALJ] must explain in the decision the weight given to
16 - OPINION & ORDER
. . . any opinions from treating [and] nontreating [medical] sources.”). See Winschel v. Comm’r,
631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[An] ALJ must state with particularity the weight given
to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.”); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231,
236 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council indicated the weight given to the
various medical reports submitted by the appellant. We therefore remand . . . with instructions . .
. to indicate explicitly the weight accorded to the various medical reports in the record.”); Rivera,
2016 WL 3452743, at *8 (“In assessing the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ must explain the
weight afforded to each opinion.”).
The ALJ in this case erred by failing to ascribe particular weight to Dr. Bartol’s opinion.
As noted above, the ALJ does not even indicate whether he fully accepts and adopts Dr. Bartol’s
findings, let alone the significance of those findings to the RFC. As a result, this Court cannot
review the ALJ’s conclusions. The appropriate remedy in this situation is remand for further
consideration with instructions to indicate explicitly the weight accorded to Dr. Bartol’s opinion,
including the limits that Dr. Bartol noted to Plaintiff’s concentration, persistence, and attention.
CONCLUSION
The Commissioner's decision is reversed and remanded for additional proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this ______ day of __________, 2016
_______________________
Marco A. Hernandez
United States District Judge
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