Wilson v. Akana et al
Opinion and Order - The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Pending Discovery. ECF 40 . The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Conduct All Pretrial Discovery. ECF 85 . The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motions to Compel. ECF 38 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 59 , 62 , 63 , 65 , and 66 . The Court GRANTS Defendants' Renewed Motion to Stay Discovery as to Defendants Barnett, Boston, Gower, Jackson, Jorgensen, Myrick , Nofziger, Peters, Ridley, Williamson, and Young. ECF 50 . Finally, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 32 ) not later than 30 days from the date of this Opinion and Order. Defendants shall file their reply not later than 14 days after Plaintiff's response. Signed on 8/28/2017 by Judge Michael H. Simon. (mja)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
HUNTER TYEE WILSON,
Case No. 2:16-cv-898-SI
OPINION AND ORDER
B. AKANA; J. DEACON; S. BOSTON; K.
JACKSON; J. MYRICK; J. JORGENSON;
R. YOUNG; L. WILLIAMSON; C.
BARNETT; M. NOFZIGER; M. GOWER;
T. RIDLEY; and C. PETERS,
Hunter Tyee Wilson, Eastern Oregon Correctional Institution, 2500 Westgate, Pendleton, OR
97801, pro se.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General; Todd Albert, Senior Assistant Attorney General;
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1162 Court Street NE, Salem, OR 97301. Of Attorneys for
Michael H. Simon, District Judge.
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Oregon Department of Corrections (“ODOC”).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, who are all employees of ODOC, violated Plaintiff’s rights
under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
when they prevented Plaintiff from attending a prison disciplinary hearing for an assault that he
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allegedly committed, later found Plaintiff in violation of prison rules without cause, and
subjected Plaintiff to unlawful disciplinary actions. On April 7, 2017, Defendants moved for
summary judgment on the basis that they are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF 32. Plaintiff
did not file an opposition to Defendants’ motion. On April 17, 2017, however, Plaintiff moved
pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to defer consideration of
Defendants’ summary judgment motion pending additional discovery. ECF 40. On May 10,
2017, Defendants moved to stay discovery as to all Defendants but Akana and Deacon pending
resolution of their summary judgment motion. ECF 50. In addition, Plaintiff has filed several
motions to compel production sought from Defendants.
For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to defer consideration of
Defendants’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiff’s motions to compel, and Plaintiff’s motion for
extension of time to conduct pretrial discovery. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to stay
A. The Parties
At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Two Rivers Correctional Institution
(“Two Rivers”). Defendants Akana and Deacon are ODOC correctional officers assigned to Two
Rivers. The remaining Defendants are all ODOC employees serving in supervisory or
managerial roles at Two Rivers or the ODOC Administrative Building. Defendants Boston and
Young (lieutenants), Jackson and Jorgenson (captains), Myrick (Superintendent), and Ridley
(Assistant Supervisor of Security) also work at Two Rivers. Defendants Williamson and Barnett
are inspectors general at the ODOC Administration Building. Defendants Nofziger and Gower
also work at the ODOC Administration Building, as a Hearings Administrator and Assistant
Director of Operations, respectively, and Defendant Peters is ODOC Director.
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B. Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff was accused of licking a fellow inmate’s face on July 6, 2015. According to a
one-page misconduct report submitted by Defendant Boston the following week (see Exhibit 1 to
Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF 2-1 at 1), Boston received an email from the State’s Prison Rape
Elimination Act (“PREA”) Coordinator relaying a complaint that Plaintiff had licked a fellow
inmate. Boston states in the misconduct report: “At the conclusion of my investigation, I have
determined that there is enough evidence to support the claim that [Plaintiff] stood up from
eating his morning meal, leaned over to his right and licked the face of [a fellow inmate].” Based
on the misconduct report, on July 16, 2015, Plaintiff was removed from the Administrative
Housing Unit and placed in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit (“DSU”), with resulting loss or
restriction of privileges.
On July 22, 2015, Defendant Deacon conducted the disciplinary hearing regarding
Plaintiff’s alleged assault. Plaintiff requested an investigation, a video recording of the unit at the
time of the assault, and to call several witnesses. On the day of the hearing, while waiting to be
brought into the hearings room, Plaintiff engaged in a verbal confrontation with Defendant
Akana. As relayed in a separate misconduct report submitted by Akana regarding the
confrontation (see Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF 2-1 at 3), Plaintiff ignored Akana’s
orders to remain quiet. Because of Plaintiff’s insubordination and disobedience and because
other inmates were present, Akana decided to return Plaintiff to his cell, without allowing
Plaintiff to attend the pending disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff alleges that Akana’s actions were in
retaliation for grievances that Plaintiff previously filed against Akana.
Shortly after Akana returned Plaintiff to his cell, Plaintiff asked Deacon for permission to
attend the disciplinary hearing or to have the hearing postponed. Deacon declined and conducted
the disciplinary hearing in Plaintiff’s absence, noting that Plaintiff had been restricted from
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attending the hearing based on his allegedly disruptive behavior. Deacon denied Plaintiff’s
request for witnesses on the basis that the proffered testimony would not constitute a defense to
the charges. Deacon denied Plaintiff’s request for an investigation for the same reason.
Deacon found by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff committed Inmate
Assault II by causing his body fluids to come into contact with another person. See Exhibit 3 to
Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF 2-1 at 3-4. Deacon sanctioned Plaintiff to 45 days of disciplinary
segregation, 14 days of lost privileges, and a $100 fine.
On July 28, 2015, Plaintiff attended a second disciplinary hearing. This hearing related to
Plaintiff’s allegedly disruptive actions in the DSU hallway before his July 22nd disciplinary
hearing. Plaintiff attended this hearing, and Deacon granted Plaintiff’s request for an
investigation, witnesses, and video records. The investigating officer, Defendant Young,
concluded that the evidence supported allegations of Disrespect I and Disobedience of an Order
(but not the other alleged violations, Extortion I and Compromising an Employee). Deacon,
however, ultimately concluded that the facts did not support a charge of Disrespect I, but were
sufficient to find Plaintiff had committed Disrespect II, based on Plaintiff’s actions “direct[ing]
hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening language or gestures . . . under circumstances that create[ ]
a threat to safety, security or orderly operation of the facility.” Exhibit 8(b) to Plaintiff’s
Complaint, ECF 2-1 at 18. Deacon sanctioned Plaintiff to ten days of disciplinary segregation,
ten days’ loss of yard privileges, and a $25 fine. Plaintiff alleges that each of the remaining
Defendants participated actively or by omission in the administration of the above sanctions or of
Plaintiff’s formal grievances regarding the same.
On May 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages
and declaratory relief. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First, Fifth,
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Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. ECF 2. Plaintiff alleges,
specifically, that Akana wrongfully prevented Plaintiff from attending the July 22, 2015,
disciplinary hearing regarding the alleged assault by Plaintiff, in retaliation for grievances about
Akana that Plaintiff had previously filed. Plaintiff also alleges that Deacon wrongfully proceeded
with the hearing notwithstanding Plaintiff’s absence and request for postponement. According to
Plaintiff, Deacon then found Plaintiff in violation of prison rules without cause. Therefore,
Plaintiff argues, the resulting disciplinary sanctions were unlawful. Based on those allegations,
Plaintiff argues that Deacon and Akana violated his substantive and procedural due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and that Akana further violated Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights by doing so in retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievances against him.
Plaintiff alleges that Boston and Akana, by submitting and endorsing the two misconduct
reports against Plaintiff, caused Plaintiff an atypical and significant hardship in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, by subjecting Plaintiff to solitary confinement in the DSU without
cause. Plaintiff alleges that Jackson, who signed the first misconduct report as the “Reviewing
Supervisor,” and Jorgenson, who signed the second misconduct report in the same capacity, also
thereby violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Plaintiff argues that Myrick, Williamson, Barnett, Nofziger, Gower, Ridley, and Peters
violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by “refusing to address,
resolve, properly train, or hold [Akana and Deacon] accountable” for violating Plaintiff’s rights
and by “upholding the decisions made by Defendants Akana and Deacon.” Plaintiff bases that
argument on his allegations that:
Plaintiff sent a kyte (communication) to Myrick accusing Akana of retaliation;
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Williamson denied Plaintiff’s request for administrative review of one of his
Barnett denied Plaintiff’s request for administrative review of one of Plaintiff’s
Myrick denied Plaintiff’s request that Akana and Deacon be reprimanded for
preventing Plaintiff from attending his disciplinary hearing; Myrick’s letter of
denial was sent to Plaintiff, with a copy directed to Ridley;
Nofziger responded to another grievance from Plaintiff regarding Deacon; and
Myrick and Gower received copies of a letter to Plaintiff from another
administrator regarding a grievance from Plaintiff.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Young conducted the investigation that Plaintiff
requested regarding his second misconduct report and disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff’s claims for
relief, however, do not allege that Young violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Young’s name
does not appear in the “Legal Claims” section of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
C. Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests, Defendants’ First Motion to Stay Discovery, and
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Between December 16, 2016, and February 3, 2017, Plaintiff served Defendants with
Plaintiff’s first requests for production of documents (see ECF 84-1), admissions, and
interrogatories. Defendants timely responded to Plaintiff’s first request for production of
documents (see ECF 84-2), and served Plaintiff with the responses of Defendants Akana and
Deacon to Plaintiff’s first requests for admissions and interrogatories. Also on March 31, 2017,
Defendants filed a motion to stay “additional discovery in this case beyond what has already
been provided to plaintiff pending the Court’s decision on defendants’ [anticipated] summary
judgment motion.” ECF 28. Several days later, Plaintiff moved the court for leave to request an
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additional 13 interrogatories for Defendant Deacon (ECF 30) and for an extension of the
discovery deadline to June 12, 2017 (ECF 31). Between April 5 and April 7, 2017, Plaintiff
served Defendants with his second requests for production of documents, admissions, and
On April 7, 2017, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on all claims, in
which they argue that Defendants Akana and Deacon are entitled to qualified immunity and that
the remaining Defendants had insufficient personal involvement with the alleged violation of
Plaintiff’s rights to be culpable. ECF 32. Along with their motion, Defendants submitted
declarations from Akana and Seawater regarding the events and circumstances underlying
Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearings. On the same day, Defendants served Plaintiff with a letter
including their summary judgment motion and accompanying declarations. See ECF 84-3. The
letter states that “two videos of the 7/22/15 incident at issue in this case” are attached to one of
the included declarations and that that “the videos will be provided to the Law Librarian, who
will arrange for you to review it.” Id. On April 14, 2017, the Court issued an order (ECF 39)
denying Defendants’ motion to stay additional discovery (ECF 28), explaining that Defendants’
motion was premature because it was filed before their motion for summary judgment.
D. Defendants’ Summary Judgment Arguments
Defendants argue that Akana and Deacon are entitled to qualified immunity from
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims on several bases. First, Defendants argue
that, as a matter of law, the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon Plaintiff at the two disciplinary
hearings (a total of 55 days disciplinary segregation, 24 days of lost or restricted privileges, and
$125 in fines) do not implicate a clearly protected liberty interest. Second, Defendants argue that
even if the disciplinary hearings implicated Plaintiff’s protected liberty interests, Akana and
Deacon did not violate any such interest but, rather, provided Plaintiff with constitutionally
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sufficient procedural due process in conducting the hearings and imposing the resulting
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim fails as a matter of
law because the pleadings show that Akana removed Plaintiff from the hallway and returned him
to his cell in part to advance the legitimate correctional goal of promoting safety, security, and
the orderly operation of the facility. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Eight Amendment claims
against Akana, Boston, Jackson, and Jorgensen fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff’s loss of
access to the amenities of administrative, as opposed to disciplinary, housing are insufficient as a
matter of law to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Lastly, regarding Plaintiff’s claims
against the remaining named Defendants, Defendants argue that those fail not only because the
underlying alleged violations by Akana and Deacon fail independently for the reasons discussed
above, and also because Plaintiff does not allege sufficient personal participation by those
Defendants in the underlying misconduct.
E. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion
On April 17, 2017, Plaintiff moved for an order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)
deferring consideration of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pending additional
discovery. ECF 40. Plaintiff stated that Defendants’ responses to his first requests for production
of documents, admissions, and interrogatories were incomplete and that the responses from
Deacon and Akana were inadequate, evasive, and incomplete. Plaintiff argued that “[t]his lack of
discovery materials from the Defendants makes the Plaintiff . . . unable to present the various
facts needed to justify an opposition” to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. ECF 40 at 3.
Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion. Nor has Plaintiff filed an
opposition on the merits to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
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On May 4, 2017, Defendants replied to Plaintiff’s second request for production of
documents. In a letter dated May 4, 2017, Defendants notify Plaintiff that “documents responsive
to your First Request for Production of Documents are being sent to the Law Librarian. The Law
Librarian will send you a call out to review the documents and take them with you if [you] . . .
choose to do so.” ECF 84-4 at 1 (ECF 84 at 21). The letter also states that three disks containing
two videos—the same videos accompanying Defendants’ April 7, 2017, letter—and two audio
recordings pertinent to several of Plaintiff’s requests “will be provided to the Law Librarian who
will arrange for you to review/listen to them.” Id. On May 10, 2017, Defendants served Plaintiff
with the responses of Defendant Deacon to Plaintiff’s second request for admissions.
F. Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Stay Discovery
Also on May 10, 2017, Defendants filed the underlying Renewed Motion to Stay
Discovery with respect to Plaintiff’s requests for admissions and interrogatories directed to
Defendants Barnett, Boston, Gower, Jackson, Jorgenson, Myrick, Nofziger, Peters, Ridley,
Williamson, and Young, pending disposition of their Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF 50.
Defendants argue that it is clear from the face of the pleadings that these individuals lack any
personal involvement in the alleged misconduct underlying Plaintiff’s claims and that, therefore,
they are entitled to qualified immunity from suit and from the attendant burden of responding to
discovery requests. Defendants state that they “have and will continue to provide responses from
[Akana and Deacon].”
Plaintiff responds (ECF 64) by reiterating the allegations that he claims show the
Defendants’ personal participation. Plaintiff does not, however, respond to Defendants’
argument regarding the propriety of determining the issue of Defendants’ qualified immunity
summary judgment argument prior to the taking of further discovery.
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G. Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel
Between April 13, 2017, and June 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed nine Motions to Compel.
ECF 38, 44, 45, 46, 59, 62, 63, 65, and 66. Defendants have responded. ECF 42, 52, 57, 64, 71,
76, 78, and 83.
H. Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Conduct All Pretrial Discovery
On August 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking an extension of time to “conduct all
pretrial discovery.” ECF 85. This motion is substantively identical to Plaintiff’s motion under
Rule 56(d). Defendants have not separately responded.
A. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion
Under Rule 56(d),1 “[i]f a movant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition [to summary judgment], the
court may . . . defer considering the motion[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (emphasis added). Plaintiff
“contends that the Defendants have not provided the Plaintiff with reasonably adequate
responses, productions, or answers to the various Discovery Request[s] made by the Plaintiff”
and that “[t]his lack of discovery materials from the Defendants makes the Plaintiff . . . unable to
present the various facts needed to justify an opposition to the Defendants[s] MSJ.” ECF 40,
¶¶ 9, 10. When Plaintiff filed this motion, Defendants had already provided responses (and
objections) to Plaintiff’s first and second requests for production, including video and audio
recordings (with transcripts). Defendants had also submitted the declarations of Akana and
The 2010 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure moved the text contained
at Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The notes of the Advisory Committee explain
that new “subdivision (d) carries forward without substantial change the provisions of former
subdivision (f).” Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2015).
PAGE 10 – OPINION AND ORDER
Deacon. Defendants’ summary judgment motion, moreover, consists primarily of legal
arguments based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also does not set forth the particular facts he seeks nor explain how they are
“essential” to his summary judgment opposition. See Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coppers & Lybrand,
790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (Rule 56(d) “requires affidavits setting forth the particular
facts expected from the movant’s discovery”) (emphasis added); Barona Grp. of the Capitan
Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Am. Mgt. & Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir.
1987) (Under Rule 56(d), “an opposing party must make clear what information is sought and
how it would preclude summary judgment”) (quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
Although Plaintiff submitted a declaration (ECF 41) with his Rule 56(d) motion, that declaration
simply repeats the assertion that the “lack of Discovery Material from the Defendants makes me .
. . unable to present the various facts needed to justify an opposition to the Defendants[‘] MSJ[.]”
ECF 41, ¶ 6. Plaintiff’s mere recitation of the text of Rule 56(d) fails to show the essential facts
necessary to oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, as required by Rule 56(d). The
Court, therefore, denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Pending Discovery (ECF 40).
B. Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery
On May 10, 2017, Defendants filed their renewed motion to stay discovery on the basis
of qualified immunity with respect to the requests for admissions and interrogatories directed to
Defendants Barnett, Boston, Gower, Jackson, Jorgensen, Myrick, Nofziger, Peters, Ridley,
Williamson, and Young. ECF 50. Defendants argue that it is clear from the face of the pleadings
that these individuals are supervisors or managers who had no personal involvement in the
alleged misconduct underlying Plaintiff’s claims and that, therefore, they are entitled to qualified
immunity from suit and from the attendant burden of responding to discovery requests.
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Defendants state that they do not object to Plaintiff’s discovery requests as to Defendants Akana
and Deacon and that they have responded and will continue to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery
demands directed to these two Defendants. Defendants ask the Court to stay discovery as to all
Defendants but Akana and Deacon pending resolution of the Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff responds that every named Defendant has “some sort of first-hand
knowledge, personal involvement and/or responsibility” in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s
Tule 26(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that a
party from whom discovery is sought may move a district court for a protective order:
(A) forbidding the disclosure or discovery;
(B) specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for
the disclosure or discovery;
(C) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected by the party
seeking discovery; [or]
The U.S. Supreme Court has “emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be resolved
at the earliest possible stage of a litigation.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6
(1987). Officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, therefore, may raise the defense of qualified
immunity on summary judgment motion before discovery. See id. (explaining that “[o]ne of the
purposes of the . . . qualified immunity standard is to protect public officials from the broadranging discovery that can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government”) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “Moreover, a district court enjoys wide discretion in controlling the scope
and extent of discovery, and it is not an abuse of that discretion to stay discovery until the
question of a defendant's immunity can be resolved on summary judgment.” Brown v. Oregon
Dep’t of Corr., 2011 WL 134941, *1 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2011) (citing Little v. City of Seattle, 863
F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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In a § 1983 suit, “vicarious liability is inapplicable,” and therefore, a plaintiff must
establish “that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). A supervisor may be
liable under § 1983 “for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or
control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct
that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.
1998)) (quotation marks omitted). There must, however, be “a sufficient causal connection
between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Id. at 1207 (quoting
Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989)) (quotation marks omitted). A “sufficient
causal connection” exists if the supervisor “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy
‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights.’” Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,
1454–55 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). However, a supervisor's “general responsibility for
supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement.” Id.
at 1455 (citation omitted). “For an official to be liable for another actor's depriving a third party
of his constitutional rights, that official must have at least the same level of intent as would be
required if the official were directly to deprive the third party of his constitutional rights.” Lacey
v.. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir.2012); see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,
1045 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that a supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of
subordinates only if he “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and
failed to act to prevent them”).
Plaintiff alleges that Myrick, Nofziger, Peters, Ridley, and Williamson violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights by “refusing to address resolve, properly train, or hold [Akana and Deacon]
PAGE 13 – OPINION AND ORDER
accountable” for violating Plaintiff’s rights and by “upholding the decisions made by Akana and
Deacon.” Defendants’ summary judgment motion argues that Plaintiff’s pleadings fail as a
matter of law to support a claim for liability under section 1983 against these Defendants
because they only participated in a supervisory or managerial capacity processing Plaintiff’s
grievances following and based on the disciplinary sanctions imposed on Plaintiff in the two
disciplinary hearings. Earlier in this Opinion and Order, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to
defer consideration of Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the basis that Plaintiff failed to
articulate any facts regarding the claims against these Defendants that are essential to Plaintiff’s
opposition to that argument. In light of Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendants’ summary judgment
argument, and Plaintiff’s response, and given the Supreme Court’s admonition in Anderson to
resolve questions of qualified immunity “at the earliest possible stage of litigation,” 483 U.S. at
646 n. 6, the Court exercises its discretion to stay discovery as to Myrick, Williamson, Barnett,
Nofziger, Gower, Ridley and Peters pending resolution of Defendants’ summary judgment
The same logic applies to Jackson and Jorgensen, the only allegations against whom are
that in their capacity as reviewing supervisor, they signed the relevant misconduct reports.
Additionally, although Boston, as the officer that submitted the first misconduct report, arguably
participated more directly in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
Defendants have raised additional legal arguments challenging Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
claims. In light of those arguments, and of Plaintiff’s failure so far to articulate what, if any,
essential discovery he anticipates at his stage of the litigation, the Court exercises its discretion to
stay discovery from Boston pending resolution of Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
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Defendants’ renewed motion to stay discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ summary
judgment motion is granted.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment Pending Discovery. ECF 40. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of
Time to Conduct All Pretrial Discovery. ECF 85. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions to
Compel. ECF 38, 44, 45, 46, 59, 62, 63, 65, and 66. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Renewed
Motion to Stay Discovery as to Defendants Barnett, Boston, Gower, Jackson, Jorgensen, Myrick,
Nofziger, Peters, Ridley, Williamson, and Young. ECF 50. Finally, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff
to respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 32) not later than 30 days from
the date of this Opinion and Order. Defendants shall file their reply not later than 14 days after
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 28th day of August, 2017.
/s/ Michael H. Simon
Michael H. Simon
United States District Judge
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