Dunn v. Myrick et al
Filing
71
OPINION AND ORDER: I ADOPT Judge Coffin's F & R 66 . Defendants' motion for summary judgment 42 is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED. Any appeal from this Order would be frivolous and not taken in good faith. Therefore, plaintiff's in forma pauperis status is REVOKED. Signed on 4/17/2018 by Judge Ann L. Aiken. (ck)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PENDLETON DIVISION
Case No. 2:16-cv-02345-TC
OPINION AND ORDER
JASON W. DUNN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOHN MYRICK, et al.,
Defendants.
AIKEN, Judge:
On February 20, 2018, Magistrate Judge Coffin filed his Findings and Recommendation
("F &R"), recommending that this Court grant defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed objections challenging "each and every" finding of this comt. Pl.'s Obj. F&R 1.
That sort of generalized objection does not meet the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provide for review of a magistrate judge's F&R based on a party's "specific
written objections." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff does, however, make some more specific objections; I will address those
arguments de novo.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Holder v.
Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs primary argument is that symptoms
from his severe mental illnesses and side effects from the medications he takes to manage those
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
illnesses have effectively rendered administrative grievance procedures unavailable to him
because he is unable to understand those procedures and comply with their technicalities. He
contends that the same is true of every inmate in the mental health housing unit where he is
housed at Twin Rivers Conectional Facility. Plaintiff avers that, rather than giving him and his
fellow inmates the benefit of the doubt generally granted to pro se litigants, this CoUtt has
"decided to hold us all to the same standards as a lawyer[.]" Pl.'s Obj. F&R 2.
Having reviewed the record and Judge Coffin's careful opinion, I cannot agree that
plaintiff was held to the same standard as a lawyer; rather, Judge Coffin appears to have read
plaintiffs filings with the degree of flexibility required when a litigant is pro se.
I am sympathetic to plaintiffs frustration regarding the exhaustion requirement. As set
out in detail in Judge Coffin's opinion, Oregon prisoners seeking to exhaust administrative
remedies must comply with a complex, multi-step process. If a prisoner files a notice of tort
claim before that process is complete, the grievance process is cut off. It is understandable that
plaintiff and other pro se litigants like him would be frustrated by that process, and I do not
doubt that those frustrations are compounded by mental illness and side effects from medication.
Neve1theless, the Supreme Court has made it very clear that exhaustion, which used to be
left to the discretion of the district court, is mandato1y. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85
(2006). A primary purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which introduced the
modem exhaustion requirement, was to "reduce the quantity of ... prisoner suits.'' Id at 94.
The Supreme Comt has expressly acknowledged and rejected the argument that requiring strict
compliance with the state's administrative grievance process would be "harsh for prisoners, who
generally are untrained in the law and are often poorly educated." Id at 103. Put simply, this
Court's hands are tied. Plaintiff did not pursue his grievances to the end of the administrative
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
process and he has not shown that the process was effectively unavailable to him. Under binding
precedent, plaintiffs ADA and equal protection claims must be dismissed for lack of exhaustion.
Plaintiff also objects to Judge Coffin's oversight of the discovery process in this case and
to Judge Coffin's denial of his request for appointment of counsel. A district judge "may
reconsider" a discovery ruling or denial of a request for counsel "where it has been shown that
the magistrate judge's order is clearly en·oneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A).
Plaintiff asserts generally that he was denied access to critical evidence, but he does not explain
what evidence he believes should have been produced. The only discovery dispute apparent
from the record is plaintiffs motion to compel production of emails and letters related to
plaintiffs termination from his kitchen position; Judge Coffin reasonably denied that motion
based on defendants' statement that they were searching for and would produce all documents
responsive to that request, with the caveat that they would not perfonn cumbersome system-wide
hard drive searches. Having reviewed the record, I see no clear e!Tor in Judge Coffin's decisions
with respect to discovery or appointment of counsel.
I ADOPT Judge Coffin's F&R (doc. 66). Defendants' motion for summary judgment
(doc. 42) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED. Any appeal from this Order would be
frivolous and not taken in good faith. Therefore, plaintiffs in forma pauperis status is
REVOKED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this
Jr day of April 2018.
Ann Aiken
United States District Judge
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
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