Pinnell v. Belleque

Filing 217

Opinion and Order - The Court DENIES Petitioner's Motion 191 for Summary Adjudication of the Seventeenth Claim for Relief. Signed on 6/2/2010 by Judge Anna J. Brown. (See formal Opinion and Order, 26-pages) (ecp)

IN THB UNITBD STATBS D I S T R I C T COURT FOR THB D I S T R I C T OF ORBGON PORTLAND D I V I S I O N

MARK ALLEN P I N N B L L , Petitioner,

06-CV-828-BR O P I N I O N AND ORDBR

v.
BRIAN BBLLBQUB, W a r d e n , Respondent.

STBVEN T . WAX Federal Public Defender C . RENEE MANBS Assistant Federal Public Defender 101 S.W. Main S t r e e t , s u i t e 1700 P o r t l a n d , OR 9 7 2 0 4 [phone] Attorneys for Petitioner JOHN R . KROGER Attorney General
CAROLYN A L B X A N D B R

TIMOTHY A . SYLWESTER Assistant Attorneys General 1162 Court Street N.E. S a l e m , OR 9 7 3 0 1 [phone] Attorneys for Respondent
1-

O P I N I O N AND ORDER

BROWN, J u d g e .

T h i s m a t t e r c o m e s b e f o r e t h e C o u r t o n P e t i t i o n e r Mark P i n n e l l r s M o t i o n ( # 1 9 2 ) f o r Summary A d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e Seventeenth Claim for Relief. Petitioner contends in his Motion

that t h i s Court should grant him habeas r e l i e f on t h i s Claim because his rights to a fair and impartial jury under the Sixth a n d F o u r t e e n t h Amendments a l l e g e d l y w e r e v i o l a t e d d u r i n g h i s s e c o n d p e n a l t y - p h a s e t r i a l when J o y c e G r a u , t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s secretary acting as bailiff, informed jurors during their sentencing deliberations that the t r i a l judge would keep them there until they reached a verdict and that this could be late into the night. A c c o r d i n g t o P e t i t i o n e r , Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t

was wrong as a matter of law (Subclaim A); constituted a coercive charge under Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) (Subclaim B); and unconstitutionally interfered with the jury's function by providing extraneous information that affected the jury's d e l i b e r a t i o n ( S u b c l a i m C) . The S t a t e a s s e r t s i n i t s R e s p o n s e t h a t (1) t h e a f f i d a v i t s t h a t a d d r e s s e d Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t w e r e d e e m e d i n a d m i s s i b l e i n state court and, therefore, are not properly before this Court; (2) a n y c l a i m t h a t t h e O r e g o n c o u r t s s h o u l d h a v e e x a m i n e d t h e admissibility of the affidavits under the Federal Rules of E v i d e n c e i s p r o c e d u r a l l y d e f a u l t e d ; a n d (3) e v e n i f t h e affidavits are admissible here, Claim Seventeen i s without merit. 2 - OPINION AND ORDER

For t h e f o l l o w i n g ' r e a s o n s , t h e C o u r t DENIES P e t i t i o n e r ' s Motion.

BACKGROUND

P e t i t i o n e r w a s i n i t i a l l y t r i e d a n d c o n v i c t e d i n May a n d J u n e 1988 and was sentenced to death on October 7, 1988. On d i r e c t

review, the Oregon Supreme court upheld Petitionerrs convictions but remanded for a new penalty-phase t r i a l .
State of Or. v.

P i n n e l l , 3 1 1 O r . 98 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .
P e t i t i o n e r ' s second penalty-phase t r i a l was held i n 1992 before the Honorable Jon B. Lund, Washington County C i r c u i t JUdge, and the jury again imposed a death sentence. Sometime

thereafter the foreperson of Petitioner's second penalty-phase jury, Harry Randall, apparently accompanied his son to a meeting w i t h Keith Walker who, a l o n g w i t h c o - c o u n s e l , r e p r e s e n t e d Petitioner during the second penalty-phase t r i a l . Although the

m e e t i n g w a s o n a n u n r e l a t e d l e g a l m a t t e r , i t a p p e a r s Mr. R a n d a l l i n d i c a t e d d u r i n g t h a t m e e t i n g t h a t M r . W a l k e r h a d n e a r l y won Petitioner's case. This conversation prompted the creation of The Randall

the Randall Affidavit, which i s at issue here. 1

Affidavit i s dated June 16, 1994, more than two years a f t e r the jury reached i t s verdict on April 13, 1992.
1 The source of t h i s h i s t o r y r e l a t i n g t o the o r i g i n of the Randall Affidavit is the post-conviction t r i a l court transcript. See Resp't Ex. 268 a t 4-5.

3 - OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner d i d n o t p r e s e n t t o t h e O r e g o n S u p r e m e C o u r t o n d i r e c t review a c l a i m r e l a t e d t o Ms. G r a u ' s c o n t a c t w i t h t h e jury during sentencing deliberations . . The Oregon Supreme Court upheld Petitioner's death sentence and entered i t s judgment on September 7, 1994.
State o f Or. v. Pinnell, 319 Or. 438 (1994).

Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. On N o v e m b e r 3 , 1 9 9 4 , P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f (PCR) i n s t a t e c o u r t . for relief, he alleged the following: Among h i s o t h e r c l a i m s

***
FOURTH CLAIM FOR R E L I E F A. The t r i a l judge i n the second penalty proceeding, Judge Jon B. Lund, v i o l a t e d Petitioner's. rights to due process and a fair penalty proceeding under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and further violated P e t i t i o n e r ' s rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to have a f a i r penalty proceeding under the Eighth Amendment t o the United States Constitution . . . when the t r i a l court erred as follows:

***
5. The t r i a l court b a i l i f f improperly and prejudicially communicated with the jury in violation of petitioner's Federal and State Constitutional rights as set out in paragraph A, s u p r a , o f t h i s c l a i m and f u r t h e r v i o l a t e d ORCP 5 9 C ( S } a n d ORS 1 3 6 . 3 3 0 ( 1 } w h e n s a i d b a i l i f f communicated to the jury that they would not be allowed t o go home u n t i l they reached a verdict which said conduct by the t r i a l court b a i l i f f was p l a i n e r r o r and

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

resulted i n d e n i a l o f f u n d a m e n t a l d u e p r o c e s s and resulted in miscarriage of justice, and an unreliable verdict a l l in violation of the E i g h t h a n d F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e United States constitution. R e s p ' t Ex. 127 a t 20-22 (underlined emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) . In support of this claim, Petitioner sought to admit the Randall Affidavit as well as an Affidavit from David Rogers, P e t i t i o n e r ' s p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n i n v e s t i g a t o r who i n t e r v i e w e d Ms. G r a u . I n i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f P e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m , t h e PCR

court admitted the Randall Affidavit, but sustained the state's objection to admission of the Rogers Affidavit on the ground of hearsay. A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f a n e v i d e n t i a r y t r i a l , t h e PCR

court denied Petitioner's claim on the merits based on the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t P e t i t i o n e r h a d n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d h e was p r e j u d i c e d b y Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t . P e t i t i o n e r c h a l l e n g e d t h e PCR c o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f t h i s c l a i m in his appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals, but he did not take i s s u e w i t h t h e PCR c o u r t ' s s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g t h a t t h e R o g e r s A f f i d a v i t was i n a d m i s s i b l e . The S t a t e , however, cross-moved on

t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r t h e PCR c o u r t e r r e d w h e n i t a d m i t t e d t h e Randall Affidavit. The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed with the

State and determined the Randall Affidavit was not admissible, a f f i r m i n g t h e PCR j U d g m e n t i n a w r i t t e n o p i n i o n a s follows: We r e v i e w t h e a d m i s s i o n o f a j u r o r ' s a f f i d a v i t regarding jury deliberations for abuse of 5 - OPINION AND ORDER

discretion. K o e n n e c k e v . S t a t e o f O r e g o n 1 2 2 Ore. App. 100 103 857 P.2d 148 rev. den. 318 Ore. 26 1 862 P.2d 1306 (1993). I t i s a longstanding rule in Oregon that the "affidavit[s] of jurors will not be received to impeach their v e r d i c t . II C l i n e v . B r o Y I 1 O r e . 8 9 9 0 ( 1 8 5 4 ) . While that f l a t prohibition has been relaxed somewhat since the nineteenth century, i t i s s t i l l lila strong policy in Oregon to protect jury verdicts from attack, and courts are hesitant to interrogate jurors after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential m i s c o n d u c t . III S t a t e v . C h e n e Y I 1 7 1 O r e . A p p . 4 0 1 , 415, 16 P.3d 1164 (2000), rev. den. 332 Ore. 316 28 P.3d 1176 (2001) (quoting Koennecke, 122 Ore. App. a t 103); see also Leland Properties v. Burton Engineering and Survey, 152 Ore. App. 557 1 563, 954 P.2d 851 1 rev. den. 327 Ore. 620, 971 P.2d 4 1 2 ( 1 9 9 8 ) (IIFew p r i n c i p l e s a r e m o r e t i m e h o n o r e d in our jury system than the rule that affidavits of jurors will not be considered as evidence to i m p e a c h t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . II) . O n l y i n c a s e s i n which the misconduct a t issue lIamounts to fraud, bribery, forcible coercion or any other obstruction of justice that would subject the offender to a criminal prosecution" will the court consider "an attack upon a verdict by a j u r o r ' s affidavit [.] Carson v. Brauer, 234 Ore. 333
I 1 1 1
I

1

I

1

I

II

1

345 1 382 P.2d 79 (1963).

In this case, the alleged misconduct is a s t a t e m e n t b y a member o f t h e c o u r t s t a f f t o t h e jury during i t s deliberations in the second p e n a l t y - p h a s e p r o c e e d i n g . The j u r y f o r e p e r s o n ' s affidavit states that, sometime during d e l i b e r a t i o n s , t h e j u r y was a d v i s e d b y t h e c o u r t ' s s e c r e t a r y t h a t t h e c o u r t IIwould k e e p u s t h e r e u n t i l we r e a c h e d a v e r d i c t [ a n d ] t h a t t h i s c o u l d be very late into the night." That does not amount to the sort of misconduct described in Carson that would warrant considering nan attack u p o n [ t h e ] v e r d i c t b y a j u r o r ' s a f f i d a v i t . 1I T h e post-conviction t r i a l court did not abuse i t s discretion in denying petitioner post-conviction r e l i e f on the ground that the jury verdict had been improperly coerced.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER

Resp't E x . 2 7 3 a t 9 - 1 0 . The O r e g o n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s d e n i e d P e t i t i o n e r ' s m o t i o n f o r reconsideration, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied his p e t i t i o n for review without comment.

P i n n e l l v . P a l m a t e e r , 2 0 0 O r . App.

303 ( 2 0 0 5 ) , r e v . d e n i e d , 3 4 0 O r . 483 ( 2 0 0 6 ) .

STANDARDS I. Summary J u d g m e n t

F e d e r a l R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 5 6 ( c ) a u t h o r i z e s summary judgment i f no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party i s e n t i t l e d to judgment as a matter of law. The

moving party must show the absence of an issue of material fact.

Rivera v. P h i l i p Morris, I n c . , 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.
2005). I n r e s p o n s e t o a p r o p e r l y s u p p o r t e d m o t i o n f o r summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and show t h e r e i s a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t f o r t r i a l .
An

Id.

issue of fact is material " ' i f the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

I"

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F. 3d 1054,

1 0 6 1 ( 9 t h c i r . 2 0 0 2 ) { q u o t i n g A n d e r s o n v . L i b e r t y L o b b y , I n c . , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The c o u r t m u s t d r a w a l l r e a s o n a b l e

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.

Id.

"Summary

j u d g m e n t c a n n o t b e g r a n t e d w h e r e c o n t r a r y i n f e r e n c e s may b e d r a w n from the evidence as to material issues." 7 - OPINION AND ORDER

E a s t e r v . A m . W. F i n . ,

381 F . 3 d 9 4 8 , 9 5 7 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 4 ) ( c i t i n g S h e r m a n O a k s Med. A r t s

C t r . , L t d . v . C a r p e n t e r s L o c a l U n i o n No. 1 9 3 6 , 6 8 0 F . 2 d 5 9 4 , 5 9 8
(9th Cir. 1982)).
A mere disagreement about a material issue of

f a c t , however, does n o t p r e c l u d e summary judgment.

Jackson v.

Bank o f Haw., 902 F . 2 d 1385, 1389 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 9 0 ) .
When t h e n o n m o v i n g p a r t y ' s c l a i m s a r e f a c t u a l l y i m p l a u s i b l e , t h a t p a r t y must "come forward w i t h more p e r s u a s i v e evidence t h a n otherwise would be necessary."

Wong v . R e g e n t s o f U n i v . o f C a l . ,

379 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended by 410 F.3d 1052, 1055 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ( c i t i n g B l u e R i d g e I n s . Co. v . S t a n e w i c h , 1 4 2 F . 3 d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1998)). The substantive law governing a claim or a defense determines whether a fact is material.

Miller v. Glenn Miller
If the

P r o d . , I n c . , 454 F . 3 d 975, 987 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) .

resolution of a factual dispute would not affect the outcome of t h e c l a i m , t h e c o u r t may g r a n t s u m m a r y j U d g m e n t .

Id.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply t o habeas proceedings to the extent that the practice in such proceedings i s not s e t forth i n the Rules Governing 2254 Cases. P. 81(a) (2). F e d . R. C i v .

See also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80-81

(1977) (summary judgment i s an appropriate v e h i c l e f o r resolving habeas-corpus cases).

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

II.

Deference
An

application for writ of habeas corpus shall not be

granted unless adjudication of the claim in state court resulted i n a d e c i s i o n t h a t w a s (1) I I c o n t r a r y t o , o r i n v o l v e d a n unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, a s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ll o r (2) I I b a s e d o n a n u n r e a s o n a b l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e f a c t s i n l i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e S t a t e c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g . II 28 U . S . C .
§

2254(d).

A state court's findings of fact are

presumed correct, and Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U . S . C .
§

2254(e) (1).

A state-court decision is IIcontrary to . . . clearly established precedent i f the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law s e t forth in [the Supreme Court's] c a s e s ll o r " i f t h e s t a t e c o u r t c o n f r o n t s a s e t o f f a c t s t h a t a r e m a t e r i a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives a t a result different from [that] precedent."
W i l l i a m s v . T a y l o r , 529 U . S . 3 6 2 , 4 0 5 - 0 6 ( 2 0 0 0 ) .

Under the lIunreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas c o u r t may g r a n t r e l i e f " i f t h e s t a t e c o u r t i d e n t i f i e s t h e c o r r e c t legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case."

Id. at 413.

The " u n r e a s o n a b l e a p p l i c a t i o n "

9 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER

clause r e q u i r e s t h e s t a t e - c o u r t d e c i s i o n t o b e m o r e t h a n incorrect or erroneous.
Id. a t 410.

For Petitioner to prevail

under this clause, the state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable.
Id. a t 409.

DISCUSSION

As a p r e l i m i n a r y m a t t e r , P e t i t i o n e r c o n t e n d s t h e O r e g o n Court of Appeals in the last reasoned state-court decision addressing this issue in Petitioner's case failed to adjudicate his federal constitutional claim on the merits. Petitioner

maintains the Oregon Court of Appeals decision i s not, therefore, e n t i t l e d t o d e f e r e n c e u n d e r 28 U . S . C . disagrees.
§

2254(d) (1).

The C o u r t

The Oregon Court of Appeals addressed P e t i t i o n e r ' s

c l a i m r e l a t e d t o t h e s t a t e m e n t Ms. G r a u made t o t h e j u r y d u r i n g the second penalty-phase proceeding and found the Randall A f f i d a v i t was i n a d m i s s i b l e u n d e r s t a t e l a w . In other words, the

Oregon C o u r t o f A p p e a l s d e c i s i o n was a s u b s t a n t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t P e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m was u n s u p p o r t e d b y a n y e v i d e n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e s t a t e a p p e a l s c o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e PCR c o u r t ' s denial of r e l i e f on the claim in a written merits decision entitled to deference under
§

2254(d) (1).

In any event, even i f the Court concluded the Oregon Court of Appeals decision was not e n t i t l e d to deference and reviewed

1 0 - OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner's c l a i m d e n o v o a s h e i n s i s t s , t h i s C o u r t w o u l d r e a c h t h e same r e s u l t f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s :
I. The Affidavits A. Randall Affidavit

According to the Randall Affidavit:

( 1 ) Ms. G r a u

communicated with the jury during their sentencing deliberations, but i t is unclear whether she had contact with the panel or R a n d a l l o n l y ; (2) d u r i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s t h e r e w e r e f o u r d e s c r i b e d votes: 7 - 5 , 9 - 3 , 1 1 - 12 , a n d u n a n i m o u s ; (3) t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n

b e t w e e n Ms. G r a u a n d t h e j u r y o c c u r r e d s o m e t i m e d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f t h e 7 - 5 a n d 9 - 3 v o t e s : ( 4 ) Ms. G r a u a d v i s e d t h e j u r y " t h a t Judge Lund would keep [them] there u n t i l [they] reached a v e r d i c t ; t h a t t h i s c o u l d b e v e r y l a t e i n t o t h e n i g h t " ; (5) Randall stated the "holdout juror" changed his vote after looking a t t h e d e a t h p h o t o g r a p h s ; (6) s t a t e m e n t s r e l a t e d t o t h e n e e d f o r unanimity and the possibility of a mistrial are characterized as b e l i e f s o f t h e j u r o r s a n d ' R a n d a l l : (7) t h e s o u r c e f o r t h e s e b e l i e f s i s n o t i d e n t i f i e d : a n d ( 8 ) R a n d a l l ' s A f f i d a v i t w a s made more than two years a f t e r the j u r y ' s death-penalty verdict.
B. Rogers Affidavit

According to the Rogers Affidavit:

(1) t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r ' s

c o n t a c t w i t h Ms. G r a u o c c u r r e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y f i v e y e a r s a f t e r

T h e f i r s t n u m b e r ( i . e . , " 7 " i n " 7 - 5 11 ) d e n o t e s t h e n u m b e r of jurors in favor of a death-penalty verdict.
2

1 1 - OPINION AND ORDER

the j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t ; (2) Ms. G r a u d i d n o t r e c a l l t h e e v e n t ; (3) Ms. G r a u s t a t e d h e r g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e i n a n s w e r i n g a q u e s t i o n a b o u t how l a t e a j u r y w i l l d e l i b e r a t e i s t o t e l l t h e m t h a t "we" h a v e n e v e r r e l e a s e d a j u r y w h i l e t h e y a r e d e l i b e r a t i n g ; ( 4 ) Ms. G r a u s t a t e d s h e n e v e r q u e s t i o n s a j u r y a b o u t v o t i n g progress; the statement attributed to her in the Randall Affidavit would be normal procedure;, a verdict would be guilty, not guilty, or hung; she did not and does not advise the jury of these choices; and the jury must follow the court's instructions even though she does not t e l l the jury that.

c.

Other Relevant .Facts in the Record

In addition to the facts proffered in these Affidavits, the r e c o r d r e v e a l s (1) d e l i b e r a t i o n s t o o k a p p r o x i m a t e l y e i g h t h o u r s ( f r o m 1 2 : 5 9 p . m . t o 8 : 5 0 p . m . ) ; (2) t h e j u r y s u b m i t t e d a w r i t t e n q u e s t i o n t o J u d g e L u n d a r o u n d 6 : 0 0 p . m . ; (3) a l t h o u g h t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e d a t o r a l a r g u m e n t t h a t i t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o i n f e r t h a t Ms. Grau's statement was not unsolicited, there i s not any basis to conclude she was t o l d where they were i n t h e i r deliberations in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h e r s t a t e m e n t ; a n d (4) t h e r e i s n o t a n y e v i d e n c e linking the putative juror confusion regarding unanimity or the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a m i s t r i a l t o Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t .
II.

Admissibility of the Affidavits
The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d d e c l i n e t o c o n s i d e r t h e

Randall and Rogers Affidavits because Oregon coUrts have 1 2 - OPINION AND ORDER

definitively r u l e d t h a t n e i t h e r w e r e a d m i s s i b l e u n d e r O r e g o n l a w and a federal court must honor state-court determinations of state-law questions. (1991).3
See E s t e l l e v . McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68

Petitioner argues the Randall Affidavit is admissible

under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and suggests the Rogers A f f i d a v i t i s a d m i s s i b l e o n t h e b a s i s t h a t I1the f e d e r a l c o u r t s sitting in habeas have the right to consider a broader range of e v i d e n c e - i n c l u d i n g h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e - when c o n s i d e r i n g a petition.
II

Federal habeas courts are split over whether evidence submitted to impeach a jury verdict i s governed by state evidentiary rules or Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).
See,

e . g . , McDowell v. Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1367 (9th Cir. 1997)

(pre-AEDPA c a s e i n w h i c h t h e N i n t h C i r c u i t d e t e r m i n e d a f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t court appropriately applied Rule 606(b) despite a p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g state-evidence r u l e ) ; Lolisco v. Goord,

3 In addition, the State asserts because Petitioner never argued before the Oregon courts that the Federal Rules of Evidence required them to admit and to consider the Affidavits in support of his substantive claim, any claim based on the admissibility of these Affidavits under federal evidentiary rules is p r o c e d u r a l l y d e f a u l t e d . The C o u r t n e e d n o t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r Petitioner adequately presented this argument to Oregon's state courts, however, because even i f the Federal Rules of Evidence a p p l y , P e t i t i o n e r c a n n o t p r e v a i l o n h i s M o t i o n . S e e 28 U . S . C . § 2 2 4 8 ( b ) (2) ( n A n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s may b e denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.") . 1 3 - OPINION AND ORDER

263 F . 3 d 1 7 8 , 1 8 7 - 8 8 { 2 d C i r . 2001} (when c o n s i d e r i n g r e a s o n ableness of the state court's no-prejudice determination under t h e AEDPA, s t a t e e v i d e n c e r u l e s s h o u l d a p p l y r a t h e r t h a n R u l e 6 0 6 when a f e d e r a l e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g h a s n o t b e e n h e l d ) . Petitioner contends the Randall and Rogers Affidavits reveal t h e j u r y was e x p o s e d t o p r e j u d i c i a l e x t r a n e o u s i n f l u e n c e b y Ms. G r a u . "Federal Rule of Evidence 606{b) i s grounded in the

common-law r u l e a g a i n s t a d m i s s i o n o f j u r y t e s t i m o n y t o impeach a verdict and the exception for juror testimony relating to extraneous influences."

Tanner v. U.S., 483 U.S. 107, 121

(1987) ( c i t a t i o n s omitted) . Rule 606{b) provides: [A] j u r o r may n o t t e s t i f y a s t o a n y m a n n e r o r statement occurring during the course of the jury deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other j u r o r ' s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. B u t a j u r o r may t e s t i f y a b o u t ( 1 ) w h e t h e r extraneous p r e j u d i c i a l information was improperly b r o u g h t t o t h e j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n , [ o r ] (2) w h e t h e r a n y o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e was i m p r o p e r l y b r o u g h t t o bear upon any juror. . . . A Juror's affidavit or e v i d e n c e o f a n y s t a t e m e n t b y t h e j u r o r may n o t b e received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.
A. Randall Affidavit

I n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s n o c o n t r o l l i n g post-AEDPA Ninth Circuit law as to whether evidence submitted to impeach a jury verdict is governed by state evidentiary rules or Federal 1 4 - OPINION AND ORDER

Rule o f E v i d e n c e 6 0 6 ( b } , t h e C o u r t w i l l e x a m i n e t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the Randall Affidavit under Rule 606(b}. Under Rule 606(b}, the statement "that Judge Lund would keep [the jury] there until [they] reached a verdict; that this could b e v e r y l a t e i n t o t h e n i g h t " a t t r i b u t e d t o Ms. G r a u i s a d m i s s i b l e under the exception as t o whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror. Moreover, the facts

that a number of votes were taken and jurors continued to review evidence (i.e., photos) are admissible to the extent they provide c o n t e x t f o r Ms. G r a u ' s e x t r a n e o u s s t a t e m e n t .
See United States

v . R u t h e r f o r d , 3 7 1 F . 3 d 6 3 4 , 644 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 4 ) ( q u o t i n g

u.S. v.

Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A] court can and

should consider the 'effect of extraneous information or improper contacts on a j u r o r ' s s t a t e of mind,
I

a juror's 'general fear and

anxiety following' such an incident, and any other thoughts a juror might have about the contacts or conduct at issue."). Because Randall's testimony regarding unanimity and the possibility of a mistrial relates to beliefs held by Randall and/or other jurors, i t i s inadmissible under Rule 606(b} as classic mental processes and internal jury deliberations.

Id. at

639-40 (testimony as to whether jurors ignored instructions in

reaching their verdict is inadmissible under Rule 606(b»). Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate this evidence b e a r s a n y r e l a t i o n t o Ms. G r a u ' s c o n t a c t w i t h t h e j u r y . 1 5 - OPINION AND ORDER

B.

Rogers Affidavit

To t h e e x t e n t P e t i t i o n e r o f f e r s t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e R o g e r s Affidavit for its truth, i t is inadmissible as hearsay within hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 805. Even i f the Court

considered the Affidavit under "a relaxed application of the hearsay, best evidence, authentication, and other evidentiary rules,
II

i t is only helpful to Petitioner to the extent i t

c o n f i r m s t h a t Ms. G r a u h a d c o n t a c t w i t h t h e j u r y , w h i c h i s a point that the State concedes. Accordingly, the Court will not consider the content of the Rogers Affidavit when i t determines whether P e t i t i o n e r can prevail on his Motion.
I I I . S t a t e m e n t Wrong a s a M a t t e r o f Law < S u b c l a i m A)

I n t h i s S u b c l a i m , P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t t o the jury was incorrect as a matter of law because a v a l i d jury verdict in this death-penalty context did not have to be unanimous. As n o t e d , h o w e v e r , t h i s S u b c l a i m i s n o t s u p p o r t e d b y

the record because there i s not any evidence linking the statement and the jury's putative misunderstanding regarding unanimity and the possibility of a mistrial. M o r e o v e r , Ms.

Grau's statement did not misstate the unanimity rule, and i t was consistent with the t r i a l court's jury instructions on the point as follows: As y o u k n o w , y o u w i l l b e g i v e n f o u r q u e s t i o n s , numbered 1 through 4, the death penalty case 1 6 - OPINION AND ORDER

questions t h a t y o u m u s t a n s w e r e i t h e r " Y e s " o r IINo." T h e S t a t e h a s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f t o p r o v e beyond a reasonable doubt that the answers to each of Questions I, 2, and 3 is "Yes." Before any question can be answered "Yes," a l l 12 jurors must agree. I f you decide that the State has failed to prove the affirmative of anyone or more of Questions 1, 2, and 3 beyond a reasonable doubt or you decide the answer to Question 4 i s "No," you must answer any such question "No."
I f all 12 jurors cannot agree that a particular question should be answered "Yes," then the question must be answered "No."

If you unanimously answer a l l four of the death penalty questions "Yes," the law requires that the penalty to be imposed shall be death. I f you answer one or more of those questions "No," the law provides that defendant shall be sentenced to l i f e imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole unless ten or more jurors find that there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant l i f e imprisonment. I f ten or more jurors so decide, then the penalty to be imposed shall be l i f e imprisonment with the possibility of release or parole.

***
You are to answer t h i s fourth question "No" i f one or more of you find there i s any aspect of the defendant's character or background or any circumstance of the offense that one or more of you believe would j u s t i f y a sentence less than death.

You may c o n s i d e r t h e s e q u e s t i o n s i n a n y o r d e r . I f you answer one or more of the death penalty questions "No," then you must decide i f defendant should be sentenced to l i f e imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole or to life imprisonment. 1 7 - OPINION AND ORDER

Supple. F i l i n g ( # 2 1 0 ) , A t t a c h . A ( j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s ) a t 1 0 0 - 0 3 (emphasis added) . Ms. G r a u 1 s r e f e r e n c e i n h e r s t a t e m e n t t o a " v e r d i c t .. i n n o way s u g g e s t s u n a n i m i t y w a s r e q u i r e d t o r e t u r n a v e r d i c t a n d , a s noted, i t is consistent with the t r i a l court's instructions a d v i s i n g t h e j u r y t h a t (1) i n o r d e r t o i m p o s e t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , a l l 12 j u r o r s h a d t o u n a n i m o u s l y a n s w e r a l l f o u r q u e s t i o n s " Y e s n b u t (2) i f a l l 12 j u r o r s c o u l d n o t a g r e e a q u e s t i o n s h o u l d b e a n s w e r e d " Y e s , " i t h a d t o b e a n s w e r e d "Non a n d a s e n t e n c e l e s s than death would be imposed. IV.
A l l e n C h a r g e ( S u b c l a i m B)

P e t i t i o n e r a r g u e s Ms. G r a u ' s c o n t a c t w i t h t h e j u r y c o e r c e d one or more of i t s members into believing they had to relinquish their conscientiously-held views in favor of reaching a verdict, thus violating Petitioner's fundamental right to due process and an adjudication before a f a i r and impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In a typical Allen charge context, the judge instructs a deadlocked jury to continue deliberations in an attempt to reach agreement. Courts, however, have not hesitated to apply an Allen

charge analysis when the i n s t r u c t i o n was delivered by someone other than the judge. Cir. 1999). (1966)
(11

Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 365 (9th

See a l s o Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 363 & 366

[T)he o f f i c i a l character of the b a i l i f f - as an officer

1 8 - OPINION AND ORDER

of t h e c o u r t a s w e l l a s t h e S t a t e - b e y o n d q u e s t i o n c a r r i e s g r e a t weight with a j u r y . " } ; Tobe v. Bensinger, 492 F.2d 232, 238 (7th c i r . 1974) ("[I]n the present case, i t is immaterial whether the

jurors believed that the b a i l i f f s were or, as i s more probable, the judge through the b a i l i f f s was t e l l i n g them over and over again i n one form or another that 'You must reach a decision. In either case the statements were not only probably but were presumptively coercive and p r e j u d i c i a l . "); u.s. v. Brande, 329 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A] juror i s more susceptible to
I

improper influence from a court officer than from spectators or parties to the case."). I n view o f t h e s e holdings, t h e Court equates Ms. Grau's statement to a statement by the t r i a l court in order to determine the fundamental question: coerced. whether the jury was improperly To t h a t end,

See Weaver, 197 F.3d a t 365.

[w]e apply a " t o t a l i t y of the circumstances" analysis when examining whether a judge's statements to a jury were impermissibly coercive. In performing the Allen analysis, i t is helpful to consider three relevant factors: "(1) the form of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , (2) the time the j u r y d e l i b e r a t e d after receiving the charge in relation to the t o t a l time of d e l i b e r a t i o n and (3) any o t h e r indicia of coerciveness." United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d, 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) . Before applying these factors, the Court addresses Petitioner's contention that an Allen charge is per se .

1 9 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER

unconstitutional w h e n , a s h e r e , n o c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n w a s given reminding jurors to hold onto their conscientiously-held beliefs. r r G e n e r a l l y , when a j u d g e t e l l s j u r o r s t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e i r positions, the judge must also warn the jurors to hold on to their conscientiously-held beliefs.
II

Id.

II

'While i t i s helpful

for an Allen charge to include such ameliorative language, [however], i t s lack does not i t s e l f necessarily require reversal.
'II

Id. at

~09~

(quoting United S t a t e v. Cuozzo, 962
~992».

F . 2 d 9 4 5 , 952 ( 9 t h C i r .

As n o t e d , e x a m i n a t i o n o f a n

Allen charge requires analysis of the "totality of the

circumstances.

II

Whether a cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n was given i s

only one factor a court should consider in i t s determination as t o w h e t h e r a j u r y was i m p r o p e r l y c o e r c e d . Indeed, there is

nothing I1talismanic about a single element making a charge valid or invalid."
Weaver,
~97

F.3d at 365.
~30

Nevertheless, Petitioner
~997),

r e l i e s on McDowell v. Calderon,

F . 3 d 833 ( 9 t h C i r .

to

s u p p o r t h i s p o s i t i o n t h a t Ms. G r a u ' s f a i l u r e t o r e m i n d j u r o r s n o t t o a b a n d o n t h e i r c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y - h e l d v i e w s w h e n s h e made h e r statement constitutes reversible error.
McDowell, however,

involved a trial court's obligation to adequately address a jury misunderstanding in a capital case after such misunderstanding was d i s c l o s e d t o t h e c o u r t . Thus, McDowell does not support

Petitioner's argument that he should prevail on his Motion based 20 - OPINION AND ORDER

solely o n t h e f a c t t h a t n o c a u t i o n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n w a s i s s u e d a s t o Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t w h e n n o d i s c l o s u r e o f j u r y i m p a s s e o r c o n f u s i o n w a s e v e r made t o Ms. G r a u o r t o t h e c o u r t . In evaluating the Berger factors, the Court notes there is not any evidence in this record of jury impasse, frustration, or concern indicating an inability to reach a verdict.
Cf. Weaver,

197 F.3d a t 362 (the jury inquired whether they had to reach a verdict on a l l counts)
i

Tobe, 492 F.2d a t 234-35 ( j u r y i n q u i r e d

what would happen i f they could not reach a decision and whether there were any alternatives i f they could not reach a decision) . S e c o n d , t h e r e i s n o t a n y e v i d e n c e t h a t i n d i c a t e s how much t i m e p a s s e d a f t e r Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t b e f o r e t h e j u r y r e a c h e d its verdict. The record r e f l e c t s the j u r y took a t l e a s t two more

votes after the statement and continued to examine evidence

(i.e., the death photographs).

In addition, the record reflects

t h e j u r y c o n t i n u e d t o d e l i b e r a t e u n t i l 6 : 0 0 p . m . when t h e y s e n t a question to Judge Lund related to P e t i t i o n e r ' s r i g h t to appeal. These facts stand i n stark contrast to those presented i n Weaver where the obvious impact of the b a i l i f f ' s statement was demonstrated by the fact that the jury reached a verdict five minutes after such statement. F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s n o t a n y e v i d e n c e t h a t Ms. G r a u 1 s s t a t e m e n t was d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a s p e c i f i c j u r o r o r s e t o f j u r o r s o r t h a t s h e k n e w a n y t h i n g a b o u t p o s i t i o n s o r a s p l i t i n v o t e s among t h e 2 1 - OPINION AND ORDER

jurors.

As n o t e d , t h e r e i s n o t a n y e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e j u r y w a s

deadlocked, had reached anything approaching an impasse, or considered further deliberations futile. See United States v. Moreover, the jury

Wauneka, 842 F . 2 d 1083, 1089 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 8 ) . reached a clear verdict in the end.

Cf. Weaver, 197 F.3d a t 366

(court found i t noteworthy that the jurors' votes appeared to have been in flux until the very end, even after the oral verdict was r e a d a l o u d i n open c o u r t " s u g g e s t i n g t h a t m i n o r i t y j u r o r s were ambivalent and thus susceptible to pressure."). Here there The

was not any apparent ambivalence on the p a r t of jurors:

foreperson announced the jury had unanimously answered "yes" to all four death-penalty questions; the court polled the jurors, and each juror confirmed he or she had voted "yes" on each question; the verdict form indicated the jurors answered "yes" to each question; and each juror signed the verdict form. Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances presented here, the Court concludes on this record that P e t i t i o n e r h a s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t Ms. G r a u ' s c o n t a c t w i t h Petitioner's second penalty-phase jury had an impermissibly coercive effect on them.
v.

Extraneous Influence on Jury During Deliberations ( S u b c l a i m C) Petitioner contends the Randall and Rogers Affidavits

e s t a b l i s h P e t i t i o n e r ' s second penalty-phase jury was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information which, pursuant to Mattox v. 2 2 - OPINION AND ORDER

United S t a t e s , 1 4 6 U . S . 1 4 0 ( 1 8 9 2 ) , i n v a l i d a t e s t h e v e r d i c t

unless the State shows i t s harmlessness. The S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d i n M a t t o x t h a t " [ p ] r i v a t e communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict, at least unless their h a r m l e s s n e s s i s made t o a p p e a r .
II

Id. at 150.

In Rutherford, the

Ninth Circuit elaborated on the Supreme Court's approach to t h i s issue: Subsequently, i n Remmer v. United S t a t e s , 347 U.S. 227 ( 1 9 5 4 ) , t h e C o u r t e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a n y "private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a t r i a l about the matter pending before the juryll is deemed "presumptively prejudicial" and placed a heavy burden on the government to rebut the presumption by proving that the e r r o r was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 371 F.3d a t 641. In Caliendo v. Warden of California Men's Colony, the Ninth Circuit held the Mattox presumption of prejudice applies when t h e u n a u t h o r i z e d c o n t a c t i s p o s s i b l y p r e j u d i c i a l . 691 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 4 ) . 365 F.3d

Contact is possibly prejudicial i f i t
I d . a t 697 ( " W h e t h e r a n

raises a risk of influencing a verdict.

unauthorized communication between a juror and a third party concerned the case i s but one factor in determining whether the c o m m u n i c a t i o n r a i s e d a r i s k o f i n f l u e n c i n g t h e v e r d i c t . 11) · factors include the length and nature of the contact, the 23 - OPINION AND ORDER Other

identity a n d r o l e a t t r i a l o f t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d t e v i d e n c e o f actual impact on the juror(s), and the possibility of eliminating prejudice through a limiting instruction.
Id. at 697-98.

A p p l y i n g t h e s e f a c t o r s , t h e C o u r t n o t e s Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t did not address a question of law or fact in the case; her statement involved a brief, isolated interaction with the jury; the jury perceived her as having the authority of the court in her role as b a i l i f f ; and there is not any evidence in the record that demonstrates her statement had an actual impact on the jury, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n l i g h t of the fact t h a t the jury was properly instructed by the t r i a l court and i s presumed to have understood and followed those instructions.
225 t

S e e W e e k s v . A n g e l o n e , 528 U . S .

234 ( 2 0 0 0 ) .

The only evidence Petitioner can rely on to

s u g g e s t Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t h a d a n i m p a c t o n t h e j u r y i s t h e Randall Affidavit reflecting, years after the fact, juror mental processes which t standing alone, are insufficient for the reasons already discussed. Thus
t

the jury's putative misunderstanding

and potentially unnecessary deliberations to achieve a unanimous verdict despite having been properly instructed is not a t t r i b u t a b l e t o Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t . Moreover, a t l e a s t two

more v o t e s were t a k e n a n d f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e ( p h o t o s ) was examined a f t e r Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t , w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t h e j u r y c o n t i n u e d t o deliberate after the statement. F i n a l l y , Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t
t

was n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s 24 - OPINION AND ORDER

and

there i s n o t a n y e v i d e n c e t h a t Ms. G r a u w a s a w a r e o f t h e j u r y ' s voting status nor any evidence that suggests an impasse or s t r u g g l e amongst t h e j u r y was communicated t o h e r o r t h e c o u r t t o trigger a need for a cautionary instruction. In short, although

the jurors were free to return a non-unanimous verdict at any point in their deliberations consistent with the trial court's instructions, the only conclusion from this record i s that they chose to continue to deliberate until the time they announced their unanimous verdict imposing a death sentence. Nothing in

t h e r e c o r d s u g g e s t s Ms. G r a u ' s s t a t e m e n t w a s p r e j u d i c i a l . On t h i s r e c o r d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e C o u r t c o n c l u d e s P e t i t i o n e r has failed to present evidence that the communication raised the risk of influencing the verdict sufficient to trigger the Mattox presumption of prejudice and to shift the burden of proof to the State.
See Caliendo, 365 F.3d a t 696.

Accordingly, the Court

denies Petitioner's Motion because he has failed to demonstrate the Oregon Court of Appeals decision on t h i s claim was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of federal law as set out in Allen and Mattox. Moreover, as noted, even under de novo

review of this claim, the Court would deny Petitioner's Motion.

25 - OPINION AND ORDER

CONCLUSION F o r t h e s e r e a s o n s , t h e C o u r t DENIES P e t i t i o n e r ' s M o t i o n
(#19~)

f o r Summary Adjudication of the Seventeenth Claim f o r

Relief. I T I S SO ORDERED. DATED t h i s

~ day

oil:::::

2010.

ANNA~----United States District Judge

26 - OPINION AND ORDER