Solano v. Belleque

Filing 37

Findings & Recommendation - The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 2254 2 should be DENIED, and a judgment of DISMISSAL should be entered. If a party wishes to file objections to the Court's Findings and Recommendation they are due by 7/7/2009. If a party files objections, another party may file a response to those objections within 10 days after service of a copy of the objections. Signed on 6/23/09 by Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)

FILED

JUN 2~

I N T H E U N I T E D STATES D I S T R I C T C O U R T F O R T H E DISTRICT OF O R E G O N WILLIAM J. SOLANO, III, Civil No. 06-1802-AC Petitioner, FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N v. B R I A N BELLEQUE, Respondent. H A R R I S O N LATTO 1631 N E Broadway No. 533 P o r t l a n d , O R 97232 A t t o r n e y for P e t i t i o n e r J O H N R. K R O G E R A t t o m e y General JONATHAN W. D I E H L A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General D e p a r t m e n t o f Justice 1162 C o u r t S t r e e t N E Salem, O R 97301 Attorneys for R e s p o n d e n t

1 - FINDINGS A N D RECOMMENDATION -

ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge. Petitioner, an inmate a t the Oregon State Penitentiary, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow, the Petition for W r i t o f Habeas Corpus s h o u l d b e DENIED.

BACKGROUND
O n M a y 27, 1999, a Washington County grand j u r y indicted Petitioner on t e n counts. Counts One and Two alleged Attempted Murder w i t h a Firearm as to victims M a x M e t c h a n and M i c h a e l M e d i c i . T h e r e m a i n i n g c o u n t s p e r t a i n e d to v i c t i m K a t h l e e n M c K e e : C o u n t s T h r e e , F o u r , F i v e , a n d S i x a l l e g e d k i d n a p i n g i n t h e F i r s t D e g r e e ; C o u n t S e v e n alleged A s s a u l t i n t h e S e c o n d D e g r e e ; C o u n t E i g h t a l l e g e d S o d o m y i n t h e F i r s t Degree; C o u n t N i n e a l l e g e d B u r g l a l y i n t h e F i r s t Degree; and Count T e n alleged Unlawful Use o f a Weapon. A l l o f the charges arose out o f events which occulTed over a three-day period i n M a y 1999 between Petitioner and his fOlmer girlfriend, Kathleen McKee. Petitioner kept M c K e e captive, first a t M c K e e ' s a p a r t m e n t a n d l a t e r a t P e t i t i o n e r ' s apartment. P e t i t i o n e r t h r e a t e n e d M c K e e w i t h firearms, at o n e point tied h e r hands and ankles w i t h plastic zip-ties, beat h e r w i t h a belt, punched her, and kicked her. While holding h e r against h e r will, Petitioner forced McKee to call h e r fOlmer boyfriend, Michael Medici, and attempt to lure Medici and Max Metchan, a d m g dealer who supplied McKee w i t h methamphetamine, to Petitioner's apartment where h e intended to s h o o t them. Medici and Metchan did n o t ever go to Petitioner's apaliment. McKee escaped w h e n p o l i c e officers alTived at Petitioner's apartment in response to a request from McKee's sister for a welfare check o n McKee. M c K e e suffered extensive bruising to h e r back, alms, forehead, and ear.

2 - FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

In December 1999, Petitioner was tried before a jury. T h e j m y acquitted Petitioner o f the crimes alleged i n Counts One, Two, Eight, and Nine. r e m a i n i n g charges. O n February 8, 2000, the trial j u d g e sentenced Petitioner to a total o f 90 months i n prison o n t h e four K i d n a p i n g c o n v i c t i o n s a n d a c o n s e c u t i v e , 7 0 - m o n t h t e r m o n t h e A s s a u l t c o n v i c t i o n . T h e j u d g e imposed a concurrent, 6O-month sentence o n the Unlawful Use o f a Weapon conviction. Petitioner appealed. Appellate counsel submitted a Balfour brief. I Petitioner declined to draft a "Section B" for inclusion i n the brief. The Oregon C o m t o f Appeals affirmed without opinion. State v. Solano, 176 Or. App. 649, 32 P.3d 974 (2001). Petitioner did not s e e k review from the Oregon Supreme Court. Petitioner then sought state post-conviction relief ("PCR"). Following an evidentiaty hearing, the P C R trial j u d g e denied relief. On appeal, the Oregon C o m t o f Appeals affirmed without opinion and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. Solano v. Czerniak, 207 Or. App. 3 1 0 , 1 4 1 P.3d 600, rev. denied, 3 4 1 0 1 ' . 5 4 8 , 1 4 5 P.3d 1109 (2006). On December 15, 2006, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus action i n this court. T h e Petition for Writ o f Habeas Corpus alleges three grounds for relief:
G r o u n d One: Ineffective assistance o f trial counsel i n violation o f t h e 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.

T h e j u r y convicted P e t i t i o n e r o n t h e

I U p o n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t o n l y f r i v o l o u s i s s u e s e x i s t o n d i r e c t appeal, a Balfour b r i e f allows appointed counsel to meet the constitutional requirement o f "active advocacy" w i t h o u t violating mles o f professional conduct. Section A, signed by counsel, contains a statement o f the case, including a statement o f facts, sufficient to apprise the court o f the jurisdictional basis for the appeal, but contains no assignments o f elTor argument. Section B, signed only the appellant, is a presentation o f the issues that appellant seeks to raise but that counsel considers to b e frivolous. Balfour v. State o f Oregon, 311 0 1 ' . 4 3 4 , 4 5 1 - 5 2 , 8 1 4 P.2d 1069 (1991).

3 - FINDINGS A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

Supporting F a c t s : Trial counsel (1) failed to file a motion i n limine to exclude prejudicial testimony and evidence, (2) failed to properly prepare for trial when h e did not obtain exculpatory discovery, failed to properly adequately develop evidence to support petitioner's version o f facts, failed to adequately investigate matters t h a t could have impeached witnesses [sic] and victims [sic] testimony, failed to interview relevant witnesses and obtain evidence that would support petitioner's defense and impeach witnesses against him, (3) failed to adequately make and preserve objections, to examine witnesses, to object to illegal character testimony and hearsay testimony, (4) failed to obtain necessary expeti testimony, (5) failed to properly control defense witnesses, (6) failed to utilize necessmy peremptory j u r y challenges, (7) failed to object to imposition o f illegal sentence. G r o u n d T w o : I n e f f e c t i v e assistance o f appellate c o u n s e l i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e 6 t h a n d 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. S u p p o r t i n g F a c t s : Appellate counsel failed to appeal meritorious issues o n appeal including Apprendi and Blakely issues. G r o u n d T h r e e : Denial o f due process i n violation o f t h e 14th Amendment to the U n i t e d S t a t e s Constitution. S u p p o r t i n g F a c t s : Petitioner's sentence is i n excess o fthat allowed b y the decision announced i n Blakely v. Washington. I n h i s M e m o r a n d u m i n S u p p o r t o f S e c t i o n 2 2 5 4 P e t i t i o n , P e t i t i o n e r a d d r e s s e s o n l y his c l a i m s t h a t counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to discover and present certain exculpatOly evidence, and (2) failing to use a peremptOly challenge to remove a prospective j u r o r who had expressed reservations about whether h e could b e fair. Petitioner also raises an additional claim, not alleged i n h i s P e t i t i o n , t h a t h i s due p r o c e s s rights w e r e violated w h e n h e w a s c o n v i c t e d b y a n o n - u n a n i m o u s j u r y . Respondent argues Petitioner is not entitled to r e l i e f o n the merits o f the two claims addressed i n his Memorandum, and that Petitioner's attempt to argue the additional claim should not b e allowed. As to the remaining claims, Respondent argues they should b e denied as n o t traversed and that, i n any event, they are all procedurally defaulted.

4 - FINDINGS AND R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

DISCUSSION I. Claims Not Addressed in Petitioner's Memorandum Respondent argues Petitioner cmmot obtain r e l i e f o n the grounds for r e l i e f alleged i n his Petition but upon which h e submitted no argument in his Memorandum i n Support o n t h e basis that h e w a i v e d t h o s e claims. C e r t a i n l y , t h i s c o u r t w o u l d p r e f e r t h a t a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l a d d r e s s all c l a i m s a l l e g e d i n t h e P e t i t i o n i n t h e M e m o r a n d u m i n Support. T h e c o u r t d o e s n o t agree, h o w e v e r , t h a t c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e to d o s o a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e s u l t s i n a w a i v e r . D i s t r i c t J u d g e M a r s h o f t h i s c o u r t addressed this issue i n Elkins v. Belleque, CV 06-1180-MA: Respondent relies upon 28 U.S.C. § 2248 which provides that the allegations o f a return to a habeas petition, or a n answer to an order to show cause, " i f n o t traversed, shall be accepted as h u e except to the extent that the j u d g e finds from t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e y are n o t t r u e . " However, the AdvisOlY Committee Notes to R u l e 5 o f t h e Rules Governing Section 2 2 5 4 Proceedings, provides that a traverse is no longer contemplated "except under special circumstances", and that the c o m m o n law assumption o f verity o f the allegations o f a return until impeached, as codified i n 28 U.S.C. § 2248, is no longer applicable." AdvisOlY Committee Note to R u l e 5, 28 foIl. § 2 2 5 4 (1976) (citing Stewart v. Overholser, 186 F.2d 339, 343 n. 5 (D.C.Cir. 1950)). I n light o f the foregoing, and i n the absence o f any case l a w supporting respondent's position that the failure to furnish legal argument i n suppOli o f habeas claims renders the claims abandoned, I decline to find the claims n o t traversed to b e w a i v e d o r s u b j e c t to d e n i a l o n t h a t b a s i s a l o n e . " Opinion and Order (#35) at 5-6. T h e court finds Judge Marsh's reasoning persuasive and, consequently, rejects Respondent's asseliion that Petitioner has waived the grounds for r e l i e f not specifically addressed i n his M e m o r a n d u m i n Support. However, having undertaken a review o f the those claims, the cOUli c o n c l u d e s h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f i s n o t w a n ' a n t e d b e c a u s e t h e y are p r o c e d u r a l l y d e f a u l t e d .

5 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

II.

Due Process Claim Raised in Memorandum A s n o t e d , P e t i t i o n e r argues a c l a i m i n h i s M e m o r a n d u m i n S u p p o r t w h i c h w a s n o t a l l e g e d

i n t h e P e t i t i o n for W r i t o f H a b e a s C o r p u s ; h e a t t e m p t s t o a d d a c l a i m a l l e g i n g h i s d u e p r o c e s s r i g h t s w e r e violated w h e n h e w a s convicted b y a non-unanimous jUlY. A p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s m u s t " s p e c i f y a l l t h e g r o u n d s for r e l i e f a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r " a n d s t a t e t h e f a c t s s u p p o r t i n g e a c h g r o u n d . " R u l e 2 ( c), F e d . R. G o v e r n i n g § 2 2 5 4 C a s e s , 28 U.S.C. foIl. § 2 2 5 4 (2007). Claims n o t raised in t h e petition n e e d n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d b y this court. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F . 3 d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (traverse n o t p r o p e r pleading to raise additional grounds). A s such, to the extent Petitioner seeks to amend his P e t i t i o n to allege t h e d u e p r o c e s s c l a i m a r g u e d i n h i s M e m o r a n d u m , t h e b e l a t e d r e q u e s t i s denied. 2 III. R e l i e f on t h e M e r i t s A. Legal Standards

W h e n a petitioner has exhausted his federal claims, this COUli m a y grant a w r i t o f habeas corpus o n l y i f t h e s t a t e c o m i proceeding: (1) resulted i n a decision that w a s c o n t r m y to, o r i n v o l v e d an unreasonable a p p l i c a t i o n of, clearly established Federal law, as determined b y t h e S u p r e m e C o m i o f the U n i t e d States; o r (2) resulted i n a decision that w a s b a s e d o n a n u n r e a s o n a b l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e facts i n l i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e s t a t e c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g . S e e 2 8 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 4 (d). Section 2254(d ) ( I ) applies to challenges to p u r e l y legal questions r e s o l v e d b y the state cOUli, and s e c t i o n 2 2 5 4 (d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved b y the s t a t e court.

I n a n y event, the d u e process claim is subject to denial because the non-unanimous v e r d i c t did n o t violate any clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 4 0 6 U.S. 4 0 4 , 4 1 0 - 1 0 (1972) (holding Oregon's statutOly system permitting j u r y convictions b y 10 o f 12 j u r o r s constitutional).
2

6 - FINDINGS A N D RECOMMENDATION -

Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004),

cert. denied, 546 U.S. 963 (2005).

Therefore, the question whether a state court erred in applying the law is a different question fi'om whether it erred i n determining the facts. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 337-38 (2006). I n conducting its review, the Court "look[s] to the last-reasoned state-court decision." Van Lynn v.

Farman, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1037 (2004).
Section 2 2 5 4 ( d ) ( l ) consists o f two alternative tests, i.e., the "contrary to" test and the "umeasonable application" test. Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the first test, the state c o m i ' s "decision is contrmy to clearly established federal law i f i t fails to apply the correct controlling authority, o r i f i t applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those i n a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result." C l a r b . Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th C i r . ) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413-414 (2000)), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003). Under the second test, ' ' ' [ a ] state c o m i ' s decision involves an umeasonable application o f federa11aw i f t h e state comi identifies the correct goveming legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts o f the prisoner's c a s e . ' ' ' Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at 7 3 8 (quoting

Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067). Under the " ' u m e a s o n a b l e application clause . . . a federal habeas court
m a y not issue the writ simply because that comi concludes i n its independent j u d g m e n t that the relevant state-comi decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly . . . [r]ather that application must b e objectively unreasonable.''' Clark, 331 F.3d at 1068 (quoting

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)). When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to

7 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

an umeasonable application o f f e d e r a l l a w , " [ fJederal courts o w e substantial deference to state court interpretations o f f e d e r a l l a w . " Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929. Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved b y the state c o u r t , " t h e q u e s t i o n o n r e v i e w is w h e t h e r a n a p p e l l a t e p a n e l , a p p l y i n g t h e n o r m a l s t a n d a r d s o f appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is suppOited b y the record." Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylorv. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.) ( " a federal court m a y n o t s e c o n d - g u e s s a s t a t e c o u r t ' s f a c t - f i n d i n g p r o c e s s u n l e s s , a f t e r r e v i e w o f t h e state-coUlt r e c o r d , i t detennines that the state court was not merely wrong, b u t actuallyumeasonable"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1038 (2004). Section 2254(d)(2) "applies most readily to situations where a petitioner c h a l l e n g e s t h e s t a t e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s b a s e d e n t i r e l y o n t h e s t a t e record. S u c h a c h a l l e n g e m a y b e b a s e d o n t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e f i n d i n g is u n s u p p o r t e d b y s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e , . . . t h a t t h e p r o c e s s employed b y the state court is defective, . . . or that no finding w a s made b y the state COUlt a t all."

Taylor, 3 6 6 F . 3 d a t 9 9 9 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) .
I n e x a m i n i n g t h e r e c o r d u n d e r s e c t i o n 2 2 5 4 ( d)(2), t h e federal c o u r t " m u s t b e p a r t i c u l a r l y deferential to our state court colleagues . . . . [M]ere doubt as to the adequacy o f the state c o u r t ' s findings o f fact i s insufficient; ' w e must be satisfied that any appellate court to w h o m the defect [in the state c o u r t ' s fact-finding process] is pointed out would b e umeasonable i n holding that the s t a t e c o u r t ' s fact-finding process was adequate.'" Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972 (quoting Taylor, 366 F . 3 d at 1000). Once the federal court i s satisfied that the state c o u r t ' s fact-finding process w a s r e a s o n a b l e , o r w h e r e t h e p e t i t i o n e r d o e s n o t c h a l l e n g e s u c h f i n d i n g s , " t h e s t a t e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s are dressed i n a presumption o f cOlTectness, which then helps steel them against any challenge b a s e d

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on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal COUlt." Taylor, 366 F . 2 d at 1000. T h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t g u a r a n t e e s c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t s t h e r i g h t to e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel. T h e Supreme COUlt's ruling inStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) sets forth the "clearly established federal law" governing claims alleging ineffective assistance o f counsel.

Williams, 529 U.S. a t 390. Under Strickland, to prevail o n a claim o f ineffective assistance o f
counsel, P e t i t i o n e r m u s t s h o w t h a t ( I ) his c o u n s e l ' s p e r f o r m a n c e w a s d e f i c i e n t , a n d ( 2 ) t h a t t h e deficient perfOlmance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); B e l l v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Failure t o make the r e q u i r e d s h o w i n g o n e i t h e r p r o n g d e f e a t s t h e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s claim. T o p r o v e deficiency o f p e r f o n n a n c e , a p e t i t i o n e r m u s t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t counsel's perfOlmance fell b e l o w an objective standard o freasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. There is a strong presumption that the counsel's conduct falls within a w i d e range o f reasonable professional assistance. ld. at 689. To establish prejudice, a petitioner m u s t s h o w t h a t there is a reasonable probability that, b u t for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result o f the proceeding would have been different. Bell, 535 U.S. at 695; Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-91; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 6 8 7 , 6 9 4 . iliA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence i n the outcome.''' Williams, 529 U.S. at 391 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

9 - FINDINGS A N D RECOMMENDATION -

B.

Analysis 1. Failnre to Discover and Present Exculpatory Evidence

Petitioner argues trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance because h e failed to discover and present at trial e-mails and letters from the victim to Petitioner w h i c h e x p r e s s e d l o v e a n d affection, b a n k s t a t e m e n t s c o r r o b o r a t i n g P e t i t i o n e r ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e v i c t i m ' s drug associates had robbed him, and airplane tickets that would h a v e corroborated Petitioner's testimony that the victim returned from Salt Lake City to resume h e r relationship w i t h Petitioner. P e t i t i o n e r a r g u e s t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l w a s e s s e n t i a l l y a " s w e a r i n g contest" b e t w e e n t h e v i c t i m a n d Petitioner, this evidence would have been useful i n r e b u t t i n g the victim's stOly o f fear, intimidation, a n d violence. P e t i t i o n e r alleged this c l a i m i n h i s P C R p r o c e e d i n g . T h e r e , t h e P C R t r i a l j u d g e e n t e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g p e r t i n e n t f i n d i n g s o f fact a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w : FINDINGS O F F A C T

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3. T r i a l c o u n s e l d i d t h o r o u g h l y i n v e s t i g a t e this c a s e a n d t r i a l c o u n s e l d i d thoroughly prepare this case for trial. . . .

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6. T r i a l c o u n s e l did p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e victim was stealing money from him. Kevin Bradley testified for petitioner t h a t t h e v i c t i m h a d a d m i t t e d to h i m t h a t s h e w a s s t e a l i n g m o n e y f r o m petitioner. Bradley also testified that the v i c t i m had admitted she gave h e r e x - b o y f r i e n d petitioner's bankcard. Trial counsel presented an o v e l w h e l m i n g amount o f evidence i n s u p p o r t o f petitioner's c l a i m t h a t t h e victim was stealing money from his bank account.

10 - F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

7.

Trial counsel also presented evidence, tIn-ough Kevin Bradley, that petitioner called the bank from Bradley's house regarding his concems that the victim was stealing money from his bank account. Trial counsel also attempted to secure, through his investigator, evidence from a computer regarding e-mails fi'om the victim to petitioner. The investigator could not secure this evidence. Petitioner's affidavit from his sister in this postconviction proceeding regarding this issue does not add anything to petitioner's case. Trial counsel attempted to secure this evidence and could not do so. Petitioner has failed to prove that counsel could have been successful in retrieving this information and that the information would have had an affect on petitioner's case. Trial counsel investigated every aspect o f petitioner's case and trial counsel presented all available evidence in support o f petitioner's defense. There existed no additional exculpatory evidence that counsel could have presented on petitioner's behalf and petitioner has failed to prove his claim that counsel failed to adequately investigate his case and that counsel failed to present evidence in suppOli o f t h e defense case. Trial counsel did effectively cross-examine the victim and trial counsel lodged all necessary objections during trial. . . . CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

8.

[9.]

I.

Based on the findings o f fact set forth above, in the underlying criminal proceedings resulting in petitioner's conviction, petitioner was not denied the right to assistance o f counsel, as guaranteed b y either the United States Constitution and as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or the Constitution o f the State o f Oregon.

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4. Petitioner did not prove any o f his claims by a preponderance o f the evidence.

Resp. Exh. 123, pp. 7-10. The P C R court's conclusion was not contraly to or an unreasonable application o f
Strickland. Petitioner did not show he was prejudiced b y any elTor o f trial counsel. As Respondent

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notes, n o n e o f t h e e v i d e n c e P e t i t i o n e r c l a i m s s h o u l d h a v e b e e n f o u n d a n d p r e s e n t e d w o u l d h a v e b e e n admissible, b e c a u s e Oregon l a w does n o t p e l m i t i m p e a c h m e n t o f a witness w i t h extrinsic e v i d e n c e . Or. R. Evid. 608(2);State v. Browl/, 297 Or. 404, 4 4 3 , 6 8 7 P . 2 d 751 (1984). M o r e o v e r , e v e n i f t h e e v i d e n c e h a d b e e n admissible, P e t i t i o n e r failed t o e s t a b l i s h a r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e trial w o u l d h a v e b e e n different. A s s u c h , t h e P C R c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i s e n t i t l e d t o d e f e r e n c e , a n d P e t i t i o n e r c a n n o t o b t a i n h a b e a s COlpUS r e l i e f o n t h i s claim.

2.

F a i l u r e to Exercise P e r e m p t o r y Challenge to Remove J u r o r

Finally, P e t i t i o n e r argues t r i a l c o u n s e l p r o v i d e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e w h e n h e f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e a p e r e m p t o r y c h a l l e n g e a g a i n s t o n e o f t h e j u r o r s . D u r i n g voir dire, t r i a l counsel engaged i n t h e following colloquy w i t h potential j u r o r R i c h a r d Fountain: Q: W h a t do y o u t h i n k a b o u t m a y b e b e i n g o n t h i s [ j u r y ] ? I w a s k i n d o f l o o k i n g f o r w a r d to i t , t h e n w h e n I h e a r d w h a t t h e c h a r g e s were, I k i n d o f w a s a little b i t hesitant b e c a u s e m a y b e t h e w a y s o m e t h i n g s w e r e w i t h m e w h e n I w a s g r o w i n g up, r e s p e c t f o r w o m e n , t h a t t y p e o f t h i n g . I h a v e s o m e d i f f i c u l t y d e a l i n g w i t h folks t h a t d o n ' t f e e l t h e s a m e w a y I do. Well, as I m e n t i o n e d a t i m e o r t w o , w h a t w e ' r e d e a l i n g w i t h h e r e a r e a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t h a v e b e e n made. I u n d e r s t a n d that. A n d t h e r e isn't a n y e v i d e n c e b e f o r e you n o w that m y c l i e n t d i d a n y t h i n g to anybody. T h a t ' s true. A n d i f there w a s information t h a t c a m e i n t h a t s a i d this p e r s o n s u f f e r e d s o m e i n j u r i e s , m a y b e i t w a s n ' t m y c l i e n t t h a t d i d it, y o u c o u l d n ' t h o l d t h a t against m y client, c o u l d you? N o , sir.

A.

Q:

A: Q:

A: Q:

A:

12 - F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

***
Q:
I t m a k e s s e n s e t h a t t h e feelings t h a t y o u ' r e e x p r e s s i n g are t h e f e e l i n g s t h a t s h o u l d b e c o m m o n , w o u l d n ' t y o u agree w i t h t h a t ?

A:

T h e y should be, yes, to m y w a y o f t h i n k i n g . Could you set aside w h a t yom' personal experiences are e n o u g h to l i s t e n to w h a t t h e evidence i s and decide what happened? That's k i n d o f t h e b o t t o m line. T h e b o t t o m l i n e i s , I ' m n o t s u r e i f ! c o u l d o r n o t . N o t o n l y i n g r o w i n g up was t h a t d r i l l e d into m e , b u t m y w i f e t h a t I ' m m a r r i e d to n o w w e n t t h r o u g h s o m e spousal abuse i n h e r p r e v i o u s m a r r i a g e a n d w e k i n d o f g o t i n o n t h e t a i l e n d o f that, a n d , o f c o u r s e , y o u h e a r a l l t h e s t o r i e s a n d / o r w i t n e s s t o t h e thing and it makes it difficult. That's all I can say. I won't s a y that I couldn't be fair, but I'm a little bit swayed to one side already j u s t hearing that. So y o u h a v e s o m e q u e s t i o n i n y o u r m i n d w h e t h e r o r n o t y o u c o u l d b e f a i r ? Uh-huh.

Q:

A:

Q: A:

Transcript Designation -- P a r t A, pp. 81-83. Counsel t h e n d e f e m e d to the trial j u d g e , who further questioned Mr. Foreman: Q: M r . F o u n t a i n , a t t h e e n d , I ' m g o i n g t o g i v e y o u i n s t r u c t i o n s a n d you m u s t f o l l o w t h e l a w w h e t h e r y o u a g r e e w i t h i t o r not. W h a t I n e e d t o k n o w i s w h e t h e r y o u c a n f o l l o w t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s w i t h , again, t h e i d e a t h a t y o u ' r e going to determine whether o r n o t under the facts these things happened. A n d i f y o u determine they didn't happen, are you going to h a v e a p r o b l e m ? A r e y o u biased such that y o u are still going to be b ia se d in favor o f a g u i l t y v e r d i c t i f y o u f o u n d t h e s e i n c i d e n t s did n o t h a p p e n ? N o , I don't believe that w o u l d b e the case. T h a n k you. D e n i e d .

A.
Q:

!d., pp. 8 3 - 8 4 .
T h e p r o s e c u t o r d e c l i n e d t o a s k any f o l l o w - u p q u e s t i o n s . P e t i t i o n e r ' s t r i a l c o u n s e l c o n t i n u e d :

13 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

Q:

I have a couple o f follow-up questions. I w a n t to address that issue to the Judge so we could clarify what the court's position would b e o n what you had said. I do have a couple other questions. I do thank you for you candor in laying that out. That's the kind o f infolmation w e need to analyze w h a t kind o f j u r o r you m a y well make i n this case. You've heard me talk earlier about the fact as w e began the trial, m y client is presumed to b e innocent. Does that concept make sense to you?

A:
Q:

Yes, sir. W h y i s that? Because there is not one o f us that's a person in this world and whatever w a y you look at it and whether it's fi'om a legal sense o r not, i f someone is making an accusation against something that you did o r didn't do, that the facts need to be brought out before a decision is really made. W e also, in analyzing this case, the State is p u t to the burden o f p r o o f beyond a reasonable doubt and, again, the Judge is going to read you an instruction regarding what that is. But let m e say that it isn't beyond all doubt, but you have to be reasonably certain in your own mind to a high degree that not only did something happen, but the person that's accused o f doing i t did it. That burden applies to each o f the elements o f t h e offense. Does it make sense that w e would have a high burden -- i n a criminal c a s e - a h i g h b u r d e n o f proof? Yes, I would think so. More so than maybe a lesser accusation. We have another -- in other kinds o f trials, civil trial, w e have a different kind o f burden than p r o o f beyond a reasonable doubt. There is one test that's called a preponderance o f the evidence which, basically, you're balancing the scales o f 51 to 49 percent o r better difference. Also, another one which is clear and convincing evidence, that is much more likely than not. Higher than a preponderance b u t less than p r o o f beyond a reasonable doubt. P r o o f beyond a reasonable doubt is the test only i n criminal trials. Does that make sense to you?

A:

Q:

A: Q:

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A:

I t h i n k in s o m e regards w h a t you mentioned are similar. B u t , yes, i t does m a k e sense. D o e s i t m a k e s e n s e to y o u that t h e d e f e n d a n t d o e s n ' t h a v e to t e s t i f y i f h e doesn't want to in a criminal matter?
I t m a k e s s e n s e t o me.

Q:

A: Q:

A n d i f that w o u l d h a p p e n i n this c a s e a n d t h e J u d g e w o u l d s o i n s t m c t , w o u l d y o u b e a b l e t o p u t t h e fact t h a t h e d i d n ' t t e s t i f y o u t o f y o u r m i n d a n d look a t the evidence w i t h o u t considering that? Yeah. Yes, I b e l i e v e so. I t h i n k it's t h e defendant's right, i f y o u will. I f t h e facts s p e a k f o r t h e m s e l v e s , t h e n i t w o u l d n ' t b e n e c e s s m y t h a t h e w o u l d b e t h e o n e p r e s e n t i n g anything.

A:

Id., pp. 85-86. Counsel then p a s s e d the j u r o r for cause and, as noted, did n o t e x e r c i s e o n o f h i s
r e m a i n i n g p e r e m p t o r y challenges. T h e P C R t r i a l j u d g e r e j e c t e d P e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m that trial c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e to e x c u s e this j u r o r w a s constitutionally ineffective. T h e j u d g e found: 9. T r i a l counsel adequately a n d effectively r e p r e s e n t e d p e t i t i o n e r d u r i n g t h e jUly selection process i n this case. There i s absolutely no evidence to s u p p o r t petitioner's claim that counsel committed e n o r w h e n h e failed to e x c u s e j u r o r Fountain. J u r o r F o u n t a i n rendered N o t G u i l t y v e r d i c t s o n t h r e e s e p a r a t e charges w i t h i n t h e indictment.

Resp. Exh. 123, p. 9. I n o r d e r to s h o w ineffective assistance o f c o u n s e l i n t h e j u r o r e m p a n e l i n g p r o c e s s , a p e t i t i o n e r m u s t p r o v e he w a s prejudiced b y counsel's failure to challenge t h e juror. P a r a d i s e v.

A r a v e , 954 F . 2 d 1483, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1992), v a c a t e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s by A r a v e v. C r e e c h , 5 0 7

u.s. 463 (1993). T h e relevant test for detenniningwhether a j u r o r is biased is "whether the juror(]
. . . h a d s u c h f i x e d o p i n i o n s t h a t [the j u r o r ] c o u l d n o t j u d g e i m p a r t i a l l y t h e g u i l t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t .

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Patton v. Young, 467 U.S. 1025,1035 (1984) (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)). A
trial court's finding that a j u r o r is impartial is a factual finding that is entitled to "special deference."

United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F . 3 d 1344, 1350 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).
I n the P C R proceeding, P e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t d e m o n s t r a t e h e w a s p r e j u d i c e d b y t r i a l c o u n s e l ' s failure to challenge Juror Fountain. Indeed, as the P C R trial c o m t noted, Fountain found Petitioner n o t guilty o n the three most serious counts, the two counts o f Attempted Murder and t h e count o f Sodomy in the First Degree. Given Petitioner's failure to establish that Juror Fountain had such f i x e d o p i n i o n s t h a t h e c o u l d n o t j u d g e i m p a t t i a l l y P e t i t i o n e r ' s g u i l t o r itillocence, t h e P C R c o m t ' s decision was n o t contraty to or an unreasonable application o f Strickland. Accordingly, Petitioner i s n o t entitled to habeas corpus r e l i e f o n this claim. RECOMMENDATION F o r these reasons, the Petition for Writ o f Habeas Corpus should b e DENIED, and a j u d g m e n t o f D I S M I S S A L s h o u l d b e entered. SCHEDULING The above Findings and Recommendation are referred to a United States District Judge for review. Objections, i f any, are due July 7, 2009. I f no objections are filed, review o f t h e Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement that date.

16 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

A party m a y respond to another p a r t y ' s objections within 10 days after service o f a copy o f the objections. I f objections are filed, review o f t h e Findings and Recommendation w i l l go under advisement upon receipt o f t h e response, or on the latest date for filing a response. DATED

this~da~ ofJune, 2009.

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J~hn V. Acosta Ynited States M a g i s t r a t e J u d g e

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