Jordan v. State of Oregon Department of Human Services et al

Filing 140

OPINION AND ORDER. For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 107 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Because plaintiff is unable to demonstrate an causal link between defendants and the decision to r equire plaintiff to reapply for her WPN, defendants' motion is GRANTED as to all defendants on plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim related to re-application. Defendants' motion is GRANTED for Bellish and Easton as to plainti ff's selective prosecution claim, First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim, and malicious prosecution claims. Defendants' motion is DENIED as to plaintiff's remaining First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim, equal protection claims, substantive due process claim, and malicious prosecution claims as discussed. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 07/21/09 by Judge Ancer L. Haggerty. (pvh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F O R T H E D I S T R I C T OF O R E G O N ROZALIA J O R D A N , Plaintiff, v. S T A T E OF O R E G O N D E P A R T M E N T OF H U M A N SERVICES, W A S H I N G T O N C O U N T Y DISABILITY AGING A N D V E T E R A N S SERVICES; a n d J O E EASTON, SEAN R U S A W, V I C K I E SHAFFER, a n d M I C H A E L BELLISH, i n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l capacities, Defendants. C i v i l No. 0 7 - 9 4 0 - H A OPINION A N D O R D E R

H A G G E R T Y , D i s t r i c t Judge: P l a i n t i f f R o z a l i a J o r d a n b r i n g s a C o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s a s s e r t i n g c l a i m s u n d e r 42 U . S . C . § 1983; a n d f o r M a l i c i o u s P r o s e c u t i o n , W r o n g f u l I n s t i t u t i o n o f C i v i l P r o c e e d i n g s , I n t e n t i o n a l Infliction o f E m o t i o n a l Distress, a n d Intentional Interference w i t h E m p l o y m e n t Agreement. Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [107] and oral argument was heard o n July 7 , 2 0 0 9 . For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted in part, and denied i n part.

1 - O P I N I O N AND O R D E R

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted and are stated in the light most favorable to p l a i n t i f f P l a i n t i f f h a s worked with disabled and elderly people for almost h e r entire life. She operated adult foster homes from 1993 to 2003. She then worked as a caregiver for Quad, Inc., a non-profit organization that provides care for quadriplegics, from November 2004 to January 2005. The Department o f Human Services (DHS) is a n agency for t h e state o f Oregon that helps m a n a g e a n d d i s p e r s e M e d i c a i d m o n e y u s e d t o c a r e f o r d i s a b l e d adults. D e f e n d a n t S e a n R u s a w w a s a case manager for DHS from August 2002 to October 31, 2006. D e f e n d a n t J o e E a s t o n w a s t h e I n - H o m e S e r v i c e s M a n a g e r for t h e O f f i c e o f Seniors and People with Disabilities from M a y 2005 to April 23, 2008. Easton w a s charged with the duty to decide whether to uphold DHS's recommendations regarding whether to t e n n i n a t e a homecare worker's provider number (WPN). See Or. Admin. R. (OAR) 411-031-0020(26) (stating a "provider number" i s given when a homecare worker i s authorized "to work as a provider employed b y t h e client, f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f r e c e i v i n g p a y m e n t for a u t h o r i z e d s e r v i c e s " ) . Defendant Michael Bellish was the District Manager for Seniors and People w i t h Disabilities f r o m 2 0 0 4 t o O c t o b e r 2008. D e f e n d a n t V i c k i e S h a f f e r w o r k s for D H S ' s A d u l t P r o t e c t i v e S e r v i c e s ( A P S ) . A P S i n v e s t i g a t e s c a s e s o f a b u s e a n d / o r n e g l e c t r e g a r d i n g d i s a b l e d adults. Doris Bailey is a partial quadriplegic who receives Medicaid benefits. Rusaw worked as Bailey's case manager from September 3 0 , 2 0 0 4 to March 1 4 , 2 0 0 6 . P l a i n t i f f began working for B a i l e y i n J a n u a r y 2005.

2 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

While working for Bailey, p l a i n t i f f believed the hours authorized for Bailey's care were i n s u f f i c i e n t a n d s h e n o t i f i e d R u s a w o f t h i s p r o b l e m . P l a i n t i f f b e g a n s u b m i t t i n g t i m e records reflecting more hours than were authorized b y DRS. P l a i n t i f f says that she wanted to b e honest in her reporting and did not expect payment for t h e unauthorized hours. Rusaw told p l a i n t i f f to stop billing DRS for more hours than authorized and allegedly ignored requests from Bailey and p l a i n t i f f to review Bailey's food stamp allotment. According to Bailey, Rusaw told her "I didn't think you had the brains to figure [the stamps] out," and once entered Bailey's home without knocking, caused h e r to spill hot water o n herself, and then laughed at her. Bailey Decl. ~ 6, ~ 17. A t o n e point, B a i l e y m i s p l a c e d h e r c r e d i t card a n d requested t h a t p l a i n t i f f p u r c h a s e h o m e health supplies for Bailey o n p l a i n t i f f s debit card. P l a i n t i f f submitted receipts for reimbursement f r o m D R S w i t h o u t a n y o b j e c t i o n from R u s a w t h r o u g h S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 5 .
I n J u l y 2 0 0 5 , B a i l e y w a s h o s p i t a l i z e d for ulcers. B a i l e y ' s d o c t o r t o l d h e r t h a t s h e r e q u i r e d

t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r c a r e , b u t p l a i n t i f f w a s o n l y a u t h o r i z e d t o p r o v i d e c a r e f o r s e v e n hours. P l a i n t i f f contacted Rusaw to arrange for twenty-four h o u r care, b u t Rusaw refused. Bailey was released from the hospital and Rusaw arranged a meeting with Bailey and his supervisor, Tracy Kelly, o n August 1 7 , 2 0 0 5 . After the meeting, Rusaw and Kelly submitted an "Exceptional Rate Request" for p l a i n t i f f s additional hours, b u t E a s t o n d e n i e d t h e request. Plaintiff then filled o u t an application to license h e r h o m e as an adult foster home. Rusaw inspected and approved p l a i n t i f f s home for safety concerns o n September 6 , 2 0 0 5 . Rusaw told Bailey that i f p l a i n t i f f began operating a licensed adult foster home, then Bailey would need to give u p h e r apartment. Bailey told h i m that she refused to give up h e r apartment. On September 1 4 , 2 0 0 5 , DRS approved Bailey's request to receive twenty-four h o u r care from a live-in homecare worker. P l a i n t i f f then moved i n w i t h Bailey.

3 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

On October 10, 2005, Rusaw sent p l a i n t i f f a letter notifying h e r that she could no longer report more hours than authorized and could not purchase Bailey's supplies w i t h p l a i n t i f f s debit card. Plaintiff responded to Rusaw's letter b y sending letters to D R S o n October 13, October 27, and N o v e m b e r 1 0 , 2 0 0 5 c o m p l a i n i n g a b o u t R u s a w , E a s t o n , a n d D R S ' s h a n d l i n g o f B a i l e y ' s case. In November 2005, Bailey was admitted to t h e Rehabilitation Institute o f Oregon (RIO). D e f e n d a n t s b e l i e v e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f r e p o r t e d h o u r s d u r i n g t h e t i m e t h a t B a i l e y w a s a t RIO, h o w e v e r , p l a i n t i f f asserts that t h e entire 199 hours listed o n her t i m e sheet were worked prior to Bailey's admission to RIO. P l a i n t i f f contacted Rusaw o n November 22, 2005 to schedule Bailey's transport from RIO, and w h e n she received no response, complained to the H o m e Care Commission. W h e n Bailey was released o n December 6, 2005, p l a i n t i f f m o v e d Bailey into p l a i n t i f f s horne. T h e parties dispute whether p l a i n t i f f notified DHS about t h e m o v e into p l a i n t i f f s horne. Bailey intended to only visit for the holiday season and she continued to p a y r e n t at h e r apartment. Bailey l a t e r r e q u e s t e d t o e x t e n d h e r v i s i t b e y o n d t h e h o l i d a y s , a n d p l a i n t i f f agreed. In F e b r u a r y 2006, p l a i n t i f f c o n t a c t e d R u s a w a n d t o l d h i m t h a t B a i l e y w a s t e m p o r a r i l y s t a y i n g w i t h her. Rusaw then contacted APS and Shaffer was assigned to Bailey's case. On February 1 7 , 2 0 0 6 , Rusaw and Shaffer made a n unannounced visit to p l a i n t i f f s horne to interview plaintiff. P l a i n t i f f told Shaffer that Bailey h a d b e e n living w i t h h e r since she left RIO, that she occasionally left p l a i n t i f f alone, and that she h a d paid an unlicensed caregiver to stay with Bailey while she was away. Shaffer then contacted the police because she allegedly believed p l a i n t i f f was operating an unlicensed adult foster horne. The Washington County S h e r i f f s Office responded and cited p l a i n t i f f under Or. Rev. Stat. (ORS) 443.991 (operating an unlicensed adult foster horne is a Class C

4 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

misdemeanor). Shaffer then allegedly sent a report to Bellish describing the events and asking h i m to terminate p l a i n t i f f s WPN. T h e W a s h i n g t o n C o u n t y D i s t r i c t Attorney's O f f i c e p r o s e c u t e d p l a i n t i f f i n a t w o - d a y c r i m i n a l t r i a l t h a t e n d e d i n a c q u i t t a l from t h e b e n c h . T h e t r i a l j u d g e s t a t e d t h a t : " [ T ] h i s c a s e s h o u l d n o t h a v e been issued. It's a travesty to waste the taxpayers' money trying it." Damore Decl., Ex. 37, at 2. P l a i n t i f f asserts that Shaffer pushed the district attorney to prosecute. D R S administratively terminated p l a i n t i f f s W P N for fiscal improprieties and failure to provide services as required. A n administrative law j u d g e reversed the agency's decision and the a g e n c y d i d n o t appeal. Following t h e administrative proceeding, p l a i n t i f f w a s required to reapply for h e r WPN. D e f e n d a n t s a s s e r t t h a t t h i s w a s m e r e l y a m i s t a k e and t h a t E a s t o n r e v e r s e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o n c e h e d i s c o v e r e d t h e error. T h e r e a f t e r , p l a i n t i f f r e s u m e d w o r k f o r B a i l e y i n M a r c h o r A p r i l 2 0 0 7 . Plaintiff contends that defendants h a d no legitimate reason to revoke p l a i n t i f f s WPN, and had no probable cause to believe she was operating an adult foster home. She asserts that no other h o m e care w o r k e r w a s p r o s e c u t e d o r h a d h e r W P N t e r m i n a t e d b e c a u s e t h e w o r k e r w a s p r o v i d i n g c a r e i n h e r o w n h o m e . P l a i n t i f f c l a i m s t h a t d e f e n d a n t s p r o s e c u t e d h e r m a l i c i o u s l y for p e r s o n a l reasons o r in retaliation for her complaints. STANDARDS A party is entitled to summary j u d g m e n t as a matter o f law i f "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions o n file, together with affidavits, i f any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see B a h n v. N M E Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). T h e moving party carries the initial burden o f p r o o f and meets this burden b y identifying portions o f the record o n file that demonstrate the absence o f any genuine issue

5 - OPINION AND O R D E R

of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 3 2 2 - 2 4 (1986). Once the initial burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate through the production o f probative evidence that there remains an issue o f fact to b e tried. Id. The court m u s t view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F .3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). All
reasonable doubt as to the existence o f a genuine issue o f fact should b e resolved against the moving party. MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & County o l S . F . , 400 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). W h e r e d i f f e r e n t u l t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e s m a y b e drawn, s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e . Sankovich v. Ins. Co. o l N Am., 638 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Deference to t h e non-moving party has limits. The non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The "mere existence o f a scintilla o f evidence i n support o f the [non-moving party's] position [is] insufficient." Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Where "the record taken as a whole could n o t lead a
r a t i o n a l t r i e r o f f a c t t o find f o r t h e n o n - m o v i n g p a r t y , t h e r e i s n o ' g e n u i n e i s s u e f o r trial. I I I M a t s u s h i t a

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION Defendants rely o n this court finding probable cause to obtain summary j u d g m e n t o n p l a i n t i f f ' s e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n , and w r o n g f u l i n s t i t u t i o n o f c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g s claims. Based o n t h e parties' briefs and argument elicited at oral argument, this court finds that no p r o b a b l e c a u s e e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e p l a i n t i f f w a s a r r e s t e d and p r o s e c u t e d for o p e r a t i n g a n u n l i c e n s e d foster home.
I n Oregon, p r o b a b l e c a u s e e x i s t s for i n i t i a t i n g a c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g i f t h e d e c i s i o n m a k e r

" r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e p e r s o n a c c u s e d has a c t e d i n a c e r t a i n m a n n e r and c o r r e c t l y b e l i e v e s t h a t

6 - OPINION AND O R D E R

such act constitutes the offense charged." Shoemaker v. SeInes, 349 P.2d 473, 476 (Or. 1960); see a l s o ORS 1 3 1 . 0 0 5 ( 1 1 ) ( " ' P r o b a b l e c a u s e ' m e a n s t h a t t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l o b j e c t i v e b a s i s f o r believing that m o r e likely than not an offense has b e e n committed and a person to b e arrested has committed it. "). Acquittal is not p r i m a facie evidence o f a lack o f probable cause. Shoemaker, 349 P.2d at 476. The applicable statute at the t i m e p l a i n t i f f was charged with operating an unlicensed foster home reads: (1) Every provider o f adult foster care shall b e licensed with the Department o f H u m a n Services before opening o r operating an adult foster home caring for adult residents. (2) A provider must live in the home that is to b e licensed o r hire a resident manager to l i v e i n t h e home. (3) T h e r e must b e a provider, resident manager o r substitute caregiver o n duty 24 h o u r s p e r d a y i n a n a d u l t foster h o m e u n d e r t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e d e p a r t m e n t o f H u m a n Services. ORS 443.725 (200S). The statute defines adult foster home as "any family h o m e o r facility in which residential care is provided in a homelike environment for five o r fewer adults who are n o t related to t h e provider b y b l o o d o r marriage." ORS 443. 705( 1). Residential care is further defined as "the provision o f room and board and services that assist the resident i n activities o f daily living, such as a s s i s t a n c e w i t h b a t h i n g , d r e s s i n g , g r o o m i n g , eating, m e d i c a t i o n m a n a g e m e n t , m o n e y m a n a g e m e n t o r recreation." O R S 4 4 3 . 7 0 5 ( 6 ) . When Rusaw and Shaffer visited p l a i n t i f f o n February 17, 2006, they learned from p l a i n t i f f that she was providing room and board to Bailey, that p l a i n t i f f was assisting i n Bailey's activities o f d a i l y living, t h a t p l a i n t i f f l e f t B a i l e y u n a t t e n d e d , 1 and t h a t p l a i n t i f f p a i d a n u n l i c e n s e d c a r e g i v e r t o

P l a i n t i f f s a d m i s s i o n t h a t s h e left B a i l e y u n a t t e n d e d d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e c l a i m t h a t p l a i n t i f f was operating a n adult foster home. Rather, defendants offer this fact to show that i f
1

7 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

care for Bailey. Defs.' Mem. at 10. Defendants argue that p l a i n t i f f violated the language o f t h e statute because she was caring for Bailey, who i s unrelated b y blood o r marriage, in plaintiff's h o m e a n d w a s p r o v i d i n g B a i l e y w i t h t h e k i n d o f r e s i d e n t i a l c a r e d e f i n e d i n t h e s t a t u t e . S e e ORS 443.705(6). H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e B a i l e y d i d n o t g i v e up h e r a p a r t m e n t a n d was s t a y i n g w i t h p l a i n t i f f temporarily for the holidays, i t was unreasonable for defendants to believe she was operating an unlicensed foster home. Moreover, defendants' beliefs were unreasonable based o n an exception to t h e statute. U n d e r O R S 4 4 3 . 7 1 5 , a n a d u l t f o s t e r h o m e d o e s n o t include: " A n y s p e c i a l i z e d l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n f o r p e r s o n s w i t h p h y s i c a l d i s a b i l i t i e s w h e r e [DHS] p r o v i d e s p a y m e n t f o r p e r s o n a l c a r e s e r v i c e s o t h e r than to an adult foster home provider." ORS 443.715(2). P l a i n t i f f falls within this exception because she provided personal care services to Bailey and received p a y m e n t from DHS. Therefore, defendants did not h a v e probable cause to believe p l a i n t i f f violated ORS 443.725.
1.

E q u a l Protection "The Equal Protection Clause o f t h e Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall

'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection o f the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should b e treated alike." City o f Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne L i v i n g Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (citation omitted). W h e n a d d r e s s i n g e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a i m s , t h e c o u r t m u s t first d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e g o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n d i s a d v a n t a g e d a s u s p e c t class o r i m p i n g e d u p o n a f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t p r o t e c t e d b y the Constitution, thereby requiring strict scrutiny review. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1983). I f n o t , the government action i s subject to rational basis review.

p l a i n t i f f w a s o p e r a t i n g a n a d u l t foster h o m e , s h e w o u l d h a v e v i o l a t e d h e r d u t y o f t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r care under ORS 443.725(3) b y leaving Bailey alone. Interestingly, at the time, defendants were upset that p l a i n t i f f was providing Bailey with too much care. 8 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

Id. (stating that the government action must rationally further a "legitimate, articulated state
purpose"). U n d e r r a t i o n a l b a s i s review, t h e court s h o u l d n o t o v e r t u r n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s a c t i o n unless "the varying treatment o f different groups o r persons is so unrelated to the achievement o f any c o m b i n a t i o n o f l e g i t i m a t e p u r p o s e s t h a t [ t h e c o u r t must] c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e [ g o v e r n m e n t ' s ] a c t i o n s were irrational." Kimel v. Fla. Bd. o fRegents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (citation omitted). A l t h o u g h e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n claims g e n e r a l l y a r i s e from g o v e r n m e n t a l t r e a t m e n t o f g r o u p s o f c i t i z e n s , equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a i m s c a n " i n s o m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s b e s u s t a i n e d e v e n i f t h e p l a i n t i f f h a s n o t alleged class-based discrimination, b u t instead claims that she has been irrationally singled o u t as a so-called 'class o f one.'" Engquist v. Or. Dept. o fAgric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2153 (2008). A class o f o n e c l a i m is p e n n i s s i b l e u n d e r t h e Equal P r o t e c t i o n C l a u s e w h e n t h e p l a i n t i f f alleges t h a t h e o r s h e h a d " b e e n i n t e n t i o n a l l y treated d i f f e r e n t l y from o t h e r s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d and t h a t t h e r e i s n o r a t i o n a l basis for the difference i n treatment." Id. (citing Vill. o f W i l l o w b r o o k v . Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). I f i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s b e i n g s i n g l e d o u t b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t , t h e n " t h e s p e c t e r o f arbitrary classification is fairly raised, and the Equal Protection Clause requires a rational basis for the difference i n treatment." Id. (citation omitted). T o p r e v a i l o n a s e l e c t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t c l a i m u n d e r t h e Equal P r o t e c t i o n Clause, p l a i n t i f f m u s t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e government's e n f o r c e m e n t h a d a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y e f f e c t a n d was m o t i v a t e d b y a discriminatory purpose. Rosenbaum v. City & County o fS.P., 484 F .3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) ( c i t a t i o n omitted). " S e l e c t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t o f v a l i d laws, w i t h o u t m o r e , d o e s n o t m a k e t h e defendants' action irrational." Freeman v. City o fSanta Ana, 68 F .3d 1180, 188 (9th Cir. 1995). P l a i n t i f f m u s t s h o w t h a t similarly situated individuals w e r e n o t p r o s e c u t e d and t h a t t h e government's p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e o f a c t i o n w a s t a k e n b e c a u s e o f t h e a d v e r s e effects u p o n plaintiff. Rosenbaum, 484

9 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

F.3d at 1153 (citations omitted). However, i f defendants can prove probable cause existed for the u n d e r l y i n g c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n , t h e n this e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w o u l d h a v e occurred regardless o f t h e retaliatory motive. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 261 (2006). Because p l a i n t i f f does not claim that she is part o f a suspect class, she seeks to prevail u n d e r a " c l a s s o f one" t h e o r y t h a t r e q u i r e s r a t i o n a l b a s i s r e v i e w . P l a i n t i f f a r g u e s t h a t h e r c l a s s o f o n e c l a i m can b e maintained because her treatment was based o n improper subjective motives. Resp. at 13; see Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by Action Apt. A s s 'n, Inc. v. Santa Monica R e n t Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007).
I n Squaw Valley, the plaintiffs, who operated a ski resort, complained that government

regulators subjected them to m o r e formal regulatory and enforcement action for their failure to comply w i t h water quality standards than similarly situated dischargers. 375 F.3d at 943. Although t h e court found that plaintiffs failed to present evidence to show that other dischargers were similarly s i t u a t e d , t h e c o u r t n e v e r t h e l e s s h e l d t h a t d e f e n d a n t s h a d a r a t i o n a l b a s i s for t h e i r a c t i o n s a g a i n s t plaintiffs based o n the resort's size, activity, and history o f non-compliance. Id. at 944-45. Therefore, t h e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f s ' equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a i m c o u l d o n l y s u r v i v e i f p l a i n t i f f s proved that the defendants' actions were motivated b y other personal o r pretextual reasons. Id. at 945. I f a p l a i n t i f f can demonstrate that (1) the defendants' proffered rational basis was objectively false, o r (2) that the defendants' actions were based o n an improper motive, then summary j u d g m e n t is inappropriate. Id. at 946; see also L a z y Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 5 8 0 , 5 9 1 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t for a s e l e c t i v e e n f o r c e m e n t claim, p l a i n t i f f c a n d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' alleged rational basis for their actions i s a pretext for a n impermissible motive). I n Squaw Valley, t h e c o u r t found t r i a b l e i s s u e s o f fact r e g a r d i n g o n e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i v e s b a s e d o n h i s g e n u i n e

10 - O P I N I O N A N D O R D E R

animosity t o w a r d t h e plaintiffs and h i s i n a b i l i t y to recall a n y i n s t a n c e w h e n plaintiffs d i d n o t c o m p l y w i t h t h e w a t e r q u a l i t y standards. Id. at 947. However, t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t w a s entitled to s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t b e c a u s e plaintiffs h a d no e v i d e n c e t o s h o w that h i s d e c i s i o n s w e r e b a s e d o n personal animosity. Id. a t 948.

I n this case, p l a i n t i f f asserts t h a t R u s a w h a d a v e r y p o o r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h p l a i n t i f f a n d t h a t h e
w a s " u n r e s p o n s i v e , r e l u c t a n t to a d m i t o r c o r r e c t h i s o w n m i s t a k e s , a n d f a i l e d t o a u t h o r i z e t h e t y p e o f care B a i l e y w a s entitled b y l a w to receive." Resp. a t 15. P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h a t s h e a n d B a i l e y c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t R u s a w several times a n d t h a t h i s b e h a v i o r w o r s e n e d a f t e r h e r complaints. Id. T h i s s h o w i n g is e n o u g h f o r a j u r y t o r e a s o n a b l y c o n c l u d e t h a t R u s a w h a d g e n u i n e a n i m o s i t y t o w a r d s p l a i n t i f f and t h a t h i s actions w e r e m o t i v a t e d b y a n i m p r o p e r purpose. M o r e o v e r , b e c a u s e t h i s court [ m d s t h a t n o p r o b a b l e c a u s e e x i s t e d for t h e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s a r e n o t e n t i t l e d to s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n p l a i n t i f f s s e l e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n claim.

2.

First Amendment Retaliation
T o e s t a b l i s h a F i r s t A m e n d m e n t retaliation violation, p l a i n t i f f m u s t s h o w t h a t defendants

deterred o r chilled h e r constitutionally protected s p e e c h a n d s u c h deterrence w a s a substantial o r m o t i v a t i n g factor i n defendants' conduct. See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F . 3 d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999); Dietrich v. John A s c u a g a ' s Nugget, 548 F . 3 d 892, 901 ( 9 t h Cir. 2008) (stating t h a t a p l a i n t i f f m u s t p r o v e t h e defendants' desired chilling effect w a s a b u t - f o r cause o f d e f e n d a n t s ' a c t i o n ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . I f p l a i n t i f f m a k e s o u t h e r p r i m a f a c i e case, t h e n t h e b u r d e n s h i f t s to d e f e n d a n t s t o p r o v e t h e y w o u l d h a v e t a k e n t h e a c t i o n a b s e n t t h e p r o t e c t e d c o n d u c t .

Hartman, 5 4 7 U.S. a t 260-61. I f defendants m a d e i n d e p e n d e n t and p r i n c i p l e d decisions separate
from p l a i n t i f f s speech, t h e n p l a i n t i f f did n o t s u f f e r a n y constitutional injury. See L a k e s i d e - S c o t t v.

M u l t n o m a h C o u n t y , 5 5 6 F . 3 d 7 9 7 , 8 0 5 ( 9 t h Cir. 2 0 0 9 ) .

11 - O P I N I O N A N D O R D E R

To prove retaliatory prosecution, p l a i n t i f f must demonstrate the absence o f probable cause and show that defendants' unconstitutional inducement "infected the prosecutor's decision to bring the charge." Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265. I f p l a i n t i f f proves that no probable cause existed, then a j u r y m a y b e able to infer retaliation. See id. at 261 (stating that i f no probable cause exists, that will "tend to reinforce the retaliation evidence and show that retaliation was the but-for basis for instigating t h e prosecution"). Because this court finds that no probable cause existed, defendants are n o t entitled to s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t o n t h e r e t a l i a t o r y p r o s e c u t i o n claim. D e f e n d a n t s a s s e r t t h a t t h e y w o u l d h a v e t e r m i n a t e d p l a i n t i f f s W P N absent h e r c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t D R S a n d t h a t this d e c i s i o n s h o u l d b e g i v e n a b s o l u t e i m m u n i t y . A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e l e v a n t regulation, defendants could lawfully suspend o r revoke p l a i n t i f f s W P N i f she "commit[ted] fiscal improprieties" o r "fail [ed] to provide services as required." O A R 411-031-0050(2). D R S defines fiscal improprieties as: financial m i s c o n d u c t i n v o l v i n g t h e client's money, p r o p e r t y o r b e n e f i t s . I m p r o p r i e t i e s include, b u t are not limited to, financial exploitation, borrowing m o n e y from the client, taking the client's property o r money, having the client purchase items for t h e R o m e c a r e W o r k e r , forging the client's signature, falsifying p a y m e n t records, c l a i m i n g p a y m e n t f o r h o u r s n o t w o r k e d , o r s i m i l a r acts i n t e n t i o n a l l y c o m m i t t e d f o r f i n a n c i a l gam. O A R 411-031-0020(14). DRS also states that a homecare worker's failure to provide services as required occurs w h e n h e o r she "does not provide the services to the client as described i n the service p l a n authorized b y [ D R S ] . " O A R 411-031-0020(32). W h i l e p r o s e c u t o r s , i n t h e i r e x e r c i s e o f d i s c r e t i o n , a r e a b s o l u t e l y i m m u n e from l i a b i l i t y for t h e i r d e c i s i o n s to p r o s e c u t e , p u b l i c officials a r e o n l y e n t i t l e d to a b s o l u t e i m m u n i t y i n e x c e p t i o n a l circumstances w h e r e immunity is essential for the conduct o f t h e public business. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262; B u t z v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). One such exceptional circumstance is 12 - OPINION AND ORDER

when a federal o r state agency assumes a role i n an administrative proceeding that is "analogous to that o f a j u d g e o r prosecutor i n a traditional trial setting." Bothke v. F l o o r Eng'rs & Constructors,

Inc., 713 F.2d 1405, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983), vacated o n other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 u.s.
1201 (1984); see Butz, 438 U.S. at 516 (holding that officials from Department o f Agriculture who were "responsible for the decision to initiate o r continue a proceeding subject to agency adjudication" were entitled to absolute immunity); Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Gaming Control B o a r d was entitled to immunity b e c a u s e i t conducted investigations and decided w h e t h e r to file complaints like a prosecutor); Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 ( 9 t h Cir. 1981) (holding that parole b o a r d officials were entitled to absolute i m m u n i t y f o r d e c i s i o n s t o g r a n t , deny, o r r e v o k e p a r o l e b e c a u s e t h e i r d u t i e s w e r e c o m p a r a b l e t o a j u d g e ' s responsibilities). A g e n c y officials, l i k e p r o s e c u t o r s , s h o u l d b e a f f o r d e d a b s o l u t e i m m u n i t y for d i s c r e t i o n a r y decisions regarding whether to initiate a proceeding o r to seek sanctions. Swift v. California, 3 8 4 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004); see Olsen v . I d a h o State Bd. o f M e d . , 363 F.3d 916, 924 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating t h a t decisions regarding whether to initiate disciplinary proceedings o r revoke a physician's license should b e afforded protection as quasi-judicial functions) (citations omitted);

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing absolute immunity for social
w o r k e r s for t h e "discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial d e c i s i o n s t o i n s t i t u t e c o u r t d e p e n d e n c y proceedings"). However, non-discretionary decisions will n o t b e afforded the s a m e protections. See

Swift, 384 F.3d at 1193 (holding that absolute immunity is improper for t h e non-discretionary act o f
m a k i n g a recommendation to the parole board to initiate parole revocation proceedings). A f t e r r e v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t m o s t f a v o r a b l e t o p l a i n t i f f , t h e facts s h o w t h a t p l a i n t i f f recorded m o r e h o u r s t h a n authorized i n a n effort to c o m p l y w i t h t h e language o f t h e

13 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

voucher. P l a i n t i f f p o i n t s to t h e "Provider Certification" s e c t i o n that reads: " A n y falsification o r c o n c e a l m e n t o f a m a t e r i a l fact m a y b e p r o s e c u t e d u n d e r f e d e r a l a n d s t a t e l a w s . " R u s a w D e c ! . , E x . 1 at 1. Additionally, p l a i n t i f f s debit card purchases s e e m reasonable i n l i g h t o f Bailey's needs a n d d e f e n d a n t s f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t p l a i n t i f f c o n t i n u e d to i m p r o p e r l y u s e h e r d e b i t c a r d a f t e r R u s a w ' s O c t o b e r 2 0 0 5 letter. T h e t e r m s o f B a i l e y ' s s e r v i c e p l a n a r e a l s o a m b i g u o u s a n d d o n o t s p e c i f y w h e r e B a i l e y ' s c a r e m u s t b e p r o v i d e d . S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t is i n a p p r o p r i a t e b a s e d o n t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f c o m m i t t e d f i s c a l i m p r o p r i e t i e s a n d f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s as r e q u i r e d . T h i s c o u r t f u r t h e r f i n d s t h a t d e f e n d a n t s f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e p l a i n t i f f s W P N w a s functionally equivalent to a prosecutorial decision. Defendants d i d n o t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e i r roles m i r r o r e d t h e level o f discretion p r e s e n t i n j u d i c i a l decision-making. A l t h o u g h t e r m i n a t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f s W P N c o u l d b e v i e w e d as a d i s c r e t i o n a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s a n c t i o n , d e f e n d a n t s h a v e n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a b s o l u t e i m m u n i t y i s n e c e s s a r y i n t h i s case. P l a i n t i f f h a s f a i l e d to d e m o n s t r a t e a n y c a u s a l l i n k b e t w e e n a n y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s a n d t h e d e c i s i o n t o r e q u i r e p l a i n t i f f to r e a p p l y f o r h e r W P N . D e f e n d a n t s ' P a r t i a l M o t i o n f o r S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t i s t h e r e f o r e g r a n t e d as t o t h e r e t a l i a t o r y r e - a p p l i c a t i o n c l a i m a n d d e n i e d as t o t h e r e t a l i a t o r y p r o s e c u t i o n a n d t e r m i n a t i o n claims.

3.

S u b s t a n t i v e D u e Process
F o r a substantive d u e process claim u n d e r the Fourteenth Amendment, p l a i n t i f f m u s t

d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t s h e w a s d e p r i v e d o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d l i b e r t y o r p r o p e r t y interest. See

Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 1999). T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s recognized that
a person's right to c h o o s e his o r h e r field o f employment is protected u n d e r t h e Constitution. Id. ( l i s t i n g cases). T h u s , p l a i n t i f f c a n m a k e o u t a s u b s t a n t i v e d u e p r o c e s s c l a i m i f s h e i s " u n a b l e t o

14 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

pursue an occupation and this inability i s caused b y government actions that w e r e arbitrary and lacking a rational basis." Engquist v. Or. Dept. o fAgric., 478 F.3d 9 8 5 , 9 9 7 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff alleges that w h e n defendants revoked h e r WPN, she was deprived o f h e r ability to pursue work i n h e r chosen field. Resp. a t 40. Although defendants contend that p l a i n t i f f was still able to pursue work providing care to disabled adults, p l a i n t i f f argues t h a t h e r chosen career as a h o m e c a r e w o r k e r r e q u i r e s p r o v i d i n g o n e - o n - o n e c a r e for a s i n g l e p e r s o n a n d d e v e l o p i n g a c l o s e relationship w i t h that person. Resp. at 41. Thus, a genuine issue o f material facts exists regarding whether the deprivation o f p l a i n t i f f s employment options was sufficient to establish a substantive due process claim. Defendants' Partial M o t i o n for Summary Judgment i s denied as to p l a i n t i f f s s u b s t a n t i v e d u e p r o c e s s claim.

4.

Malicious Prosecution2
T o e s t a b l i s h a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n claim, p l a i n t i f f m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e defendants

p r o s e c u t e d h e r w i t h m a l i c e a n d w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e , a n d t h a t t h e y d i d so f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f denying h e r equal protection o r another particular constitutional right. Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1189. P l a i n t i f f must also prove that the prior criminal proceeding terminated i n h e r favor. See H e c k v.

H u m p h r e y , 5 1 2 U . S . 4 7 7 , 4 8 4 (1994). H o w e v e r , t h e m e r e fact t h a t a p r o s e c u t i o n w a s u n s u c c e s s f u l
does n o t m e a n it was unsupported b y probable cause. Freeman, 68 F. 3 d at 1189.

P l a i n t i f f brings federal and common law malicious prosecution claims as well as a claim for wrongful initiation o f civil proceedings. Because t h e claims contain identical elements, the above discussion regarding the federal claim also extends to the c o m m o n law and civil claims. See Compton v. Myers, 558 P . 2 d 355, 356 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that p l a i n t i f f must prove t h a t t h e defendants " c o m m e n c e d o r m a i n t a i n e d t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , t h a t i t t e r m i n a t e d favorably to the plaintiff, that defendants h a d no probable cause to initiate o r prosecute the action against him, t h a t d e f e n d a n t s h a d a m a l i c i o u s p u r p o s e i n i n i t i a t i n g o r p r o s e c u t i n g t h e a c t i o n , and t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s d a m a g e d b y t h e i r actions").
2

15 - OPINION AND ORDER

Additionally, p l a i n t i f f must rebut the presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent j u d g m e n t and demonstrate that the defendants compromised the prosecutor's judgment. B e c k v. City o f Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff c a n rebut this presumption b y showing that t h e p r o s e c u t o r was p r e s s u r e d to p r o s e c u t e , t h e p r o s e c u t o r was given false information, the p r o s e c u t o r failed to use independent j u d g m e n t to determine i f probable cause existed, o r that the officers acted maliciously o r in b a d faith when initiating t h e legal proceeding. Id. at 862-63. Generally, malice is a question o f fact to b e decided b y a j u r y whereas t h e existence o f probable cause is a question o f law that can b e decided b y the court. See Estate o f Tucker e x reI. Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515

F 3 d 1019, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that t h e issue o f malice focuses o n t h e defendants' state o f
m i n d w h e n i n i t i a t i n g t h e legal p r o c e e d i n g w h i l e p r o b a b l e c a u s e is d e t e r m i n e d o n a n o b j e c t i v e basis). B e c a u s e t h i s c o u r t finds n o p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r t h e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n , s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t also fails o n this claim.

5.

C l a i m s as t o E a c h I n d i v i d u a l D e f e n d a n t
Under section 1983 claims, personal liability only attaches when t h e individual defendants

participated i n the constitutional violations. See Taylor v. List, 880 F .2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Participation includes t h e defendant's affirmative acts, the defendant's participation i n another's affirmative acts, and t h e defendant's omissions, w h e n legally required to perform an act, that cause the constitutional violation. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The requisite causal c o n n e c t i o n c a n b e e s t a b l i s h e d n o t o n l y b y s o m e k i n d o f direct p e r s o n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e d e p r i v a t i o n , b u t also b y s e t t i n g i n m o t i o n a s e r i e s o f a c t s b y o t h e r s w h i c h t h e a c t o r k n o w s o r reasonably should k n o w would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. "). Respondeat superior liability is inappropriate for section 1983 claims, P o l k County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981), however, a supervisor c a n b e liable for "his own culpable action o r inaction i n the training,

16 - OPINION AND O R D E R

supervision, o r control o f his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation . . . o r for conduct that showed a reckless o r callous indifference to t h e rights o f others." Watkins v. City
ofOakland~

Cal., 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).

Defendants admit that Rusaw and Shaffer called the police to report plaintiff, see Defs.' Mem. at 16; therefore, their actions resulted in the p l a i n t i f f s prosecution, which is the basis for p l a i n t i f f s s e l e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n claim, F i r s t A m e n d m e n t r e t a l i a t o r y p r o s e c u t i o n c l a i m , and m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n claims. A j u r y c o u l d a l s o find t h a t R u s a w a n d S h a f f e r p a r t i c i p a t e d i n p l a i n t i f f s s u b s t a n t i v e d u e process claim and First Amendment retaliatory W P N termination claim. I n h e r role as an APS investigator, Shaffer participated i n the decision to contact the police and forwarded h e r file to t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y . A j u r y c o u l d find t h a t s h e r e a s o n a b l y s h o u l d h a v e k n o w n t h a t h e r a c t i o n c o u l d r e s u l t i n t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f s W P N . Similarly, R u s a w ' s a c t i o n o f a l l e g i n g p l a i n t i f f committed fiscal improprieties and failure to provide services set into m o t i o n the subsequent t e r m i n a t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f s WPN. A l t h o u g h R u s a w a n d Shaffer d i d n o t d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e decision to terminate p l a i n t i f f s WPN, their actions h a d a reasonable causal connection to the t e r m i n a t i o n and t h e y r e a s o n a b l y s h o u l d h a v e k n o w n p l a i n t i f f s W P N c o u l d b e t e r m i n a t e d . R u s a w and Shaffer are therefore entitled to summary j u d g m e n t only as to p l a i n t i f f s First Amendment retaliation action regarding t h e decision to require p l a i n t i f f to reapply for h e r WPN. Bellish and Easton, i n their management roles at D R S as well as their direct participation i n t h e W P N termination process, participated i n the actions subject to p l a i n t i f f s substantive due process c l a i m a n d F i r s t A m e n d m e n t r e t a l i a t o r y t e r m i n a t i o n o f W P N claim. P l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e that Bellish o r Easton participated i n t h e decision to notify police and press charges against plaintiff. A l t h o u g h p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e i n t h e i r s u p e r v i s o r y capacity, p l a i n t i f f 17 - O P I N I O N A N D O R D E R

has n o t submitted evidence showing acquiescence in the decision to wrongfully press charges o r a reckless indifference to p l a i n t i f f s rights. Bellish and Easton are therefore entitled to summary j u d g m e n t as to p l a i n t i f f s selective prosecution claim, First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim, r e t a l i a t o r y r e - a p p l i c a t i o n claim, and m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n claims. CONCLUSION F o r t h e foregoing reasons, defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [107] is GRANTED i n part and DENIED i n part. Because p l a i n t i f f is unable to demonstrate an causal link b e t w e e n d e f e n d a n t s and t h e d e c i s i o n t o r e q u i r e p l a i n t i f f t o r e a p p l y for h e r W P N , d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n is GRANTED as to all defendants o n p l a i n t i f f s First Amendment retaliation claim related to rea p p l i c a t i o n . D e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n i s G R A N T E D for B e l l i s h a n d E a s t o n as t o p l a i n t i f f s s e l e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n claim, F i r s t A m e n d m e n t r e t a l i a t o r y p r o s e c u t i o n c l a i m , a n d m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n c l a i m s . Defendants' motion is DENIED as to p l a i n t i f f s remaining First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim, equal protection claims, substantive due process claim, and malicious prosecution claims as discussed. IT IS SO ORDERED. D a t e d t h i s - . 2 1 d a y o f July, 2 0 0 9 .

~~iiiL.ta~
U n i t e d States District J u d g e

18 - OPINION A N D ORDER