Hamilton v. Belleque

Filing 37

OPINION and ORDER. The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED, with prejudice. Signed on 11/16/09 by Judge Robert E. Jones. (tomg)

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FlLEIf 09 tiN i s i4:i2USOC{IRP I N THE UNITED STATES D I S T R I C T COURT FOR THE D I S T R I C T OF OREGON KENNETH O T I S HAMILTON, Petitioner, ) ) ) ) } ) ) C i v i l No. 07-951-JO v. BRIAN BELLEQUE, Respondent. O P I N I O N AND ORDER ) ) Mark Bennett weintraub Assistant Federal Public Defender 1 5 1 W. 7 t h A v e n u e , S u i t e 5 1 0 Eugene, Oregon 97401 Attorney for Petitioner John R. Kroger Attorney General Jacqueline Sadker Assistant Attorney General Department of Justice 1 1 6 2 C o u r t S t r e e t NE Salem, Oregon 97301 Attorneys for Respondent III 1 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER JONES, D i s t r i c t J u d g e . Petitioner 28 U.S.C. § brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 2254 i n which he challenges his s t a t e convictions for Manslaughter in the First Degree and Assault in the Third Degree. For the reasons s e t f o r t h below, the Amended P e t i t i o n for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#32) i s denied, and Judgment i s entered dismissing this action with prejudice. BACKGROUND In November 25, 1998, the Multnomah County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging p e t i t i o n e r with two counts of Manslaughter in the First Degree, one count of Assault in the Third Degree, one count of Reckless Driving and one count Respondent's of Driving Under the 102. A jury Influence of Intoxicants. Exhibit convicted petitioner on a l l counts and the sentencing court imposed a sentence t o t a l i n g 375 months. Respondent's Exhibit 101. Petitioner directly appealed his convictions, but the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the t r i a l court without written opinion, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State v. Hamilton, 185 Or.App. 523, 61 P.3d 977 (2002), rev. denied, 336 Or. 192, 82 P.3d 626 (2003) j Respondent's Exhibits 103-110. ("PCR") in Petitioner next filed for post-conviction relief state court. Blacketter, The peR t r i a l court denied r e l i e f . Umatilla County Circuit Court Case No. Hamilton v. CV04-0677. On a p p e a l , t h e O r e g o n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s g r a n t e d t h e S t a t e ' s M o t i o n 2 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER for S u m m a r y A f f i r m a n c e w i t h o u t a w r i t t e n o p i n i o n , a n d t h e O r e g o n Supreme Court denied review. rev. denied, (S54184) j Hamilton v. Blacketter, (A127809), Respondentls Exhibits 128-134. petitioner filed this action. In his On J u n e 2 7 , 2007, Amended P e t i t i o n f o r Writ of Habeas Corpus, p e t i t i o n e r r a i s e s the following grounds for relief: Ground One: An " A c q u i t t a l F i r s t " j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n given by the trial court regarding lesser included sentences violated Mr. Hamilton' s r i g h t t o Due Process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. G r o u n d Two: His sentence under the Oregon Sentencing Guidelines, based on judicial findings of fact, violated his r i g h t s under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as s e t forth i n A p p r e n d i v . New J e r s e y , 5 3 0 U . S . 4 6 6 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . Respondent asks because: the court to deny r e l i e f on the Petition (1) Ground One was c o r r e c t l y denied on the merits i n a s t a t e - c o u r t d e c i s i o n e n t i t l e d t o d e f e r e n c e j a n d ( 2 ) G r o u n d Two i s procedurally defaulted and without merit. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review An a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t o f habeas corpus s h a l l n o t be g r a n t e d unless adjudication of the claim in state court resulted in a decision that was: (I) IIcontrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 3 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court's bears by findings the clear of fact of are presumed the correct and of petitioner correctness § burden and rebutting presumption 28 convincing evidence. U.S.C. 2254 (e) (1) . A state court decision if the is "contrary court to applies a clearly rule that established precedent state contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] c a s e s II o r l I i f t h e s t a t e c o u r t c o n f r o n t s a s e t o f f a c t s t h a t a r e materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the supreme] Court and nevertheless II arrives at a result different 362, from [that] (2000). precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 405-06 U n d e r t h e l I u n r e a s o n a b l e a p p l i c a t i o n ll c l a u s e , a f e d e r a l h a b e a s c o u r t may g r a n t r e l i e f lIif t h e s t a t e c o u r t i d e n t i f i e s t h e c o r r e c t l e g a l principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner r s case. n Id. a t 413. state The lIunreasonable application n clause requires the than incorrect or erroneous. court decision to be more Id. at 410. The s t a t e c o u r t ' s application of c l e a r l y established Id. at 409. law must be objectively unreasonable. The l a s t reasoned decision by the s t a t e court i s the b a s i s for review by the federal court. 803-04 2003). (1991); Van Lynn v. S e e Y l s t v . N u n n e m a k e r , 5 0 1 U. S . 7 9 7 , Farman, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. When a s t a t e c o u r t d o e s n o t s u p p l y t h e r e a s o n i n g f o r i t s decision, a federal court does an independent review of the record 4 - OPINION AND ORDER to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r unreasonable. the s t a t e c o u r t d e c i s i o n w a s o b j e c t iv e l y Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). I f the f e d e r a l court does not find the s t a t e court decision was objectively unreasonable, deference is given the state court decision and habeas relief is denied. absence of a Id. at 981-82. Here, in the reasoned Oregon decision, the court conducted an independent review of the record in reviewing petitioner's claims. II. Application A. " A c q u i t t a l F i r s t .. J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n petitioner's counsel took exception to the t r i a l first instruction This statute At t r i a l , court giving what was known as an a c q u i t t a l c o d i f i e d b y t h e O r e g o n l e g i s l a t u r e a t ORS 1 3 6 . 4 6 0 ( 2 ) . provides: The jury s h a l l f i r s t consider the charged offense. Only i f the jury finds the defendant not guilty of the charged offense may the j u r y consider the l e s s e r included offenses i n o r d e r of seriousness. The j u r y may consider a less serious lesser included offense only after finding the defendant not guilty of any more serious lesser included offenses. At t r i a l , p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel argued the i n s t r u c t i o n was contrary t o Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1979) (holding a death sentence may not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y be imposed a f t e r a j u r y v e r d i c t of g u i l t of a c a p i t a l offense where the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense). On a p p e a l , however, p e t i t i o n e r acknowledged h i s case presented the same issue the Oregon Court of Appeals recently decided in State v. Horsley, 5 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER 169 Or. App. 438 (2000)l wherein it held DRS 136.460(2) was constitutional. Although petitioner disagrees with this holding, and a state state courts are the final arbiters of state law, court's interpretation of state law i s binding on a federal court. S e e E s t e l l e v . M c G u i r e , 5 0 2 U . S . 6 2 , 6 7 - 6 8 ( 1 9 9 1 ) (II [ W ] e r e e m p h a s i z e that i t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court detenninations o n s t a t e - l a w q u e s t i o n s . II) i see also M e n d e z v . S m a l l , 2 9 8 F . 3 d 1 1 5 4 , 1 1 5 8 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) (IIA s t a t e c o u r t h a d t h e l a s t w o r d o n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s t a t e l a w . 11) ( c i t i n g McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir.1989» Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 972 ( 9 t h C i r . 2 0 0 0 ) {II (A] i Bains v. federal court is b o u n d b y t h e s t a t e c o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f s t a t e l a w . II ( c i t i n g Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 15 F. 3d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 84 ( 1 9 8 3 » i P e l t i e r v. Wright, 1994) (state courts are the ultimate expositors of s t a t e law) . Accordingly, petitioner cannot demonstrate the t r i a l court's issuance of an acquittal first instruction in accordance with Oregon law was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. B. Apprendi Claim contends the trial to court's upwardly finding depart of from the the Petitioner "persistentinvolvement" factor presumptive guideline sentence violated his rights under Apprendi l Review denied, 331 Or. 692 (2001). 6 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER and B l a k e l y v . W a s h i n g t o n , 5 4 2 U . S . 2 9 6 ( 2 0 0 4 ) . argues this claim is procedurally defaulted, Although the state the court need not determine whether i t was f a i r l y presented to Oregon's s t a t e courts because, as discussed below, this claim is without merit. S e e 28 U . S . C . § 2 2 4 8 ( b ) ( 2 ) ("An a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s m a y be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the S t a t e . II) As a preliminary matter, the Ninth C i r c u i t has held t h a t the Supreme Court announced a new r u l e i n Blakely t h a t does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See United States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005) i Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1034-36 (9th Cir. 2005}i Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1246 (9th C i r . ) , c e r t . denied, 546 U.S. 944 (2005). Moreover, petitioner's argument that the trial court's imposition of an upward departure sentence was unconstitutional because i t violated Apprendi i s based on an application of the Apprendi r u l e t h a t was not made c l e a r u n t i l Blakely issued a f t e r his conviction had become f i n a l on August 27, 2003. In short, petitioner argues that Apprendi required a jury to find enhancement factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner's arguments notwithstanding, i t is clear that, at the time of his sentencing, the t r i a l court did not contravene federal enhanced sentence. law in imposing an 7 - OPINION AND ORDER Under t h e r u l e o f A p p r e n d i , " [ o ] t h e r t h a n t h e f a c t o f a p r i o r conviction, any fact that increase[s] the penalty of a crime beyond t h e p r e s c r i b e d s t a t u t o r y maximum m u s t b e s u b m i t t e d t o a j u r y , a n d proved beyond a reasonable doubt." At the time of Apprendi, 530 U.S. a t 490. sentencing, Oregon courts petitioner' 's a p p l y i n g A p p r e n d i u n d e r s t o o d t h e a p p l i c a b l e " s t a t u t o r y maximum" f o r felonies to consist of terms s e t forth in Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.605, which s e t maximum t e r m s o f imprisonment f o r v a r i o u s c l a s s e s o f felonies. See,~, S t a t e v. D i l t s , 39 P.3d 276 (Or. App. 2002), a f f ' d 82 P.3d 593 (Or. 2003), vacated by D i l t s v. Oregon, 542 U.S. 934 (2004). the For Manslaughter in the First Degree and Assault in the " s t a t u t o r y maximums" were 20 years and Third Degree, 5 years respectively under that standard. Then-current Supreme Court authority reaffirmed the role of judicial fact finding in sentencing as long as the sentence did not exceed statutory limits. See, ~, Apprendi, that it 530 U.S. is a t 481 ("nothing in this history for judges to exercise suggests impermissible discretion-taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute."). The meaning of " s t a t u t o r y maximum" for Apprendi purposes changed i n 2004 with the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Apprendi i n Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The defendant in Blakely pleaded Blakely, 542 U.S. a t , guilty to kidnapping and use of a firearm. 8 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER 298-99. Like Oregon1s sentencing guidelines, those at issue in Blakely established a presumptive sentence for a particular crime. Id. at 300. a Both schemes also permit the sentencing court to above the standard range based on certain impose sentence findings that would j u s t i f y a departure. In Blakely, the standard r a n g e f o r t h e c r i m e o f w h i c h d e f e n d a n t p l e a d e d g u i l t y w a s 4 9 t o 53 months. crueltyll Finding that the defendant had acted with "deliberate (one of several enumerated grounds for departure) Id. the t r i a l c o u r t d e p a r t e d u p w a r d t o 90 m o n t h s . The defendant argued t h a t imposing a sentence i n excess of the s t a n d a r d - r a n g e maximum u n d e r t h e s t a t e s e n t e n c i n g g u i d e l i n e s , b a s e d on facts not found by a process rights. jury, violated his jury t r i a l and due The s t a t e contended t h a t the relevant statutory maximum f o r A p p r e n d i p u r p o s e s w a s t h e l O - y e a r maximum f o r C l a s s B felonies and not a standard-range Id. at 302. state I s argument and set forth a maximum under the state sentencing guidelines. The Court rej ected the d e f i n i t i v e m e a s u r e o f I I s t a t u t o r y maximum ll f o r A p p r e n d i p u r p o s e s : O u r p r e c e d e n t s m a k e c l e a r * * * t h a t t h e II s t a t u t o r y maximum" f o r A p p r e n d i p u r p o s e s i s t h e maximum s e n t e n c e a judge may impose s o l e l y on the b a s i s of the f a c t s reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e r e l e v a n t II s t a t u t o r y maximum" i s n o t t h e maximum s e n t e n c e a j u d g e m a y i m p o s e a f t e r f i n d i n g a d d i t i o n a l f a c t s , b u t t h e maximum h e may impose without any additional findings. Id. at 303-04. 9 - OPINION AND ORDER In t h e w a k e o f B l a k e l y , t h e O r e g o n S u p r e m e c o u r t a d j u s t e d i t s understanding of If s t a t u t o r y m a x i m u m 11 accordingly, so that the p r e s u m p t i v e s e n t e n c e u n d e r t h e g u i d e l i n e s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e maximum penalties for various classes of felonies under Or. § Rev. Stat. 161.605, set the ceiling beyond which enhancement factors must be State v. D i l t s , 103 proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. P.3d 95 (Or. 2004). In the same month, Oregon courts c l a r i f i e d of "persistent that enhancement of a sentence based on a finding i n v o l v e m e n t ll r e q u i r e d a j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n a r e v i e w o f the bare facts of a defendant's prior crimes. State v. Perez, 102 P.3d 705 (Or. App. 2004), r e v ' d on other grounds, 131 P.3d 168 (Or. 2006) . Blakely's clarification of the term Ifstatutory maximum" resulted in a significant change from Oregon sentencing as i t had been conducted post-Apprendi. P.3d 1 (Or. App. 2005), of See Peralta-Basilio v. denied, The 132 P.3d that Hill, 1056 126 (Or. rev. 2006) (discussing effect Blakely). fact no post- Apprendi federal circuit court of appeals decided issues analogous t o those presented i n Blakely i n the way t h a t the Supreme Court finally did exemplifies Blakely's unforeseeability. (collecting cases) . As noted above, p e t i t i o n e r ' s conviction became f i n a l p r i o r to Blakely's clarification of Apprendi 1 S view of this time line, 11 Id. at 3 s t a t u t o r y maximum" t e r m . In I cannot agree with petitioner that his 1 0 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER sentence w a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e c a u s e i t w a s i m p o s e d i n v i o l a t i o n of Apprendi as i t was understood p r i o r to Blakely. Accordingly, petitioner cannot demonstrate that the trial c o u r t ' s i m p o s i t i o n o f u p w a r d d e p a r t u r e s e n t e n c e s b a s e d o n i t s own finding of p e r s i s t e n t involvement was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Amended P e t i t i o n f o r Writ of Habeas Corpus prejudice. I T I S SO ORDERED. DATED t h i s (#32) i s DENIED, a n d t h i s c a s e i s D I S M I S S E D , w i t h ~ day of November, 2009. . Jones States District Judge 1 1 - O P I N I O N AND ORDER

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