Kyei v. Oregon Department of Transportation et al

Filing 135

OPINION AND ORDER - For the reasons explained above, Kyei's motion 121 for a new trial is DENIED. Signed 3/2/10, by U.S. Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)

02

UNITED STATES D I S T R I C T C O U R T DISTRICT OF OREGON P O R T L A N D DIVISION

KOFIKYEI, Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 07-1607-AC OPINION AND ORDER

v.
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.

Opinion

The jUly returned a verdict against p l a i n t i f f Kofi Kyei ("Kyei") and in favor o f defendant O r e g o n D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ( " O D O T " ) o n K y e i ' s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , hostile w o r k environment, and retaliation claims based o n race and national origin under Title VII. Kyei moves for a new trial o f his claims, arguing that a new trial is warranted because the court erred in exercising its discretion to seek a n advisOlY verdict from the j u r y o n the issue o f Kyei 's past and future economic loss. Kyei argues that allowing the jUly to hear evidence related to his economic

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damages unfairly prejudiced his Title VII claims because it allowed the jUly to misuse that evidence by considering it w h e n deciding liability under Title VII. K y e i ' s m o t i o n is denied. T h e evidence he challenges as character evidence was n o t character evidence. F u r t h e r , e v e n a s s u m i n g t h e c h a l l e n g e d e v i d e n c e m e e t s t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e under F e d e r a l R u l e o f E v i d e n c e 4 0 4 , Kyei h a s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a d m i s s i o n o f that e v i d e n c e s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e j u d i c e d h i m i n t h e c o n t e x t o f all t h e e v i d e n c e p r o d u c e d a t t r i a l . Backgrollnd Kyei is a black m a n born i n Ghana. l H e w o r k e d for O D O T from March 2002 until May 2006, w h e n O D O T terminated his employment as the final step i n a series o f disciplinmy actions for u n a c c e p t a b l e j o b p e r f o r m a n c e . I n O c t o b e r 2 0 0 7 , Kyei f i l e d a d i s c r i m i n a t i o n l a w s u i t a g a i n s t O D O T and o t h e r defendants under federal and state law. As a result o f t h e cOUli's s u m m m y j u d g m e n t ruling a n d K y e i ' s v o l u n t m y d i s m i s s a l s , all d e f e n d a n t s e x c e p t O D O T a n d s o m e o f K y e i ' s c l a i m s , i n c l u d i n g all o f h i s s t a t e l a w c l a i m s , w e r e d i s m i s s e d f r o m t h i s a c t i o n . K y e i ' s T i t l e V I I d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , h o s t i l e w o r k e n v i r o n m e n t , and r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m s a g a i n s t O D O T r e m a i n e d f o r t r i a l . T w o days b e f o r e t h e t r i a l date, K y e i f i l e d a s u p p l e m e n t a l t r i a l b r i e f i n w h i c h h e s t a t e d t h a t he would n o t pursue at trial his claim for emotional distress damages. Kyei also asked the court to n o t take evidence o f e c o n o m i c damages i n the presence o f the jUly, although he acknowledged that t h e court had the discretion to " s u b m i t questions o f back pay a n d front p a y to the j u r y for advisory findings pursuant to Fed. R. e i v . P. 39(c)." (PI.'s Supp. Trial Br. at 3.) A t the pretrial conference, the c o u r t told counsel that i t w o u l d seek an advisOlY verdict o n K y e i ' s claim for p a s t and future wage loss a n d t h a t it would h e a r evidence relevant to that claim i n the jUlY'S presence. O n the morning

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Kyei is pronounced "shay".

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oftrial and before jUly selection began, in response to Kyei' s request in his Supplemental Trial Brief, the court reaffirmed its ruling on this issue. A t trial, Kyei testified that he believed his post-termination j o b search efforts were unsuccessful because O D O T gave bad references about him to prospective employers who contacted ODOT about him. Kyei testified that he had applied for over one thousand j o b s in the four years following his termination and had received numerous interviews, and that in many instances he had progressed to the final round. After the reference checks, however, he received no offers o f employment. Kyei testified that the only j o b he had been able to secure was as a pmt-time school bus driver. O n cross-examination, Kyei acknowledged that he listed ODOT on his employment applications but without also listing the reasons for his termination; he testified that he explained the reasons at the interviews. The c o u r t ' s pretrial evidentimy rulings precluded ODOT from offering exhibits at trial to support its theOly that the specific performance problems Kyei experienced at ODOT were vittually identical to the performance problems his prior employers had identified. The court did allow ODOT to introduce two exhibits pertaining to Kyei's past j o b with the State o f Oregon's Housing and Community Services Department ("HCSD"), which exhibits ODOT offered to refi.lte K y e i ' s argument that ODOT was the only source o f potentially negative j o b references. The first, Exhibit 210, was a Janumy 1 6 , 2 0 0 2 , letter to Kyei from two human resources managers at HCSD. Most o f Exhibit 2 l 0 ' s content had been redacted to comply with the c o u r t ' s pretrial evidentiary rulings precluding descriptions o f K y e i ' s specific performance issues at HCSD and o f his various discussions with his managers and H R s t a f f regarding those performance issues. What remained o f the letter advised Kyei that HCSD was terminating his trial service employment and explaining to

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him the process for winding-up his current projects. The unredacted portion o f the letter also included the following: This decision to end your employment does not m e a n that you do n o t have the knowledge and the ability to be successful. It is a simple case o f being honest about the fact that the background and experience you bring to the position is not a good match for the responsibilities o f the position. The second, Exhibit 211, w a s a February 21, 2002, letter from the director o f H C S D to Kyei advising him that the decision t o terminate his trial service employment was final. The letter reiterated to Kyei that HCSD had determined that his "background and experience did not align with the duties and responsibilities o f the position." During cross-examination, Kyei also acknowledged that his trial service employment w i t h Washington County had been terminated but no questions regarding his performance there were asked. Presentation o f evidence at trial lasted four days. The great bulk o f testimony and virtually all o f the exhibits pertained to K y e i ' s performance a t ODOT and O D O T ' s continual effOlts to address and correct Kyei' s performance issues. Kyei contended that he performed his j o b duties well and that only because o f discriminatory animus did ODOT find his performance deficient and t e r m i n a t e h i s e m p l o y m e n t . K y e i ' s case c o n s i s t e d m o s t l y o f h i s own t e s t i m o n y , s u p p l e m e n t e d by b r i e f testimony o f a former ODOT co-worker regarding a specific incident, and the testimony o f his former supervisor and the ODOT human resources manager who advised his supervisor regarding K y e i ' s performance issues. ODOT presented a number o f witnesses who described, and numerous exhibits that documented, issues regarding K y e i ' s performance o f his j o b duties, his refusal to take direction from his supervisors, and actions he took that often alienated representatives o f other governmental agencies with which he was expected to work i n carrying out his ODOT job duties. The human resources manager also testified that following his termination she had received only one OPINION AND O R D E R
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reference check for Kyei, w h i c h h a d come from the school district considering h i m for the school bus d r i v e r p o s i t i o n . Standards Under Federal Rule o f Civil Procedure 5 9 ( a ) ( I ) , the court may grant a n e w trial on all or some o f t h e issues tried to a j u r y " f o r any reason for which a n e w trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal cOUli[.]" Rule 59 does not specify the grounds o n which a motion for a n e w trial m a y b e granted." Zhangv. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, t h e c o u r t i s " b o u n d b y those g r o u n d s t h a t h a v e b e e n h i s t o r i c a l l y r e c o g n i z e d . "

Id.

Historically recognized grounds include, but are not limited to, claims " t h a t the verdict is against the w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e , t h a t t h e d a m a g e s a r e e x c e s s i v e , o r t h a t , f o r o t h e r r e a s o n s , t h e trial w a s n o t fair to the party moving." MontgomelY Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). A n e w trial is warranted o n the basis o f an incorrect evidentimy ruling only " i f the ruling substantially prejudiced a pmiy." United States v. 99.66 A c r e s o fLand, 970 F.2d 651, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Harmless error in a n evidentiary ruling does not justify a n e w trial. M e r r i c k v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cil'. 1990). I n order to establish reversible enol', the complaining p m i y m u s t e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e e r r o r w a s prejudicial, w h i c h m e a n s t h a t t h e trial c o u r t ' s e r r o r more p r o b a b l y than not tainted the j u r y ' s verdict. Engquist, 478 F.3d at 1009. A district c o u r t ' s evidentiary rulings are subject to the abuse o f discretion standard. E n g q u i s t v. Or. Dep't o fAgric., 478 F.3d 985, 1008 (9th Cil'. 2007), aff'd, 128 S. Ct. 2146 (2008). T h e N i n t h C i r c u i t h a s h e l d t h a t " [ t ] h e t r i a l c o u r t m a y g r a n t a n e w t r i a l o n l y i f the v e r d i c t i s contrmy to the clear w e i g h t o f the evidence, is based upon false o r perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage o f j u s t i c e . " Passantino V. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 2 1 2 F.3d 493, 510

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n.15 (9th Cir. 2000). This is true e v e n i f a verdict is otherwise supported by substantial evidence. Silver Sage Partners Ltd. v. City o f Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001). "Upon the Rule 59 motion o f the party against w h o m a verdict has been returned, the district COUlt has ' t h e duty . . . to weigh the evidence as [the court] saw it, and to set aside t h e verdict o f the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in [the COUlt' s] conscientious opinion, the verdict is contraJy to the clear weight o f the evidence." Molski v. M 1. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Discussion Under FRCP 3 9 ( c ) ( I ) , in a n action n o t triable by right to a j u r y the court may " b y any issue w i t h an advisOlY j u r y [ . ] " Kyei acknowledges that the rule gives the court discretion to seek an advisory verdict and h e does not directly challenge the c o u r t ' s decision to seek an advisOlY verdict o n the question o f his back and front pay. Rather, he contends t h e court erred in making an e v i d e n t i a r y r u l i n g r e l a t e d t o t h i s i s s u e : a l l o w i n g O D O T t o i n t r o d u c e c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e i n the form o f his performance i n j o b s prior to his O D O T employment. This, Kyei contends, allowed the jUly to misuse that evidence by considering i t w h e n determining liability o n his Title VII claims. Kyei c l a i m s t h i s r u l i n g u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d h i m a n d w a r r a n t s a n e w trial. A s an initial matter, the court addresses an apparent premise o f K y e i ' s argument: that it is a u t o m a t i c e r r o r o r u n d u l y p r e j u d i c i a l b y d e f i n i t i o n t o a s k a j u r y t a s k e d o n l y w i t h m a k i n g a liability finding to also render an advisOlY verdict o n an issue to be decided by the court, because i t allows the jUly to consider evidence not relevant to determining Title VII liability. (PI.' s Mem. in Support o f Mo. for N e w Trial ( " M e m o " ) at 3.) Kyei cites no authority for this implied premise, which is c o n t r a r y t o R u l e 3 9 ( c ) ( 1 ) ' s e x p r e s s a u t h o r i z a t i o n for o b t a i n i n g a n a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t o n " a n y i s s u e "

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otherwise triable to t h e c o u r t ( e m p h a s i s added). T h u s , by itself, t h e c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n to s e e k an advisOly v e r d i c t o n an i s s u e for its d e c i s i o n c o u l d n o t b e error; i f i t w e r e , t h e n R u l e 3 9 (c)(1) w o u l d be m e a n i n g l e s s a n d w i t h o u t p u r p o s e . Rather, R u l e 39 ( c ) ( l ) c l e a r l y c o n t e m p l a t e s t h a t i f a n advisOlY v e r d i c t is s o l i c i t e d , a j U l y w i l l h e a r e v i d e n c e u n r e l a t e d t o t h e i r p r i m m y c h a r g e . A d v i s o r y v e r d i c t s in s u c h i n s t a n c e s a r e p r o p e r , i n c l u d i n g i n T i t l e VII c a s e s , a n d COUtts h a v e r e l i e d u p o n R u l e 39(c)(1) to p r o c e e d i n p r e c i s e l y t h i s way. See, e.g.,Sarantisv. ADP, Inc., N o . C V - 0 6 - 2 1 5 3 - P H X - L O A , 2008 W L 4 0 5 7 0 0 7 , a t *3 (D. Ariz. A u g . 28, 2 0 0 8 ) (trial c o u r t s o u g h t advisOlY v e r d i c t o n b a c k and front p a y i n a T i t l e VII case).> T o the e x t e n t t h a t K y e i ' s p o s i t i o n relies o n t h i s theory, that theory i s w i t h o u t s u p p o r t i n R u l e 3 9 ( c ) ( I ) o r its purpose. T u r n i n g to t h e t e n e t o f K y e i ' s p o s i t i o n , t h a t t h e c o u r t c o m m i t t e d e r r o r b y s e e k i n g a n a d v i s o r y v e r d i c t b e c a u s e t h a t d e c i s i o n r e s u l t e d i n the p r e s e n t a t i o n o f c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e to t h e jUly (see M e m o at 4 ; P l . ' s R e p l y i n S u p p o r t o f M o . for N e w T r i a l ( " R e p l y " ) a t 2 ) , K y e i ' s a r g u m e n t d o e s n o t c o m p e l g r a n t i n g a n e w trial f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e r e a s o n s . F i r s t , t h e e v i d e n c e K y e i c h a l l e n g e s a s c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e w a s n o t c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e . Kyei c l a i m s t h a t t h e COUlt p e r m i t t e d O D O T " t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e o f p l a i n t i f f s p r i o r w o r k p e r f o r m a n c e " ( M e m o a t 2 ) , b u t a t n o t i m e d u r i n g trial did t h e c o u r t p e r m i t O D O T t o i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e a b o u t K y e i ' s p e r f o r m a n c e , o r p r o b l e m s w i t h his performance, in p a s t j o b s . T h e e x h i b i t s t h e c o u r t a d m i t t e d pertaining t o K y e i ' s p a s t j o b w i t h H C S D , E x h i b i t 210 i n r e d a c t e d form a n d E x h i b i t 2 1 1 , s t a t e d o n l y t h a t K y e i ' s t r i a l - s e r v i c e p e r i o d w i t h H C S D w o u l d n o t be e x t e n d e d , a n d t h e e x h i b i t s c i t e d a s t h e o n l y r e a s o n t h a t h i s b a c k g r o u n d a n d e x p e r i e n c e w e r e " n o t a good m a t c h for t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e position". O D O T ' s w i t n e s s e s p r e s e n t e d n o evidence o f

T h e c o u r t c i t e d d e c i s i o n s f r o m t h e F i f t h a n d S e v e n t h C i r c u i t s a p p r o v i n g advisory v e r d i c t s i n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a s e s , a s w e l l as f r o m a n o t h e r j u d g e i n the D i s t r i c t o f Arizona. !d. & n.3.
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his past j o b performance, n o r did the court permit O D O T ' s counsel to cross-examine Kyei o n any p r o b l e m s o r i s s u e s K y e i h a d w i t h p r i o r e m p l o y e r s . I n s h o r t , t h e r e w a s n o e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l o f any specific performance issues, o r any reference to performance issues, Kyei experienced at past j o b s and no evidence that p u r p o r t e d to compare his O D O T performance issues w i t h his performance issues or c i r c u m s t a n c e s a t p a s t j o b s . Character e v i d e n c e is e v i d e n c e " o f a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r or a t r a i t o f c h a r a c t e r " , usually offered for the p u r p o s e o f p r o v i n g t h a t the person acted i n conformity therewith o n a particular occasion. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(a). This rule prevents a party from making a "general p r o p e n s i t y " a r g u m e n t , t h a t i f i n t h e p a s t a p e r s o n e n g a g e d i n c o n d u c t o f a c e r t a i n type, " i t f o l l o w s that he likely c o m m i t t e d " t h e actions presently at issue." 1 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §IOO (1994). Here, n o n e o f the evidence Kyei challenges fits Rule 4 0 4 ( a ) ' s definition because O D O T did n o t introduce specific evidence o f any o f K y e i ' s p e r f o r m a n c e p r o b l e m s a t H C S D o r W a s h i n g t o n County, o r w i t h any o t h e r p r i o r o r s u b s e q u e n t employer. T h e c o u r t ' s p r e t r i a l r u l i n g e x p r e s s l y p r o h i b i t e d O D O T from o f f e r i n g such e v i d e n c e . Instead, the COUlt limited O D O T to introducing evidence t h a t K y e i ' s trial-service periods were n o t e x t e n d e d a t t w o p r i o r e m p l o y e r s f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f r e f u t i n g K y e i ' s c h a r g e t h a t h i s i n a b i l i t y t o find a j o b aftei' his separation from O D O T stemmed only from O D O T ' s unfavorable references to his p r o s p e c t i v e employers. Second, Kyei argues that the evidence the COUlt did allow could h a v e been misused by the j u r y ( M e m o a t 4), b u t h e d o e s n o t e x p l a i n h o w t h e j u r y a c t u a l l y o r p r o b a b l y m i s u s e d this evidence. Kyei does not offer a c i t a t i o n to the record, such as to inconsistent findings in the verdict form or to j u r o r questions that r e v e a l e d such misuse. Kyei offers no other factual or legal argument to SUppOit

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pOlt for t h e argument that the this contention. I n short, Kyei offers no basis in fact and no legal SUp -se jUly misused evidence that two prior employers did n o t extend his trial rvice periods, by inferring

e m s w h i c h c a u s e d ODOT to from that evidence that the specific and repeated performance probl i o r employers. terminate him m u s t have occurred because they had occurred w i t h pr w h e t h e r , the c o u r t ' s T h i r d , Kyei h a s n o t s h o w n t h a t , o r e v e n a n a l y z e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f c o n s i d e r a b l e evidence o f t h e evidentiary ruling substantially prejudiced him. At trial, the jUly h e a r d performance deficiencies u p o n w h i c h O D O T b a s e d K y e i ' s termination . T h e e v i d e n c e phase o f t r i a l

i e s f o c u s e d o n the n u m e r o u s consumed four court days a n d during viJtually all o f that t i m e the part fied for almost two full COUlt s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s o f K y e i ' s p e r f o r m a n c e a t ODOT. Kyei h i m s e l f t e s t i i related and reiterated to the days, both o n direct and cross-examination. During his testimony, Kye j u r y his v e r s i o n o f his O D O T j o b performance, t h e obstacles his s u p e r v d e p a r t m e n t c r e a t e d t o h i s a b i l i t y t o c a n y o u t h i s j o b duties, and h i s d e s c to w h i c h b o t h h i s s u p e r v i s o r a n d O D O T ' s h u m a n resources d e p a r t m e i s o r a n d the h u m a n resources

r i p t i o n o f t h e unfair treatment nt subjected him. In support,

i t n e s s e d p a r t o f o n e incident K y e i o f f e r e d the b r i e f t e s t i m o n y o f a f o n n e r O D O T c o - w o r k e r w h o w s o r a n d t h e h u m a n resources t h e p a r t i e s d i s p u t e d , a n d K y e i c a l l e d as a d v e r s e w i t n e s s e s h i s s u p e r v i m b e r o f witnesses, i n c l u d i n g m a n a g e r i n v o l v e d i n h i s situation. A g a i n s t this, O D O T offered a n u K y e i ' s u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a n d e m p l o y e e s o f other s t a t e and f e d e r a l a g e n c i e s w i t h w h o m Kyei h a d

rking w i t h Kyei. ODOT also w o r k e d , w h o t e s t i f i e d a b o u t t h e p r o b l e m s they e n c o u n t e r e d w h e n w o p r e s e n t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f K y e i ' s s u p e r v i s o r and t h e h u m a n r e s o u r c e s m a n a g e r involved i n K y e i ' s w r i t t e n discussions w i t h him

s i t u a t i o n r e g a r d i n g K y e i ' s m a n y p e r f o r m a n c e p r o b l e m s , t h e i r oral a n d about these problems, a n d their effOlts to help h i m improve h i s perfor

m a n c e . FUlthennore, t h e two

e a m o n g approximately 200 exhibits O D O T introduced regarding K y e i ' s prior employment w e r

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exhibits the parties s u b m i t t e d to the jury. e j u d i c e d h i m h a s less K y e i ' s contention t h a t the cOUlt's evidentiary ruling substantially pr s u p p o r t in t h e t r i a l r e c o r d o f t h i s c a s e t h a n d i d t h e p l a i n t i f f s s i m i l a r a rgument i n Neuren v. Adduci,

e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s rejected. Maslriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F . 3 d 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1995), w h i c h th T h e r e , t h e p l a i n t i f f s u e d h e r f o r m e r e m p l o y e r , a l a w firm, f o r g e n d e r d A t trial, the cOUlt allowed the d e f e n d a n t to introduce b o t h documenta iscrimination under Title Vll.

r y a n d t e s t i m o n i a l evidence o f

ent w i t h the defendant. Id. at the p l a i n t i f f s performance at a n o t h e r l a w firm p r i o r to h e r employm t h e p l a i n t i f f s credibility and 1508. T h e defendant had a r g u e d t h a t the evidence b o t h i m p e a c h e d supported its defense that i t fired the p l a i n t i f f for legitimate b u s i n e s s reasons. Id. at 1508-09. The

ntending t h a t Federal Rule o f j u r y returned a v e r d i c t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t h e p l a i n t i f f appealed, c o E v i d e n c e 4 0 4 b a r r e d a d m i s s i o n o f t h e p r i o r j ob p e r f o r m a n c e e v i d e n c e. Id. at 1509.

mony concerning h e r T h e c o u r t o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f o f f e r e d t h r e e days o f t e s t i r o m a f o r m e r c o - c o u n s e l in a e m p l o y m e n t a n d t e r m i n a t i o n a t t h e defendant, including t e s t i m o n y f l i t i g a t i o n matter, t e s t i m o n y f r o m t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s b o o k k e e p e r , p l a i n t i f f s o w n testimony, a n d hostile

nt countered with "extensive testimony from a p a r t n e r i n t h e defendant l a w firm. Id. D e f e n d a t i m o n y b y several partners o f e v i d e n c e " o f t h e r e a s o n s f o r p l a i n t i f f s dismissal, i n c l u d i n g t h e t e s p l a i n t i f f s habitual inability to m e e t deadlines and complaints about he r p o o r interpersonal skills. Id. l u a t i o n s from h e r

ormance eva a t 1509-10. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t o f f e r e d p l a i n t i f f s w r i t t e n p e r f

l a i n t i f f h a d difficulty m e e t i n g prior employer, a c c o m p a n i e d by corroborating testimony, that t h e p there. Id. at 1510. d e a d l i n e s and g e t t i n g a l o n g w i t h c o w o r k e r s d u r i n g h e r e m p l o y m e n t T h e COUlt o f appeals found t h a t the t r i a l j u d g e abused his discretion i n o f t h e p l a i n t i f f s c o n d u c t i n h e r p r i o r e m p l o y m e n t , b u t it a f f i r m e d t h e a d m i t t i n g the e v i d e n c e

j u r y ' s v e r d i c t b e c a u s e t h e trial

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judge's error did not substantially affect the trial's outcome. The court stated that evidence o f prior acts cannot be introduced to prove that a person acted in conformity therewith o n the occasion i n question. ld. at 1511. Because the trial judge had admitted the evidence to show that the plaintiff had "the same problem" a t a p r i o r f i n n for which the defendant had fired her, he "admitted the evidence for the purpose specifically prohibited by Rule 404 - as evidence that [the plaintiff] acted in conformity with her behavior at [her prior firm] while working for [the defendant]." Neuren, 43 F.3d at 1511. This, the court o f appeals concluded, was error. ld. at 1512. T h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s t h e n a d d r e s s e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f " w h e t h e r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s erroneous admission o f the [prior firm] evidence prejudiced the outcome at trial or was harmless error." New'en, 43 F.3d at 1512, citing FED. R. EVID. 103 ("Error may n o t be predicated upon a ruling which admits . . . evidence unless a substantial right o f the pmiy is affected."). The harmless error test is fact-specific and "depends upon the balance o f the evidence bearing upon the issue which the e r r o r a r g u a b l y a f f e c t e d a n d t h e c e n t r a l i t y o f t h a t issue to t h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n . " l d . ( c i t a t i o n s omitted). "The proper inquiry is 'whether the error i t s e l f had substantial influence. I f so, or i f one is left in grave doubt, the [verdict] cannot stand. ' " Id. (citations omitted). The court stated that to decide whether the admission o f the prior j o b performance evidence was harmless error, it would review the standards for determining whether the p l a i n t i f f s termination contravened Title VII and determine whether the j u d g m e n t was substantially affected by the prior j o b performance evidence. New'en, 43 F.3d at 1512. After summarizing the burden o f p r o o f in a Title VII case, the cOUli o f appeals concluded " i t is not clear that [the plaintiff] has met it here," Neuren, 43 F.3d at 1512. The court noted that although the plaintiff was " o n l y arguably performing near her employer's legitimate expectations",

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it would " a s s u m e a r g u e n d o " that she met her p r i m a f a c i e burden. Id. at 1512-13. The court o b s e r v e d that the d e f e n d a n t r e s p o n d e d w i t h " s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e " t h a t i t t e r m i n a t e d the p l a i n t i f f s e m p l o y m e n t for l e g i t i m a t e reasons: it p r o d u c e d s e v e r a l p a r t n e r e v a l u a t i o n s w h i c h c o n t a i n e d

expressions o f serious concern about the p l a i n t i f f s ability to meet deadlines and get along with coworkers, accompanied by corroborating testimony. Id. at 1513. T h e court t h e n stated that " [w]hen viewing this evidence separately from the [prior firm] evaluations, we c a n s a y w i t h c e l i a i n t y t h a t [the defendant] m e t its b u r d e n o f production to establish a legitimate business justification for [the p l a i n t i f f s] discharge." Id. Turning to the p l a i n t i f f s evidence o f pretext, the cOUli then concluded that she h a d failed to s h o w evidence o f pretext - some o f the evidence s h e offered was n o t credible and other evidence pertained to fellow associates whose circumstances w e r e " e n t i r e l y different" from hers. Id. at 1513-14. T h e c o u r t concluded: While the [prior firm] evidence m a y h a v e h a d s o m e effect o n the j u r y ' s weighing o f t h e evidence, w e c a n say with certainty that the [prior firm] evidence did n o t h a v e a substantial impact o n the result at trial. E v e n without consideration o f the [prior firm] evidence, [the defendant] provided substantial evidence to meet its burden o f p r o d u c t i o n regarding its legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for [the p l a i n t i f f s ] dismissal, and [the plaintiff! provided insufficient evidence to meet her b u r d e n o f e s t a b l i s h i n g p r e t e x t b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e evidence.

Id. at 1514-15. H a v i n g f o u n d the trial c o u r t ' s error harmless, the cOUli o f appeals affirmed the trial
c o u r t ' s denial o f t h e p l a i n t i f f s motion for n e w trial. T h e record here is less favorable to Kyei t h a n was the record for the p l a i n t i f f i n Nelll·en. The evidence o f K y e i ' s p e r f o r m a n c e problems at O D O T was at least as strong as the d e f e n d a n t ' s evidence against t h e p l a i n t i f f i n Neuren, a n d the prior employment evidence the court admitted here a n d which Kyei has challenged involved o n l y two letters that lacked a n y specifics about his priOl'job p e r f o r m a n c e a n d w a s u n a c c o m p a n i e d b y a n y w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y , c o m p l e t e l y u n l i k e the V e 1 Y specific

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evidence and corroborating witness testimony admitted in Nelll·en. A key difference between K y e i ' s situation and the p l a i n t i f f s in Nelll'en is that in this case the court excluded from trial evidence o f K y e i ' s specific performance issues w i t h his prior employers. ODOT was n o t permitted here, as the defendant in Neuren w a s permitted to do against the p l a i n t i f f there, to introduce at trial written e v a l u a t i o n s and w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g K y e i ' s p a s t p e r f o r m a n c e d e f i c i e n c i e s . With no

evidence o f specific instances o f p a s t performance, or even general references to prior performance p r o b l e m s , a d m i t t e d a t t r i a l , Kyei c a n n o t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t the j u r y ' s j u d g m e n t w a s s u b s t a n t i a l l y a f f e c t e d b y the e v i d e n c e h e c h a l l e n g e s . Additionally, K y e i ' s evidence o f discrimination was lacking and decidedly insufficient to overcome the considerable weight o f O D O T ' s evidence that it terminated his employment because o f h i s o n - g o i n g p e r f o r m a n c e p r o b l e m s . K y e i ' s c a s e c o n s i s t e d a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y o f his o w n testimony; he offered his accounts o f difficulties and confrontations w i t h h i s supervisor, O D O T ' s human resources manager, and representatives o f other agencies w h o m h e encountered in the course o f p e r f o r m i n g h i s duties. H e p r e s e n t e d o n l y o n e favorable w i t n e s s t o s u p p o r t h i s t e s t i m o n y , a n d t h a t witness s a w only one o f t h e many incidents Kyei claimed evidenced his s u p e r v i s o r ' s discriminatOlY attitude toward him. A s to that one incident, K y e i ' s witness corroborated part o f K y e i ' s description o f i t and directly contradicted Kyei o n other aspects o f the incident. T h e only other witnesses Kyei called w e r e a d v e r s e - h i s s u p e r v i s o r a n d t h e O D O T h u m a n r e s o u r c e m a n a g e r - b o t h o f w h o m l e n t little, i f a n y s u p p o r t , t o K y e i ' s a l l e g a t i o n s . In all, ODOT produced thirteen witnesses, including h i s supervisor and O D O T ' s h u m a n r e s o u r c e s m a n a g e r , w h o c o n t r a d i c t e d K y e i ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t he w a s p e r f o r m i n g h i s j o b s a t i s f a c t o r i l y or refuted his claims that his supervisor and O D O T ' s human resources manager treated h i m unfairly.

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These witnesses described K y e i ' s failure to meet project deadlines; his improper completion or the p o o r q u a l i t y o f his a s s i g n m e n t s ; h i s f a i l u r e o r r e f u s a l t o f o l l o w s h i s s u p e r v i s o r ' s d i r e c t i v e s f o r performing various j o b duties, requesting time off, submitting t i m e sheets, and documenting e x p e n s e s ; and t h e i m p r o p e r e x e r c i s e o f h i s authority i n w o r k i n g w i t h o t h e r agencies, among o t h e r issues. Many o f the witnesses also described O D O T ' s attempts to achieve K y e i ' s recognition o f these deficiencies and its efforts to help Kyei improve in these areas. O D O T supplemented this witness testimony with approximately 100 exhibits, the bulk o f w h i c h contemporaneously chronicled much o f these witnesses' testimony, including O D O T ' s detailed written explanation to Kyei about these performance issues and the need for him to correct them. In sum, when viewing all the evidence, this court cannot say admission o f t h e challenged evidence substantially prejudiced Kyei or that t h e court " i s left in grave doubt" whether i t did. Here, the evidence demonstrated that Kyei probably was not e v e n " o n l y arguably" performing near O D O T ' s l e g i t i m a t e e x p e c t a t i o n s ; t h u s , his c a s e o n this p o i n t w a s n o m o r e c o m p e l l i n g t h a n t h a t o f the p l a i n t i f f in New'en, a n d possibly less so. Furthermore, O D O T produced "extensive evidence" o f K y e i ' s p e r f o r m a n c e p r o b l e m s d u r i n g h i s e m p l o y m e n t , w h i c h e v i d e n c e w a s a t l e a s t as c o m p e l l i n g , i f not more compelling, as that w h i c h the defendant in NeZ/ren had offered. Balanced against this e v i d e n c e i s K y e i ' s o w n e v i d e n c e , w h i c h d i d n o t o v e r c o m e O D O T ' s l e g i t i m a t e r e a s o n s , a n d the p r i o r e m p l o y m e n t e v i d e n c e K y e i c h a l l e n g e s , w h i c h lacked b o t h the s p e c i f i c i t y a n d the q u a n t i t y p r e s e n t i n NeZ/ren and which t h e c o m t o f appeals there held did not substantially prejudice the plaintiff. T h u s , v i e w i n g the t r i a l r e c o r d s e p a r a t e l y f r o m the e v i d e n c e o f K y e i ' s p r i o r e m p l o y m e n t , the c o u r t can say w i t h the same degree o f certainty expressed by the New'en court that the challenged evidence d i d n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e j u d i c e Kyei.

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Order

For the reasons explained above, K y e i ' s motion (#121) f 0 l ) t e w trial is DENIED.

D , k d l h r , ci',q' d , y or M. .,h, 20 I0,

CQ (, c2
Jdhn V. Acosta U.~Magistrate J u d g e

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