Kyei v. Oregon Department of Transportation et al

Filing 136

OPINION AND ORDER - ODOT's cost bill 121 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Total Costs Awarded: $2,595.35. Signed on 3/11/10 by Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)

FILED

NAIl I" 20m

U N I T E D STATES DISTRICT C O U R T DISTRICT OF OREGON P O R T L A N D DIVISION

KOFIKYEI, Plaintiff, v. OREGON D E P A R T M E N T OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.

Case No. C V 07-1607-AC OPINION A N D ORDER

Opinion
B e f o r e t h e c o u r t i s d e f e n d a n t O r e g o n D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ' s ( " O D O T " ) c o s t bill. T h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Kofi Kyei ( " K y e i " y a n d i n f a v o r o f O D O r o n K y e i ' s discrimination, h o s t i l e w o r k e n v i r o n m e n t , and retaliation claims b a s e d o n r a c e a n d national origin under Title VII. T h e c o u r t d e n i e d K y e i ' s post-verdict m o t i o n for n e w trial. O D O r , as t h e prevailing

1

Kyei is p r o n o u n c e d " s h a y " . 1

OPINION AND O R D E R

party, now seeks to recover $10,372.05 in costs. The court grants in part and denies in part ODOT's cost bill, and awards ODOT $2,595.35 in total costs, as explained below in more detail.
Background

Kyei, a blackman born in Ghana, worked for ODOT from March 2002 until May 2006, when O D O r terminated his employment as the final step in a series o f disciplinary actions for unacceptable job performance. I n October 2007, Kyei filed a discrimination lawsuit against O D O r and other defendants under federal and state law. As a result o f the court's summary judgment ruling and Kyei' s voluntary dismissals, all defendants except O D o r and some o f Kyei ' s claims, including all o f his state law claims, were dismissed from this action. Kyei' s Title vn discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims against ODOT were tried to a j u r y over five days. As part o f its pretrial filings, ODOT submitted motions in limine to exclude evidence Kyei intended to present at trial or which it anticipated Kyei would offer. The court granted one o f ODOT's motions and denied another, granted in part and denied in part a third, and denied a fourth as moot. ODOT also listed twenty-six witnesses on its witness list but ultimately called only thirteen o f these witnesses to testify at trial. ODOT submitted more than 100 exhibits for trial, the great majority o f which were received in evidence.
Standards

The specific items a prevailing party may recover as costs are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Costs "should be allowed to the prevailing party."
FED.

R. ClV. P. 54(d)(1). This rule creates a

presumption in favor o f awarding costs to the prevailing party; i f a district court departs from that presumption, it must provide an explanation so that the appellate court can determine whether the district court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Association o fMexican-American Educators v. State

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ofCalifornia, 231 F . 3 d 572, 592-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ( i f disallowing costs, the district court
should " e x p l a i n why a case i s n o t ' o r d i n a r y ' and why, in t h e circwnstances, it w o u l d b e inappropriate o r inequitable to aw ard costs."). See also Save Our Valley v. S o u n d Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (district c o u r t " n e e d o n l y fmd t h a t t h e r e a s o n s for denying costs are n o t sufficiently persuasive t o o v e r c o m e t h e p r e s w n p t i o n i n favor o f a n award"). Courts, however, are free to construe the m e a n i n g a n d scope o f t h e items enumerated a s t a x a b l e costs in §1920, Aljlex Corp. v.

Underwriters Lab., Inc., 9 1 4 F . 2 d 1 7 5 , 1 7 7 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), a n d t h e trial j u d g e has wide
d i s c r e t i o n i n a w a r d i n g c o s t s u n d e r F R C P 5 4 ( d ) ( l ) . A r b o i r e a u v . A d i d a s S a l o m o n A G , No. 01-105ST, 2002 WL31466564, a t *4 (D. Or. June 1 4 , 2 0 0 2 ) .

Discussion A.
Waiver o f Costs Kyei c h a l l e n g e s O D O T ' s c o s t b i l l i n i t s entirety o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t h i s financial resources a r e " l i m i t e d " a n d b e c a u s e a n a w a r d o f c o s t s w o u l d i m p o s e a " c h i l l i n g e f f e c t " o n future c i v i l r i g h t s litigants. H e a r g u e s t h a t a w a r d i n g c o s t s w o u l d d i s s u a d e o t h e r s f r o m p u r s u i n g t h e i r rights u n d e r T i t l e

VII. O D O T responds t h a t costs should b e waived only in cases o f extraordinary importance, such
as cases w h o s e o u t c o m e w i l l a f f e c t l a r g e g r o u p s o f p e o p l e o r s h a p e p u b l i c policy, b u t t h a t K y e i ' s c a s e c o n c e r n e d o n l y h i s s p e c i f i c e m p l o y m e n t s i t u a t i o n , t h e o u t c o m e o f w h i c h w o u l d h a v e no e f f e c t o n others. T h e c o u r t d e c l i n e s t o w a i v e t a x i n g o f c o s t s a g a i n s t Kyei. F i r s t , K y e i c l a i m s h i s f i n a n c i a l resources a r e " l i m i t e d " b u t h e does n o t c l a i m t h a t h e i s i n d i g e n t o r t h a t p a y i n g c o s t s w o u l d r e n d e r h i m indigent. I n addition, as explained below, t h e a m o u n t t h e c o u r t has a w a r d e d to O D o r is s i g n i f i c a n t l y less - a p p r o x i m a t e l y s e v e n t y - f i v e p e r c e n t l e s s - t h a n t h e a m o u n t O D O r s o u g h t t o

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recover. F u r t h e r o n t h i s p o i n t , t h e c o u r t notes t h a t i t is " i n c u m b e n t u p o n t h e losing party t o demonstrate w h y t h e costs s h o u l d n o t b e awarded, Stanley v. University o fSouthern California, 178 F . 3 d 1069, 1 0 7 9 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) , a n d t h a t K y e i h a s p r o v i d e d o n l y t h e a s s e r t i o n o f h i s c o u n s e l t o s u p p o r t his c o n t e n t i o n . I n s u m , K y e i h a s n o t p r o v i d e d r e a s o n s f o r d e n y i n g c o s t s t h a t a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y p e r s u a s i v e t o o v e r c o m e t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i n f a v o r o f a n award. K y e i ' s r e l i a n c e o n S t a n l e y is m i s p l a c e d b e c a u s e h i s s i t u a t i o n i s u n l i k e t h e Stanley p l a i n t i f f ' s i n several key r e s p e c t s . T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a d t a x e d c o s t s a g a i n s t S t a n l e y i n t h e a m o u n t o f

$46,710.97 (id. a t 1080), i n c o n t r a s t to t h e $2,595.35 t h e court h a s a w a r d e d O D O T here. Stanley
w a s u n e m p l o y e d a t t h e t i m e t h e c o s t b i l l a w a r d w a s entered (id.); here, Kyei i s employed part-time. Finally, t h e S t a n l e y c o u r t o b s e r v e d t h a t " t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f s u c h h i g h c o s t s o n losing c i v i l r i g h t s plaintiffs o f m o d e s t m e a n s m a y c h i l l civil rights litigation i n t h i s a r e a " (id.), b u t the c o s t award here is b o t h s u b s t a n t i a l l y l o w e r t h a n t h a t i n S t a n l e y a n d w e l l w i t h i n t h e r a n g e o f c o s t a w a r d s typically arising o u t o f T i t l e V I I cases. Accordingly, t h e c o u r t denies K y e i ' s r e q u e s t t h a t t h e c o u r t waive t a x i n g o f a l l costs a g a i n s t him.

B.

D o c k e t F e e s (28 U . S . C . § 1 9 2 0 ( 5 ) ) A prevailing p a r t y m a y r e c o v e r a d o c k e t fee. 2 8 U.S.C. § 1920(5). T h a t fee is $20.00 an d

is recoverable " o n trial o r final h e a r i n g (including a default j u d g m e n t w h e t h e r e n t e r e d b y t h e court o r b y the clerk) i n civil, c r i m i n a l , o r a d m i r a l t y c a s e s [ . ] " 28 U . S . C . § 1 9 2 3 ( a ) . Kyei d o e s n o t

s p e c i f i c a l l y o p p o s e t h i s c o s t . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e c o u r t a l l o w s t h i s c o s t i n t h e a m o u n t o f $20.00. C. D e p o s i t i o n C o s t s a n d T r a n s c r i p t s (28 U . S . C . § 1 9 2 0 ( 2 ) ) U n d e r 2 8 U . S . C . § 1920(2), a p r e v a i l i n g party m a y r e c o v e r " [ f ] e e s for p r i n t e d o r electronically recorded transcripts necessarily o b t a i n e d for u s e i n the c a s e [ . ] " See also FED. R. CIV.

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P. 54(d)(1) ("costs . . . should be allowed to the prevailing party"). "Depositions are 'necessary' i f introduced into evidence or used at trial for impeachment or cross-examination." Arboireau, 2002 WL 31466564, at *5. The cost o f a deposition not used at trial still may be recovered " i f taking the deposition was reasonable as part o f the pretrial preparation o f the case rather than merely discovery for the convenience o f counsel, or i f the deposition was required for a dispositive motion." Id. ODOT seeks to recover the costs incurred for obtaining deposition transcripts for witnesses E. Blair Johnson, John Johnson, and Kelly Taylor, as well as for the transcript from the summary judgment hearing. Kyei opposes a cost award for the E. Blair Johnson transcript because ODOT ordered it after the court granted summary judgment dismissing him from the case. Kyei also opposes costs for the summary judgment hearing transcript because it was not necessary for ODOT' s pre-trial preparation, but obtained only for the convenience o f counsel. ODOT responds that all deposition transcripts were necessary to prepare for trial, to prepare witnesses for trial, and to impeach certain witnesses at trial. ODOT also contends that the summary judgment hearing transcript was obtained to confirm the representations o f Kyei' s counsel regarding Kyei' s theory o f the case as to the Title VII claims. Lastly, ODOT argues that the deposition transcripts were used to prepare its motions in limine. Disallowance o f expenses for depositions not used at trial is within the district court's discretion. Washington State Dep't. ofTransp. v. Washington Natural Gas Co., et. al., 59 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). However, in calculating award o f costs, a court may, it its discretion, tax deposition and copying costs even i f the items in question were not used at trial. Sea Coast Foods,
Inc. v. L u - M a r Lobster a n d Shrimp, Inc., 260 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2001).

First, Kyei does not object to transcript and court reporter costs for his deposition. Thus, the

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court allows this cost i n the a m o u n t o f $ 8 2 8 . 5 0 . S e c o n d , J o h n J o h n s o n a n d K e l l y T a y l o r w e r e k e y w i t n e s s e s i n t h e c a s e a n d t h e i r actions w e r e the primary focus o f K y e i ' s claims. I n fact, b o t h Kyei and ODOT called Johnson and Taylor in their r e s p e c t i v e c a s e s - i n - c h i e f . T h a t t h e s e w i t n e s s e s ' deposition t r a n s c r i p t s w e r e n e c e s s a r i l y o b t a i n e d " f o r use in the case" is clear, given their alleged role in the events upon w h i c h Kyei based his claims. Accordingly, court reporter and transcript costs o f $ 6 1 8 . 7 5 for J o h n J o h n s o n a n d $408.55 for Kelly Taylor are allowed. Third, the court disallows the court reporter and transcript cost for E. Blair J o h n s o n ' s deposition. The c o u r t ' s summary j u d g m e n t ruling dismissed E. B l a i r Johnson as a party in the case. T h e r e a f t e r , h i s t r i a l t e s t i m o n y w o u l d h a v e p e r t a i n e d o n l y t o a n a r r o w i s s u e i n t h e case a n d w o u l d have been o f limited duration, a fact made clear by the c o u r t ' s summary judgment ruling. Ultimately, ODOT did not call h i m as a witness at trial. Kyei represents that O D o r did not order t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f E . B l a i r J o h n s o n ' s d e p o s i t i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h e c o u r t d i s m i s s e d J o h n s o n as a d e f e n d a n t i n t h e c a s e ; O D o r d o e s n o t r e f u t e t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . C o n s i d e r i n g a l l r e l e v a n t factors, t h e c o u r t denies this cost. F o u r t h , t h e c o u r t a l l o w s t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r a n d t r a n s c r i p t c o s t for t h e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t hearing. The court ruled from the bench o n O D O T ' s a n d the other defendants' summary judgment motion. W e l l i n a d v a n c e o f t h a t h e a r i n g t h e c o u r t a d v i s e d c o u n s e l f o r t h e p a r t i e s t h a t i t i n t e n d e d t o rule f r o m t h e b e n c h t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e c a s e w o u l d b e tried, i f t r i a l w a s necessary, o n t h e previously scheduled trial date. Neither side objected to t h e court ruling from the bench. Transcription o f the s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t h e a r i n g w o u l d h a v e b e e n n e c e s s a r y to o b t a i n w r i t t e n d e t a i l s o f t h e c o u r t ' s r u l i n g o n the defendants' m o t i o n , as well as for use i n the case going forward to trial. Accordingly, the

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court allows this cost i n t h e amount o f $272.50. D. Witness Fees (28 U.S.C. § 1920(3)) Witness fees are a recoverable cost under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3). T o be taxable as costs the w i t n e s s ' s t e s t i m o n y m u s t b e m a t e r i a l to a n i s s u e t r i e d a n d r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y t o i t s d i s p o s i t i o n .

United California B a n k v . THC Financial Corp., 557 F.2d 1 3 5 1 , 1 3 6 1 (D. Haw. 1977). The trial
judge is i n the best position to determine whether the testimony meets this standard. I d ODOT seeks witness fees and mileage for eleven o fthe twenty-six witnesses i t listed for trial. Kyei objects to the witness fees a D O T seeks for six o f these witnesses - Kevin Alano, Larry Miller, J o n Rosenberger, P a m e l a S t r a w n , R a y m o n d Tindell, and L i n d a W i l l i a m s - b e c a u s e t h e y d i d n o t a c t u a l l y t e s t i f y a t t r i a l . Kyei a r g u e s t h a t O D O T m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e s e w i t n e s s e s ' t e s t i m o n y w a s " m a t e r i a l t o a n i s s u e t r i e d a n d r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y t o i t s d i s p o s i t i o n , " a n d t h a t O D O r h a s failed t o m e e t t h i s s t a n d a r d as t o t h e s e s i x w i t n e s s e s . O D O T r e s p o n d s t h a t t h e s e w i t n e s s e s w e r e o n i t s w i t n e s s list, the purpose o f their potential testimony was described, a n d ''theses [sic] witnesses were necessary to a material i s s u e a t trial and [ O D O r ] is entitled to recover those costs;" O D O r c h o s e n o t to c a l l e a c h o f t h e s e s i x w i t n e s s e s a t t r i a l , w h i c h c h o i c e reflects O D O T ' s conclusion that none o f the six ultimately were needed at trial to address a material issue. In light o f t h i s u n d i s p u t e d fact, O D O T h a s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d h o w t h e s e s i x w i t n e s s e s ' t e s t i m o n y w e r e necessary to a material issue at trial even though none o f them were called to testify at trial. Accordingly, the court disallows costs for these six witnesses and allows costs for the remaining five witnesses, as follows:

Witness
Chris Meyers

A t t e n d a n c e Fee
$40.00

Mileage
$50.77

Total
$90.77

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Dave Polly Lenore D e l u s i a Howard Fege 1s Tommye G i l b r e a t h

$40.00 $40.00 $40.00 $40.00

$50.77 $2.25 $59.87 $3.39

$90.77 $42.25 $99.87 $43.39

TOTAL
Accordingly, ODOT m a y recover $367.05 in witness fees. E. Records S u b p o e n a F e e s

$367.05

ODOT seeks $80.00 i n total fees for records subpoenas issued to t w o o f K y e i ' s health care providers. Kyei does not specifically object to these costs. Kyei originally claimed that O D O T ' s actions caused h i m emotional distress and physical ailments, and he sought damages for these injuries. Shortly before trial, Kyei dropped his claim for a n y non~economic d a m a g e s . P r i o r t o K y e i ' s v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l o f h i s c l a i m f o r n o n - e c o n o m i c damages, ODOT properly believed that i t would face these claims i n the case, including at any trial. T h e r e f o r e , s u b p o e n a s to o b t a i n r e c o r d s r e l a t e d t o t h i s c l a i m w e r e a p p r o p r i a t e a n d t h e c o u r t a l l o w s the c o s t t o o b t a i n t h e m , i n t h e a m o u n t o f $ 8 0 . 0 0 . F. Copying Costs (28 U.S.C. § 1920(4)) A prevailing party m a y recover "[f]ees for exemplification and the costs o f maldng copies o f any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). C o p y i n g c o s t s for d o c u m e n t s p r o d u c e d t o o p p o s i n g p a r t i e s i n discovery, s u b m i t t e d t o t h e c o u r t for consideration o f motions, and used as exhibits at trial are recoverable. Arboireau, 2002 WL 31466564, at *6 (citing Fressell v. A T & T Tech., Inc., 103 F.R.D. 111, 115-16 (N.D. Ga. 1984». H o w e v e r , r e c o v e r a b l e c o p y i n g c o s t s " d o ' n o t i n c l u d e e x t r a c o p i e s o f f i l e d p a p e r s , correspondence,

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and copies o f cases since these are prepared for the convenience o f t h e attorneys.'" Id. (citation omitted). Recoverable copying costs also do not include costs associated with in-house

photocopying for use by counsel. Frederickv. City o fPortland, 1 6 2 F . R . D . 1 3 9 , 144 (D. Or. 1995). A p a r t y ' s c o n d u s o r y assertion that all copies were reasonably necessary t o its case is, by itself, insufficient. Kraftv. Arden, No. 07-487-PK, 2009 WL 73869, at *9 (D. Or. Jan. 8 , 2 0 0 9 ) . See also

Arboireau, 2002 W L 31466564, at *6 (same).
O D O T r e q u e s t s a n a w a r d o f c o p y i n g c o s t s t o t a l i n g $ 6 , 6 3 8 . 2 1 . O D O T asserts t h a t t h e copying costs were incurred w h e n making copies o f discovery documents produced to Kyei, for documents produced by Kyei to the defendants and for w h i c h defendants were charged, for d o c u m e n t s from o t h e r c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s i n w h i c h Kyei w a s i n v o l v e d , a n d f o r m e d i c a l d o c u m e n t s from K y e i ' s m e d i c a l p r o v i d e r s . K y e i r e s p o n d s t h a t O D O T h a s s i m p l y m a d e a c o n d u s o r y a s s e r t i o n and failed to make a n adequate showing o f i t s entitlement to recovery for copying costs, citing Kraft

v. Arden for support.
The court agrees t h a t O D O T h a s n o t m e t its burden to explain the nature o ft h e copying costs.

I n Key Bank Nat 'lAss 'n v. VanNoy, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Or. 2009), Judge Hubel denied copy
c o s t s t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y b e c a u s e the p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y f a i l e d t o e x p l a i n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e p h o t o c o p y i n g c h a r g e s a n d t h e c o u r t c o u l d n o t d e t e r m i n e w h i c h c o s t s , i f any, w e r e p r o p e r l y a w a r d a b l e and which were not. Id. a t 1168. Here, ODOT asks the court to award i t $4,454.20 in copying costs and provides only c o n d u s o r y assertions that the costs are recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). T h e e x h i b i t s a t t a c h e d t o v e r i f y O D O T ' s c o p y c o s t s r e f l e c t o n l y t h e d a t e a n d a m o u n t o f t h e charges for the print-outs a n d copies but do not describe the purpose for which the documents were printed o r copied. The court is no better position here than was Judge Hubel in Key Bank to determine " t h e

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nature o f the photocopying charges and . . . which costs, i f any, were properly awardable and which were not." Accordingly, the court disallows this item o f cost i n its entirety.
Order

For the reasons explained above, O D O T ' s cost bill (#121) is GRANTED in part and DENIED i n part, as follows: Docket fees: Deposition Costs and Transcripts: Witness Fees: Record Subpoena Fees:
T O T A L C O S T S AWARDED:

$

20.00

2,128.30 367.05 80.00

$2,595.35

Dated this

I /~y o f March, 2010.
I

John V. Acosta \ U.S. Magistrate Judge
"

. \)

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