Johnson v. Williams et al

Filing 91

OPINION and ORDER re Motion for Preliminary Injunction 65 : Johnson's Motion For Preliminary Injunction is denied. Based on the foregoing conclusions, the court will entertain a motion to dismiss from defendants. Signed on 11/24/09 by Judge Garr M. King. (tomg)

IN T H E UNITED STATES DISTRICT C O U R T DISTRICT OF OREGON C A S E Y LEE J O H N S O N , Plaintiff, vs. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

C i v i l Case N o . 0 7 - 1 6 5 9 - K I OPINION A N D O R D E R

M A X WILLIAMS, e t aI.,
Defendants.

Casey Lee J o h n s o n SID #12151379 LEGAL MAIL SRCI 777 Stanton Blvd. Ontario, O r e g o n 9 7 9 1 4 P r o Se P l a i n t i f f Jacqueline S a d k e r K a m i n s K r i s t i n A. W i n g e s State o f O r e g o n 1162 C o u r t S t r e e t , N E S a l e m , Oregon 97301 Attorneys f o r D e f e n d a n t s P a g e 1 - OPINION AND O R D E R

KING, Judge: Pro se p l a i n t i f f Casey Lee Johnson is a n inmate who is presently incarcerated at the Oregon State Penitentiary's Intensive Management U n i t ("IMU"). H e filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a c t i o n a g a i n s t D e p a r t m e n t o f C o r r e c t i o n s o f f i c i a l s M a x W i l l i a m s , B r i a n B e l l e q u e , S t a n Czerniak, B r a n d o n Kelly, Daryl R u t h u e n , D o n a l d D r a v i s , W i l l i a m B e l l m a n , a n d J o h n V a r g o ("defendants") alleging t h a t t h e I M U p l a c e m e n t p r o c e s s , c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e IMU, a n d t h e l a c k o f m e n t a l h e a l t h treatment i n the IMU violated his constitutional rights. Before the court is Johnson's Motion for P r e l i m i n a r y I n j u n c t i o n ( # 6 5 ) . J o h n s o n s e e k s i m m e d i a t e r e l e a s e f r o m t h e I M U . F o r t h e reasons s e t forth b e l o w , t h e m o t i o n i s d e n i e d .

FACTS
Johnson is currently serving six years in prison for two separate incidents o f assault a g a i n s t p r i s o n o f f i c e r s . H i s c u r r e n t l M U p l a c e m e n t h a s i t s r o o t s i n h i s p r e v i o u s s t i n t i n prison, d u r i n g w h i c h he also s p e n t s i g n i f i c a n t a m o u n t s o f t i m e i n t h e I M U . O n M a r c h 1 6 , 2 0 0 6 , J o h n s o n assaulted a s t a f f m e m b e r at the Oregon State Correctional Institution ("OSCI"). Although he was to serve 180 days in t h e Disciplinary Segregation Unit as a sanction, o n April 21, 2006, Johnson was released o n parole. I n July 2006, while o n parole, Johnson was arrested o n n e w charges for M e n a c i n g a n d F e l o n y P o s s e s s i o n o f a W e a p o n . H e w a s h o u s e d i n M u l t n o m a h C o u n t y j a i l , where h e a s s a u l t e d t w o M u l t n o m a h C o u n t y j a i l d e p u t i e s . O n J a n u a r y 3, 2 0 0 7 , J o h n s o n p l e d g u i l t y i n Multnomah County Circuit Court to Assault o f a Public Safety Officer. He was sentenced to 24 months in prison. When admitted to the Oregon Department o f Corrections ("ODOC I' ) o n January 4 , 2 0 0 7 , J o h n s o n a l r e a d y h a d a M a r i o n C o u n t y d e t a i n e r a n d h e b e g a n a w a i t i n g criminal proceedings for his March 2006 assault o f O S C I staff. In June 2007, J o h n s o n was convicted o f Page 2 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

Assault o n a Public Safety Officer, i n connection w i t h the March 2 0 0 6 incident, and sentenced to 48 months i n prison, to b e served consecutively with his fIrst sentence. J o h n s o n ' s n u m e r o u s a s s a u l t s o n j a i l a n d p r i s o n s t a f f w e r e t h e b a s i s for O D O C ' s J a n u a r y 1 7 , 2 0 0 7 d e c i s i o n to a s s i g n J o h n s o n a L e v e l 5 c u s t o d y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a n d J a n u a r y 1 9 , 2 0 0 7 decision to place h i m in the IMU. Cooney Aff. Attach. 4 at 2. Level 5 is the highest level o f supervision assigned to a n inmate. It is assigned to a n inmate who "presents extreme risk o f escape, violence, o r disruption to the safe, secure, and orderly operation o f a Department o f C o r r e c t i o n s facility." C o o n e y A f f .

'8.

"On March 1 5 , 2 0 0 7 , Johnson received and signed for a

copy o f h i s IMU A s s i g n m e n t P a c k e t , w h i c h i n c l u d e d a copy o f h i s L e v e l 5 c u s t o d y classification score." Cooney Aff. , 37, Attach. 4 at 4. The same day Johnson filed a request for administrative review o f his Level 5 classification. O n April 3, after concluding that Johnson "continues to demonstrate serious management concerns and [that] his behavior poses a sufficient threat that it c a n only be adequately controlled in appropriate special housing," Barbara Cooney affirmed the recommendation o f IMU placement and Level 5 designation. Cooney Aff. , 39. Since being assigned to the IMU, Johnson alleges he has been unable to exhibit the behavior necessary to graduate o u t o f the placement because he has n o t received adequate mental h e a l t h treatment. Johnson asserts that he "is suffering from mental illnesses, learning disabilities, behavioral p r o b l e m s , b i p o l a r disorders, antisocial p e r s o n a l i t y d i s o r d e r s a n d n e u r o l o g i c a l impairments." Winges Aff. Attach. 1 at 2. To combat his mental issues, during Johnson's previous 7-year stint i n prison, he "tr[ied] a number o f different medications . . . [and] conclud[ ed] that Neurontin ( a m o o d stabilizer) and Ritalin are the m o s t effective for him." Page 3 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

Johnson Decl. Ex. 3 a t 4. J o h n s o n alleges that once placed in the IMD, defendants "improperly [discontinued his] mood stabilizers and antipsychotic medication i n w h i c h [sic] he has been prescribed for nine years." Pl.1s Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 5. Although Johnson alleges his m e d i c a t i o n s w e r e d i s c o n t i n u e d as r e t a l i a t i o n f o r p o o r b e h a v i o r , h e a l s o a c k n o w l e d g e s "[d]efendant[s] h a v e [ d i s c o n t i n u e d ] a n t i p s y c h o t i c m e d i c a t i o n S e r o q u e l for p a s t m i s c o n d u c t for mishandling the medicine." Pl.1s Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 11. Johnson also alleges "[d]efendants have refused all types o f cognitive behavioral therapy and interpersonal therapy thats [sic] necessary to control plaintiffs [sic] illnesses." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 5. D e s p i t e J o h n s o n ' s a s s e r t i o n s o f r e q u e s t s for therapy, d u r i n g a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v a l u a t i o n h e "voiced a strong desire for psychotropic medications, but vehemently rejected any need for mental health therapy." Johnson Decl. Ex. 3 at 2.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A p a r t y is e n t i t l e d t o p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f i f i t demonstrates that it is likely to succeed o n the merits and may suffer irreparable injury, o r t h a t s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n s e x i s t o n the m e r i t s a n d t h e b a l a n c e o f h a r d s h i p s tips i n its favor. The two tests are not separate but represent a sliding scale i n w h i c h t h e r e q u i r e d p r o b a b i l i t y o f s u c c e s s o n t h e m e r i t s d e c r e a s e s as t h e d e g r e e o f h a r m increases. Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church o f Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 913 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). "The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that, absent a threat o f immediate and irreparable harm, t h e federal courts should not e n j o i n a state to conduct its business in a particular way." Rodgers-Durgin v. de l a Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) .

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DISCUSSION

J o h n s o n argues t h a t d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n o f h i s mental h e a l t h t r e a t m e n t a n d m e d i c a t i o n amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, and that "the decision to place a seriously mentally i l l inmate in [the IMU] is a n Eighth Amendment violation in itself." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. 1nj.8. He argues preliminary injunction should be granted to remove him from the IMU because "the devastating effects o f a prolonged isolation even o n 'normal' prisoners cause [sic] irreparable injury." PI. IS Mem. Supp. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 3. Johnson also argues he was placed i n the IMU without notice o f the factual basis for the decision, t h a t he w a s n o t g i v e n a f a i r o p p o r t u n i t y for r e b u t t a l , a n d t h a t t h e p r o c e s s e s for r e t e n t i o n and determining differing levels o f treatment i n the IMU are generally insufficient under the Due P r o c e s s Clause. D e f e n d a n t s a r g u e t h e c o u r t s h o u l d d e n y the m o t i o n f o r p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n b e c a u s e c l a i m a n d i s s u e p r e c l u s i o n m a k e J o h n s o n u n l i k e l y to s u c c e e d o n t h e m e r i t s . !

1.

Claim and Issue P r e c l u s i o n This is not the first time Johnson has litigated various aspects o f his detention in the IMU.

Johnson has litigated to conclusion at least one state court action a n d two federal court actions related to the constitutionality o f his placement in and the conditions o f the IMD. A. T h e State H a b e a s Proceeding

Johnson's litigation for his Petition for Writ o f Habeas in Johnson v. Bellegue, Marion County Circuit Court Case No. 07C 12531, makes issue preclusion likely to bar his instant

11 need n o t reach the o t h e r grounds argued by defendants because I find that Johnson's suit is precluded.
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claims. The preclusive effect o f a state court action o n subsequent federal court litigation is governed by the state's law o f issue preclusion. See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1998). U n d e r Oregon law, i f one tribunal has decided an issue, the decision on that issue may preclude relitigation o f the issue i n another proceeding i f (1) the issue i n the two proceedings is identical, (2) the issue was actually litigated and w a s essential to a final decision o n the merits in the p r i o r proceeding, (3) the party sought to be precluded has had a full and fair opportunity to be heard o n that issue, (4) the party sought to be precluded was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior proceeding, and (5) the prior proceeding was the type o f proceeding to which this court will give preclusive effect. Nelson v. E m e r a l d People's UtiI. Dist., 318 Or. 99, 1 0 4 , 8 6 2 P.2d 1293, 1296-97 (1993). Here, the requirements for issue preclusion are satisfied, w i t h the pos~ible exception o f the second a n d t h i r d e l e m e n t s . F i r s t , t h e i s s u e s i n the t w o p r o c e e d i n g s a p p e a r i d e n t i c a l . I n J o h n s o n ' s s t a t e c o u r t P e t i t i o n for Writ o f Habeas, he alleges violations o f his rights under the D u e Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. J o h n s o n seems t o assert his due process rights were violated because he was not given a hearing prior to being placed i n the IMU, and that placement segregated from other prisoners is a violation o f the E q u a l Protections Clause. Johnson's Eighth Amendment claim relates to the State's alleged failure to provide necessary mental health services i n the IMU, confinement allegedly without adequate heat and ventilation, a n d other conditions o f the IMU. Johnson's Fourth A m e n d e d Complaint filed in this case contains two claims. One claim asserts that the alleged conditions i n the IMU, such as inadequate ventilation, little stimuli or Page 6 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

exercise, twenty-four-hour illumination, and excessive noise, violate Johnson's rights under the Eighth and Fo~eenth Amendments. T h e second claim alleges that the State has failed to provide adequate mental health treatment. The issues i n the instant proceeding, whether the conditions and mental health treatment i n the IMU are adequate, are, therefore, identical to issues raised i n the state habeas p r o c e e d i n g . S e c o n d , the i s s u e s w e r e l i k e l y a c t u a l l y l i t i g a t e d a n d w e r e l i k e l y e s s e n t i a l t o a f m a l d e c i s i o n o n t h e m e r i t s i n t h e s t a t e h a b e a s proceeding. I n O r e g o n s t a t e c o u r t s a habeas proceeding must consider a challenge t o I M U placement o n the merits i f there is an alleged need for immediate attention based o n a violation o f constitutional rights, a n d i f a n alternative remedy is practically inadequate to m e e t this need. Barrett v. Bellegue, 209 Or. App. 295, 299, 150 P.3d 1064, 1065 (2006). Judge Ochoa, who ruled o n Johnson's Petition for W r i t o f Habeas, has a t r a c k r e c o r d o f a d d r e s s i n g t h e m e r i t s o f I M U p l a c e m e n t , e v e n w h e n t h e a b o v e c o n d i t i o n s are n o t satisfied. See id. at 298 (explaining trial court Judge Ochoa considered Petition for Writ o f H a b e a s w h e r e inmate c h a l l e n g e d I M U p l a c e m e n t , a n d d e n i e d b a s e d o n c a s e l a w a d d r e s s i n g constitutionality o f such placement). I n the case at bar, Judge Ochoa wrote: The C o u r t , h a v i n g f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e p l e a d i n g , m o t i o n s , m e m o r a n d a , e x h i b i t s , testimony, and having heard the arguments o f counsel, and having ruled from the b e n c h t h a t p l a i n t i f f h a d f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h h i s c l a i m f o r h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f b y a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e . . . J U D G M E N T is e n t e r e d . . . i n f a v o r o f defendant. Winges Aff. Attach. 2. Although the record does not include transcripts from the state habeas proceedings, Judge Ochoa's process o f dealing with the IMU placement challenge o n the' merits i n Barrett establishes it is sufficiently likely the issues were actually litigated and were essential to a final decision o n the merits. I note, however, that were I considering a motion to dismiss or

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a motion for summary judgment, I w o u l d need excerpts from t h e transcript i n order to be certain J u d g e O c h o a m a d e h i s d e c i s i o n o n t h e merits. Third, J o h n s o n has h a d a full and fair opportunity to be heard o n the issues i n question. O r e g o n c o u r t s c o n s i d e r t h i s e l e m e n t m e t w h e r e t h e r e is n o r e s t r i c t i o n o n t h e e v i d e n c e a p l a i n t i f f is allowed to adduce at a hearing, o r limitation o n the time p l a i n t i f f has to put o n such evidence. See Barackman v. Anderson, 214 Or. App. 660, 668-69, 167 P . 3 d 994, 1000 (2007). A habeas proceeding may afford the opportunity for a full and fair opportunity to be heard. See Pham v. Thompson, 156 Or. App. 440, 447-48 (1998) (holding inmate's challenge to validity o f disciplinary p r o c e e d i n g s i n h a b e a s p r o c e e d i n g n o t b a r r e d b y i s s u e p r e c l u s i o n b e c a u s e c o u r t d e c i d e d o u t c o m e o n b a s i s o f m o o t n e s s a n d m e r i t s o f i s s u e s w e r e n o t a c t u a l l y litigated). I n a d d i t i o n , t h e N i n t h C i r c u i t h a s h e l d t h a t a n e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g i n a s t a t e h a b e a s c a s e s a t i s f i e s the requirement o f a full and fair opportunity to be heard a n d determined u n d e r federal standards. Silverton v. Dep't o f T r e a s w y o f U.S., 644 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, the "habeas proceeding came before the Court for a n evidentiary hearing." Winges Aff. Attach. 2. The state court considered all documentation provided and heard oral arguments. In addition, Johnson was represented b y counsel. Without the benefit o f the transcript from the habeas proceeding, it is i m p o s s i b l e t o k n o w for c e r t a i n i f a n y r e s t r i c t i o n s were p l a c e d o n J o h n s o n ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n o f evidence. I t is sufficiently likely, however, that Johnson had a full a n d fair opportunity to be heard. F o u r t h , t h e p a r t y s o u g h t t o b e p r e c l u d e d h e r e , J o h n s o n , w a s c l e a r l y a p a r t y i n t h e state habeas p r o c e e d i n g .

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Fifth and finally, the state habeas proceeding was the type o f proceeding to which this court will give preclusive effect. Oregon state courts give habeas proceedings preclusive effect. See Eli v. Lampert, 194 Or. App. 280, 287, 94 P.3d 170, 174 (2004). N i n t h Circuit courts are a l s o bound: " b e c a u s e o f t h e n a t u r e o f a s t a t e h a b e a s p r o c e e d i n g , a d e c i s i o n a c t u a l l y r e n d e r e d should preclude a n identical issue from being relitigated in a subsequent § 1983 action i f the state habeas court afforded a full and fair opportunity for the issue to be heard and detennined under federal standards." Silverton, 644 F.2d at 1347 (holding issue preclusion prevented California attorney who used state habeas proceeding to seek injunction requiring state bar to expunge references o f disbarment from relitigating the same issue in a § 1983 action in federal court). A l t h o u g h I c a n n o t b e c e r t a i n t h a t t h e state h a b e a s p r o c e e d i n g d e a l t w i t h t h e i s s u e s Johnson raises in this case a n d m e t the requirements o f the second a n d third elements, given J u d g e Ochoa's d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n B a r r e t t , g i v e n t h e w o r d i n g o f his j u d g m e n t , a n d given my findings o n the other elements, I conclude t h a t Johnson is not likely to succeed o n the merits d u e t o issue preclusion. C l a i m p r e c l u s i o n r e l a t e d t o t h e s t a t e h a b e a s p r o c e e d i n g is e q u a l l y l i k e l y t o b a r J o h n s o n ' s i n s t a n t claims. T h e State a r g u e s t h a t c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n a p p l i e s t o t h i s c a s e , c i t i n g N i n t h C i r c u i t precedent. It m u s t be noted, however, that in detennining the preclusive effect o f a state court j u d g m e n t , a federal c o u r t " m u s t a p p l y t h e [preclusion] r u l e s o f t h e s t a t e t h a t r e n d e r e d t h e underlying j u d g m e n t . " Zamarripa v. City o f Mesll, 125 F.3d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1997). "Claim preclusion [in Oregon] works to prevent a party who has litigated one action through to a final judgment from bringing another action against the adverse party w h e n the second claim: 1) involves the same parties and the same facts as i n the first action, 2) seeks a n additional o r

P a g e 9 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

alternative remedy, and 3 ) could have b e e n raised in the ftrst action." Owest C o m . v. City o f Portland, 385 F.3d 1236, 1243 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Secors InV., LLC v. Anderegg, 188 Or. App. 154, 71 P.3d 538 ( 2 0 0 3 » , overruled o n other grounds b y Sprint Telephony pes, L.P. v. County o f San Diego, 543 F . 3 d 571 (9th Cir. 2008). I t is also worth noting that lithe principle o f res judicata is applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. II B a r b e r v . Gladden, 215 Or. 1 2 9 , 1 3 3 , 3 3 2 P . 2 d 6 4 1 , 6 4 3 (1958). H e r e , t h e e l e m e n t s o f c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n are also p r e s e n t . F i r s t , t h e s t a t e h a b e a s p r o c e e d i n g involves the same parties a n d likely the same facts as the case at bar. Johnson and Brian B e l l e q u e w e r e a n d are, r e s p e c t i v e l y , p l a i n t i f f a n d d e f e n d a n t i n t h e s t a t e h a b e a s a n d p r e s e n t cases. M o r e o v e r , t h e facts i n b o t h c a s e s r e v o l v e a r o u n d w h e t h e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s a n d m e n t a l h e a l t h t r e a t m e n t i n t h e I M U w e r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y adequate. Second, t h e i n s t a n t c l a i m s e e k s additional remedies. Apart from the injunctive r e l i e f sought in the habeas proceeding and the instant action, J o h n s o n n o w also s e e k s d e c l a r a t o r y a n d c o m p e n s a t o r y r e l i e f . T h i r d , t o t h e e x t e n t J o h n s o n r a i s e s claims i n t h i s p r o c e e d i n g t h a t h e f a i l e d to b r i n g i n t h e s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g , h e h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to do so i n the state habeas action. In sum, Johnson's likelihood o f sUCCess o n the merits is cast further i n doubt by the l i k e l i h o o d o f d e f e n d a n t s ' s u c c e s s w i t h t h e defense o f claim p r e c l u s i o n . B. The Previous Litigation i n U.S. District Court

D e f e n d a n t s argue t h a t i s s u e a n d c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n s t e m m i n g f r o m J o h n s o n ' s two previous a c t i o n s i n federal c o u r t r e q u i r e d e n i a l o f t h e i n s t a n t M o t i o n f o r P r e l i m i n a r y I n j u n c t i o n . T h e doctrine o f collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, dictates that "once a court decides an issue o f fact or law necessary to its j u d g m e n t , that decision precludes relitigation o f the same issue o n a

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different cause o f action between the parties." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. C o m . , 456 u.s. 461, 467 n.6 (1982). U n d e r t h e f e d e r a l c o m m o n · l a w d o c t r i n e o f c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n , a final j u d g m e n t o n t h e merits, rendered by a court o f competent jurisdiction, is conclusive and constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent lawsuits involving the same cause o f action against the same defendant o r those i n privity with that defendant. Montana v. United States, 4 4 0 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). To d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r s u c c e s s i v e l a w s u i t s i n v o l v e t h e s a m e cause o f a c t i o n , a c o u r t m u s t c o n s i d e r the following factors: (1) whether rights or interests established i n the prior j u d g m e n t would be d e s t r o y e d o r i m p a i r e d b y p r o s e c u t i o n o f t h e s e c o n d a c t i o n ; (2) w h e t h e r substantially the same evidence is presented in the t w o actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement o f the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out o f the same transactional nucleus o f facts. T h e last o f these criteria is the m o s t important. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F . 2 d 1 3 9 1 , 1 3 9 8 (9th Cir. 1992). Both "res j u d i c a t a a n d collateral estoppel relieve parties o f the cost a n d vexation o f m u l t i p l e lawsuits, c o n s e r v e j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s , and, b y p r e v e n t i n g i n c o n s i s t e n t decisions, encourage reliance o n adjudication." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). H e r e , J o h n s o n h a s p r e v i o u s l y l i t i g a t e d t o c o n c l u s i o n t w o s e p a r a t e c a s e s i n federal c o u r t , Johnson v. Czerniak, No. C V 02-292 (D. Or. May 1 2 , 2 0 0 3 ) ("Johnson I") and Johnson v. Kulongoski, No. C V 0 3 - 3 7 7 , 2 0 0 4 WL 1737732 (D. Or. Aug. 03, 2004), a f f d 141 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Johnson 11"). I n Johnson I, Johnson asserted, among other things, that the conditions o f his c o n f i n e m e n t i n t h e l M U a m o u n t e d t o c r u e l a n d u n u s u a l p u n i s h m e n t i n v i o l a t i o n o f the Eighth Amendment. Winges Aff. Attach. 4 at 2. In Johnson II, Johnson alleged, among o t h e r c l a i m s , t h a t h e w a s d e n i e d d u e p r o c e s s i n h i s p l a c e m e n t i n t h e I M U , a n d t h a t the c o n d i t i o n s Page 11 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

of his confinement violated the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel a n d unusual punishment. Winges Aff. Attach. 5 at 1-2.

I t is likely that Johnson's claims i n the instant action regarding violations o f the due
process clause a n d the Eighth Amendment are barred b y issue preclusion. One o f the defendants i n Johnson I, Stan Czerniak, is a defendant i n the present action. One o f the defendants in Johnson II, Brian Belleque, is also a defendant in the present action. The "same parties" requirement, therefore, is satisfied. The issues Johnson litigated i n Johnson I and I I dealt with the constitutionality o f the process o f transfer to the IMU a n d the conditions o f the IMU. These a r e t w o o f t h e s a m e i s s u e s J o h n s o n is l i t i g a t i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t case. T h e " s a m e i s s u e " requirement, therefore, is also satisfied. I conclude that issue preclusion makes Johnson unlikely t o s u c c e e d o n t h e m e r i t s o f t h e p r e s e n t action. I need n o t reach whether the "same cause o f action11 factors mandate that this action could e v e n t u a l l y b e d i s m i s s e d o n t h e g r o u n d o f c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n . Issue p r e c l u s i o n r e l a t e d t o J o h n s o n ' s p r e v i o u s federal l i t i g a t i o n , a n d i s s u e a n d c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n r e l a t e d t o J o h n s o n ' s s t a t e habeas proceeding provide sufficient bases to conclude that Johnson has failed to demonstrate he is e n t i t l e d t o p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i v e relief.

III

III

III
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CONCLUSION
Johnson's M o t i o n for Preliminary Injunction (#65) is denied. Based o n the foregoing conclusions, the court will entertain a motion to dismiss from defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

jt
U n i t e d States D i s t r i c t Judge

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