Gehring v. Board of Parole and Post Prison Supervision

Filing 41

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATION - the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be DENIED, and a judgment of DISMISSAL should be entered. Should Petitioner appeal, a certificate of appealability should be DENIED as Petitioner has not made a subst antial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Objections to the Findings and Recommendation are due by 2/23/2010. If objections are filed, a party may file a response to those objections within 14 days of service of a copy of the objections. This Findings is referred to US District Judge Garr M. King for review. Signed on 2/9/10 by Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)

IN T H E UNITED STATES D I S T R I C T C O U R T F O R T H E DISTRICT OF OREGON K U R T D A Y T O N GEHRING, Petitioner, Civil No. 0 7 - 1 6 8 6 - A C FINDINGS AND R E C O M M E N D A T I O N

v.
B R I A N BELLEQUE, Respondent. T H O M A S J. H E S T E R A s s i s t a n t Federal P u b l i c Defender 101 S W M a i n Street Suite 1700 POltland, O R 9 7 2 0 4 A t t o m e y for P e t i t i o n e r J O H N R. K R O G E R Attorney General L E S T E R R. H U N T S I N G E R S e n i o r Assistant A t t o r n e y General D e p a t t m e n t o f Justice 1162 Court Street N E S a l e m , O R 97301 A t t o r n e y s for R e s p o n d e n t 1 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge. Petitioner, a n inmate at the Oregon State Penitentiary, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. F o r the reasons that follow, the Amended Petition for W r i t o f H a b e a s C o r p u s s h o u l d b e D E N I E D , a n d this a c t i o n s h o u l d b e D I S M I S S E D .

BACKGROUND
O n M a y 13, 1975, Petitioner was convicted o n charges o f Sodomy i n the First Degree and K i d n a p i n g i n t h e S e c o n d D e g r e e . T h e t r i a l j u d g e s e n t e n c e d P e t i t i o n e r to 2 0 y e a r s o n t h e S o d o m y conviction, to b e served consecutively to a sentence for a previous conviction, and 10 years o n the Kidnaping conviction, to b e served consecutively to the Sodomy sentence. O n July 15, 1975, Petitioner was convicted o f R a p e i n the First Degree and S o d o m y i n the First Degree. The trial j u d g e found Petitioner was a dangerous offender and sentenced h i m to 3 0 years o n each conviction to be served consecutively to the previously imposed sentences and to each other. On August 8, 1975, Petitioner was convicted o f Kidnaping i n the Second Degree and sentenced to 10 years, to b e served consecutively to the previous sentences. A l l o f t h e 1975 sentences were imposed under the discretionatyparole system. O n July 31, 1985, Petitioner opted into the matrix parole system. Under the matrix scheme, i n January 1987 P e t i t i o n e r w a s r e l e a s e d to p a r o l e . I n June 1987, Petitioner's parole was revoked. O n October 27, 1987, Petitioner w a s convicted o n two counts o f Kidnaping i n the First Degree. The trial j u d g e sentenced Petitioner as

2 - F I N D I N G S AND R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

a dangerous offender to 30 years o n each conviction to be served consecutively to previous convictions and to each other. T h e O r e g o n B o a r d o f P a r o l e a n d P o s t - P r i s o n S u p e r v i s i o n (the " B o a r d " ) s e t a n e w p a r o l e consideration date i n December 1998 o n all o f Petitioner's sentences. I n July 1998, t h e B o a r d deferred Petitioner's parole consideration hearing date for 24 months. I n July 2000, t h e B o a r d again d e f e n e d Petitioner's parole consideration hearing date, for another 24 months. I n preparation for Petitioner's next parole consideration hearing, o n August 29, 2002, Frank P. Co1istro, Ed.D. conducted a psychological evaluation interview w i t h Petitioner. O n September

13, 2002, Dr. Colistro issued a report setting forth his evaluation and recommendation. U p o n receipt o f Dr. Co1istro' s report, the B o a r d required Petitioner to participate i n a second psychological evaluation with Robeli Stuckey, Ph.D. Dr. Stuckey issued his repOli o n October 13, 2002. O n November 20, 2002, the Board conducted a parole consideration hearing w i t h Petitioner. T h e r e s u l t i n g B o a r d A c t i o n F o r m ( " B A F " ) #6, d a t e d N o v e m b e r 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 , a n d m a i l e d o n N o v e m b e r 28, 2002, d e f e n e d Petitioner's parole consideration date for another 24 months. Petitioner sought administrative review o f B A F #6. Petitioner alleged the B o a r d ' s decision w a s n o t suppOlied b y sufficient evidence o r a proper diagnosis, each o f which were required b y state law. Petitioner also alleged these failures to meet the S t a t e ' s statutory obligations deprived h i m o f d u e p r o c e s s u n d e r t h e U n i t e d States Constitution. T h e B o a r d d e n i e d r e l i e f i n A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Review Response C A R R " ) #5, dated February 21, 2003, and mailed to Petitioner on M a r c h 3, 2003.

3 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

Petitioner filed a M o t i o n for L e a v e to Proceed w i t h Judicial R e v i e w w h i c h p r e s e n t e d t w o s u b s t a n t i a l questions:

1.

Was there substantial evidence o r even a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e b o a r d ' s finding t h a t p e t i t i o n e r r e m a i n e d d a n g e r o u s ? W a s t h e b o a r d ' s action i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h its o w n r u l e a t t h e t i m e o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t o f f e n s e s t h a t r e q u i r e d a f o r m a l d i a g n o s i s as a prerequisite b e f o r e i t c o u l d d e t e n n i n e w h e t h e r o r n o t the c o n d i t i o n w h i c h m a d e p e t i t i o n e r dangerous was absent o r i n remission?

2.

Resp. Exh. 104, p. 4. I n his argument i n SUppOlt o f t h e first question, P e t i t i o n e r n o t e d t h a t t h e psychological evaluations relied u p o n b y the B o a r d w e r e invalid b e c a u s e state l a w at t h e t i m e o f P e t i t i o n e r ' s crimes required an examination b y a psychiatrist, n o t a psychologist. O n M a r c h 12,

2004, t h e O r e g o n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s g r a n t e d P e t i t i o n e r ' s M o t i o n .
I n his appellate brief, Petitioner argued the B o a r d failed to follow the law i n t w o respects: (1) t h e applicable statutes " d i d n o t allow for evaluation o f a dangerous o f f e n d e r b y a p s y c h o l o g i s t , " and, (2) denial o f p a r o l e for a dangerous offender h a d to b e b a s e d o n a s u p p o r t i n g " d i a g n o s i s , " w h i c h w a s lacking i n P e t i t i o n e r ' s case. H e also argued t h a t t h e r e c o r d lacked a d e q u a t e evidence to SUppOlt t h e defell"al o f parole. P e t i t i o n e r ' s arguments w e r e b a s e d e n t i r e l y o n s t a t e law; at no p o i n t i n t h e b r i e f d i d P e t i t i o n e r a r g u e the B o a r d ' s a c t i o n s v i o l a t e d f e d e r a l d u e p r o c e s s o r e x p o s t

f a c t o protections. T h e O r e g o n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s a f f i r m e d t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t opinion. Gehringv. B o a r d o fParole a n d Post-Prison Supervision, 342 Or. 4 1 6 , 1 4 8 P . 3 d 925 (2006).
P e t i t i o n e r s o u g h t r e v i e w from t h e O r e g o n S u p r e m e C o u r t . I n h i s P e t i t i o n f o r R e v i e w , h e s e t fOlth three Questions Presented: Ouestion 1. W h e n a statute explicitly requires a n administrative agency to m a k e an a f f i l m a t i v e finding, i s t h e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e f i n d i n g i n t h e w o r d s o f t h e s t a t u t e 4 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies as to that required finding? Therefore, does the b o a r d ' s finding under ORS 144.228(1 )(b) (1987) necessarily require the b o a r d to also find that the condition making petitioner dangerous is the s a m e c o n d i t i o n t h a t m a d e p e t i t i o n e r d a n g e r o u s at t h e t i m e o f h i s s e n t e n c i n g ? Question 2. D i d the Court o f Appeals elT i n ruling that the b o a r d was n o t required to comply w i t h ORS 144.228 (1987) and have petitioner examined b y a psychiatrist? Question 3. D o e s a psychological repOli stating that an inmate has "features" o f an a n t i s o c i a l p e r s o n a l i t y d i s o r d e r c o n s t i t u t e a s u f f i c i e n t d i a g n o s i s to s a t i s f y b o a r d r u l e O A R 255-38-005(1)? Resp. Exh. 108, pp. 6-7. In his argument, Petitioner stated: B y i t s arbitrary d i s r e g a r d o f a p p l i c a b l e p r o v i s i o n s o f l a w a n d i t s unauthorized delay in setting a parole release date for petitioner, the board is increasing petitioner's term o f incarceration and violating p e titio n e r 's due process rights under the federal Constitution. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689-904 n A (1980) (a state c o u r t ' s arbitrary disregard o f state sentencing law and imposition o f a n unauthorized sentence also violates the defendant's due process rights under the federal Constitution); Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (same).

Resp. Exh. 108, p. I I . The Supreme COUli denied review. Gehring v. B o a r d o fParole a n d PostPrison Supervision, 342 Or. 4 1 6 , 1 5 4 P.3d 722 (2007).

Currently before this COUli is Petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ o f Habeas Corpus. Petitioner alleges three claims for relief: ( I ) the Board violated Petitioner's rights u n d e r the D u e P r o c e s s C l a u s e w h e n i t d e t e r m i n e d there w a s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t m a d e Petitioner dangerous was n o t absent or i n remission; (2) the Board violated P e t i t i o n e r ' s rights under t h e D u e P r o c e s s C l a u s e w h e n deferred P e t i t i o n e r ' s p a r o l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n d a t e b a s e d u p o n a r e p o r t that did n o t contain a diagnosis o f Present Severe Emotional Disturbance; and (3) the B o a r d violated Petitioner's rights under the Due Process Clause and the E x P o s t Facto Clause w h e n it 5 - F I N D I N G S AND R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

used reports prepared b y psychologists, rather than a psychiatrist, to defer P e t i t i o n e r ' s parole consideration date. Respondent argues Petitioner procedurally defaulted all three claims for r e l i e f because he failed to fairly present them to the state courts and the time to do so has expired. I n addition, Respondent argues, the claims should b e denied because they lack merit. L E G A L STANDARDS A s t a t e p r i s o n e r m u s t e x h a u s t all a v a i l a b l e s t a t e r e m e d i e s e i t h e r o n d i r e c t a p p e a l o r t h r o u g h collateral proceedings (e.g., state post-conviction relief) before a federal court m a y consider federal habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(I); 0 'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999);

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (requiring dismissal o f federal petition unless all
available state remedies as to all federal claims are exhausted). A prisoner satisfies the exhaustion r e q u i r e m e n t b y " f a i r l y p r e s e n t i n g " h i s c l a i m s to t h e h i g h e s t s t a t e c o u r t w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n t o c o n s i d e r t h e m , t h e r e b y a f f o r d i n g t h e s t a t e c o m i s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to c o n s i d e r t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f l e g a l e r r o r a n d correct any violations o f its prisoner's federal rights. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citing Duncan v. H e m y , 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)).

A p r i s o n e r fairly p r e s e n t s his claims b y describing i n t h e s t a t e c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g b o t h t h e
operative facts and the legal theOly on which his claim is based. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1 1 5 3 , 1 1 5 6 (9th Cil'. 2003); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982). A fair presentation requires a prisoner to state the facts that entitle h i m to relief, and to reference the federal source o f law o n w h i c h h e r e l i e s , o r a c a s e a n a l y z i n g t h e federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e o n w h i c h h e r e l i e s , o r t o simply label his claim "federal." Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32; Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 1 5 2 , 1 6 2 -

6 - F I N D I N G S AND R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

63 (1996). I t is n o t enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal c l a i m w e r e available to t h e state courts, o r that somewhat similar claims were made. Anderson, 4 5 9 U.S. at 6. I t i s also n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e t h e federal c l a i m i n " a p r o c e d u r a l c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t s m e r i t s w i l l n o t b e considered." Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1989).

I f a p e t i t i o n e r d o e s n o t f a i r l y p r e s e n t h i s federal c l a i m s i n s t a t e c o u r t , a n d c a n n o l o n g e r d o
so b e c a u s e they are procedurally batTed u n d e r state law, the claims are procedurally defaulted i n federal court. 0 'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848. When a claim is procedurally defaulted, federal h a b e a s r e v i e w is ban-ed " u n l e s s the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default a n d actual prejudice, o r demonstrate that the failure to consider the claims w i l l result i n a miscaITiage o f j u s t i c e . " Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 7 2 (1977); Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F . 3 d 802, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

I.

Due Process Claims
P e t i t i o n e r d i d n o t p r e s e n t t h e c l a i m s a l l e g e d i n t h i s a c t i o n as f e d e r a l d u e p r o c e s s c l a i m s t o

t h e O r e g o n C o u r t o f Appeals. A s n o t e d , P e t i t i o n e r ' s b r i e f o n appeal d i d n o t c i t e to t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n y a m e n d m e n t , o r a s i n g l e f e d e r a l case; h e a r g u e d e x c l u s i v e l y s t a t e law. A s s u c h , nothing i n t h e b r i e f w o u l d have aletied t h e appeals court to the federal n a t u r e o f the questions presented. P e t i t i o n e r d i d r a i s e h i s d u e p r o c e s s c l a i m s i n h i s P e t i t i o n for R e v i e w t o t h e O r e g o n S u p r e m e Court. N e v e t i h e l e s s , t h e d u e p r o c e s s c l a i m s r e m a i n u n e x h a u s t e d a n d defaulted. T h e O r e g o n S u p r e m e Court " m a y o n l y consider questions w h i c h w e r e ' p r o p e r l y b e f o r e ' the C o u r t o f A p p e a l s . "

7 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

Von Berckefeldt v. Hall, C a s e No. 02-CV -927-CO, 2005 W L 1566650 *7 (D. Or. 2005) (citing Or.

R. App. P. 9.20(2) and State v. Castrejon, 317 Or. 202, 208-12, 856 P . 2 d 616 (1993)), a f f ' d , 200
Fed. Appx. 642 (9th Cir. 2006); s e e also Reese v. Baldwin, 2 8 2 F . 3 d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[u ] n d e r Oregon law, claims m a y n o t b e presented in a petition for review to the O r e g o n Supreme Court unless they are first raised in fi'ont o f t h e Oregon Court o f Appeals"), rev. on other gl'llds,

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004).
B e c a u s e P e t i t i o n e r failed to p r e s e n t his d u e process c l a i m s to t h e O r e g o n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , t h e y are p r o c e d u r a l l y defaulted. I n t h e a b s e n c e o f a s h o w i n g o f c a u s e and p r e j u d i c e o r a f u n d a m e n t a l m i s c a n i a g e o f j u s t i c e e x c u s i n g t h e p r o c e d u r a l default, h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f o n P e t i t i o n e r ' s d u e p r o c e s s c l a i m s m u s t b e denied.
II.

E x P o s t Facto C l a i m s
Petitioner concedes h e did not raise a federal ex p o s t f a c t o claim i n s t a t e c o u r t b a s e d u p o n

t h e B o a r d ' s u s e o f a p s y c h o l o g i s t , r a t h e r t h a n a p s y c h i a t r i s t , t o e v a l u a t e P e t i t i o n e r ' s e l i g i b i l i t y for parole. H e argues, however, that the state is j u d i c i a l l y estopped fi'om asserting t h e c l a i m w a s p r o c e d u r a l l y defaulted b e c a u s e i n the proceedings before t h e Board, the B o a r d r e p e a t e d l y t o l d Petitioner it w a s applying the lUles i n effect at the t i m e h e committed h i s offense, b u t w h e n t h e case w a s b e f o r e t h e O r e g o n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s t h e S t a t e argued t h e B o a r d could p r o p e r l y a p p l y t h e l a w i n effect at the t i m e o f the parole consideration hearing. I n support o f his argument, Petitioner relies u p o n t h e r e c e n t N i n t h Circuit Court o f Appeals decision in Whaley v. Belleque, 5 2 0 F . 3 d 997 (9th Cir. 2008).

8 - F I N D I N G S AND R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

In Whaley, the petitioner attempted to present a constitutional challenge to his parole c o n d i t i o n s i n s t a t e court. T h e s t a t e r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e O r e g o n C o u r t o f A p p e a l s t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e w a s m o o t under O r e g o n l a w b e c a u s e t h e p e t i t i o n e r h a d b e e n r e m o v e d f r o m parole and re-incarcerated. Petitioner did not challenge this assertion, and the Oregon Court o f Appeals dismissed the appeal. The petitioner then sought federal habeas corpus relief. There, the state argued that his constitutional claims were /lot moot, that the petitioner was obligated to seek review o f t h e appeal c o u r t ' s dismissal to the Oregon Supreme Court, and that the p e t i t i o n e r ' s failure to do so constituted a procedural default. In support o f this argument the state cited a prior Oregon c a s e w h i c h contradicted the p o s i t i o n i t t o o k o n t h e m o o t n e s s o f P e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m s b e f o r e the O r e g o n C o u r t o f Appeals. The Ninth Circuit found that the state improperly "created an advantage for i t s e l f b y arguing to the Oregon cOUli that W h a l e y ' s claims were moot." Whaley, 520 F.3d at 1002. A s such, the state was judicially estopped fi'om taking the opposite position i n the federal case. Id.; s e e a l s o

Russell v. R o l f t , 893 F . 2 d 1033, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1990) Gudicial estoppel bars a state fi'om taking different legal positions i n state and federal court in order to create a procedural default that would o t h e l w i s e b a r a h a b e a s petition). Here, the state created no such advantage for itself. The B o a r d ' s statement that it applied t h e r u l e s i n e f f e c t at t h e t i m e o f P e t i t i o n e r ' s c r i m e s w a s o b v i o u s l y i n c o n e c t , b e c a u s e a t t h a t t i m e a p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n w a s required, n o t a p s y c h o l o g i c a l evaluation. T h a t s t a t e m e n t , h o w e v e r , does not rise to the level o f the s t a t e ' s actions in Whaley.

9 - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION -

Petitioner w a s well aware h e was examined b y psychologists, rather than psychiatrists. M o r e o v e r , P e t i t i o n e r w a s a w a r e t h a t t h e law i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e o f h i s o f f e n s e s r e q u i r e d a psychiatric evaluation. Although Petitioner did not directly raise this issue in his Request for A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e v i e w , h e d i d n o t e t h e c h a n g e i n l a w a n d t h e B o a r d ' s f a i l u r e to c o m p l y w i t h t h e p r i o r law i n his Motion for Leave to Proceed With Judicial Review. I n fact, Petitioner devoted an e n t i r e s e c t i o n o f a r g u m e n t i n h i s M o t i o n to h i s c l a i m t h a t t h e B o a r d v i o l a t e d s t a t e l a w b y u s i n g a p s y c h o l o g i c a l , r a t h e r t h a n p s y c h i a t r i c , evaluation. The Motion for Leave to Proceed with Judicial review was filed before the state filed its R e s p o n d e n t ' s B r i e f i n which it stated, for the first time, that application o f the law in effect at the t i m e o f t h e parole consideration hearing was appropriate. Petitioner fails t o show h o w the s t a t e ' s subsequent change i n position prevented h i m fi'om recognizing that the failure to follow the law i n effect at the time o f his crime not only violated state law, b u t might rise to the level o f a federal e x

p o s t f a c t o violation.
T h e state i s n o t judicially estopped from asserting the procedural default o f P e t i t i o n e r ' s ex

postfactoclaim. Petitioner procedurally defaulted the claim b y failing to federalize i t i n the Oregon
Court o f Appeals. Because no cause and prejudice or fundamental miscaI1'iage o f j u s t i c e excuse the procedural default, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.
RECOMMENDATION

F o r these reasons, the Amended Petition for Writ o f Habeas Corpus should b e DENIED, and a judgment o f DISMISSAL should be entered. Should Petitioner appeal, a certificate o f

10 - F I N D I N G S A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

appealability s h o u l d b e D E N I E D as Petitioner has n o t m a d e a substantial showing o f t h e denial o f a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). SCHEDULING T h e a b o v e F i n d i n g s a n d R e c o m m e n d a t i o n are r e f e r r e d to a U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t J u d g e f o r review. Objections, i f any, are due February 2 3 , 2 0 1 0 . I f n o objections are filed, r e v i e w o f t h e F i n d i n g s and Recommendation w i l l go under advisement that date. A p a r t y m a y respond to another p a r t y ' s objections within 14 days after service o f a c o p y o f the objections. I f objections are filed, review o f t h e Findings and R e c o m m e n d a t i o n will go u n d e r a d v i s e m e n t u p o n r e c e i p t o f t h e r e s p o n s e , o r o n t h e l a t e s t d a t e for f i l i n g a r e s p o n s e .

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Jbhn V. A c o s t a , p n i t e d States Magistrate Judge

11 - FINDINGS AND R E C O M M E N D A T I O N -

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