Tallacus v. Leavitt

Filing 64

OPINION AND ORDER - For the reasons stated, the MPBS decision is upheld, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 35 is GRANTED as to gender, age, and disability discrimination, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 35 as to retaliation is DENIED, and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 35 is GRANTED. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Deposition of Phil Fritz 49 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Factual Background is DENIED. Signed on 4/15/10 by Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT C O U R T F O R T H E D I S T R I C T OF O R E G O N P O R T L A N D DIVISION

L A R R Y D. T ALLACUS, Plaintiff,

Civ. N o . 0 8 - 5 9 1 - A C OPINION AND ORDER

v.
K A T H L E E N S E B E L I U S , Secretary, . D e p a r t m e n t o f H e a l t h a n d H u m a n Services,

Defendant.

A C O S T A , M a g i s t r a t e Judge:

Introduction
P l a i n t i f f Larry D. Tallacus ("Tallacus") alleges six claims against Defendant Kathleen Sibelius, t h e Secretary o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f H e a l t h a n d H u m a n S e r v i c e s ("Defendant"). T h e c l a i m s

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specifically concern a Reduction i n Force ("RIF") action t a k e n b y the Indian H e a l t h Services ( " I H S " o r ' ' t h e A g e n c y ' ' ) a t i t s P o r t l a n d , O r e g o n office. T a l l a c u s a l l e g e s t h a t h e w a s r e t a l i a t e d a g a i n s t f o r e n g a g i n g i n p r o t e c t e d a c t i v i t y , i n v i o l a t i o n o f 4 2 U . S . C . § 2 0 0 0 e , e t seq. ( " T i t l e V I I " ) . T a l l a c u s a l l e g e s t h r e e c l a i m s a r i s i n g f r o m d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b a s e d o n age, s e x , a n d d i s a b i l i t y , i n v i o l a t i o n o f T i t l e

VIT. Tallacus also seeks j u d i c i a l review o f the administrative determination t h a t the A g e n c y ' s
p e r s o n n e l a c t i o n , t h e RIP, w a s l a w f u l . F i n a l l y , T a l l a c u s a l l e g e s t h a t t h e R I F w a s c o n t r a r y t o t h e t e r m s o f a n e a r l i e r s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t and, t h e r e f o r e , a m o u n t s t o a b r e a c h o f contract. C u r r e n t l y b e f o r e t h e c o u r t a r e D e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h e b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t c l a i m for l a c k o f s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o F e d e r a l Rille o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ( " R i l l e " ) 12(b)(1) a n d for summary j u d g m e n t o n all other claims p u r s u a n t t o Rule 56(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 56(b). Judicial r e v i e w o f t h e personnel a c t i o n a n d t h e d e c i s i o n o f the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e L a w J u d g e ( " A L J " ) w i l l b e l i m i t e d t o t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e record. l

Factual Background
T h e f a c t u a l b a c k g r o u n d a p p l i c a b l e to j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n d e r i v e s solely from t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d before t h e A L J a t t h e t i m e o f t h e administrative hearing. T h e factual b a c k g r o u n d t h a t t h e c o u r t m a y c o n s i d e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m s includes, a d d i t i o n a l l y , e v i d e n c e c o l l e c t e d d u r i n g d i s c o v e r y i n t h i s federal action.

1

Facts f r o m Administrative R e c o r d T a l l a c u s has b e e n e m p l o y e d b y I R S since 1988 i n t h e C o n t r a c t H e a l t h S e r v i c e s ( " C H S " )

division. In 1997, Tallacus filed a claim against IHS u n d e r Title VIT. O n O c t o b e r 2 7 , 2 0 0 0 , Tallacus

1 I n a declaration, D a n i e l F. M e n d o z a certifies t h a t ' ' t h e d o c u m e n t s a t t a c h e d t o t h i s declaration are true a n d correct copies o ft h e administrative record t h a t was before the M e r i t Systems P r o t e c t i o n B o a r d s . " ( M e n d o z a D e c l a r a t i o n ( " D e c l . " ) a t 2.)

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entered into a settlement agreement w i t h then Secretary o f Health and H u m a n

Services~

Donna

Shalala. T h e a g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e d ~ i n r e l e v a n t p a r t , t h a t T a l l a c u s w o u l d r e c e i v e a c a s h s e t t l e m e n t , attorney fees and costs, and a n e w position a t IHS w i t h additional duties bearing t h e title "Contract H e a l t h S e r v i c e C o n s u l t a n t / O f f i c e r " o r " C H S O . " ( A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R e c o r d ( " A R " ) 9.) T h e w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t d i d n o t e x p l i c i t l y address u n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s T a l l a c u s ' s p o s i t i o n c o u l d be el i m i n ate d o r Tallacus h i m s e l f could be terminated. A t t h e t i m e t h e s e t t l e m e n t w a s reached, D o n a l d a W i l d e r ( " W i l d e r " ) h a d j u s t b e g u n w o r k i n g at IHS and was involved i n the settlement negotiations. Wilder made a statement to Tallacus to the e f f e c t t h a t h e s h o u l d w o r k h a r d b e c a u s e o f t h e m o n e t a r y a w a r d he h a d r e c e i v e d . S h e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n w o u l d l i k e l y b e s u b j e c t t o a n RIP i n t h e future, b e c a u s e a n i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r o f t r i b e s w e r e t a k i n g o n t h e d u t i e s t h a t m a k e u p h i s p o s i t i o n as C H S O . I n 2 0 0 3 , W i l d e r a g a i n c o m m e n t e d t o Tallacus, t h i s t i m e privately, t h a t h e would likely b e subject to a n RIP i n t h e future. In 2005, T a l l a c u s s a w a n e x e c u t i v e c o m m i t t e e a g e n d a w h i c h s t a t e d t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n w o u l d b e d i s c u s s e d as o n e t h a t c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y b e e l i m i n a t e d v i a a n RIP. T h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s a c o p y o f t h e " M a n a g e m e n t C o n t r o l S e l f - A s s e s s m e n t for Contract H e a l t h S e r v i c e s for F Y 2 0 0 7 . " ( A R 3 6 6 - 7 6 . ) T h e a s s e s s m e n t w a s p r e p a r e d b y T a l l a c u s a n d s i g n e d o f f o n b y Wilder. ( A R 3 7 2 , 3 6 6 . ) T h e d o c u m e n t asked: " A r e t h e A O ' s F I E , P D & P A S a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e responsibilities & functions related t o CHS p r o g r a m ? " ( A R 3 7 3 . ) T h e a s s e s s o r o r assessors a n s w e r e d t h a t , y e s , the " F I E " w a s c u r r e n t l y a p p r o p r i a t e , w h e r e F T E s t a n d s f o r ~ ' f u l l t i m e e q u i v a l e n t " a n d r e f e r s t o a full t i m e p o s i t i o n , o r i t s e q u i v a l e n t . T h e d o c u m e n t d o e s n o t b e a r a s p e c i f i c d a t e , t h o u g h i t g e n e r a l l y r e f e r s t o fiscal y e a r 2 0 0 7 . A n a c c o m p a n y i n g l e t t e r w a s s e n t o u t w i t h t h e a s s e s s m e n t , d a t e d A p r i l 26, 2 0 0 7 . ( A R 3 6 5 . ) O n A u g u s t 3 0 , 2 0 0 7 , T a l l a c u s r e c e i v e d n o t i c e o f a n

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RIF from DHS. T h e notice stated: T h i s RIF r e s u l t s f r o m t h e c o n t r a c t i n g o f C o n t r a c t H e a l t h S e r v i c e ( C H S ) and t r a n s f e r o f fiscal a l l o c a t i o n t o t h e t r i b e s u n d e r t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e P u b l i c L a w 9 3 - 6 3 8 . . . . I n F Y-06, two (2) Portland Area tribes compacted or contracted their CHS programs a n d a s s o c i a t e d shares. T h e P o r t l a n d A r e a n o w d i r e c t l y o p e r a t e s C H S P r o g r a m s f o r o n l y 5 ( o u t o f 43) t r i b e s i n t h e e n t i r e A r e a a n d t h r e e (3) o f t h o s e a r e t r i b e s o f 2 0 0 i n d i v i d u a l s o r less. Therefore,· y o u r p o s i t i o n c a n n o l o n g e r b e a full t i m e C H S C o n s u l t a n t , t h e r e f o r e a [ n ] R I F a c t i o n h a s to b e c o n d u c t e d . ( A R 15.) T h e n o t i c e f u r t h e r . p r o v i d e s t h a t T a l l a c u s w o u l d b e r e a s s i g n e d t o t h e p o s i t i o n o f Accounting T e c h n i c i a n in t h e D i v i s i o n o f Financial Management. D e s p i t e t h e fact t h a t t h e n e w position was a t a lower p a y grade, Tallacus was to "retain [his] current grade, step, a n d pay for a p e r i o d o f n o t to e x c e e d t w o y e a r s , " t h o u g h h e w a s e l i g i b l e t o r e t a i n h i s p a y g r a d e a t t h e e n d o f t w o years. ( A R 1 6 . ) T a l l a c u s r e q u e s t e d a n appeal o f this a g e n c y a c t i o n b y t h e M e r i t S y s t e m s P r o t e c t i o n B o a r d ("MSPB"), o n December 4 , 2 0 0 7 . ( A R 2.) I n this application, Tallacus argued t h a t t h e agency had a c t e d i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e e a r l i e r s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t . He a l s o a r g u e d t h a t t h e n e e d f o r a C H S program a n d the resources available for s u c h a program were sufficient to require a n d fimd the p o s i t i o n h e l o s t t h r o u g h t h e RIF. As r e l i e f , T a l l a c u s s o u g h t r e i n s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p o s i t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n t h e 2000 settlement agreement, a promotion, and payment o f attorney fees. ( A R 3.) Tallacus also filed a d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e E q u a l E m p l o y m e n t O p p o r t u n i t y O f f i c e o n S e p t e m b e r 7 , 2007, alleging discrimination based o n gender, age, disability, and retaliation for protected conduct. ( A R 4 5 , 4 9 - 5 0 . ) H e notified IHS o f this complaint o n October 4 , 2 0 0 7 . ( A R 53.) O n January 3, 2 0 0 8 , D o n i W i l d e r r e q u e s t e d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t T a l l a c u s ' s a c c r u e d s i c k l e a v e a n d a n n u a l leave. Tallacus h a d accrued a total o f 2 1 2 . 5 hours o f annual leave a n d 84 hours o f sick leave i n 2007. ( A R 62.) T h e r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t these t o t a l s w e r e w i t h i n t h e t o t a l a m o u n t s o f b o t h a n n u a l a n d s i c k l e a v e

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to w h i c h Tallacus was entitled. ( A R 63.) 2008.

Tallacus filed this c l a i m i n federal court o n M a y 15,

n.

Additional Facts i n District Court Record Tallacus received a n 8 0 % disability r a t i n g b y t h e V e t e r a n s Administration. (Tallacus

D e p o s i t i o n ( " D e p o . " ) 1 6 : 2 2 - 17:2.) D u e t o d i f f i c u l t y w a l k i n g , T a l l a c u s r e q u e s t e d a c c o m m o d a t i o n f r o m C H S i n t h e f o n n o f a p a r k i n g spot. I d a t 1 8 : 3 - 2 0 : 2 5 . A f t e r h i s r e q u e s t w a s i n i t i a l l y d e n i e d , T a l l a c u s f i l e d a f o n n a l c o m p l a i n t a n d r e c e i v e d t h e a c c o m m o d a t i o n i n 1997. W i l d e r a d m i t s t h a t , during t h e s e t t l e m e n t negotiations t h a t r e s u l t e d i n t h e 2000 s e t t k m e n t agreement, she w a r n e d Tallacus o f the possibility o f an RIF o f this position. She also asked him w h a t h e w o u l d d o for h i s c o m m u n i t y t o , i n essence, j u s t i f y r e c e i v i n g t h e settlement. ( W i l d e r D e p o . 84:4-11, 2 2 - 2 4 . ) W i l d e r stated: [W]e h a d r e a c h e d a n agreement w h e r e h e was going t o receive a s u m o f m o n e y t h a t would h a v e otherwise provided hea1thcare t o Indian p e o p l e and I ' m I n d i a n a n d I w o r k e d m y w h o l e c a r e e r for t h a t , a n d I w a n t e d t o m a k e s u r e t h a t h e u n d e r s t o o d I h o p e t h a t h e w a s g o i n g t o [do] s o m e t h i n g g o o d f o r t h e A g e n c y t h a t w o u l d m a k e s u r e t h a t the m o n e y w a s w e l l s p e n t .

!d. at 133:7-14.
S o o n a f t e r t h e s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t w a s signed, W i l d e r t o l d Tallacus h e w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y be subj e c t t o an RIP as a result o f tribes opting t o administer the program internally. (Tallacus Depo. 103:7-22.) W h e n T a l l a c u s w a s i n f o n n e d o f t h e RIP, W i l d e r b r o u g h t w i t h h e r a c o p y o f the s e t t l e m e n t agreement. ( T a l l a c u s Depo. 84:4-19.) S h e a s k e d T a l l a c u s i f h e t h o u g h t t h i s d o c u m e n t prevented the Agency from eliminating h i s position. Id. a t 85: 16-22. Tallacus has since testified t h a t h e believed the RIF was a b r e a c h o f this agreement because h e w a s guaranteed his position s o l o n g as there w a s a " C H S principal contact i n the a r e a office." I d at 90:21-91 :20.

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Subsequent to T a l l a c u s ' s RIF~ two h e a l t h system specialist positions o p e n e d u p , b o t h a t higher pay grades than T a l l a c u s ' s current p a y grade. Tallacus d i d n o t apply for either position. ( W i l d e r Depo. 45:20-46:19.) I t was T a l l a c u s ' s v i e w t h a t i f h e a p p l i e d f o r s u c h a position, he w o u l d f o r f e i t his r i g h t t o a s s e r t t h e c u r r e n t c a u s e o f action. (Tallacus Depo. 6 9 : 8 - 2 4 . ) S i n c e h i s p o s i t i o n w a s e l i m i n a t e d v i a t h e RIF, T a l l a c u s h a s f r e q u e n t l y b e e n c a l l e d o n t o h e l p o t h e r employees p e r f o r m h i s o l d tasks and s p e n d s approximately one h o u r p e r w e e k doing so. ( T a l l a c u s D e p o . 66: 1 6 - 6 8 : 1 9 . ) B i e r y t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e s p e n d s a p p r o x i m a t e l y f i v e p e r c e n t o f h e r w o r k d a y o n C H S issues. ( B i e r y D e p o . 1 0 : 5 - 1 7 . ) L e a h T o m ( " T o m " ) i s t h e o n l y i l l S e m p l o y e e b e s i d e s T a l l a c u s w h o is d i s a b l e d .

ill.

Motions t o Strike

A.

Fritz Deposition

D e f e n d a n t f i l e d a m o t i o n t o s t r i k e t h e d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y o f P h i l F r i t z ( " F r i t z ' ' ) as i n a d m i s s i b l e c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e p r o h i b i t e d u n d e r F e d e r a l R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e ( " F R E " ) 4 0 4 a n d 608. F r i t z t e s t i f i e d that, i n h i s opinion, W i l d e r t e n d e d t o h o l d g r u d g e s a n d retaliate against people. F R E 4 0 4 states, i n r e l e v a n t p a r t , t h a t " [ e ] v i d e n c e o f a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r o r a t r a i t o f c h a r a c t e r i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e for t h e p u r p o s e o f p r o v i n g a c t i o n i n c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e w i t h o n a p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n [ . ] "
FED. R. E v . 404(a). Three exceptions are given, n o n e o f w h i c h are applicable here. F R E 608

p r o v i d e s that " [ t ] h e credibility o f a witness m a y b e attacked o r s u p p o r t e d b y evidence i n t h e f o o n o f o p i n i o n o r r e p u t a t i o n , " b u t o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h e e v i d e n c e a d d r e s s e s t h e w i t n e s s ' s " c h a r a c t e r for truthfulness o r untruthfulness." FED. R. E v . 608(a). Defendant argues t h a t the testimony does n o t a d d r e s s W i l d e r ' s c h a r a c t e r f o r t r u t h f u l n e s s o r u n t r u t h f u l n e s s a n d i s , i n fact, o f f e r e d o n l y t o p r o v e t h a t she acted in conformity w i t h t h e alleged characteristics i n conducting t h e RIP o f Tallacus.

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Therefore, Defendant argues, the evidence is inadmissible and should be stricken. Plaintiff responds that the evidence speaks to the motives behind the RIP and is admissible under F R E 404(b), 405(a), and 608(a). As to FRE 404(b), P l a i n t i f f claims t h a t motive and intent are a t issue i n the context o f a retaliation claim and, thus, the evidence is admissible under this rule. FRE 404(b) states that " [e]vidence o f other crimes, wrongs, o r acts" may be admissible to prove motive o r intent. FED. R. Ev. 404(b). As Defendant points out, Fritz does not testify about a crime, w r o n g , o r a c t i o n t a k e n b y Wilder. R a t h e r , F r i t z t e s t i f i e s o n l y a b o u t h i s o w n b e l i e f o r f e e l i n g t h a t Wilder holds grudges and retaliates. Thus, the evidence is n o t admissible under this rule. F R E 405 concerns methods o f p r o o f for establishing a p e r s o n ' s character. I t states, in relevant part: " I n all cases i n which evidence o f character o r a trait o f character o f a person is admissible, p r o o f m a y b e m a d e b y t e s t i m o n y a s t o r e p u t a t i o n o r b y t e s t i m o n y i n t h e f o r m o f a n opinion." FED. R. Ev. 405(a). As Defendant points out, this rule concerns methods o f p r o o f and not a d m i s s i b i l i t y and, t h u s , d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f F r i t z ' s t e s t i m o n y . F i n a l l y , b o t h p a r t i e s c i t e F R E 608(a), w h i c h p e r m i t s o p i n i o n o r r e p u t a t i o n e v i d e n c e t o e s t a b l i s h a w i t n e s s ' s " c h a r a c t e r for truthfulness o r untruthfulness." FED. R. EV. 608(a). F r i t z ' s testimony does not address W i l d e r ' s character as it relates to truthfulness o r untruthfulness. Rather, the testimony speaks t o W i l d e r ' s c h a r a c t e r a s i t r e l a t e s t o a l l e g e d l y h o l d i n g grudges a n d r e t a l i a t i o n . T h i s t e s t i m o n y i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e u n d e r R u l e 608. F o r a l l o f t h e s e r e a s o n s , t h e d e p o s i t i o n o f F r i t z i s s t r i c k e n .

B.

Defendant's Factual Background

T a l l a c u s a r g u e s t h a t the c o u r t s h o u l d strike t h e F a c t u a l B a c k g r o u n d s e c t i o n o f D e f e n d a n t ' s memorandwn. Tallacus cites Local Rule 56.1 (c)(2) which provides that, i n a concise statement o f material fact, "[a] party may reference only the material facts which are necessary for the Court to

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detennine the limited issues presented in the motion for summary judgment and no others." Local
Rules o fCivil Practice, District o f Oregon, LR 56-1 (c)(2) (2009). According to Tallacus, there are

thirty-seven references to the record that are not included i n Defendant's concise statement, and these . references should be stricken. Tallacus also cites Local Rule 56-1 (e)2 which states that " [e]xcept as otherwise required by law, when resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court has no independent duty to search and consider any part o f the Court record not otherwise referenced in the separate concise statements o f the parties." L o c a l Rules o fCivil Practice, District o f Oregon, LR 56-1(e) (2009). Defendant opposes the motion on several grounds. The court agrees with Defendant that the administrative record has, as a whole, been admitted into the record. Where a district court is called upon to review an agency's determination the court must "review the administrative record as a whole, considering the evidence that both supports and undercuts the agency's detennination."
Pavlikv. United States, 951 F.2d 220, 225 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Burkhartv. Bowen, 856F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1988». Furthermore, Local Rule 56-1(c)(2) governs the content o f the concise statement

and does not speak to what is properly included in the parties' briefing. And, although the court does not have an independent duty to search the record outside o f those citations included in the concise statement, the parties are not precluded from providing additional citations where the record supports their position. Ultimately, it is for the court to decide which facts are material. Although the court has no independent duty to search the record for evidentiary support to support a party's position, the court need not restrict its review to those facts referenced in the concise statement.

2 The memorandum refers to subsection (d), but it is clear that Tallacus meant to cite subsection (e) to support this particular argument. OPINION AND ORDER
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For these reasons, T a l l a c u s ' s m o t i o n t o strike is denied.

L e g a l Standards

1

D i s m i s s a l for L a c k o f S u b j e c t M a t t e r J u r i s d i c t i o n " A m o t i o n t o dismiss under Federal R u l e o f Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests t h e subject matter

j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e court." A h m e d v . Scharfen, No. C 08-1680 MHP, 2009 WL 55939, a t *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7 , 2 0 0 9 ) (citing Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F . 3 d 1036, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 3 » . T h i s c h a l l e n g e t o j u r i s d i c t i o n m a y h e e i t h e r facial o r f a c t u a l , d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e m o t i o n relies o n l y o n t h e allegations o f t h e c o m p l a i n t o r i f i t r e l i e s o n e v i d e n c e e x t r i n s i c t o t h e complaint as well. See Savage, 343 F .3d a t 1039 ( " I n evaluating the rule 12(bX l ) m o t i o n to dismiss, t h e district c o u r t considered affidavits furnished b y b o t h parties. This i s p r o p e r because R u l e 1 2 ( b ) ( l ) a t t a c k s o n j u r i s d i c t i o n c a n b e e i t h e r facial, c o n f I n i n g t h e i n q u i r y t o a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e complaint, o r factual, permitting t h e c o u r t t o l o o k b e y o n d t h e complaint. " ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d » . Where t h e c h a l l e n g e i s factual, t h e c o u r t ' ' n e e d n o t " p r e s u m e true t h e a l l e g a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e c o m p l a i n t .

White v. Lee, 227 F . 3 d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). T h e party asserting j u r i s d i c t i o n bears the burden
o f establishing t h a t i t exists i n a given case. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 3 7 5 , 3 7 7 (1994) (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-183 ( 1 9 3 6 » . II. Summary Judgment S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t is a p p r o p r i a t e " i f t h e p l e a d i n g s , t h e d i s c o v e r y a n d d i s c l o s u r e m a t e r i a l s o n fIle, a n d any affidavits s h o w t h a t there i s n o genuine issue as t o any material fact a n d t h a t t h e m o v a n t is entitled t o j u d g m e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w . " FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (2008). Summary j u d g m e n t is n o t p r o p e r i f m a t e r i a l factual issues e x i s t for trial. Warren v. City o fCarlsbad, 58 F.3d 4 3 9 , 4 4 1 ( 9 t h C i r . 1995);

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The m o v i n g party has t h e b u r d e n o f establishing t h e absence o f a genuine issue o f material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4 7 7 U.S. 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 (1986). I f t h e m o v i n g p a r t y s h o w s t h e absence o f a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l fact, t h e n o n m o v i n g p a r t y m u s t g o b e y o n d t h e p l e a d i n g s a n d i d e n t i f y f a c t s w h i c h s h o w a genuine issue for trial. Id. a t 324. A n o n m o v i n g p a r t y cannot d e f e a t s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t b y relying o n t h e allegations i n t h e complaint, o r w i t h u n s u p p o r t e d c o n j e c t u r e o r conclusorystatements. Hernandezv. SpacelabsMedical, Inc., 343 F . 3 d 1 1 0 7 , 1 1 1 2 (9th Cir. 2003). T h u s , s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t s h o u l d b e e n t e r e d a g a i n s t " a p a r t y w h o fails t o m a k e a s h o w i n g s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n e l e m e n t e s s e n t i a l t o t h a t p a r t y ' s case, a n d o n w h i c h t h a t p a r t y w i l l b e a r t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f a t trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. a t 322. T h e court m u s t v i e w t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t m o s t favorable t o t h e n o n m o v i n g party. Bell

v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 6 6 9 F . 2 d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982). All reasonable d o u b t as to
t h e existence o f a genuine issue o f fact s h o u l d b e r e s o l v e d a g a i n s t t h e m o v i n g party. Hector v.

Wiens, 533 F . 2 d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976). W h e r e different ultimate inferences m a y b e d r a w n ,
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t i s inappropriate. Sankovichv. Life Ins. Co. o fNorth America, 638 F . 2 d 1 3 6 , 1 4 0

(9th Cir. 1981).
However, deference t o t h e n o n m o v i n g p a r t y has limits. T h e n o n m o v i n g p a r t y m u s t set forth "specific facts s h o w i n g a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. C N . P. 56(e) (2008) (emphasis added). T h e " m e r e e x i s t e n c e o f a s c i n t i l l a o f e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n [is] i n s u f f i c i e n t . "

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 4 7 7 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Therefore, w h e r e " t h e r e c o r d t a k e n a s
a w h o l e c o u l d n o t l e a d a r a t i o n a l t r i e r o f fact t o f i n d f o r t h e n o n m o v i n g p a r t y , t h e r e i s n o g e n u i n e issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal q u o t a t i o n m a r k s omitted).

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Discussion

1.

Lawfulness o f t h e Agency A c t i o n A d i s t r i c t c o u r t m a y t a k e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a c l a i m for j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f a M S P B d e c i s i o n

where i t i s c o u p l e d w i t h c e r t a i n additional c l a i m s o f e m p l o y m e n t discrimination. T h e N i n t h Circuit described this jurisdictional scheme succinctly i n Romain v. Shear, 799 F .2d ·1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1986): O r d i n a r i l y , p e t i t i o n s for j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f M S P B a c t i o n a r e filed i n t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e F e d e r a l C i r c u i t a n d are r e v i e w e d o n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e c o r d . Where a claim o fdiscrimination is coupled w i t h a nondiscrimination claim, however, t h e e n t i r e " m i x e d c a s e " is f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t court. O n t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m , t h e petitioner "shall h a v e the right to h a v e the facts subject t o trial de n o v o by the reviewing court." T h e n o n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m i n a m i x e d c a s e is, however, reviewed o n t h e administrative record . . . . (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, the RIF will b e reviewed b a s e d o n t h e administrative r e c o r d only a n d those a r g u m e n t s b e f o r e t h e A L J a t t h e t i m e o f administrative review. T a l l a c u s alleges t h a t t h e R I F ' s " b o n a fides," t h a t is, t h e r e a s o n s g i v e n b y t h e agency f o r t h a t a g e n c y a c t i o n , are n o t s u p p o r t e d i n fact and, t h u s , t h e R I F w a s u n l a w f u l . D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e R I F w a s j u s t i f i e d b y a p p r o p r i a t e b o n a fides, b o t h a l a c k o f a v a i l a b l e w o r k a n d a s h o r t a g e o f f u n d s and, t h u s , t h e a g e n c y a c t i o n w a s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e l a w . T a l l a c u s o r i g i n a l l y b r o u g h t t h i s c l a i m b e f o r e the MSPB. The A L J upheld the a g e n c y ' s action. The A L J concluded t h a t "the RIF w a s conducted for a proper reason and the RIF regulations were properly invoked." ( A R 820.) T a l l a c u s i s e n t i t l e d to j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f t h e A L J ' s d e c i s i o n . 5 U . S . C . § 7 7 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 ) . T h e statute provides t h a t the decision o f the MSPB a n d m u s t be upheld unless s u c h 'action is: (1) a r b i t r a r y , c a p r i c i o u s , a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n , o r o t h e r w i s e n o t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h

OPINION A N D O R D E R

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the law; (2) obtained without procedures required b y followed; o r (3) unsupported by substantial evidence[.]

law~ rule~

o r regulation having been

5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2009).3 The court~s role is t o " r e v i e w the findings to make sure t h e A U applied t h e c o r r e c t legal s t a n d a r d s a n d r e v i e w t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s a r e s u p p o r t e d b y substantial evidence." Young v. Sullivan, 911 F . 2 d 180, 183 ( 9 t h Cir. 1990) (citing Martinez v.

Heckler, 807 F . 2 d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986)). " A n A L l ' s findings as t o credibility are entitled to
considerable deference." Washingtonv. Garrett, l O F . 3 d 1421, 1430 ( 9 t h C i r . 19 9 3 ) ( c i t i n g Curran

v. Department o fthe Treasury, 714 F . 2 d 913,195 (9th Cir. 1983)). However, where i t is undermined
b y " i n h e r e n t improbab[ility]" o r "undisputed
fact~"

t h e A L l ' s credibility s h o u l d n o t receive

deference. ld. So long as i t is supported b y substantial record evidence, the A L l ' s decision m u s t

b e upheld~ e v e n i f t h e r e a r e o t h e r r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a l s o s u p p o r t e d b y t h e r e c o r d e v i d e n c e
a n d even i f the court i t s e l f m a y h a v e concluded otherwise. See Robbins v. SSA, 466 F . 3 d 880, 882 ( 9 t h Cir. 2 0 0 6 ) ( " I f t h e e v i d e n c e c a n s u p p o r t e i t h e r a f f i r m i n g o r r e v e r s i n g t h e A U ' s c o n c l u s i o n , w e m a y n o t substitute o u r j u d g m e n t f o r that o f the A U . " (citing Flaten v. S e c ' y o f Health & Human
Servs.~

44 F.3d

1453~

1 4 5 7 ( 9 t h Cir. 1 9 9 5 ) ) .

A.

Tallacus's Witnesses

Ta11acus argues t h a t h e was prejudiced b y t h e A U ' s decision n o t t o allow all o f h i s proposed w i t n e s s e s t o t e s t i f y a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g . A c c o r d i n g to
Tallacus~

the testimony o f T o m

w o u l d have d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t a substantial p o r t i o n o f h e r w o r k l o a d was t a k e n u p b y h i s o l d duties a n d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f D e n i s e Irtlholt ( " ! m h o It") w o u l d h a v e e x p l a i n e d t h a t t r i b a l s h a r e s f o r e i g h t e e n

3 T a l l a c u s ' s discrimination c l a i m s w e r e a l s o addressed b y t h e A L l . These claims, however, are subject t o de novo review in district court a n d are addressed separately, below.

OPINION AND ORDER

12

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tribes w e r e actually retained b y t h e P o r t l a n d office. H o w e v e r , b e y o n d T a l l a c u s ' s o w n conjecture, t h e court h a s n o b a s i s t o conclude t h a t t h e A L J a b u s e d h i s discretion b y limiting t h e n u m b e r o f w i t n e s s e s T a l l a c u s c o u l d p r e s e n t a t t h e administrative hearing. T h e C o u r t o f Appeals f o r t h e Federal C i r c u i t h a s n o t e d t h a t "[a] d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o a l l o w o r e x c l u d e w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y is w i t h i n t h e s o u n d discretion o f t h e administrative j u d g e . " Guise v. Dept. o fJustice, 3 3 0 F . 3 d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) (citing Tiffany v. Dept. o fthe Navy, 795 F . 2 d 67, 7 0 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). I n Guise, t h e p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d t o m a k e a s p e c i f i c s h o w i n g t h a t t h e A L l ' s r u l i n g " d e p r i v e d [him] o f i m p o r t a n t e v i d e n c e a n d , thus, t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t i t w a s n o t a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . " Id. a t 1380. I n t h i s case, T a l l a c u s s i m i l a r l y fails t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t h e w a s d e p r i v e d o f i m p o r t a n t e v i d e n c e and, t h u s , t h e c o u r t d e f e r s t o t h e A L J ' s decision to e x c l u d e this testimony. T a l l a c u s ' s o w n " W i t n e s s L i s t a n d S u m m a r y o f T e s t i m o n y " a l s o suppo~ t h e A L J ' s ruling. T a l l a c u s l i s t e d I m h o l t a s a witness a n d s t a t e d t h a t she " [ w o u l d ] b e able t o identify t h e tribes t h a t have l e f t t h e i r C H S T r i b a l S h a r e s R e t a i n e d . " ( A R 785.) T a l l a c u s also r e f e r s t o t h e s p r e a d s h e e t t h a t I m h o l t developed " s h o w i n g w h i c h A r e a programs have C H S shares left a n d shares t a k e n b y e a c h t r i b e for t h e P o r t l a n d A r e a . " Id. T h i s s p r e a d s h e e t was a d m i t t e d into e v i d e n c e a n d c a n b e f o u n d at A R 203-204. T a l l a c u s does n o t e x p l a i n w h y I m h o l t ' s t e s t i m o n y w a s necessary o r w h y t h e

spreadsheet w a s insufficient t o communicate t h e same information. T a l l a c u s also listed T o m a s a w i t n e s s a n d s t a t e d t h a t she c o u l d testify a s t o a n e x e c u t i v e m e e t m g t h a t t o o k p l a c e t h r e e days p r i o r t o t h e RIF, a n d t o t h e fact t h a t she w a s e x c u s e d f r o m t h e m e e t i n g s o t h a t t h e c o m m i t t e e c o u l d d i s c u s s p e r s o n n e l issues. H o w e v e r , t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n is c o n t a i n e d i n a n e m a i l e d v e r s i o n o f t h e m e e t i n g m i n u t e s s e n t b y T o m to Leslie Dye ( " D y e " ) , f o u n d at C A R 295. Tallacus a l s o stated t h a t T o m " c a n testify a b o u t t h e additional w o r k l o a d s h e received

OPINION AND ORDER

13

{KPR}

from CHS . . . and maybe any conversations she had with Doni Wilder, pertaining t o the added CHS w o r k l o a d a n d Ms. W i l d e r ' s r e s p o n s e . " ( A R 7 8 6 . ) T a l l a c u s r e f e r e n c e s t w o e x h i b i t s , f o u n d a t A R 209 and 241. The fIrst is a n email authored by Tallacus which outlines which CHS duties were to b e handled b y which IRS employee. The second exhibit is another email authored b y Tallacus w h i c h states that Tallacus, Dye, Tom, and David Battese ("Battese") m e t to discuss distribution o f the CHSO duties amongst those in the Office o f Health Programs. The email goes o n to note that the Agency " i s continuing to hire" employees i n other divisions. Again, Tallacus fails to explain h o w T o m ' s testimony, as characterized i n the summary oftestimony, deprived him o f important evidence a n d w a s t h u s a n abuse o f discretion b y t h e A U . T a l l a c u s s u b m i t t e d a s u b s e q u e n t d e c l a r a t i o n o f T o m w h i c h i n d i c a t e s t h a t s h e spends a p p r o x i m a t e l y eighty-fIve p e r c e n t o f h e r w o r k d a y o n C H S duties. T h i s d e c l a r a t i o n w a s n o t p a r t o f t h e administrative record a n d i t s c o n t e n t c a n n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d i n r e v i e w i n g t h e propriety o f t h e A L J ' s decision. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, (1985) ("The t a s k o f the reviewing court is t o apply the appropriate AP standard o f review to the agency decision based o n t h e r e c o r d t h e agency p r e s e n t s t o t h e r e v i e w i n g c o u r t . " ( c i t a t i o n s omitted)). B a s e d o n the

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e record, s p e c i f I c a l l y T a l l a c u s ' s " W i t n e s s L i s t a n d S u m m a r y o f T e s t i m o n y , " t h e c o u r t cannot conclude that the ALJ abused his discretion is excluding the testimony o f Imholt and Tom.

B.

L a c k o f Work

Defendant justifIes the RIF that eliminated Tallacus' s position as due to a lack o f work t h a t resulted from an increasing number o f tribes opting t o administer the CHS program internally. A s m o r e a n d m o r e t r i b e s o p t e d t o a d m i n i s t e r C H S ' s functions t h e m s e l v e s , t h e P o r t l a n d A r e a C H S h a d less and less work. Ultimately, the workload became so small that it no longer justified a n F T E {KPR}

OPINION A N D O R D E R

14

position and, accordingly, Tallacus was subjected to an RIF. Defendant further points o u t that Tallacus w a s t h e o n l y e m p l o y e e o f t h e P o r t l a n d a r e a CHS a n d w a s therefore t h e o n l y employee whose position could have been subject t o the RIF. Furthermore, the remaining CHS duties were a p p r o p r i a t e l y d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g e x i s t i n g i l l S employees. 4 T a l l a c u s r e s p o n d s t h a t t h e a d v e r s e e m p l o y m e n t a c t i o n a n d t h e r e a s o n for t h a t a c t i o n l a c k a rational nexus and, thus, the RIF was not legitimate. See Curran v. Dept. o fthe Treasury, 714 F.2d 9 1 3 , 9 1 4 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Before the MSPB, it is the agency's burden to establish t h a t t h e adverse action 'promoted the efficiency o f the service.' This requires p r o o f o f a rational nexus between the adverse action taken and the agency's articulated reason for the action." (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 770 1(c) and 7513(a); additional citations omitted)). First, Tallacus argues that Defedant' s claim that the increase in tribes assuming their own CHS functions demonstrates a lack o f work at CHS is a " r e d h e r r i n g . " I n s u p p o r t o ft h i s a r g u m e n t , T a l l a c u s cites t h e M a n a g e m e n t C o n t r o l S e l f - A s s e s s m e n t for C o n t r a c t H e a l t h S e r v i c e s for F Y 2 0 0 7 . T a l l a c u s c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e F T E w a s s p e c i f i c t o h i s position as CHSO and that b y contracting out some o f his duties to Colville, the agency did n o t c h a n g e t h e fact t h a t a n F T E e x i s t e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , T a l l a c u s a r g u e s t h a t t h e A L I ' s f m d i n g i s d i r e c t l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e F Y 2 0 0 7 assessment. Tallacus argues that the ALJ incorrectly interpreted the meaning o f this docwnent. The ALJ wrote: T h e a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t i f t h e r e w a s n o t e n o u g h w o r k t o j u s t i f y his p o s i t i o n , t h e A s s u r a n c e S t a t e m e n t s h o u l d have r e s p o n d e d " n o . " . . . W i l d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e A s s u r a n c e S t a t e m e n t s are t o s h o w t h a t p r o g r a m s a r e b e i n g o p e r a t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e

argues that i l l S followed proper procedures i n performing the RIF. Tallacus does n o t claim that the RIF was procedurally deficient and, as such, the court will n o t address its p r o p r i e t y i n t h i s disposition. OPINION A N D O R D E R 15

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with the law, policy a n d procedures. She stated that the assurance states t h a t the F T E i s a p p r o p r i a t e , b u t t h a t t h e F T E r e f e r e n c e d i s n o t t i e d to a s p e c i f i c p o s i t i o n . S h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e F T E c o n t i n u e d t o w o r k t h e CHS program. ( A R 8 2 0 ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . ) T h e A L I s t a t e d t h a t " [ a ] n a g e n c y d e c i s i o n to e l i m i n a t e a n e m p l o y e e ' s p o s i t i o n because the function c a n be p e r f o r m e d b y o t h e r employees . . . and o r b y contracting o u t . . . is legitimate." I d (citing 0 'Connell v. Dept. o fHealth & Humans Services, 21 M.S.P.R. 257, 260 (1984) a n d Kelley v. R a i l r o a d Retirement B d , 2 0 M.S.P.R. 188, 189 (1984)). B a s e d o n the t e s t i m o n y i n t h e r e c o r d a n d t h e c i t e d authority, t h e A L J ' s c o n c l u s i o n i s r e a s o n a b l e a n d s u p p o r t e d b y substantial evidence. Tallacus admits t h a t his o l d position was eliminated by t h e RIF, b u t argues t h a t splitting u p t h e d u t i e s b e t w e e n s e v e r a l o t h e r a g e n c y e m p l o y e e s i s t h e functional e q u i v a l e n t and, therefore, c o n t r a r y t o l a w . T a l l a c u s also n o t e s t h a t , e v e n i f h i s d u t i e s d i d n o t a d d u p t o a n F T E , t h e a g e n c y c o u l d h a v e a d d e d duties sufficient t o m a k e i t a n FTE. F i n a l l y , Tallacus argues t h a t P e g g y B i e r y ( " B i e r y " ) , w h o t o o k o n s o m e o f T a l l a c u s ' s CHS d u t i e s , w a s n o t a n e x i s t i n g employee a t t h e t i m e o f the RIF; i n fact, she h a s h i r e d o n N o v e m b e r 11, 2007, several months after the RIF, w h i c h occurred o n A u g u s t 30, 2007. D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e A L J s p e c i f i c a l l y c i t e d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Dye, w h o t e s t i f i e d t h a t T a l l a c u s ' s duties have b e e n a b s o r b e d b y h i s office a n d those duties d o n o t a m o u n t t o a n F T E p o s i t i o n . T h e A L I w r i t e s : " C a p t a i n L e s l i e Dye, D i r e c t o r o f t h e O f f i c e o f H e a l t h P r o g r a m s , P o r t l a n d Area, testified t h a t h i s office absorbed some o f the a p p e l l a n t ' s duties after t h e RIF. H e testified t h a t h e h a n d l e s appeals, L e a h T o m h a n d l e s C H E F m a t t e r s a n d B a t t e s e h a n d l e s transmissions. H e d e n i e d t h a t the a b s o r b e d w o r k w a s sufficient t o j u s t i f y a fulltime e q u i v a l e n t p o s i t i o n a n d s t a t e d t h a t h e a n d h i s t w o s u b o r d i n a t e s s p e n d a c o m b i n e d t w o days p e r w e e k p e r f o r m i n g t h e a b s o r b e d d u t i e s . " ( A R

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818 (citations omitted).) The hearing transcript reveals t h a t w h e n asked t o estimate h o w m u c h t i m e i t t o o k h i s o f f i c e t o p e r f o r m T a l l a c u s ' s p r e v i o u s duties, Dye s t a t e d t h a t i t w o u l d t a k e " o n average a c o u p l e o f d a y s a w e e k for t h e w h o l e s h o o t i n g m a t c h . " ( A R 713.) T h e administrative r e c o r d c o n t a i n s e m a i l s a u t h o r e d b y T a l l a c u s w h e r e i n he c o m p l a i n s o f b e i n g u n a b l e t o keep up w i t h a n o v e r w h e l m i n g workload. T h e A L l c i t e d t e s t i m o n y o f T a l l a c u s ' s s u p e r v i s o r , S h a r l e n e A n d r e w , w h o s t a t e d t h a t ' ' t h e b a c k l o g o f w h i c h [Tallacus] c o m p l a i n e d i n his emails was comprised o f claims w o r k t h a t w o u l d have b e e n processed b y the GS-5 claims clerk had t h a t p o s i t i o n b e e n filled. I t w a s n o t w o r k t h a t w o u l d n o r m a l l y b e p e r f o r m e d b y t h e C H S O . T h a t w o r k w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e C o l v i l l e S e r v i c e U n i t . " ( A R 8 1 9 . ) T h i s t e s t i m o n y is u n d i s p u t e d a n d is also supported by additional record evidence. See A R 406 ( W i l d e r ' s email stating t h a t t h e position o f t h e clerk, V e r n F o s t e r , w o u l d n o t b e filled a n d r e q u e s t e d s u g g e s t i o n s for c o m p l e t i n g h i s workload.); A R 593 ( W i l d e r testifying that, as a result o f F o s t e r ' s departure from C H S , there was a b a c k l o g o f w o r k T a l l a c u s h a d t o t e m p o r a r i l y a s s u m e , p r i o r to i t b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d t o C o l v i l l e . ) . This represents substantial e v i d e n c e t h a t T a l l a c u s ' s h e a v y w o r k l o a d was the r e s u l t o f t h e departure o f h i s c l e r k a n d was n o t p e r m a n e n t l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h i s position. Accordingly, e m a i l s t e n d i n g t o s h o w t h a t , f o r a p e r i o d o f t i m e , T a l l a c u s w a s o v e r w h e l m e d w i t h w o r k do n o t d e t r a c t f r o m t h e A g e n c y ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t his p o s i t i o n n o l o n g e r c o n s t i t u t e d a n FTE. T a l l a c u s a r g u e s a t l e n g t h t h a t b e c a u s e B i e r y w a s n o t e m p l o y e d a t t h e t i m e o f h i s RIP a n d n o w performs s o m e o f his former functions, she ·was hired for the purpose o f doing his job. T h e facts do n o t b e a r t h i s o u t . B i e r y is l i s t e d as a n I n f o r m a t i o n T e c h n o l o g y S p e c i a l i s t o n t h e

rns document

i d e n t i f y i n g e m p l o y e e s e l i g i b l e for a V S I P . ( A R 2 1 4 . ) W i l d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d u t i e s t h a t B i e r y p e r f o r m s t h a t w e r e f o r m e r l y T a l l a c u s ' s are n o t h e r " p r i m a r y d u t i e s . " ( A R 6 1 3 . ) D y e t e s t i f i e d t h a t

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Biery only performs CHS tasks w h e n another employee is n o t around. See A R 713 ("She does t h e backup transition w h e n David is n o t around[. ]"). Accordingly, the fact that Biery performs some o f T a l l a c u s ' s former duties does n o t undermine the A U ' s conclusion that the RIF was lawful. F o r a l l o f t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d , t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t the A L J ' s determination that the RIF was lawfully premised o n a lack o f w o r k sufficient to j u s t i f y a n F T E f o r T a l l a c u s ' s duties.

C.

Shortage o f Funds

T a l l a c u s f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e A g e n c y d i d n o t l a c k funds t o c o n t i n u e t o f u n d h i s p o s i t i o n and, t h e r e f o r e , i t s s e c o n d c l a i m e d " b o n a f i d e " i s a l s o w i t h o u t b a s i s . T h e A g e n c y d i d n o t d i s p u t e t h a t '"there is funding i n the Area that could support a full-time position, there i s no[] requirement t h a t t h e A r e a structure i t s e l f i n this m a n n e r . " ( A R 4 2 . ) T h e A g e n c y e x p l a i n e d : " M a n y functions t h a t w e r e p r e v i o u s l y p e r f o r m e d b y a f u l l t i m e s t a f f d e v o t e d t o a s i n g l e d i s c i p l i n e are n o w d o n e b y a n individual w i t h many such assignments, done b y a s t a f f at a Service Unit, or n o t done at all." Id. T h e A L I d i d n o t a d d r e s s t h e s h o r t a g e o f funds issue, i n s t e a d p r e m i s i n g t h e h o l d i n g o n " p r e p o n d e r a n t e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e C H S O d u t i e s w e r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a f u l l t i m e C H S O . . . ."

(AR 820.) Accordingly, the c o u r t cannot a n d need .not review the sufficiency o f the A L J ' s
conclusion. Because the RIP was adequately j u s t i f i e d b y insufficient w o r k t o require a n FTE, the A L I ' s d e c i s i o n i s s o u n d a n d t h i s c o u r t a f f i r m s t h a t decision.

II. -.

Discrimination Claims E a c h o f Tallacus' s discrimination claims is premised o n the basis that, after his position was

eliminated, his duties were distributed to people outside o f his protected class. F o r purposes o f this d i s c u s s i o n , i t is h e l p f u l t o r e v i e w t h e i d e n t i t i e s a n d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h o s e p e o p l e . T a l l a c u s h i m s e l f OPINION A N D O R D E R

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is a sixty-two year o l d male. Dye i s m a l e a n d approximately t h e s a m e age as Tallacus; Battece i s m a l e , y o u n g e r t h a n Tallacus; T o m i s female a n d a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e s a m e a g e as T a l l a c u s ; B i e r y i s a t h i r t y - f o u r y e a r o l d female. C h a p t e r 42 o f t h e U n i t e d States Code, s e c t i o n 2 0 0 0 e · 3 states, in r e l e v a n t part:

I t shall b e a n l.Ul1awful employment practice for a n employer to discriminate against any o f h i s e m p l o y e e s o r applicants for e m p l o y m e n t . . . b e c a u s e h e h a s o p p o s e d any practice m a d e a n l.Ul1awful e m p l o y m e n t practice b y [Title VII], o r because he has m a d e a charge, testified, assisted, o r p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a n y m a n n e r i n a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n , p r o c e e d i n g , o r h e a r i n g u n d e r [ T i t l e VII].
4 2 U S C S § 2 0 0 0 e - 3 . T h i s p r o v i s i o n o f T i t l e V I I " p r o t e c t s t h e r i g h t t o b e free f r o m c e r t a i n t y p e s o f forbidden discrimination, a s well a s t h e r i g h t t o s p e a k out against such discrimination. It also p r o t e c t s against r e t a l i a t i o n for t h e exercise o f t h e r i g h t t o s p e a k o u t a g a i n s t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . "

Hernandezv. Spacelabs Medical Inc., 343 F . 3 d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003).
T a l l a c u s ' s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m s a r e g o v e r n e d b y t h e McDonnell Douglas b u r d e n - s h i f t i n g f r a m e w o r k . " U n d e r M c D o n n e l l Douglas, a p l a i n t i f f a l l e g i n g d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t u n d e r T i t l e V I I m u s t f i r s t e s t a b l i s h a p r i m a facie c a s e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e p l a i n t i f f m u s t s h o w t h a t

( 1 ) h e b e l o n g s t o a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s ; ( 2 ) h e w a s q u a l i f i e d f o r t h e p o s i t i o n ; (3) h e w a s s u b j e c t t o a n
a d v e r s e e m p l o y m e n t action; a n d ( 4 ) s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d i n d i v i d u a l s o u t s i d e h i s p r o t e c t e d c l a s s w e r e treated m o r e favorably." Chaung v. Univ. o fCalifornia Davis, 225 F . 3 d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal c i t a t i o n omitted). " T h e requisite degree o f p r o o f necessary t o e s t a b l i s h a p r i m a f a c i e c a s e f o r a T i t l e V I I c l a i m o n s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t ' i s m i n i m a l a n d d o e s n o t e v e n n e e d t o rise t o t h e l e v e l o f a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e . ' " McNackv. Warren, C i v i l N o . 9 9 · 1 2 1 1 - K I , 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14381, a t *13 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2 0 0 0 ) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. S i m p l o t C o . , 2 6 F . 3 d 8 8 5 , 8 8 9

(9th C i r . 1 9 9 4 » . " T h e p l a i n t i f f n e e d o n l y o f f e r e v i d e n c e w h i c h ' g i v e s r i s e t o a n i n f e r e n c e o f
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unlawful discrimination. '" Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889 (quoting Lowe v. City o fMonrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 1985)). Once a plaintiffhas made his prima facie showing o f discrimination, "[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. See also Knox, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 ("If plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden o f production then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." (citing Chaung v.
Univ. o fCal., 225 F.3d 1115, 1123-1124 (9th Cir. 2000))). I f the defendant successfully gives such

a reason for the employment action, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the proffered reason is pretextuaL Chaung, 225 F.3d at 1124. Pretext may be established in one o f two ways: "(1) indirectly by showing that defendant's proffered explanation is unworthy o f credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable; or (2) directly, by showing that unlawful discrimination more likely motivated the defendant." White v. TA Operating Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48103, at *8-9 (D. Or. June 19,2008) (citing Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998)).
A. Gender Discrimination

Defendant concedes that Tallacus has satisfied the first three prongs o f the prima facie analysis for this claim Therefore, Ta1lacus need only show that a similarly situated woman was treated more favorably than he was. Tallacus argues that the bulk o f his former duties have been assigned to two female employees ofIBS, Tom and Biery. I n her deposition, Tom testified that she initially spent approximately fifty- to sixty-percent o f her day performing CHS functions. (Tallacus Decl., Tom Depo. at 9:21-10:9.) I n a subsequent declaration, Tom stated that she spends at least OPINION AND ORDER 20
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eighty-five percent o f her time on CHS duties "on a regular basis." (Tom Supp. Decl. 3.) Tom also stated that Biery performs approximately ten percent o f the CRS duties. Id. at 4. Tallacus also argues that Biery was hired as a result o f Tom taking over some ofTallacus's CRS duties and, thus, but for the RIF that eliminated his position, Biery would not have been hired. As noted above, Tom and Biery are female. Defendant argues that this evidence fails to establish that similarly situated women were treated more favorably. First, Tallacus provides no evidence that the decision to conduct the RIF was based on gender. Second, Tallacus does not provide examples o f women that are actually similarly situated to himself. Tom and Biery work in a different division o f IHS, the Business Office. Neither o f them were potentially subject to an RIP premised on a lack o f work in CHS. Third, no one was hired to replace Tallacus in CRS, let alone a female. Third, although Biery was hired after the RIP, she was hired in an information technology position and was not supposed to be performing CRS duties, but was pressed into service as a result o f a high volume o f work in the Business Office. Fourth, both men and women have taken over CRS duties since the RIP. Finally, that Tom and Biery currently perform Tallacus's old duties is not evidence o f that females have been treated more favorably than males. Defendant is correct. Tallacus simply cannot show that a similarly situated female was treated more favorably because there was no similarly situated female at the time o f the RIF. I t is true that the majority o f his former tasks ended up on the desks o f two other female employees. However, to characterize this as favorable treatment misses the point. I f Tom or Biery had retained their jobs as a result o f Tallacus' s RIP, then it could be argued that they received favorable treatment.
In this case, however, the RIF was specific to CRS because o f the shrinking number o ftribes electing

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to administer a CHS program internally, resulting i n a lack o f w o r k sufficient to j u s t i f y an F T E i n CHS. I t follows t h a t t h e o n l y employees t h a t c o u l d h a v e b e n e f i t t e d from g e n d e r b a s e d

discrimination, w i t h respect to the RIF, would be female employees o f CHS. T o m and Biery were n o t employees o f CHS a n d d i d n o t b e n e f i t f r o m t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f T a l l a c u s ' s p o s i t i o n a t C H S . Accordingly, Defendant's motion as to the gender discrimination claim is granted.

B.

Age Discrimination

Tallacus's age discrimination claim follows m u c h the same analytical path as h i s claim for g e n d e r discrimination. Tallacus c a n n o t s h o w t h a t a s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d b u t y o u n g e r p e r s o n r e c e i v e d a benefit from T a l l a c u s ' s position being eliminated. Again, the alleged benefit was receiving more work as a result o f Tallacus's departure from CHS. Furthermore, the p e r s o n who, according to Tallacus, performs the bulk o f his o l d duties is approximately the same age as he is. F o r the above reasons, Defendant's motion as to the age discrimination claim is granted.

C.

Disability Discrimination

The American with Disabilities A c t o f 1990 (''the ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §12201, prohibits c o v e r e d employers from "discriminat[ing] a g a i n s t a qualified individual w i t h a d i s a b i l i t y because o f t h e disability o f s u c h i n d i v i d u a l i n r e g a r d t o j o b a p p l i c a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s , t h e hiring, advancement, o r d i s c h a r g e o f employees, e m p l o y e e c o m p e n s a t i o n , j o b t r a i n i n g , a n d o t h e r t e r m s , c o n d i t i o n s , a n d p r i v i l e g e s o f e m p l o y m e n t . " 4 2 U . S . C . § l 2 1 1 2 ( a ) (2010). T h e A D A d e f i n e s " q u a l i f i e d i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a d i s a b i l i t y " a s a n " i n d i v i d u a l w i t h a d i s a b i l i t y who, w i t h o r w i t h o u t r e a s o n a b l e a c c o m m o d a t i o n , c a n p e r f o r m t h e e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s o ft h e e m p l o y m e n t p o s i t i o n t h a t s u c h i n d i v i d u a l holds o r desires." 42 U.S.C. § 1 2 1 1 l ( 8 ) ; 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(m).

I n o r d e r t o prevail o n a n

e m p l o y m e n t t e r m i n a t i o n c l a i m u n d e r t h e A D A , a p l a i n t i f f m u s t e s t a b l i s h that: ( l ) s h e i s a d i s a b l e d

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person w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e A D A ; ( 2 ) s h e i s qualified, t h a t is, w i t h o r w i t h o u t reasona b l e a c c o m m o d a t i o n ( w h i c h s h e m u s t describe), s h e is a b l e t o p e r f o r m t h e e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s o f t h e j o b ; a n d (3) t h e e m p l o y e r t e r m i n a t e d h e r b e c a u s e o f h e r disability. N u n e s v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F . 3 d 1243, 1 2 4 6 (9th Cir. 1 9 9 9 ) . T a l l a c u s a r g u e s t h a t h i s r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m s u b s u m e s t h e d i s a b i l i t y c l a i m , t h a t is, h i s d i s a b i l i t y g a v e rise t o t h e 2 0 0 0 s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t w h i c h c a u s e d W i l d e r t o r e s e n t h i m a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , e l i m i n a t e h i s p o s i t i o n for illegitimate reasons. D e f e n d a n t argues t h a t t h i s r e a s o n i n g lacks s u p p o r t a n d i s c i r c u l a r . T h e c o u r t a g r e e s t h a t T a l l a c u s m u s t p r o v e h i s p r i m a facie c a s e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b a s e d o n disability w i t h o u t relying o n t h e t h e o r y o f retaliation. I f T a l l a c u s was, indeed, retaliated a g a i n s t for e n g a g i n g i n p r o t e c t e d activity, p r o p e r r e d r e s s i s t h r o u g h a r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m . I f h e w a s d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t for h i s disability, h e m u s t p r o v e t h a t t h e R l F w a s a r e s u l t o f h i s disability, n o t h i s p r o t e c t e d activity. T h a t said, T a l l a c u s fails t o m e e t h i s p r i m a facie b u r d e n as t o t h i s c l a i m . D e f e n d a n t c o n c e d e s t h a t Tallacus satisfies t h e first t w o p r i m a facie elements, b u t argues t h a t h e has n o t p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e t h a t h i s t e r m i n a t i o n r e s u l t e d f r o m d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b a s e d o n h i s disability. T a l l a c u s a r g u e s t h a t W i l d e r ' s testimony demonstrates discrimination. W h e n asked i f s h e k n e w t h a t Tallacus was disabled, she testified t h a t she " o n l y k n e w t h a t h e ' d h a d injuries a n d k n e e surgeries a t various p o i n t s . " ( A R 554.) She also m e n t i o n e d t h a t i l l S p r o v i d e d h i m a p a r k i n g s p o t b e c a u s e h e h a d "difficulty w a l k i n g . " I d I n addition, p r i o r t o t h e R l F , W i l d e r investigated T a l l a c u s ' s u s e o f s i c k l e a v e a n d a n n u a l leave. T h i s e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t to s u g g e s t t h a t T a l l a c u s ' s p o s i t i o n w a s e l i m i n a t e d b e c a u s e o f d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a n i m u s b a s e d o n disability. T a l l a c u s d o e s n o t d i s p u t e t h e t e s t i m o n y o f W i l d e r t h a t

OPINION A N D O R D E R

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she requested a report on Tallacus's leave after the RIF occurred, nor does he dispute that Wilder reviews the leave used by all employees that she supervises. (AR 636-637.) While the fact that Wilder did not characterize Tallacus's position as a disability, yet recognized that he had physical limitations, suggests a potentially dismissive attitude toward his disability, i t alone cannot justify the inference that Tallacus' s position was eliminated because o f discriminatory animus. Therefore, Defendant's motion as to disability discrimination is granted.

J...

Retaliation Claim The McDonnell Douglas framework also governs retaliation claims arising under Title V I I .

See Bergene v. S a l t River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power District, 272 F.3d 1136, 1140

(9th Cir. 2001) ("We apply a system o f shifting burdens in Title vn discrimination and retaliation

cases." (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-803)). "Aplaintiffmayestablishaprimafacie case o f discriminatory retaliation by showing that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Jamal v. Wilshire Management L e a s i n g
Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1078 (D. Or. 2004) (citing Bergene v. Salt River Proejct Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001». " I f the plaintiff establishes a p r i m a facie case, 'the McDonnell Douglas' order and allocation o f proof that governs disparate

treatment claims also governs retaliation claims.'" Kitchen v. WSCO Petroleum Corp., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1144 (D. Or. Jan. 29, 2007) (citing Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied 498 U.S. 939 (1990)).

Again, Defendant concedes that Tallacus meets the fIrst two prongs o f this test. Defendant contends, however, that Tallacus cannot establish a causal connection between the protected conduct,

OPINION AND ORDER

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bringing a claim against i l l S and subsequently entering into the 2000 settlement agreement, and the adverse employment action, the elimination o f his position via an RIP in 2007. Tallacus argues that there is no set time limit that breaks the chain o f causation and, further, that there is additional evidence that overcomes the seven-year gap between the settlement o f his lawsuit and the allegedly retaliatory RIP. The Ninth Circuit has declined to establish a bright-line rule with respect to the time between protected activity and adverse action: There is no set time beyond which acts cannot support an inference o f retaliation, and there is no set time within which acts necessarily support an inference o f retaliation. Whether an adverse employment action is intended to be retaliatory is a question o f fact that must be decided in the light o f the timing and the surrounding circumstances. In some cases, the totality o f the facts may form such a clear picture that a district court would be justified in granting summary judgment, either for or against a plaintiff, on the issue o f retaliatory motive; but the length o f time, considered without regard to its factual setting, is not enough by itself to justify a grant o f summary judgment.
Coszalter v. City o fSalem, 320 F.3d 968,978 (9th Cir. 2003).

Tallacus argues that Wilder revealed her feelings about the settlement agreement at the time it was entered into. Wilder stated in her testimony at the administrative hearing: You know, basically we had reached an agreement where he was going to receive a sum o f money that would have otherwise provided healthcare to Indian people and I ' m Indian and I worked my whole career for that, and I wanted to make sure that he understood that I hope that he was going to [do] something good for the Agency that would make sure that that money was well spent. (AR 567.) At the time o f the settlement agreement, Wilder mentioned to Tallacus that he might be subject to an RIP in the future because o f the increasing number o f tribes opting to internalize their CHS program. Tallacus interpreted this statement as a threat. I n 2003, Wilder again commented to Tallacus that he may be subject to an RIP in the future. (AR 727.) In 2005, Tallacus saw his name OPINION AND ORDER 25
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on an executive committee agenda which indicated that an RIF o f his position would be discussed. (AR 729-730.) Tallacus testified that these three incidents made him feel that he was perpetually in danger o f being subject to an RIF. (AR 731.) This evidence is sufficient to meet Tallacus's prima facie burden. Wilder's own testimony reveals that, at the very least, she felt that Tallacus' s settlement was depriving the population served by IHS o f health care and that Tallacus would need to work hard to compensate for this. Also, as described in the disability discrimination section, Wilder testified somewhat dismissively about Tallacus's disability, which suggests further that she believed the settlement agreement was unnecessary, excessive, or even illegitimate. Taken together, a reasonable jury could conclude that Wilder harbored a grudge against Tallacus that caused her to pursue an RIF that was not strictly necessary. Defendant proffers as its legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons a lack o f work and shortage offunds, the reasons originally given to justify the RIP. It bears noting that in establishing a genuine issue o f material fact as to whether the proffered reason is pretextual, Tallacus "may rely on the same evidence they used to establish a prima facie case or put forth additional evidence." Coleman v. The
Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000). The court finds that the evidence for his

prima facie burden is sufficiently strong to create a reasonable inference that the reason given for the adverse action was pretextual. Wilder, a supervisor, expressed a strong and admittedly emotional response to the settlement agreement. Her response was particularly intense because she felt that, not only was Tallacus receiving a large sum o f money, he was i n effect depriving those i n need o f those funds. The court acknowledges that seven years is a long period o f time in the context o f a retaliation claim. That said, this is an issue that hinges on facts and credibility and the court cannot OPINION AND ORDER

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conclude t h a t a reasonable j u r y c o u l d n o t find for Tallacus o n his retaliation claim. Accordingly, D e f e n d a n t ' s m o