Earp v. Multnomah County Health Department et al

Filing 33

OPINION AND ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees 21 and Bill of Costs 20 are granted in part. Plaintiff is entitled to $20,325.85. in attorney fees and $416.52 in costs. Signed on 1/7/10 by Judge Garr M. King. (cib)

FILED
JAN:Z 2010

IN T H E UNITED STATES DISTRICT C O U R T D I S T R I C T OF O R E G O N P O R T L A N D DIVISION

C A T H E R I N E EARP,
Plaintiff,

Civil C a s e No. 0 8 - 1 2 1 7 - K I

OPINION A N D O R D E R vs.

MULTNOMAH COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, and V A L E R I E WHITTLESEY, i n her official capacity a n d as a n individual,
Defendants.

George P. Fisher 3635 S W D o s c h R o a d Portland, O r e g o n 9 7 2 3 9 A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f Agnes Sowle, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y for M u l t n o m a h C o u n t y , O r e g o n Jenny M. M o r f Page 1 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

Bernadette Nunley Assistant C o u n t y Attorneys 501 SE Hawthorne Blvd., Suite 500 Portland, O r e g o n 9 7 2 1 4 Attorneys for Defendants

K I N G , Judge: B e f o r e t h e c o u r t i s p l a i n t i f f C a t h e r i n e E a r p ' s M o t i o n f o r A t t o r n e y F e e s (#21) a n d B i l l o f C o s t s (#20). F o r t h e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h b e l o w , I g r a n t t h e m o t i o n f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s i n p a r t a n d g r a n t the Bill o f Costs i n part. A l s o b e f o r e t h e court i s p l a i n t i f f s M o t i o n t o S t r i k e D e f e n d a n t s ' O b j e c t i o n s ( # 2 7 ) , w h i c h I deny.

BACKGROUND
P l a i n t i f f C a t h e r i n e E a r p , a n u r s e formerly e m p l o y e d b y d e f e n d a n t M u l t n o m a h C o u n t y H e a l t h D e p a r t m e n t a n d s u p e r v i s e d b y d e f e n d a n t V a l e r i e W h i t t l e s e y ( t o g e t h e r , ' ' t h e County"), alleged i n a lawsuit t h a t defendants violated h e r First Amendment right to free speech as well as provisions o f O r e g o n ' s Whistleblower Act. P l a i n t i f f also brought claims alleging wrongful discharge and intentional infliction o f emotional distress. She filed her complaint o n October 20, 2008. T h e C o u n t y p r o d u c e d a n O f f e r o f J u d g m e n t o n O c t o b e r 12. 2 0 0 9 , w h i c h p l a i n t i f f a c c e p t e d o n O c t o b e r 2 0 , 2 0 0 9 . T h e O f f e r o f J u d g m e n t r e a d s , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , as f o l l o w s : P u r s u a n t to t h e F e d e r a l R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 6 8 , d e f e n d a n t s h e r e b y offer to allow j u d g m e n t in the above-captioned matter to b e t a k e n against them by p l a i n t i f f i n t h e s u m o f f i f t e e n t h o u s a n d a n d o n e dollars a n d o n e c e n t ($15,001.01) i n addition t o reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred as o f the date o f this offer. D e f s . ' Offer o f J. (#15). P l a i n t i f f is represented by George Fisher.

P a g e 2 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

LEGAL STANDARDS
In addressing a petition for attorney fees under federal law, the court must first determine the "lodestar" amount b y multiplying the number o f hours reasonably spent o n the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Morales v. City o f San Rafael, 96 F.3d 3 5 9 , 3 6 3 (9th Cir. 1996), amended o n other grounds, 108 F.3d 981 (1997). In determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, the district court should consider the factors specified i n Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild. Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9 th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976). The factors are: (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty o f t h e questions i n v o l v e d , (3) t h e s k i l l r e q u i s i t e t o p e r f o r m t h e l e g a l s e r v i c e p r o p e r l y , (4) t h e preclusion o f other employment by the attorney due to acceptance o f the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed o r contingent, I (7) t i m e limitations imposed b y t h e client o r the circumstances, (8) the a m o u n t involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability o f t h e attorneys, (10) the " u n d e s i r a b i l i t y " o f t h e case, (11) the nature a n d l e n g t h o f t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l relationship w i t h the client, and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 363 n.8. N e x t , t h e c o u r t m u s t c o n s i d e r the n e c e s s i t y o f a d j u s t i n g t h e l o d e s t a r a m o u n t , b a s e d o n t h e K e r r factors n o t a l r e a d y s u b s u m e d i n t h e l o d e s t a r c a l c u l a t i o n . M o r a l e s , 9 6 F . 3 d a t 3 6 3 - 6 4 . T h e r e is a strong presumption, however, that the lodestar amount is a reasonable fee a n d should only be enhanced in " r a r e a n d exceptional c a s e s . " Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). A reduction o f the lodestar fee may be justified when t h e plaintiff fails to obtain r e l i e f o n all claims, and i f hours spent o n unsuccessful claims were not needed to pursue successful claims. Ouesada v. Thomason, 8 5 0 F.2d 537, 539 (9th Cir. 1988).

" w h e t h e r the fee is fixed o r contingent" is listed as a factor, the Supreme Court subsequently held that enhancing a fee award o n account o f contingency is improper. See City o f Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Davis v. City and County o f San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1549 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated i n part o n other grounds, 984 F . 2 d 345 (9 th Cir. 1993). Page 3 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

I Although

DISCUSSION
1.
Motion t o Strike P l a i n t i f f moves to strike the C o u n t y ' s objections to h e r M o t i o n for Attorney Fees and Bill o f C o s t s , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e C o u n t y ' s s u b m i s s i o n w a s untimely. P l a i n t i f f filed h e r m o t i o n for attorney fees o n December 3, 2009. The County filed its response on December 21. Contrary to p l a i n t i f f ' s assertion, the C o u n t y ' s objections were not late. Pursuant t o Local Rule 54-3(b), objections were due " n o t later than fourteen (14) days after s e r v i c e o f t h e m o t i o n . " P u r s u a n t t o F e d e r a l R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ( " F R C P " ) 6(a)(1), t h e " d a y o f the event that triggers the period" is to be excluded. Counting fourteen days from December 4 would make the objections due December 17. Pursuant to F R C P 6(e), however, " [ w ] h e n a p a r t y m a y o r m u s t a c t w i t h i n a specified t i m e a f t e r s e r v i c e a n d s e r v i c e i s made u n d e r Rule 5(b)(2)(C), ( 0 ) , (E), or (F), 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire under R u l e 6(a)." H e r e , s e r v i c e w a s m a d e u n d e r R u l e 5(E) (service b y e l e c t r o n i c m e a n s ) , w h i c h made t h e objections due o n Sunday, December 20. Pursuant to FRCP 6 ( a ) ( I ) ( C ) , " i f the last day is a Saturday, S u n d a y , o r l e g a l h o l i d a y , t h e p e r i o d c o n t i n u e s t o r u n u n t i l t h e e n d o f t h e n e x t d a y t h a t is not a Saturday, Sunday, o r legal holiday." As a result, the C o u n t y ' s objections were due on M o n d a y , D e c e m b e r 2 1 , w h i c h is w h e n i t f i l e d t h e m . II. Attorney F e e s A. Prevailing PartY

The County, relying o n S e a C o a s t Foods v. Lu-mar Lobster and Shrimp, 260 F .3d 1054, 1059 (9 th Cir. 2001), suggests p l a i n t i f f is not a prevailing party and therefore not entitled to attorney fees. T h e defendant i n S e a C o a s t Foods offered a j u d g m e n t o f $375,000, without Page 4 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

mentioning whether o r not t h a t a m o u n t included attorney fees, which the p l a i n t i f f accepted. Since one o f the claims u n d e r w h i c h p l a i n t i f f sued entitled i t t o attorney fees, the court was r e q u i r e d t o e v a l u a t e w h e t h e r p l a i n t i f f w a s t h e p r e v a i l i n g party. C o m p a r i n g t h e o u t c o m e w i t h t h e demand o f over $3,000,000, the c o u r t concluded p l a i n t i f f did n o t prevail. The COWlty contends t h a t , as i n S e a C o a s t F o o d s , t h e s e t t l e m e n t h e r e w a s a n u i s a n c e s e t t l e m e n t a n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f s demand for reinstatement, backpay, emotional distress and punitive damages far exceeded what she r e c e i v e d - " l e s s t h a n a quarter o f p l a i n t i f f s yearly salary[.]" D e f s . ' Obj. at 3.

In contrast to the d e f e n d a n t ' s offer i n S e a Coast Foods, however, the COWlty'S offer o f
judgment included "reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred as o f the date o f this offer." Offer o f J. (#15). The County, as the "master o f the offer," is not entitled t o duck the language o f its offer. Sea Coast Foods, 260 F.3d at 1059. A s a result, I do n o t consider the C o u n t y ' s frivolous argument that p l a i n t i f f is not entitled to attorney fees. B. A m o u n t Requested

P l a i n t i f f requests $49,530.00 i n attorney fees. The County objects to t h e petition o n the f o l l o w i n g grounds: F i s h e r ' s h o u r l y r a t e s h o u l d b e r e d u c e d f r o m $ 3 2 5 to $ 2 5 0 ; p l a i n t i f f m a y n o t recover for 46 hours Fisher spent p r i o r to the filing o f the Complaint; 14.5 hours Fisher spent "cataloging" discovery is n o t compensable; 4.7 hours Fisher spent after the COWlty made its Offer o f Judgment should b e cut; and the total request is unreasonable a n d should b e decreased b a s e d o n t h e results p l a i n t i f f achieved. 1. Hourly Rate

Fisher seeks fees based o n a n hourly fee o f $ 3 2 5 .

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The County relies o n the Oregon State B a r ' s Economic Survey from 2007, i n which P o r t l a n d a t t o r n e y s p r a c t i c i n g c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n b i l l e d a m e d i a n h o u r l y r a t e o f $ 2 5 0 . A t t o r n e y s i n the 95 th percentile billed $350. T h e County also relies o n several decisions f r o m this court i n which F i s h e r was a w a r d e d f e e s b a s e d o n a n h o u r l y r a t e o f $ 2 2 5 . F i s h e r suggests I s h o u l d reference t h e s e c t i o n o f the E c o n o m i c S u r v e y tracking hourly rates for attorneys in private practice based o n years o f practice. Attorneys practicing 16 to 20 years in Portland in the 75 th percentile billed $325 p e r hour. H e contends that i n the absence o f a p u b l i s h e d r a t e f o r a t t o r n e y s i n l a b o r a n d e m p l o y m e n t law, I s h o u l d c o n s i d e r h i m a s p e c i a l i s t i n t h e a r e a a n d a w a r d t h i s h i g h e r rate. Fisher, having practiced 18 years in the somewhat complicated arena o f employment law, is entitled t o a higher hourly rate than is suggested by the County. However, g i v e n that the rates for attorneys representing plaintiffs i n civil litigation (excluding personal injury) range from $181 ( f o r the 25 th percentile) to $350 ( f o r the 95 th percentile), I think a rate o f $295 (in line with the 75 th percentile) is appropriate. 2. W o r k P r i o r to C o m p l a i n t

F i s h e r s p e n t 46 h o u r s , p r i o r to d r a f t i n g t h e C o m p l a i n t , i n i t i a t i n g a n d p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e administrative process overseen by the B u r e a u o f Labor and Industries (BOLI).2 P l a i n t i f f was not required to file a B O L l c o m p l a i n t as a condition to proceeding i n court. T h e s e hours are not r e c o v e r a b l e u n d e r 4 2 U . S . C . § 1988 i f t h e y do n o t h a v e a n " i n t i m a t e c o n n e c t i o n " o r s e r v e s o m e sort o f "integral function" to the federal action. R o c k Creek Ltd. P ' s h i p v. State Water Res.

2 P l a i n t i f f d o e s n o t d i s p u t e the C o u n t y ' s c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e h o u r s F i s h e r s p e n t o n B O L l r e l a t e d matters. Page 6 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

Control Bd., 972 F.2d 274, 2 7 9 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Webb v. B o a r d o f E d u c . o f Dyer County, 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) ( t i m e s p e n t o n "optional administrative proceedings" may b e r e c o v e r a b l e u n d e r § 1988 i f w o r k w a s " b o t h u s e f u l a n d o f a t y p e o r d i n a r i l y n e c e s s a r y t o a d v a n c e t h e . . . l i t i g a t i o n " t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e p a r t y succeeded). P l a i n t i f f asserts o n l y t h a t h e r " B O L l c o m p l a i n t s o u g h t t o e n f o r c e § 1 9 8 3 . " P I ' s . Reply a t 10. I cannot tell from F i s h e r ' s time entries whether h i s w o r k o n t h e B O L I complaint served h i m w e l l i n t h e f e d e r a l l i t i g a t i o n a n d h e p r o v i d e s no e x p l a n a t i o n a s t o w h a t h e f i l e d w i t h B O L l a n d what he gained from t h a t process t h a t benefitted this litigation. As a result, I conclude Fisher c a n n o t r e c o v e r for t h e 46 h o u r s h e s p e n t o n t h e BOLI proceeding.

3.

Cataloging Discovery

Fisher cataloged discovery for 14.5 hours, and the County objects t o paying for that work. F i s h e r e x p l a i n s t h a t w h a t h e m e a n s b y " c a t a l o g i n g " d i s c o v e r y is t h a t h e r e a d t h e d i s c o v e r y p r o v i d e d b y p l a i n t i f f a n d t h e C o u n t y a n d s u m m a r i z e d e a c h page. H e f o u n d t h i s p r o c e s s h e l p e d i n f o r m h i m a b o u t t h e f a c t s o f t h e case. F i s h e r s u b m i t t e d t o t h e c o u r t t h e c a t a l o g i n s u p p o r t o f h i s statements a b o u t its content. P l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o fees f o r F i s h e r ' s r e v i e w o f d i s c o v e r y .

4.

Post-Offer W o r k

Fisher billed 7.9 hours after the County proposed its Offer o f Judgment. The County is seeking to excise 4.7 o f t h o s e hours (10/13, 10/14, 10/20 and 11/19 entries). I t specifically notes in a footnote t h a t i t does n o t s e e k t o exclude 3.2 hours Fisher s p e n t o n his fee petition (11130 entry).

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Fisher does n o t r e s p o n d t o the C o u n t y ' s objection to 2.6 hours (the 10/13, 10/14 and 10/20 entries), b u t notes t h a t t h e C o u n t y included i n its objection 2.1 h o u r s Fisher spent o n his fee petition (11/19 entry). D e s p i t e t h e c l e a r p h r a s i n g o f t h e O f f e r o f J u d g m e n t l i m i t i n g a t t o r n e y fees t o t h o s e "incurred as o f the date o f t h i s offer," t h e County does n o t object t o F i s h e r ' s recovery o f fees connected w i t h his fee petition. C o m p a r e Guerrero v. Cummings, 70 F . 3 d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1995) ( p o s t - o f f e r l e g a l w o r k n o t c o m p e n s a b l e w h e r e o f f e r c l e a r l y p r e c l u d e s s u c h f e e s ) , w i t h Holland v. Roeser, 3 7 F.3d 501 (9 th Cir. 1994) (language o f offer ambiguous as t o whether fees c u t - o f f as o f date o f offer). Since the County does not object, I excise only 2.6 hours Fisher spent o n legal w o r k after the offer o f j u d g m e n t , b u t a l l o w Fisher t o recover fees for his attorney fee petition. I also note t h a t Fisher reports h e spent 5 hours o n h i s reply. H e is entitled t o those fees as w e l l a n d n e e d n o t s u b m i t a s u p p l e m e n t a l p e t i t i o n . 5. Reasonableness o f A w a r d

The County contends that t h e overall fee should b e reduced because p l a i n t i f f achieved only a m o d i c u m o f s u c c e s s , t h e c a s e w a s n o t c o m p l i c a t e d , i t w a s r e s o l v e d quickly, t h e 2 6 . 6 hours F i s h e r s p e n t r e v i e w i n g a n d p r o d u c i n g d i s c o v e r y w a s excessive, a n d F i s h e r b l o c k billed. A f t e r m a k i n g t h e a d j u s t m e n t s n o t e d a b o v e , F i s h e r ' s fee r e q u e s t i s r e d u c e d t o a t o t a l o f $ 3 2 , 0 9 6 (108.8 h o u r s x $ 2 9 5 ) . I a c c e p t F i s h e r ' s s t a t e m e n t s t h a t t h e c a s e w a s f a c t u a l l y c o m p l e x , t h a t t h e C o u n t y ' s i n c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n s m a d e " c o m m i t m e n t t o l e g a l a r g u m e n t s and c a s e strategy u n u s u a l l y f l u i d , " a n d t h a t h e h a d t o t u r n d o w n o t h e r w o r k t o d e v o t e s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o t h i s case. PI's. Mem. a t 3. I s e e n o b l o c k billing i n F i s h e r ' s fee petition; where Fisher completed multiple tasks, he itemized the t i m e parenthetically.

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Nevertheless, because p l a i n t i f f achieved only minor success i n the litigation, I think i t is appropriate to reduce t h e award b y forty percent. The C o u n t y ' s Offer o f Judgment made no a d m i s s i o n o f l i a b i l i t y , t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s as r e c a l c u l a t e d w o u l d b e m o r e t h a n d o u b l e t h e s e t t l e m e n t , a n d p l a i n t i f f d i d n o t a c h i e v e t h e e q u i t a b l e o r c o m p e n s a t o r y r e l i e f s h e sought. 3 Accordingly, p l a i n t i f f is entitled to attorney fees i n t h e a m o u n t o f $ 1 9 , 2 5 7 . 6 0 , plus $1,068.25 for electronic legal research w h i c h is described further below. P l a i n t i f f is entitled to a t o t a l a w a r d o f a t t o r n e y fees o f $ 2 0 , 3 2 5 . 8 5 .

n.

Bill o f Costs P l a i n t i f f seeks $3,977.48 i n costs. P l a i n t i f f is entitled to recover costs other t h a n attorney

fees as a matter o f course, unless the court otherwise directs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 4 ( d ) ( l ) . Expenses which may be taxed as costs against a losing party are enumerated i n 28 U.S.C. § 1920. T h e C o u n t y a r g u e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s B i l l o f Costs w a s late s i n c e i t w a s n o t f i l e d w i t h i n "fourteen (14) days after entry o f j u d g m e n t " as required by Local Rule 54-1(a)(1). Judgment was entered o n November 1 2 , 2 0 0 9 , b u t p l a i n t i f f did not file h e r Bill o f Costs until December 3, 2009. The County concedes the court granted p l a i n t i f f an extension o f t i m e to file her Motion for Attorney Fees, b u t contends p l a i n t i f f did not request additional time to file her Bill o f Costs. I construe p l a i n t i f f ' s request for extension o f time to include a n extension to file a Bill o f Costs. T h e C o u n t y also d i s p u t e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r for e l e c t r o n i c r e s e a r c h , appearance fees, a n d deposition transcripts.

3 P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e C o u n t y c a n n o t g u e s s a t t h e a m o u n t o f r e l i e f s h e sought. Plaintiff's wages, however, were $30.63 an hour and she sought backpay from July 8, 2007. Backpay for one year alone would exceed $60,000. Page 9 - OPINION A N D O R D E R

Plaintiff itemized $1,068.25 4 for electronic legal research a n d Fisher reports that this is a c o s t " n o r m a l l y e x p e c t e d to b e p a i d b y a c l i e n t who p a y s f o r l e g a l s e r v i c e s o n a n h o u r l y b a s i s . " PI's. Mem. at 4. P l a i n t i f f concedes that she is not entitled to this a m o u n t as p a r t o f her Bill o f Costs since electronic research is n o t an i t e m enumerated i n § 1920 for recovery. Kelley v. Sears. Roebuck. & Co., No. CV-01-1423-ST, 2004 WL 1824121, *5 (D. Or. Aug. 10,2004).5 Nevertheless, she submits t h a t she c a n recover those costs as p a r t o f h e r attorney fee award. Id. Case law supports p l a i n t i f f ' s contention that she c a n recover the cost o f conducting electronic research as p a r t o f h e r attorney fee award, Trustees o f Const. Indus. a n d Laborers Health and Welfare Trust v. Redland Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (9 th Cir. 2006). The b e n e f i t s o f e l e c t r o n i c r e s e a r c h r e d u c e s t h e t i m e a n a t t o r n e y w o u l d o t h e r w i s e s p e n d researching legal matters. See Haroco. Inc. v. American N a t ' l Bank & Trust Co. o f Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1994) ( " e v e n t h o u g h t h e clients n o w p a y two fees, t h e i r ultimate bill should be lower because the attorney should be able to do the research more quickly a n d efficiently."); A c c o r d i n g l y , p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r $ 1 , 0 6 8 . 2 5 as p a r t o f h e r a t t o r n e y f e e a w a r d . P l a i n t i f f also seeks costs for court reporter appearance fees o f $330. These are not recoverable under § 1920. Bosse v. Napolitano, 337 F. A p p ' x 633, 636-7 (9th Cir. 2009) ( " d i s t r i c t c o u r t e x c l u d e d r e p o r t e r a p p e a r a n c e fees" and t h e r e f o r e " d i d n o t inappropriately t a x r e p o r t e r a p p e a r a n c e fees").

4Confusingly, p l a i n t i f f reports this amount as $1,103.81 i n h e r Bill o f Costs and $1,068.25 i n her Motion for Attorney Fees. The invoices a d d up to $1,068.25.

51 note t h a t Fisher was p l a i n t i f f ' s attorney i n Kelley. That opinion was issued i n 2004.
Fisher, therefore, should have k n o w n not to request these costs as p a r t o f the Bill o f Costs. Page 10 - OPINION AND O R D E R

Finally, p l a i n t i f f seeks $2,127.15 in transcript fees. T h e County contends that because the parties did n o t engage i n motions practice or proceed to trial, the depositions were merely for discovery purposes a n d may n o t b e taxed against it. P l a i n t i f f responds that b y taking the depositions she was able to force the County to settle the case. P l a i n t i f f neglects to offer any e x p l a n a t i o n as t o t h e i d e n t i t i e s o f t h e d e p o s e d i n d i v i d u a l s a n d w h y t a k i n g t h e d e p o s i t i o n s w a s "reasonably necessary i n light o f facts known to counsel at the time[.]" Taylor v. Albina Community Bank, No. C V - 0 0 - I 0 8 9 - S T , 2002 WL 31973738, *9 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 2002). Indeed, "[d]epositions which are merely useful for discovery, investigative, o r preparatory purposes are not taxable items and are expenses 'incidental to normal preparation for trial. '" Id. at *8. A c c o r d i n g l y , I d e c l i n e to a w a r d t h e s e costs. In sum, I award p l a i n t i f f t h e $350 for her filing fee and the $66.52 for her printing fees, for a total o f $ 4 1 6 . 5 2 . CONCLUSION B a s e d o n t h e f o r e g o i n g , p l a i n t i f f ' s M o t i o n for A t t o r n e y F e e s ( # 2 1 ) a n d B i l l o f C o s t s ( # 2 0 ) are granted in part. P l a i n t i f f is entitled to $20,325.85. i n attorney fees and $416.52 i n costs. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this _ _

.....:7_!3_/t_ day o f January, 2010.

U n i t e d States D i s t r i c t J u d g e

~~AThf

Page 11 - OPINION AND O R D E R