Johnston v. Thomas

Filing 31

Opinion And Order. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus(#1)is DISMISSED. Signed on 6/23/10 by Judge Michael W. Mosman. (cib)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON PORTLAND DIVISION

DONALD K. JOHNSTON, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY THOMAS, W a r d e n , Respondent.

CV. 0 9 - 1 0 9 6 - M O

OPINION AND ORDER

STEPHEN R. SADY Office of the Federal Public Defender 1 0 1 SW m a i n S t r e e t , S u i t e 1 7 0 0 P o r t l a n d , OR 9 7 2 0 4 Attorney for Petitioner DWIGHT C. HOLTON United States Attorney RONALD K. SILVER Assistant United States Attorney 1 0 0 0 SW T h i r d A v e n u e , S u i t e 600 P o r t l a n d , OR 9 7 2 0 4 - 2 9 0 2 Attorneys for Respondent

1 - OPINION AND ORDER

Mosman, D i s t r i c t J u d g e . P e t i t i o n e r , a n i n m a t e a t F e d e r a l P r i s o n Camp, S h e r i d a n , O r e g o n (UFPC S h e r i d a n U) a t t h e t i m e o f f i l i n g , b r i n g s t h i s h a b e a s c o r p u s a c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o 2 8 U. S . C .
§

2241.

He a l l e g e s t h e B u r e a u o f

P r i s o n s (UBOP U) a r b i t r a r i l y a n d u n j u s t l y d e n i e d h i m e l i g i b i l i t y a n d e n t r y i n t o i t s R e s i d e n t i a l D r u g A b u s e P r o g r a m ("RDAp U) . Petitioner

s e e k s i m m e d i a t e e l i g i b i l i t y t o RDAP, a n d c r e d i t f o r e a r l y r e l e a s e as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3621. lacks jurisdiction to review (#1 a t 26.) BOP's Because this Court individualized RDAP is

determinations, DISMISSED.

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(#1)

BACKGROUND

I.

Factual Background. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Petitioner entered a

guilty plea to one count of Conspiracy in Relation to Marijuana Trafficking i n v i o l a t i o n of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a) (1). U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska The

accepted

P e t i t i o n e r ' s p l e a a n d t h e H o n o r a b l e T i m o t h y G. B u r g e s s s e n t e n c e d P e t i t i o n e r t o 24 months imprisonment and three years supervised r e l e a s e , w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t o t h e BOP: " C o u r t VERY
STRONGLY r e c o m m e n d s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e 5 0 0 h o u r

drug and alcohol program.

Court recommends that the defendant (#1,

serve his time at the Facility located in Sheridan, Oregon." Ex. 1 a t 2, emphasis as in original.)

The judgment also included

2 - OPINION AND ORDER

Special C o n d i t i o n s o f S u p e r v i s i o n s p e c i f y i n g :

"In addition to

submitting to drug testing . . . the defendant shall participate in either or both inpatient or outpatient treatment programs approved by the U.S. Probation Office for substance abuse treatment, which programs shall include testing to determine whether the defendant has reverted to the use of drugs or alcohol."

( I d . , Ex. 1 a t 4.)

P e t i t i o n e r a r r i v e d a t FPC S h e r i d a n i n S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 , a n d w a s i n t e r v i e w e d f o r RDAP e l i g i b i l i t y . 2008, (#26, Ex. 3.) On S e p t e m b e r 1 7 ,

P e t i t i o n e r r e c e i v e d n o t i c e h e d i d n o t m e e t RDAP a d m i s s i o n s

criteria; a substance abuse or dependence diagnosis could not be rendered "[d] ue to the discrepancy between information in the (#26, Ex. 6.) In an

inmate's PSI and E l i g i b i l i t y Interview[.]"

Administrative Note dated September 17, 2008, Dr. Solomon (the Drug Abuse Program Coordinator) specified, "Due to the marked

discrepancy between the inmate's self-reported drug history during t h e RDAP E l i g i b i l i t y I n t e r v i e w a n d h i s P S I , his c r e d i b i l i t y was

tarnished, and as such, t h i s author was unable to render a current substance abuse or dependence diagnosis. RDAP u n q u a l i f i e d . " (#26, Ex. 5.) Therefore, he was deemed

I n r e s p o n s e t o b e i n g d e n i e d a d m i s s i o n t o RDAP, P e t i t i o n e r t o l d Dr. Solomon the Presentence Report IS ("PSR") author may have

misunderstood his representations regarding drug use.

Dr. Solomon

then contacted the PSR's author to verify the information regarding Petitioner's drug use. (#26, a t 4.) In an Administrative Note

dated September 23, 2008, Dr. Solomon wrote: 3 - OPINION AND ORDER

This a u t h o r i n f o r m e d [ P e t i t i o n e r ] t o d a y t h a t h e h a d contacted the author of his PSI in an attempt to obtain information regarding his drug history that might result i n h i s q u a l i f y i n g f o r RDAP. I n t a l k i n g w i t h t h e a u t h o r , she was adamant in s t a t i n g t h a t [Petitioner] was very adamant a t the time in saying he was providing a t r u t h f u l report of his drug history. Thus, there was no a d d i t i o n a l information t h a t would cause t h i s author "to r e c o n s i d e r [ P e t i t i o n e r ' s ] e l i g i b i l i t y f o r RDAP a n d h e w i l l r e m a i n DAP U n q u a l i f i e d . He w a s a p p r i a s e d [ s i c ] o f t h i s conversation with his PSI writer. Perhaps 30 minutes l a t e r , he returned and asked i f he could be involved in any other form of drug treatment. This author described Non-Residential treatment and [Petitioner] expressed an interest in enrolling. This information was forwarded to the Non-Residential t r e a t m e n t p r o v i d e r s o t h a t he may p l a c e [ P e t i t i o n e r ] i n the next available Non-Res. tx. group.

( #2 6 , E x . 7 . )

Based on P e t i t i o n e r ' s s e l f - r e p o r t of drug use, his ("NR-

December 2008 Treatment Plan for non-residential treatment DAP") included the diagnoses "Sedative, Hypnotic,
(#1,

or Anxiolytic Petitioner

Dependence" and "Opioid Dependence." c o m p l e t e d t h e NR-DAP o n M a r c h 3 0 , 2 0 0 9 .

Ex.

2.)

(Id. )

W h i l e p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n NR-DAP, P e t i t i o n e r p u r s u e d t w o o f t h e three levels of administrative remedy available to challenge the B O P ' s d e c i s i o n t o d e n y h i m a d m i s s i o n t o RDAP.
(#26.)

He w a s

d e n i e d r e l i e f a t t h e f i r s t l e v e l b y t h e W a r d e n b e c a u s e h i s PSR d i d not support the information suggested a he provided of in his Eligibility and opioid

Interview, dependence.

which

diagnosis

sedative

(Id., Ex. 8 a t 2.)

P e t i t i o n e r was denied r e l i e f a t

the second level with the Regional Director noting: P r o g r a m S t a t e m e n t (PS) 5 3 3 0 . 1 0 , Drug Abuse P r o g r a m s ManuaL Inmate, eN-03 dated October 9, 1997, s t a t e s , "Drug abuse program s t a f f shall determine i f the inmate has a substance abuse disorder by f i r s t conducting the 4 - OPINION AND ORDER

Residential D r u g A b u s e P r o g r a m E l i g i b i l i t y I n t e r v i e w followed by a review of a l l pertinent documents in the inmate's central file to corroborate self-reported information." The s t a f f a t Fcr Sheridan determined there was no information i n the Central F i l e which would corroborate your self-report. The s t a f f then went one s t e p f u r t h e r a n d c o n t a c t e d t h e P a r o l e O f f i c e r who h a d completed your Pre-sentence Investigation Report. She stated that you had been very adamant in s t a t i n g that you had provided her a truthful report of your drug history. (Id. at 4.) The Regional Director also noted, a f t e r outlining the

diagnostic criteria used in the eligibility interview process, " [ t ] h e DAPC s u b s e q u e n t l y f o u n d a n a c t i v e s u b s t a n c e a b u s e d i a g n o s i s un-warranted. Thus, you were determined to be unqualified for the (Id.)

Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program."

P e t i t i o n e r was furlough t r a n s f e r r e d to a Residential Reentry C e n t e r ("RCC") on J a n u a r y 5, 2010. May 3 1 , 2 0 1 0 . II. (#26, at 2.) He w a s s c h e d u l e d t o b e r e l e a s e d

Statutory Background. C o n g r e s s v e s t e d b r o a d a u t h o r i t y i n t h e BOP t o m a n a g e f e d e r a l

correctional institutions.
§§

18 U.S.C.

§

4042(a).

In 18 U.S.C.

3621-3625,

C o n g r e s s v e s t e d t h e BOP w i t h b r o a d a u t h o r i t y t o

manage the imprisonment of a convicted person, and s p e c i f i e d " [t] he Bureau s h a l l make available appropriate substance abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau determines has a treatable condition of substance addiction or abuse." added) . mandate 18 U.S.C.
§

3621(b)

(emphasis

In § 3621(e), Congress articulated a specific statutory for residential substance abuse treatment programs for

"eligible prisoners."

The s t a t u t e defines " e l i g i b l e prisoner" as

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

one who i s ,

n (i)

determined by the Burea u o f Prisons to have a
and (ii) willing to participate in a program[.]" 18 U.S.C.

substance abuse problem, residential
§

substance

abuse

treatment

3 6 2 1 ( e ) ( 5 ) (B)
In §

(emphasis added). entitled Inapplicability of the Administrative
§§

3625,

Procedure Act (nAPA"), Congress specified t h a t
§§

554 and 555 and making of
"1

701-706

of

the

APA

"do

not

apply

to

the

any The

determination,

decision,

or order under this subchapter.

phrase "this subchapter" refers to Subchapter C which includes
§§

Imprisonment,

3621-3625.
DISCUSSION

In this habeas action, Petitioner seeks immediate admission to RDAP, credit for early release under
§

3621(e)

and

Program

S t a t e m e n t P 5 3 3 0 . 1 0 , a n d t h a t t h e c o u r t " d i r e c t R e s p o n d e n t , h i s DTS, and DTC to cease and desist from their continued efforts to

implement 'additional r e s t r i c t i o n s ' and/or evade the unambiguous language and e l i g i b i l i t y c r i t e r i a provided for in P.S.5330.10."
(#1,

at 26.)

He a r g u e s " h i s d e n i a l o f e l i g i b i l i t y t o RDAP i s

c a p r i c i o u s , a r b i t r a r y , c o n t r a r y t o BOP p o l i c y , a n d d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed to legislative intent."
(#1,

at

3.)

He a l l e g e s

Dr.

Solomon's actions are "contrary to P.S. Congress, t h e DSM-IV,

5330.10, the mandate of
(Id.

a n d g e n e r a l common s e n s e . "

at 11.)

P e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m c h a l l e n g e s t h e B O P ' s a c t i o n s u n d e r t h e APA. l U n d e r t h e APA, § 5 5 4 g o v e r n s A d j u d i c a t i o n s ; § 5 5 5 g o v e r n s Ancillary Matters; §§ 701-706 govern Judicial Review. 6 - OPINION AND ORDER

Respondent a r g u e s t h a t p u r s u a n t t o 1 8 U . S . C . § 3 6 2 5 t h i s C o u r t lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n to review the BOP's individual determinations r e l a t e d t o RDAP. (#15.) Respondent also argues the case i s moot

because the Court cannot grant Petitioner the r e l i e f he requests; . the BOP's decision denying Petitioner admission to RDAP was

reasonable;

and the case should be dismissed because Petitioner

completed only two of three levels of administrative remedies. (#25, at 3-6.) As a t h r e s h o l d m a t t e r , t h e C o u r t m u s t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r i t h a s jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's claim that the BOP

a r b i t r a r i l y a n d c a p r i c i o u s l y d e n i e d h i m a d m i s s i o n t o RDAP.

See
1986)

Wallace

v.

Christiansen,

802

F.2d

1539,

1542

(9th

Cir.

( j u r i s d i c t i o n must be addressed and answered before the merits may be reached). I. T h e APA a n d J u d i c i a l R e v i e w "The APA c o n f e r s a general cause of action upon persons

'adversely affected or aggrieved by action within the meaning of the relevant statute,' but withdraws that cause of action to the extent the relevant statute 'preclude[s] judicial review."

Block

v. Community N u t r i t i o n I n s t i t u t e e t . a l . , 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984) (internal c i t a t i o n s omitted); 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 and 702. 2
2S e c t i o n

"Whether

701. Application; definitions (a) This chapter applies . . . except to the extent statutes preclude judicial review; or that-(l) agency action is committed to agency (2) discretion by law.

***
7 - OPINION AND ORDER

and t o w h a t e x t e n t a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e p r e c l u d e s j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i s determined not only from i t s express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, i t s objectives, i t s legislative history,
Id.

and the nature of the administrative action involved."

In Heckler v. Chaney,

470 U.S. 821, 828

(1985), the Supreme "a party must

Court stated that before judicial review occurs, first clear the hurdle of § 701(a)." of

The Court explained t h a t the substantive to statute preclude

"[§

701(a)] to

requires determine

construction whether

involved

Congress

intended

j u d i c i a l review of c e r t a i n decision" and "applies when Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review." Section 701(b) applies where "Congress has
Id. at 828, 830.

not

affirmatively

precluded review but that the statute i s drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the

agency's exercise of discretion." II. Analysis

Wallace, 802 F.2d a t 1543 n.2.

In filing the instant petition,

P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s he was and seeks this

a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d o r a g g r i e v e d b y BOP a c t i o n ,

Court's review of the BOP's determination t h a t he was i n e l i g i b l e Section 702. Right of review A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.

***
8 - OPINION AND ORDER

for RDAP.

He a r g u e s § 3 6 2 5 d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e t h e C o u r t ' s j u d i c i a l

r e v i e w a n d c o n t e n d s " t h e BOP a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y w h e n i t e x c e e d e d i t s discretionary authority by failing to accept the sentencing court's findings, the information in the presentence the report that

[Petitioner]

used sedatives

and opiates,

letters

from his

family attesting to drug abuse, and his willingness to participate as sufficient evidence to corroborate the diagnosis." 20.) The Court finds P e t i t i o n e r ' s arguments unavailing. In § 3925, Congress specified: "[t]he provisions of sections 554 and 555 and 701 through 706 of t i t l e 5, United States Code, [the APA] do not apply to the making of any This determination, subchapter (#19, at

decision,

or order under this

subchapter."

Subchapter C - includes §§ 3621-3625. in the language of § 3625. (2001)

The Court finds no ambiguity

See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172

(begin with the language of the statute and, i f possible,
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.

give effect to every clause and word);

v.

Natural Resources Defense Council r I n c . , 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)

("If the intent of Congress i s clear [from the statutory language], that i s the end of the matter . . . . ").
§§

The s t a t u t e s p e c i f i e s t h a t

701-706

do

not

apply to

"the making of any determination, Section 3621 vests authority for It

decision, or order" under § 3621.

t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f i n m a t e d r u g t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m s i n t h e BOP. would be contrary to Congress's directive in
§

3625 for t h i s Court

t o a p p l y t h e r i g h t o f r e v i e w g r a n t e d u n d e r § 7 0 2 o f t h e APA t o P e t i t i o n e r ' s c l a i m c h a l l e n g i n g h i s RDAP e l i g i b i l i t y d e t e r m i n a t i o n 9 - OPINION AND ORDER

when

§

3625

expressly

states

§§

702

does

not

apply

to

determinations made under § 3621. P e t i t i o n e r ' s r e l i a n c e on Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487

(9th Cir. 2008), in arguing the court has jurisdiction to review the BOP's determination The that in he was ineligible did not for RDAP is the

misplaced.

petitioner

Figueroa

challenge

immigration judge's discretionary determination that he had failed to prove removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Rather, the petitioner alleged the judge applied the

wrong legal standard in making the determination and misinterpreted the statute. 543 F.3d a t 493. The Ninth Circuit noted i t lacked

jurisdiction "to review the BIA's discretionary determination that an alien failed to prove that her removal would result in

'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship'" but found i t had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o review whether the immigration judge made l e g a l errors in construing the operative statute.

Id.

at

495-96

("Notwithstanding the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C.
§

1 2 5 2 ( a ) ( 2 ) (B) ( i ) ,

the

REAL

ID Act of 2005

restored

judicial

review of 'constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review.'"). jurisdiction were, (1) Essential to the Ninth Circuit finding of there was a question of statutory

interpretation at issue and,

(2) Congress had expressly r e s t o r e d That is not the case

j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i n t h e REAL I D A c t o f 2 0 0 5 . here.

1 0 - OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner a l s o d i r e c t s t h e C o u r t t o r e c e n t o p i n i o n s i s s u e d b y District Judge Haggerty, in particular
Sacora

v.

Thomas,

648

F.Supp. 2d 1218 (2009), in which the court reviewed individualized RDAP d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . In Sacora, the petitioner challenged the

B O P ' s d e c i s i o n t o e x p e l h i m f r o m RDAP, a l l e g i n g t h e d e c i s i o n w a s arbi trary, capricious,
Id.

and an

abuse

of discretion,

and

sought

reinstatement.

at 1219.

Citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3), the

district court noted relief under

"a p e t i t i o n e r may be e n t i t l e d t o receive

[ ] § 2241 i f the p e t i t i o n e r shows t h a t his or her
Id.

custody is in violation of federal law." basis,
§

at 1221.

On t h i s

the court r e j e c t e d Respondent's a s s e r t i o n t h a t 18 U.S.C. precluded judicial review of the petitioner's RDAP

3625

expulsion, concluding n[j]udicial review is available to determine whether properly. the BOP exercised its discretion to administer RDAP

S e e SEC v . S l o a n , 4 3 6

u.s.

103, 118-119 (1978)

(judicial

review may determine whether an agency's exercise of d i s c r e t i o n was consistent with the agency's scope of authority.)" This Court disagrees that the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 negates 18 U.S.C. § 3625, which expressly removes judicial
~eview

u n d e r t h e APA f o r a g e n c y d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , d e c i s i o n s , 3621.
See Heckler,

or orders under §

4 7 0 U. S .

a t 828

(before

judicial review occurs a party must clear the hurdle of § 701(a):
C a r l i n v. McKean, 823 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C.Cir. 1987)

(courts should

1 1 - OPINION AND ORDER

not

presume

reviewability

of

agency

action

when

Congress

has

e x p l i c i t l y exempted agency action from the APA's provisions). The court in Sacora also s t a t e d : A l t h o u g h c e r t a i n p o r t i o n s o f t h e [APA] h a v e b e e n d e c l a r e d i n a p p l i c a b l e t o Subsection C of 18 U.S.C. § 3625 [presumably t h i s language r e f e r s t o Subchapter C, which includes §§ 3621-3625], Subsection C addresses the "place o f i m p r i s o n m e n t " a n d a u t h o r i z e s t h e BOP t o d e s i g n a t e locations for incarceration based on factors including the nature and circumstances of the prisoner's offenses. * * * Claims of constitutional violations, abuses of discretion, agency actions contrary to law, and agency actions exceeding the scope of i t s authority are not precluded from judicial review. U n d e r a p p l i c a b l e p o r t i o n s o f t h e APA, a g e n c y a c t i o n s , findings and conclusions will be struck i f they are found to be "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C.
§

***

706 (2) (A) · "

648 F.Supp. 2d a t 1221.

The court l i m i t s the scope of the BOP's

a u t h o r i t y u n d e r S u b c h a p t e r C , a n d t h e i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e APA, to the designation of locations for incarceration. However, the

scope of the BOP's authority under Subchapter C i s not limited to designating locations for incarceration and clearly also includes a u t h o r i t y t o a d m i n i s t e r RDAP a n d o t h e r t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m s .
§

See

3621(b),

(e) and ( f ) .

More fundamentally, the court applies the standard of
§

APA's

arbitrary and capricious

review despite

the

jurisdiction stripping provision of

3625, which expressly makes

t h e APA s t a n d a r d s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o " a n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n , d e c i s i o n , o r order" under Subchapter C. Accordingly, this Court declines to

adopt the reasoning in Sacora and joins other d i s t r i c t courts that have reviewed § 3625 and concluded Congress intended that BOP

1 2 - OPINION AND ORDER

rulemaking b e r e v i e w a b l e u n d e r t h e APA, b u t n o t i t s a d j u d i c a t i o n o f specific cases.

S e e Warman v . P h i l i p s , 2 0 0 9 WL 4 0 7 1 3 3 7 ( 4 t h C i r . )

(affirming N.D.W.Va. holding t h a t e l i g i b i l i t y for substance abuse t r e a t m e n t i n a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e BOP a n d p u r s u a n t t o § 3 6 2 5 , not reviewable); Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076,1079 (8th Cir. 1998) (section 3625 precludes judicial review of agency 2 0 0 9 WL

adjudications but not rulemaking); Pullie v. Stansberry,

2176120 *3 (E.D.Va.) (Congress intended t o preclude j u d i c i a l review of adjudications);

Trani v.

Owen,

2 0 0 8 WL 4 4 3 5 7 3 1

*1

(D.S.C.)

( " C o n g r e s s s p e c i f i c a l l y e x e m p t e d f r o m APA r e v i e w t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e BOP c o n c e r n i n g
§

. p l a c e m e n t i n t h e RDAP . . . . 1 8 U . S . C .

3625."; Jasperson v. Federal Bureau o f Prisons, 460 F.Supp.2d 76, (adopting reasoning in Lyle infra);
§§

8 3 - 8 5 (D. D . C . 2 0 0 6 )

Davis v.
3625 and

Beeler, 966 F.Supp 483, 489 (E.D.Ky 1997) (language of
3621 make it clear Congress intended to commit

substantive

decisions

to the unreviewable d i s c r e t i o n of the BOP);

Lyle v.

S i v l e y , 8 0 5 F . S u p p . 7 5 5 , 7 5 8 - 6 0 ( D . A z . 1 9 9 2 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g H. R e p . N o .
98-1030, 98th Congo 3182, 2d 3332 Sess. and 149 (1984)

reprinted
light

in
of

1984
the

U.S.C.C.A.N.

stating,

"[i]n

overwhelming evidence of congressional intent, this Court concludes that in enacting section 3625, Congress intended to 'carve out' an area of decision making [certain individualized, discretionary

agency decisions]

committed solely to agency discretion and not

subject to judicial review.").

1 3 - OPINION AND ORDER

While t h e C o u r t r e t a i n s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o r e v i e w c l a i m s a l l e g i n g BOP a c t i o n i s c o n t r a r y t o e s t a b l i s h e d f e d e r a l l a w , v i o l a t e s t h e

u. S . C o n s t i t u t i o n , o r e x c e e d s t h e s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y C o n g r e s s
vested i n the agency, Staacke v. United States Sec. o f Labor, 841 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1988), Petitioner in this case contests

only an individualized determination t h a t he was i n e l i g i b l e to p a r t i c i p a t e i n RDAP. 3 The authority to determine which inmates

p a r t i c i p a t e i n BOP d r u g t r e a t m e n t p r o g r a m s r e s t s s o l e l y w i t h t h e BOP.
Downey v. Crabtree,

100

F.3d

662,

670

(9th Cir. the

1996)

("Regarding

substance-abuse

treatment

programs,

Bureau's

discretion begins with deciding whether an inmate ever enters such a program[]") 877 (discussing United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874,

(6th Cir. 1995)

("[I]t is solely within the authority of the

F e d e r a l B u r e a u o f P r i s o n s . . . t o s e l e c t t h o s e p r i s o n e r s who w i l l b e best served by participation in [drug rehabilitation] programs.") ( a l t e r a t i o n s i n o r i g i n a l ) ; see also Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 83 (2nd Cir. 2006) (BOP c h a r g e d w i t h d i s c r e t i o n t o p l a c e i n m a t e s i n

treatment programs). When C o n g r e s s e n a c t e d § 3 6 2 5 a n d m a d e t h a t s e c t i o n a p p l i c a b l e to § 3621, i t expressly removed the cause of action conferred under E v e n a s s u m i n g P e t i t i o n e r r a i s e d a Due P r o c e s s c l a i m , s u c h a claim would necessarily f a i l because inmates do not have a p r o t e c t e d l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t i n RDAP p a r t i c i p a t i o n , o r i n t h e associated discretionary early release benefit. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001): Greenholtz v. Inmates o f Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 422 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); Downey, 100 F.3d a t 670; M a r t i n e z v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 2 0 0 9 WL 1 6 6 3 9 8 5 * 2 ( W . D . N . Y . ) .
3

1 4 - OPINION AND ORDER

§

7 0 1 o f t h e APA t o p e r s o n s " a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d o r a g g r i e v e d b y and precluded For

action within the meaning of the relevant statute,"

j u d i c i a l r e v i e w o f i n d i v i d u a l i z e d d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y t h e BOP. the Court to review Petitioner's individualized

eligibility

determination would require disregarding the express language of
§

3625, and would impose a level of j u d i c i a l oversight on the BOP's I t would

drug treatment programs not contemplated by the statute.

also put the federal court in the untenable position of micromanaging the BOP's individualized determinations inherent to the management of i t s drug treatment programs and ignoring the "wideranging deference to be accorded to the decisions of prison

administrators."

Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,

I n c . , 433 U . S . 1 1 9 , 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 ( 1 9 7 7 ) .
Absent an allegation that the BOP violated established

federal law, the United States Constitution, or exceeded the i t s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y i n making the determination t h a t P e t i t i o n e r was i n e l i g i b l e f o r RDAP, t h e C o u r t d o e s n o t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o r e v i e w Petitioner's claim. In light of this holding, the Court need not that

address Respondent's arguments that the petition i s moot,

Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, or that the BOP e l i g i b i l i t y d e t e r m i n a t i o n w a s r e a s o n a b l e .

///

///

1 5 - OPINION AND ORDER

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of

H a b e a s C o r p u s ( # 1 ) i s DISMISSED.

IT I S SO ORDERED.
DATED t h i s ~ d a y o f J u n e , 2 0 1 0 .

M i c h a e l W. Mosman United States Distrlc

1 6 - OPINION AND ORDER