Nichols v. Metlife Investors Insurance Company
Filing
85
Opinion and Order - Simmons' Motion to Remove Gary Beagle as A.N.'s GuardianAd Litem 63 is denied. The partial summary judgment motions brought by Beagle on behalf of A.N. challenging the Estate's claims to the insurance proceeds [32 ], and challenging the Estate's status as a party and the viability of wrongful death claim in this interpleader action 46 , are granted. Counsel are ordered to confer and to file a Joint Status Report addressing the proprietyof entering a part ial Judgment reflecting these rulings, and proposing a schedule for final adjudication of the remaining issues. This Report shall be filed by July 14, 2011. Signed on 6/20/2011 by Judge Ancer L. Haggerty. (See formal Opinion and Order, 14-pages) (ecp)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
STEVEN WAGNER NICHOLS, an
Individual,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 10-651-HA
v.
OPINION AND ORDER
STEVEN WAGNER NICHOLS, an
individual; GARY BEAGLE, as guardian ad
litem for A.N., a minor; and JULIA ANNE
SIMMONS, as personal representative of
the Estate of Rhonda Kristen Casto, deceased,
Counterclaim Defendants.
________________________________________________
GARY BEAGLE, as guardian ad litem for
A.N., a minor,
Cross claimant,
v.
STEVEN WAGNER NICHOLS, an
Individual; and JULIA ANNE SIMMONS, as
personal representative of the Estate of Rhonda
Kristen Casto, deceased,
Crossclaim defendants.
JULIA ANNE SIMMONS, as personal
representative of the Estate of Rhonda Kristen
Casto, deceased,
Crossclaimant,
v.
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
STEVEN WAGNER NICHOLS, an
individual,
Crossclaim defendant.
________________________________________________
STEVEN WAGNER NICHOLS, an
individual,
Cross claimant,
v.
GARY BEAGLE, as guardian ad litem for
A.N., a minor; JULIA ANNE SIMMONS, as
personal representative of the Estate of Rhonda
Kristen Casto, deceased,
Crossclaim defendants.
________________________________________________
HAGGERTY, District Judge:
In January 2011, defendant and counter-claimant MetLife Investors Insurance Company
(MetLife) was dismissed with prejudice from this action. The pending motions in the case
include a motion [63] seeking the removal of Gary Beagle as Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) to A.N.,
a minor, advanced by counterclaim defendant and cross-claim defendant and cross-claimant Julia
Anne Simmons (Simmons). Also addressed below are two Motions for Summary Judgment [32
and 46] brought by Beagle on behalf of A.N. For the following reasons, the motion seeking
Beagle's removal is denied, and the summary judgment motions are granted.
BACKGROUND
This case is complex and emotionally charged. Plaintiff Steven Wagner Nichols
(plaintiff) became romantically involved with Rhonda Casto (decedent) in 2005. They had a
child (A.N.) together in mid-2008. In late 2008, plaintiff and decedent bought life insurance. An
agent met with the couple, and eventually sold policies providing benefits of one million dollars
to each of them. Each policy named the other as the primary beneficiary and the child A.N. as
the contingent beneficiary.
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
Three months later, in March 2009, decedent died after a fall while hiking with plaintiff
in Eagle Creek, Oregon. Her death is considered to have occurred under suspicious
circumstances. Plaintiff submitted a claim for the insurance policy proceeds. Before the
proceeds were paid, decedent's mother, Simmons, filed a complaint against MetLife with
Oregon's Department of Consumer and Business Services.
In November 2009, the insurance company denied plaintiff's claim, declaring that the
policy was void because of omissions on the application. Plaintiff sued MetLife, which removed
plaintiff's suit to this court. In its Answer and Counterclaim for Interpleader, MetLife asserted
that "it is unclear whether plaintiff/counterclaim defendant Steven Wagner Nichols was involved
in the murder of Rhonda Casto. If he was, he may not be entitled to the $1,000,000 in proceeds
due under the Policy pursuant to Oregon's slayer statute, ORS 112.455-112.555." Answer, ¶ 52.
MetLife stated that if plaintiff/counterclaim defendant Nichols "is not entitled to the $1,000,000
in Policy proceeds by reason of ORS 112.515, then the proceeds would be payable to
counterclaim defendant A.N., as the contingent beneficiary under the Policy." Id., ¶ 53.
This court subsequently appointed Gary Beagle, a professional fiduciary, as GAL for
A.N. pursuant to an unopposed motion by MetLife. The insurance proceeds were deposited in an
interest-bearing account with the court. Judgment was later entered dismissing MetLife from this
action.
PENDING CLAIMS, MOTIONS, AND ANALYSIS
Simmons obtained appointment as Personal Representative (PR) of her daughter's estate
(the Estate) on September 30, 2010, for purposes of pursuing a wrongful death claim against
plaintiff. Simmons has advanced the wrongful death claim in this action on behalf of
beneficiaries including Simmons, A.N., and Timothy Alan Casto, decedent's purported biological
father, and any step-parents. ORS 30.030(4). She also has advanced a claim to the insurance
proceeds on behalf of the Estate.
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
Beagle, on behalf of A.N., has brought summary judgment motions challenging the
Estate's claims to the insurance proceeds, and challenging the Estate's status as a party and the
viability of litigating the wrongful death claim in this interpleader action. Simmons responded in
part by moving to remove Beagle as GAL, effectively staying Beagle's summary judgment
motions. The motion to remove is addressed first.
The parties' requests for oral argument on the pending motions are denied. The pending
summary judgment motions are resolved herein, following adjudication of Simmons' removal
motion.
1.
MOTION TO REMOVE BEAGLE AS GUARDIAN
A.
Standards
Under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules, state law generally determines an individual's
capacity to represent a minor in federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3) (stating that an
individual's capacity to sue in a representative capacity is determined by "the law of the state
where the court is located"). This court's appointment of Beagle has not been challenged as
contrary to Oregon statutes, and this court finds no grounds for declaring the appointment to have
been in violation of any law. See, e.g., ORCP 27 (directing that the courts may appoint some
suitable person to act as guardian ad litem for a minor under fourteen years of age who is a
defendant, under application of any other party).
The First Circuit recently commented that "Next Friend" capacity in federal court "is not
lightly granted." Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 90 (1st Cir. 2010). That
decision underscored that "Rule 17(c) recognizes that an individual may represent the real party
in interest as a Next Friend [in federal court,] but [Rule 17] offers no clear guidance regarding
who may proceed as a Next Friend." Id.
The court examined a decision by the United States Supreme Court pertaining to
third-party standing issues in the context of habeas corpus litigation. In Whitmore v. Arkansas,
the Supreme Court held that a Next Friend should comply with "two firm prerequisites:" (1) an
adequate explanation – such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability – why
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
the real party in interest cannot appear on his or her own behalf to prosecute the action; and (2) a
showing that the Next Friend is "truly dedicated to the best interests of the person the Next
Friend seeks to represent." 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990).
The First Circuit acknowledged that although "the Supreme Court recognized that some
courts have 'suggested' that a Next Friend must also have a significant relationship with the real
party in interest, the Court did not hold that a significant relationship is a necessary prerequisite
for Next Friend status." Elliott, 608 F.3d at 90 (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64).
Eight years prior to Elliott, the Ninth Circuit addressed Whitmore and provided a Next
Friend analysis. In Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers & Professors v. Bush, the Ninth Circuit quoted
Whitmore's requirements that a Next Friend must first provide an explanation why the real party
in interest cannot appear, and then must also be shown to be truly dedicated to the best interests
of the person on whose behalf he or she seeks to litigate. 310 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64, and subsequently acknowledging that the Supreme Court
recognized that "it has been . . . suggested that a 'next friend' must have some significant
relationship with the real party in interest").
The Ninth Circuit further acknowledged that it had previously construed the two-pronged
Whitmore inquiry as requiring the putative Next Friend to show (in habeas actions): (1) that the
habeas petitioner is unable to litigate a cause due to mental incapacity, lack of access to court, or
other similar disability; and (2) the Next Friend has some significant relationship with, and is
truly dedicated to the best interests of, the petitioner. Coal. of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1159-60
(citing Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001)). In reliance upon
the interpretation offered by Massie, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a coalition of professionals
lacked third-party standing to file habeas petitions on behalf of alleged terrorist combatants being
detained in Cuba. The court reasoned:
The existence of a significant relationship enhances the probability that a
petitioner is a suitable next friend, i.e., that a petitioner knows and is dedicated to
the prisoner's individual best interests. The more attenuated the relationship
between petitioner and prisoner, the less likely a petitioner can know the best
interests of the prisoner.
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
***
Nevertheless, the contours of the requisite "significant relationship" do not
remain static, but must necessarily adapt to the circumstances facing each
individual detainee. "Significance" is a relative concept, dependent on the
individual prisoner's plight. Not all detainees may have a relative, friend, or even
a diplomatic delegation able or willing to act on their behalf. In such an extreme
case it is plausible that a person with "some" relationship conveying some
modicum of authority or consent, "significant" in comparison to the detainee's
other relationships, could serve as the next friend. Moreover, the concept of "true
dedication" is a subjective one, difficult of measurement. The existence of some
relationship, whether it be from authorized representation to friendship or alliance
to familial, serves as an objective basis for discerning the "intruder" or "uninvited
meddler" from the true "next friend."
Coal. of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162.
The court explicitly acknowledged that "there may be some extreme circumstances
necessitating relaxation of the Whitmore-Massie standard," but determined that the record in the
case before it was "devoid of such circumstances." Id. at 1162. Therefore, the court concluded
that "even assuming the detainees are unable to litigate on their own behalf and even under the
most relative interpretation of the 'significant relationship' requirement the Coalition lacks
next-friend standing." Id. at 1163.
B.
Analysis
At the outset, this court wholly rejects Simmons' contention that "this is not a case in
which it is necessary or appropriate for the court to appoint – or, in this case, retain – a next
friend to act on [A.N.'s] behalf." Simmons' Mem. Supp. at 7. As adjudicated in the unopposed
motion for GAL appointment brought by MetLife, there is no reasonable dispute that
appointment of a GAL was necessary to protect A.N.'s rights and to ensure that the life insurance
proceeds due under the policy at issue are paid to the party legally entitled to them. The
applicable Federal Civil Procedure Rule requires the court to appoint a GAL for the protection of
a minor who is unrepresented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 17(c)(2). There is also no dispute
that A.N. was rendered "unrepresented" by conflicts arising between A.N. and plaintiff, her legal
guardian. When the interests of A.N. and plaintiff diverged, appointment of a GAL became
appropriate. Id.
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
The court has evaluated the record and also finds no grounds for questioning Beagle's
qualifications or capacity to serve effectively as an GAL for A.N. His experience, objectivity,
and expertise in this role make him an exceptional candidate for such services.
Simmons' primary challenges to Beagle as GAL assert that Beagle lacks standing to serve
as Next Friend for A.N. because he had no prior relationship with her. Simmons Reply at 2-3.
Simmons contends that "controlling Ninth Circuit authority" holds that "only people who have a
'significant relationship' with the real party in interest have standing to sue as a 'next friend,'" and
that even if limited exceptions to this requirement are recognized, such exceptions are
inapplicable in this case. Id. at 2, 6.
After careful scrutiny of the relevant decisions from the United States Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit, as well as other persuasive authorities, this court concludes that the standards
applicable to the circumstances of this case are less restrictive than Simmons proposes.
Moreover, even if Simmons' reading of authorities is correct, then this court rules alternatively
that this action would qualify as an "extreme case" in which exceptions to the "significant
relationship" analysis have been recognized by the Ninth Circuit.
Simmons relies upon the Ninth Circuit's 2001 decision in Massie, in which the court
upheld a district court's decision that a journalist who had corresponded with a death row inmate
for fifteen years lacked standing to appear as a "Next Friend" because the journalist failed to
show that the inmate lacked competency to litigate his own cause. 244 F.3d at 1198-99. The
Massie court recited standards that Simmons interprets as helpful: a "putative next friend must
show: (1) that the petitioner is unable to litigate his own cause due to mental incapacity, lack of
access to court, or other similar disability; and (2) the next friend has some significant
relationship with, and is truly dedicated to the best interests of, the petitioner." Id. at 1194 (citing
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-65). Because the journalist in Massie failed to meet Whitmore's first
prong for standing, the Ninth Circuit elected not to address whether the journalist could be
deemed to have had "some significant relationship with Massie and is truly dedicated to his best
interests." Massie, 244 F.3d at 1199 n.3 (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64)).
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
Although it is true that the Massie court refers to a requirement that a Next Friend has
some significant relationship with a prisoner for purposes of litigating a habeas corpus petition,
the decision's references cite directly to the Whitmore holding. As noted above, and explicitly
recognized by the First Circuit, the Supreme Court recognized only two prerequisites for Next
Friend standing: an adequate explanation as to why the real party in interest cannot appear to
prosecute the action, and a showing that the Next Friend is "truly dedicated" to the best interests
of the person the Next Friend seeks to represent. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163; see also Elliott, 608
F.3d at 90 (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64). The Supreme Court did not hold that a
significant relationship is a necessary prerequisite for Next Friend status, but noted that some
courts have "suggested" that a Next Friend must also have a significant relationship with the real
party in interest. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64 (citations omitted); Elliott, 608 F.3d at 90.
As also noted above, after the Massie decision, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the two-prong
Next Friend test described in Massie and reasoned that "the existence of a significant relationship
enhances the probability that a petitioner is a suitable next friend, i.e., that a petitioner knows and
is dedicated to the prisoner's individual best interests." Coal. of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162.
A Next Friend's probable suitability to represent a party certainly can be enhanced if the
Next Friend enjoys a significant relationship with the party. It is just as true that "[t]he more
attenuated the relationship between petitioner and prisoner, the less likely a petitioner can know
the best interests of the prisoner." Id. The Ninth Circuit's resulting conclusion that a "faithful
understanding" of Whitmore includes a requirement that a would-be Next Friend share a
significant relationship with the real party in interest, and that a coalition of professionals could
not serve as Next Friends to war detainees because they lacked any relationship with them, is
sound under the circumstances presented in that case. Id.
Nevertheless, this court concludes that Simmons' proposed strict construction of the
scope of the ruling in Coal. of Clergy violates the reasoning provided by the Supreme Court in
Whitmore, and – when viewed from the circumstances presented in this case – fails to advance
the principles underscored in the careful "Next Friend" analyses performed repeatedly by the
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
Ninth Circuit. As noted above, the Ninth Circuit wisely acknowledged that the "contours of the
requisite 'significant relationship' do not remain static, but must necessarily adapt to the
circumstances facing [the real party in interest]," and that the concept of "true dedication" – the
Supreme Court's overriding concern regarding this issue in Whitmore – "is a subjective one,
difficult of measurement." Id.
The Ninth Circuit then emphasized that the "existence of some relationship" – explicitly
including an "authorized representation" such as Beagle's appointment – is appropriate for the
primary purpose of evaluating Next Friend representations: objectively "discerning the 'intruder'
or 'uninvited meddler' from the true 'next friend.'" Id.
A careful reading of Whitmore and the Ninth Circuit's reasoning of that decision in
Massie and Coal. of Clergy compels this court to construe that Beagle's "authorized
representation" established a sufficient relationship for purposes of Next Friend standing in this
case. Beagle's appointment was necessary in light of the uncontroverted facts of this case. His
authorized representation plainly distinguishes Beagle from a mere intruder or uninvited meddler.
To impose a more onerous burden on Beagle before upholding his appointment would warp the
relevance of Whitmore's explicit holdings, and would misconstrue the analysis in Coal. of Clergy
that pertained to the possible representation of war detainees for habeas petition purposes. See,
e.g., Elliott, 608 F.3d at 91 (in evaluating an individual's capacity to serve as Next Friend for
minors who lack ties with family members, some courts have rejected a rigid application of the
significant relationship requirement, holding that the common-law concept of Next Friend is
"capacious enough" to include individuals who pursue a suit on behalf of a minor in good faith)
(citations omitted). Although "the significant relationship requirement may avert litigation by
individuals who lack a concrete stake in the litigation, and also enhances the probability that a
petitioner is a suitable Next Friend[,] . . . [i]mportant social interests are advanced by allowing
minors access to a judicial forum . . . through a Next Friend that the court finds has a good faith
interest in pursuing a federal claim on the minor's behalf." Id. at 91-92 (internal quotations
omitted; citing Coal. of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162).
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
Assuming without deciding that Simmons' stricter construction of Ninth Circuit precedent
is correct results in the same conclusion. Simmons acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit
recognized that in an "extreme case" in which the real party in interest lacks a relative or friend
with whom a significant relationship is shared who is "able or willing" to act on the party's
behalf, "it is plausible that a person with 'some' relationship conveying some modicum of
authority or consent . . . could serve as the next friend." Coal. of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162.
This court concludes in the alternative that even if Beagle's lack of a pre-existing
"significant relationship" with A.N. would otherwise preclude his service as GAL in this case
under Ninth Circuit precedent, the facts presented in this litigation places the suit squarely within
the exception for what the Ninth Circuit has contemplated as an "extreme case."
Scrutiny of the evidence that casts doubt upon the ability of Simmons or the alternate
proposed GAL (the alleged maternal great-grandfather of A.N.) to serve on behalf of A.N. is
unnecessary. It is sufficient to note that the record provides sufficient grounds to question the
objectivity and capacity of either of the proposed alternative GALs to be truly dedicated to the
interests of A.N. The offers of Simmons to disavow obvious potential conflicts, and the roles
that both proposed alternative GALs could – and likely will – play in ongoing litigation with
plaintiff preclude either as a reasonable GAL for A.N. Accordingly, the facts presented plainly
render this an "extreme case" in which Beagle's services are necessary and proper, even if Ninth
Circuit precedent might otherwise generally suggest or require that a more subjective relationship
be in place to support Next Friend standing.
C.
Conclusion regarding Simmons' motion to remove Beagle
Simmons' Motion to Remove Beagle as GAL is denied. His initial appointment was
necessary and proper, and the nature of Beagle's good faith relationship to A.N. is sufficient to
withstand the motion for his removal under the facts presented in this case. Alternatively,
assuming without deciding that Simmons' construction of relevant Ninth Circuit precedent places
the correct emphasis upon the importance of a relationship between the GAL and an otherwise
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
unrepresented minor, this court concludes that this action constitutes an "extreme case" in which
Beagle's representation remains necessary and appropriate.
2.
A.N.'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Also pending is A.N.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [32] and Second Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment [46]. The first motion seeks to dismiss the Estate from this action
because the Estate is not a proper party in this action and lacks any viable claim to the policy
stake. The second motion seeks to dismiss the Estate's counterclaim seeking recovery for
wrongful death, without prejudice to the Estate to pursue that claim in a proper state venue.
A.
Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute
regarding material facts. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a genuine factual dispute should be resolved against the moving
party. MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 400 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted). If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for
trial. Id. at 324. A nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by relying on the
allegations in the complaint, or with unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements.
Hernandez v. Spacelabs Medical, Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment
should be entered against "a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B.
Analysis
I.
First partial summary judgment motion
The first partial summary judgment motion pertains to MetLife's decision to add the
Estate as an interpleader co-defendant in this action. There is no dispute that counsel for MetLife
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
did this because MetLife was notified by counsel for the Estate of Rhonda Casto that the Estate
intended to advance a viable claim for the proceeds. Reply to First Summary Judgment Motion
at 3 (citing and quoting Supp. Aff. of Scott F. Kocher). No claim of any kind against the
insurance proceeds has materialized from the Estate.
The Estate's responsive brief to this motion focuses upon the purported propriety of
MetLife's decision to add the Estate as an interpleader co-defendant. Response at 5-6. However,
regardless of whether, as the Estate argues, "MetLife had good reason to believe that the
estate might have a claim to the proceeds, even though the policy lists Nichols as the
primary beneficiary and A.N. as the contingent beneficiary," A.N.'s motion seeks summary
judgment for reasons independent of the possible merits of MetLife's prior decision-making.
A.N.'s motion is based upon the absence of a claim to the proceeds by the Estate, and does not
challenge whether MetLife had sufficient reason to believe that the Estate "might have" such a
claim. The court has evaluated the authorities provided by the Estate in response to A.N.'s
motion, and finds no basis for denying summary judgment on the grounds advanced. The
Estate's failure to present a viable claim to the policy stake is ripe, well-taken, and dispositive.
II.
Second partial summary judgment motion
On November 1, 2010, the Estate filed a "Cross-claim Against Nichols for Wrongful
Death." The second dispositive motion by A.N. asserts that after the merits of her first summary
judgment motion regarding the impropriety of the Estate as an interpleader claimant to the
insurance proceeds are acknowledged, A.N. is entitled to dismissal of the Estate's wrongful death
cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction. This court agrees, and declines to recognize jurisdiction over
the Estate's wrongful death claim based upon the purported merits of an interpleader cross-claim
that never materialized. The argument presented by A.N. that the Estate's presence in this
interpleader action occurred only because the Estate advised MetLife that the Estate would
advance a claim against the policy proceeds is persuasive.
An interpleader action allows the stakeholder of money to sue various claimants to force
them to litigate who is entitled to the money. Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261,
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
1265 (9th Cir. 1992). An interpleader action's primary purpose is to protect the stakeholder from
multiple liability and the expense of multiple litigation, not to compensate the stakeholder. See
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bayona, 223 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that interpleader
is governed by equitable principles). Diversity in this case existed between the stakeholder party
MetLife, an insurance company organized under the laws of New York with its principal place of
business in New York, and the counterclaim defendants named by MetLife: Nichols and A.N.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2361 authorizes a district court to discharge the stakeholder in any civil
interpleader action from further liability to claimants, and MetLife was subsequently discharged
as a party in this case. Although the court properly retained jurisdiction over Nichols and A.N.
after MetLife disclaimed interest in the controversy, the Estate has never established that it
warranted status as a third interpleader claimant.
The Estate's attempt to persuade this court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction has been
considered. The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction "is a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff's right." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
state law claim if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999,
1000 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A] federal district court with power to hear state law claims has
discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them under the conditions set out in § 1367(c)"). Under
that statute, district courts may also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if
the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, if the claim substantially predominates
over the claims that the district court had original jurisdiction, or if exceptional circumstances or
compelling reasons exist for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Supreme Court
has opined that a court's discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction "lies in considerations of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 715; see also
Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992).
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
Regardless of the factors that support retaining jurisdiction over the competing claims of
the true interpleader co-defendants, there is no basis for exercising jurisdiction over the Estate's
wrongful death claim. Such a claim would predominate over the remaining claims, requiring a
trial on wrongful death damages even though no damages trial is necessary in litigating A.N.'s
slayer claim, and also requiring litigation of negligence standards of care, negligence theories,
and negligence facts that are unrelated to the slayer claim. Moreover, exercising jurisdiction over
the wrongful death claim would necessitate the continued presence of the Estate as an additional
party in the case, and could likely lead to challenges regarding the conflicts between Simmons as
PR, and Simmons in her role as a co-beneficiary in the wrongful death action. Accordingly, this
court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the Estate'ss wrongful death claim.
C.
Conclusion regarding A.N.'s summary judgment motions
The partial summary judgment motions advanced by Beagle on behalf of A.N. are
granted. The wrongful death claim is dismissed without prejudice to the Estate to pursue that
claim in a proper state venue.
OVERALL CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided, Simmons' Motion to Remove Gary Beagle as A.N.'s Guardian
Ad Litem [63] is denied. The partial summary judgment motions brought by Beagle on behalf of
A.N. challenging the Estate's claims to the insurance proceeds [32], and challenging the Estate's
status as a party and the viability of wrongful death claim in this interpleader action [46], are
granted. Counsel are ordered to confer and to file a Joint Status Report addressing the propriety
of entering a partial Judgment reflecting these rulings, and proposing a schedule for final
adjudication of the remaining issues. This Report shall be filed by July 14, 2011.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2011.
/s/ Ancer L. Haggerty
ANCER L. HAGGERTY
United States District Judge
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
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