Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. United States Army Corps of Engineers et al
Filing
36
OPINION and ORDER - Because Plaintiff's choice of venue in the Portland division is not improper under the federal and local rules or federal venue statutes, Defendants' Motion to Reassign Venue to the Medford Division 4 is DENIED. Dated this 20th day of April, 2011, by U.S. Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
Civ. No.lO-1129-AC
NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE CENTER,
OPINION AND
ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS etal.,
Defendants.
ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge:
Introduction
PlaintiffNOlihwest Environmental Defense Center ("NEDC") brought an action against the
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") and the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") (collectively, "Defendants"), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against certain
meeting and planning activities of the Defendants that occurred in Oregon. The action was filed in
OPINION AND ORDER
1
{LW}
the Portland Division of the District of Oregon. Presently before the court is Defendants' motion
to reassign the case to the Medford Division. For the reasons set fOlih below, the cOUli DENIES
Defendants' motion to reassign.
Background
NEDC's complaint makes two general allegations: that the Corps held planning meetings
in violation of the Federal AdvisOlY Committee Act ("FACA"), 5 U.S.C. App 2 (1997), and that one
outcome of those meetings was a mining plan that, among other things, violates the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"). 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2008). NEDC's complaint seeks a declaratOlY judgment
that the meetings violated FACA and an injunction against any future meetings in violation of
FACA. Plaintiff also requests that the court issue a permanent injunction to prevent the Corps from
implementing the mining plan that resulted from the challenged meetings.
FACA was established to "eliminate useless advisory committees, strengthen independence
of remaining advisory committees, and prevent advisory groups from becoming self-serving."
Consumers Union ofU.S., Inc. v. Dep 'tofHealth, Educ. and Welfttre, 409 F. Supp. 473, 474 (D.D.C.
1976), affirmed 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977). AdvisOlY committees should be convened only
when "determined to be essential," and should be "kept to the minimum necessary." 5 U.S.C. App
2 § 2(b)(2). Legislation that establishes advisory committees must ensure that the committees are
"balanced in terms of points of view represented," and that recommendations of the conmlittee are
not induly influenced by any "special interest." 5 U.S.C. App 2 § 5(b)(2-3). AdvisOlY committees
should operate under uniform procedures, and the public should be kept informed as to their
"number, purpose, membership, activities and cost." 5 U.S.C. App 2 §§ 4-5. Committees operating
under FACA must file a charter with the head of the agency they advise, give advance notice in the
OPINION AND ORDER
2
{LW}
Federal Register of any meeting, and make transcripts of their proceedings available to the public.
5 U.S.C. App 2 §§ 9(c), 10(b), II(a). Advisory committee meetings,must be open to the public. 5
U.S.C. App 2 §§ lO(a)(1).
NEDC's core assertion regarding FACA is that Defendants organized and held private
meetings to develop a plan for gravel mining in Oregon's rivers, that these meetings should have
been organized under FACA, and that in any event the meetings were carried out in violation of
FACA policies. (PI. Compl. for Decl. & Inj. Relief ("Complaint")
~~
39-54.) These meetings
included representatives of federal and state agencies, and representatives of the mining industry.
ld.
NEDC alleges that these groups, which came to be known as the Executive Team and the
Technical Team, were "clearly subject to FACA's requirements." ld. ~ 47. NEDC recites a number
of specific dates on which the teams met, and Defendants do not dispute that these meetings took
place. NEDC alleges that a substantial portion of these meetings took place at Corps headqumiers
in POliland, and offers documents supporting that allegation. (Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n ("Response")
(Docket #6) Ex. B Attach. 3-18.)
NEDC further alleges that, as a result of the challenged meetings, a plan was developed to
mine the Chetco River and other rivers in Oregon. (Complaint ~~ 56-62.) NEDC alleges that the
plan for mining the Chetco River is meant to "serve as a model for evaluating other river systems."
ld.
~
54. NEDC alleges that the method for arriving at the Chetco plan, and the plan itself, give rise
to numerous violations of the ESA. ld.
~~
83-106. NEDC asks the court to declare that these
activities violated, and continue to violate, the ESA, and asks that the court set aside the plan that
resulted limn the challenged meetings.
Defendants timely filed a motion to reassign venue to the Medford division. Defendants
OPINION AND ORDER
3
{LW}
maintain that the heart ofNEDC's complaint concerns plans for gravel mining on the Chetco
River, and that the acts or omissions alleged to have taken place in Portland are tangential to the
matter. (Fed. Def. Mem. Supp. Mot. to Reassign ("Motion to Reassign") 1,4.) Defendants urge
the court to focus on the portion of the local rule that designates the location of the "propeliy ...
that is the subject of the action" as determinative of venue. (Motion to Reassign 2.) Pointing out
that the Chetco River is located entirely in the Medford division, Defendants ask the court to
reassign the case to Medford on that basis.
Legal Standards
This court's jurisdiction over the matter is uncontested. Federal jurisdiction is proper here
because the actions alleged arise under the laws of the United States, and because the defendants are
federal agencies. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Administrative Procedure Act,S U.S.c. §§ 701 et seq.
Venue is proper in the District of Oregon under the federal rules that govern assignment of
venue among the federal judicial districts. 28 U.S.c. § 1391(e) (2002). Where the federal cOUli has
jurisdiction, a plaintiff may assert venue in "any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the
action resides, [or] a substantial pmi of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or
a substantial pati of propeliy that is the subject of the action is situated." Id. Because all the events
are alleged to have taken place in the state of Oregon, venue in the District of Oregon is proper. The
pmiies contest, however, the divisional venue in which this case should be filed and heard.
Divisional venue, the issue disputed here, is analyzed under three distinct but related
authorities: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules of the District of Oregon, and the
statutes governing federal judicial procedure, 28 U.S. C. §§ 1391, 1404 and 1406. While Defendants
rely primarily on precedent under this district's Local Rules in their argument for change of venue,
OPINION AND ORDER
4
{LW}
the court evaluates all three authorities to determine the proper location for advancement of the case.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), ("Federal Rule") while the plaintiff makes
the initial choice of where to file a suit, the defendant may challenge the plaintiffs choice of venue
as an affirmative defense. FED. R. Cry. P. 12(b)(3). A venue defense must be asserted in a
responsive pleading, and is waived if the defendant fails to make the motion under the rule. Id.
12(h). In adjudicating a 12(b)(3) motion, the COUlt draws all reasonable inferences in favor ofthe
non-moving party and resolves all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party. See Murphy
v. Schneider Nat'!, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004).
The DIstrict of Oregon's Local Rules ("Local Rules") also govern assigllllent of venue. A
judicial district is empowered by federal statute and Federal Rule 83 to make local rules. See 28
U.S.C. § 137 ("The business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the
judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court") and FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(I) ("[a] district
COUlt ... may adopt and amend rules governing its practice."). The Ninth Circuit accords broad
deference to the district court's interpretation of local rules. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 105
F.3d 1288, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversed on other grounds) (citing
us. v. MOllzin, 785 F.2d 682,
695 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Local Rule 3-2 divides the District of Ol:egon into four divisions to "distribute the judicial
work and to align counties for juror management purposes." LR 3-2(a). These divisions, which
encompass all Oregon counties, are POitland, Pendleton, Eugene, and Medford.
Parties are
instructed that their pleading must identify the division where venue lies; i.e., "the division in which
a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial patt
OPINION AND ORDER
5
{LW}
of the property that is the subject of the action is situated." LR 3-2(b). This "substantial part"
language follows exactly the analogous portion of the federal venue statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
Parties are further insl1:ucted that "[c]ases where the divisional venue lies within ... Portland ...
must be filed in Portland," and that "[clases where divisional venue lies within the Medford Division
must be filed in Medford." LR 3-3(a). Should a party initially file a case in the wrong division, the
Court may reassign the case "on its own motion or that of any pmiy." LR 3-3(c).
The comi additionally looks for guidance in two federal judicial procedure statutes. 28
U.S.C. § 1404,28 U.S.C. § 1406(b). The first statute governs motions for "convenience" transfers,
which arise when venue is proper in either of two forums, but one pmiy prefers a given fOlUm for
reasons of convenience. 28 U.S.C. § 1404. The statute places discretion in the district court to
. evaluate convenience transfers on an "individualized, case-by-case" basis for convenience and
fairness, in the interests of justice. Stell'{ll'tOl'g., Inc. v. Ricoh COl]}., 487 U.S. 22, 23 (1988). The
court considers multiple factors, such as:
(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the
state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiffs choice of forum,
(4) the respective patiies' contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the
plaintiffs cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of
litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel
attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of
proof.
Jones v. GNC Fin., 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000).
The second federal venue statute concerns "wrong court" transfers, which arise when an
opposing party maintains that venue is improper in the original filing forum. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b).
In "wrong court" cases, the district cOUli must either dismiss the case or direct its transfer to the
proper fOlUm. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the case is filed in the proper venue.
OPINION AND ORDER
6
{LW}
Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979).
Discussion
The gravamen of Plaintiffs complaint is that, by failing to charter the advisory committees,
holding meetings that included industry representatives but not the public and other interested
parties, failing to provide public notice of the meetings, and failing to make advisory committee
materials available to the public, Defendants violated the requirements of FACA. Additionally,
Plaintiffs assert that the Chetco River mining plan that resulted from the meetings engendered
multiple violations of the ESA. Because the challenged meetings largely took place in Portland,
Plaintiffs asseli that venue in the POliland division is appropriate.
Defendants claim that because the Chetco River mining recommendations that arose from
the meetings are planned to take place in the Medford area, venue in that division is appropriate; and
that under precedent established by this couti, Medford venue is indeed mandatory.
The precise issue presented here appears to be one of first impression. As Defendants
correctly point out, the Local Rule has been interpreted by judges of this court to mandate transfer
to the geographic division where the challenged agency decisions were to be carried out, even though
some 01' all of the decision making process took place in POliland. However, this case differs from
the cited precedents because of the complaint's particular allegations and asselied cause of action,
which focus on a meaningful, independent process violation, in addition to concerns about the
outcome of the challenged processes. The degree to which alleged violations of mandated agency
decision-making processes constitute "substantial" acts or omissions in the venue is not an issue that
was analyzed in the cases Defendants rely upon, nor do the cases assert independent process
violations alleged to have taken place in Portland. In all the cases cited by Defendants, the
OPINION AND ORDER
7
{LW}
administrative agency in question was situated in Portland, and the decision challenged was to be
effectuated elsewhere in Oregon. In each case, the judge interpreted the local rule to require the case
to be heard in the location where the agency action was to be carried out.
The foundational case relied upon by Defendants is Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v.
Goodman, in which Judge King declared that Rule 3 is a "mandatolY requirement" under which a
case must be transferred if it was brought in the wrong division. (Goodman, Civil No. 04-593-AS
(D. Or. May 26, 2004) Transcript of Telephone Hearing, Dkt. No. 32 at 8.) (Fed. Def.'s Mot. To
Reassign, Ex. 1.) In Goodman, the plaintiff challenged a United States Forest Service ("USFS")
decision to authorize a post-fire salvage timber sale in portions of the national forest that are located
in Klamath and Lake Counties, both of which are located in the Medford division. The plaintifffiled
the action in Portland because all the patties were located in P01tland, and because the decision to
authorize the logging had been made at the U.S. Forest Service office in P01tland. The plaintiff
argued for Portland venue on the basis of convenience, and because it alleged that the Forest Service
decision constituted an "informational injuty" that arose in Portland where the plaintiffs were located
and where the decision took place.
In Goodman, all of the harms that allegedly arose from the P01tland meetings would be
suffered in the national forests in Lake and Klamath counties. The plaintiff claimed that the logging
plan relied on a model for diversity planning that was inappropriate for a post-burn forest such as
the one in question; that the plan would result in too few snags remaining in the forest; and that
USFS had failed to develop a restoration-only alternative for the post-burn forest in question. Judge
King found nothing in the pleadings that indicated the court should make an exception from the
mandatory requirement that cases arising in Medford be filed in Medford, and accordingly
OPINION AND ORDER
8
{LW}
transfe11'ed the action to the Medford division.
The Goodman pleadings make no allegations regarding specific components of agency
actions that tie the actions to POliland, beyond recognizing that the Regional Forester who made the
decision was headquartered in Portland. Upon questioning by Judge King, the plaintiffs attol'lley
stated that the case was filed in Portland because the plaintiff and the defendant were located there.
(Goodman, Civil No. 04-593-AS (D. Or. May 26, 2004) Transcript of Telephone Hearing, Dkt. No.
32 at 3-4.) (Fed. Def. 's Mot. To Reassign, Ex. l.) During this conversation, the plaintiffs attomey
raised the issue of the "informational
il~ury"
to the plaintiff having arisen at the place where the
plaintiffs are located; however, this issue does not appear in the original complaint and is not
developed in Judge King's analysis.
Subsequent cases in the district followed Judge King's reasoning and transferred cases
involving agency decisions to the division where the decision would be implemented. In Or.
Natural Res. Council Fund v. Brong, Civil No. 04-693-AA, Judge Haggeliy transferred to Medford
a case involving a Bureau of Land Management decision to implement a timber sale in Southel'll
Oregon. (Fed. Def.'s Mot. To Reassign, Ex. 2.) Defendants were located in Portland, and the
agency decision had been made in Portland, but the burden ofthe harms alleged would be suffered
in Medford. Similarly, in Pearson v. U. S. Dept. ojTransp., Civil No. 07-272-PA, 2009 WL464469
(D. Or. Feb 24, 2009), Chief Judge Aiken granted the defendant's motion to reassign to Medford.
(Fed. Def.'s Mot. To Reassign, Ex. 3.) The agency's decision, which was made in Portland,
concel'lled a highway interchange to be built in the Medford division.
In Siskiyou Reg. Educ. Project v. U. S. Forest Serv., Civil No. 05-1429-CO, 2005 WL
2675114 (D. Or. Dec. 19,2005), Judge Ashmanskas granted a transfer to Medford. The challenged
OPINION AND ORDER
9
{LW}
decision, to cany out a timber sale in Josephine County, was made by the U.S. Forest Service at their
office in Portland. Transfer was also granted in Grain Millers v. Pac. Flexpak. No. 07-1065, 2008
WL 550124, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 26, 2008), where Judge Ashmanskas found that in contract disputes
the "location of intended performance generally determines proper venue." While Grain Millers
did not concern an agency action as in the cases above, the court's analysis of the "factual connection
of [plaintiff s1claims to events occUlTing in the Eugene Division" warranted transfer from Portland
to Eugene. Id.
In contrast, the pleadings here contain allegations and prayers for relief that identifY specific
acts or omissions that demonstrably took place in Portland. IfNEDC contended only that the Chetco
mining plan was the result of meetings that took place in Portland, the Local Rule's mandate would
require the case be reassigned to Medford; the substantive harm alleged by NEDC would result
primarily from carrying out in Medford plans made in Portland, and venue would be proper in
Medford. However, because NEDC challenges the legality under FACA of the Portland meetings
themselves, and pleads with specificity its allegations regarding those meetings, the pleadings here
concern actions in Portland which are separate and distinct from the Medford plans. The Portland
meetings are alleged to have violated a federal law, the purpose of which is to prohibit the precise
injuries NEDC alleges occurred here. Thus, the venue dispute provides an issue of first impression
for this district.
Similar venue challenges, involving the process of agency decision-making, have been heard
by courts in other districts. In Freeman v. Fallin, 254 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2003), former federal
employees brought a Bivens action against their former employers, alleging that the employers
manipulated random drug testing in order to target plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that the
OPINION AND ORDER
10
{LW}
employers' conspiracy involved discussions regarding design, administration and scheduling of the
plaintiffs' tests, and that these discussions took place at the employer's headquarters in the District
of Columbia. The court dismissed a venue challenge by the agency, finding venue proper where
"conspiring, planning, or supervision of an event occurred, even if the event itself took place in
another judicial district." Freeman, 254 F. Supp 2d at 57.
A COUlt in the Eastern District of Pemlsylvania declined to transfer venue in a case brought
againstthe State Depattment in Egervwy v. YOllng, 159 F. Supp. 2d. 132 (D. Pa. 2001) (reversed on
other grounds). In Egervwy, a father brought a Bivens action against federal agents alleged to have
assisted in his estranged wife's international abduction of their son. Egervary alleged that State
Depattment agents arranged to allow his son to be removed from the country without a passport.
The court found venue proper in the Eastern District of Peilllsylvania, where the State Department
officials were located, even though the abduction took place in the Middle District. Venue was
appropriate in the Eastern District because that is where State Department officials "made
arrangements" to waive the passport requirements.
In Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Babbill, 1994 WL 908586 (D.D.C. 1994) (not
RepOlted in F.Supp.), the plaintiff challenged three aspects of a rulemaking decision by which the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") declared the marbled murrelet (a bird found in the
Pacific Northwest) to be a threatened species. The defendant agency was sued in the District of
Columbia, where it was located. The COUlt found that venue was proper in both the District of
Columbia, where the rulemaking decision was made, and in the Western District of Washington,
where there was ongoing litigation involving substantially similar issues.
In the cited cases, where the process violation is alleged to have taken place in a district other
OPINION AND ORDER
11
{LW}
than the one where the decision was ultimately carried out, courts may find that "a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" occurred in both places. The Ninth Circuit has
held that, under § 1391, "the substantiality of the operative events is determined by assessment of
their ramifications for efficient conduct of the suit." Myers v. Bennell Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068,
1076 (9th Cir. 2001), quoting Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124, 1134-35 (D.C.Cir.1978). In Myers,
"at least one of the harms suffered by [p]laintiff' had taken place in Nevada, where venue was
sought; accordingly the Court found that venue was proper because a substantial part of the events
giving rise to the claim had occurred there. Id
Cases from other circuits have found that "venue
is not limited to the district with the most substantial events or omissions ... [rather] § 1391(a)(2)
contemplates that venue can be appropriate in more than one district." Employers MUI. Cas. Co. v.
Bw·tile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1166 (lOth Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
In another case challenging venue, the First Circuit found that the court was not required to
determine the best venue, only a proper venue; it held that venue "could be found" in Rhode Island,
where one of the harms in a trade secret case was alleged to have occurred, even though the parties
were residents of California and Florida. Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden America, Inc., 591 F.3d
1 (1 st Cir. 2009). As one commentator states, "If the selected district's contacts are 'substantial', it
should make no difference that another's are more so, or the most so." Siegel, Commentary on 1990
Revision of Subdivisions (a), (b) and (e), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (1991)," cited in Merchants Nat. Bank
v. Safi'abank (California) 776 F.Supp. 538, 541 (D.Kan.l99l).
Once it is established that the plaintiff s choice of forum is proper under the "substantial.part"
test, the "convenience" factors under 1404(a) must operate strongly in the moving party's favor in
OPINION AND ORDER
12
{LW}
order to overcome the presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice of forum. Piper Aircraft v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,255 (1981). Under § 1404(a), the "convenience" statute, the defendant must
make a "strong showing of inconvenience to upset the plaintiff s choice of venue." Decker Coal v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cit'. 1986). Factors that the court considers in
evaluating inconvenience include private factors, such as ease of access to witnesses and sources of
proof, and convenience to the parties, and public factors, such as familiarity of the forum with
applicable law, and "local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." Id.
Here, NEDC's allegations concel'11 regularly scheduled meetings that took place in Portland.
The occurrence of the meetings themselves is alleged to violate a federal statute. In addition, the
parties involved in the meetings, the content of the meetings and actions taken subsequent to the
meetings, are all alleged to violate the federal statute.
The Chetco plan is only one of the
contemplated results of those meetings. Plaintiff alleges that mining plans developed at the Portland
meetings would ultimately be executed in every region of the state, a further argument for
administration of the proceedings in the POliland division. Plaintiffs choice of Portland as the
location where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred is supported by the
allegations.
Under these circumstances, it comports with both the convenience of the parties and the
interests of justice to retain venue in POltland. As far as the court can discel'11, none of the cited
"inconvenience" factors operates to override Plaintiff s choice of POltland as the proper forum for
the case. Indeed, all parties associated with the case are located in POltland, many of the witnesses
and much of the evidence associated with the case would be located in Portland, and because Corps'
decision that resulted from the meetings would have its impact statewide, there is no other forum in
OPINION AND ORDER
13
{LW}
Oregon that is inherently preferable in terms of convenience. Accordingly, under the 1404(a)
analysis, the motion to transfer to Medford does not succeed.
Nor does the § 1406 "wrong court" analysis operate in Defendants' favor. The wrong cOUlt
analysis applies only when venue is improper in the first instance. Grain Millers, 2008 WL 550124,
at *2. If an action is initially filed in the wrong venue, the court is "required to dismiss the action
or transfer it to ajudicial districfor division where venue is authorized." Garvey v. Piper Rudnick
LLP Long Term Disability Ins. Plan, No. 07-886, 2008 WL 410088, at *3 (D. Or. Feb 12,2008).
Under § 1406, transfer may be granted as an alternative to dismissal, but in either case the
disposition is predicated on initial filing in an improper venue. 28 U.S.C. l406(a). Because the
COUlt has determined that Plaintiffs filing in POltland is not improper, none of the considerations
guiding § 1406 transfer is applicable in this case.
As for the portion of the complaint that concerns agency actions to be effectuated in the
Medford division, it is within this court's discretion to retain jurisdiction; LR 3-4 states that the
Court "may" reassign the case. The court sees no compelling reason to transfer on the basis of the
portions of the pleading that allege acts or omissions in Medford, since all those allegations relate
back to the challenged meetings that took place in POltland.
Finally, Defendants observe that the Executive Team and Technical Team were disbanded
one month after Plaintiffs initial filing. Defendants argue that this development renders irrelevant
NEDC's arguments that venue is appropriate in Portland.
(Reply in Support of Fed. Mot. To
Reassign Case to the Medford Division, Dkt. No.7, Ex. I.) Defendants have supplied the court with
a copy of the letter sent by the Corps to the Team members, which indicates that the Corps is
"considering" forming new teams, and that "any fiJture team with be created in compliance with.
OPINION AND ORDER
14
{LW}
· . [FACA]." ld. Ex. 1 at 1. This letter might be taken as an accession to Plaintiffs original demand
that the court enjoin the Corps from continuing to engage in a pattern and practice of violating
FACA. (Complaint 28.) However, the assertion that disbanding the Teams vitiates the Portland
locus of Plaintiff s complaint ignores ten other prayers for relief, including that the court "declare
that the CotpS has violated FACA with respect to the Team[ s]; ... order the CotpS to publicly
release all materials related to the Team[s]; ... [and] enjoin the Corps from using, or relying on, any
information produced by or recommendations received from ... the Team[s]." (Complaint, Prayer
for Relief
~~
1, 3-4 (emphasis added).) These prayers for relief do not cease to be relevant simply
because the Teams have disbanded, and the fact of disbanding does not influence the venue
conclusions under any of the previous analyses.
Because Plaintiffs choice of venue in the Portland division is not improper under the federal
and local rules or federal venue statutes, Defendants' motion to reassign venue to the Medford
division (#4) is DENIED.
DATED this 20th day of April, 2011.
C(l J(J,
OV.ACOSTA
OPINION AND ORDER
15
{LW}
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?