Puri et al v. Khalsa et al

Filing 436

OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons stated above, I GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 390 , DENY Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 389 , and DENY or DENY as moot the parties' Motions to Strike [418, 424, 428]. This case is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed on 4/26/2018 by Judge Michael W. Mosman. (kms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

BIBIJI INDERJIT KAUR PURI;
RANBIR SINGH BHAI; KAMALJIT
KAUR KOHLI; KULBIR SINGH PURI,
No. 3:10-cv-01532-MO
Plaintiffs,
OPINION AND ORDER
v.

SOPURKH KAUR KHALSA;
PERAIM KAUR KHALSA; SIRI
RAM KAUR KHALSA; KARTAR
SINGH KHALSA; KARAM SINGH
KHALSA; SIRI KARM KAUR
KHALSA; ROY LAMBERT;
SCHWABE, WILLIAMSON &
WYATT, an Oregon Professional
Corporation; LEWIS M. HOROWITZ;
LANE POWELL PC, an Oregon
Professional Corporation; UNTO
INFINITY, LLC, an Oregon Limited
Liability Company; SIRI SINGH
SAHIB CORPORATION, an Oregon
non-profit corporation; GURUDHAN
SINGH KHALSA; GURU HARi SINGH
KHALSA; AJEET SINGH KHALSA;
EWTC MANAGEMENT, LLC; DOES, 1-5,
Defendants.

MOSMAN,J.,
This matter comes before me on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [389]
and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [390]. The parties also filed several motions to
1 - OPINION AND ORDER

strike. [418, 424, 428]. For the reasons below, I GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment [390], DENY Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [389], and DENY or
DENY as moot the parties' Motions to Strike [418, 424, 428].

BACKGROUND
I.

Factual Background
This dispute revolves around the now deceased Siri Singh Sahib Bhai Sahib Harbhajan

Singh Khalsa Yogiji, aka Yogi Bhajan. Yogi Bhajan was a Sikh Dharma spiritual leader who
helped promulgate the Sikh religion and Kundalini Yoga in the United States until his death in
2004. In 1971, Yogi Bhajan became "Siri Singh Sahib," or the Chief Religious and
Administrative Authority for the Ordained Ministry of Sikh Dharma in the Western Hemisphere.
Gurujot Deel. [396], iii! 6, 8. Pursuant to his role as Siri Singh Sahib, Yogi Bhajan established
numerous non-profit organizations and for-profit businesses. This case involves three of these
organizations: Sikh Dharma International (SDI), Siri Singh Sahib Corporation (SSSC), and Unto
Infinity, LLC (UI).
The Plaintiffs in this case are Bibiji Inderjit Kaur Puri, Ranbir Singh Bhai, Kamaljit Kaur
Kohli, and Kulbir Singh Puri, the widow and three children of Yogi Bhajan. 1 The Defendants
remaining in this case are UI, SSSC, Sopurkh Kaur Khalsa, the President and a member of the UI
Board of Managers and a member of the SSSC Board of Trustees, and Kartar Singh Khalsa, a
member of the UI and SSSC boards. Plaintiffs allege in the operative Second Amended
Complaint (SAC) that after Yogi Bhajan's death on October 6, 2004, the individual Defendants
conspired to exclude them from management ofUI and SSSC. SAC [234]

iii! 24-29. They seek

declaratory relief placing them on the boards and monetary damages.
1

This opinion will refer to certain individuals in this case by their first names to distinguish from others who have
the same last name.

2 - OPINION AND ORDER

A. SDI
SDI is a California nonprofit religious corporation. Gurujot Deel. [396], if 13; id. Ex. 1.
It is undisputed that SDI is a religious organization. SDI, which was originally named Sikh
Dharma Brotherhood, was formed in 1973 for the following primary purposes:
[T]o operate for the advancement of education, science and religion and for
charitable purposes by the distribution of its funds for such purposes by operating
as a religious organization and as association of religious organizations, by
teaching the principles of the Sikh Dharma, or way of life, in the Western
Hemisphere and including, but not limited to, the creation and operation of places
of worship, the ordination of ministers of divinity, the creation and operation of
educational centers and associated and supp01iive activities related to these
primary purposes.
Gurujot Deel. [396], Ex. 1 (SDI Articles oflncorporation). SDI's 2003 Bylaws, which were in
effect at the time of the events underlying this case, stated:
[SDI] is organized and shall be operated exclusively for the purposes of operating
as a religious organization and as an association of religious organizations by
teaching the principles of the Sikh Dharma, or way of life; by creation and
operation of places of worship; by ordination of ministers of divinity; by creation
and operation of educational centers; and by the conduct of associated and
supportive activities related to these purposes; and to do all things necessary,
expedient or appropriate to the accomplishment of the purposes for which this
corporation is formed.
See Gurujot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 1. And SDI receives a tax exemption as "a church or a convention

or association of churches" under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) and§ 170(b)(l)(A)(i). Gurujot Deel.
[396], Ex. 4.
Prior to Yogi Bhajan' s death, there were two individual religious positions in SDI: the
Siri Singh Sahib and the Bhai Sahiba. Yogi Bhajan, in his role as Siri Singh Sahib, served as the
chief religious authority of SDI, and the Bhai Sahiba "over[saw] religious protocol." Gurojodha
Deel. [395], Ex. 3 at 31. Following Yogi Bhajan's death, the "Siri Sikdar Sahib/a and the Bhai
Sahib or Bhai Sahiba [are] together ... the chief authority on the teachings of Siri Singh Sahib

3 - OPINION AND ORDER

Harbhajan Singh Khalsa Yogiji on the practice of Sikh Dharma." Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at
10. The Bhai Sahiba advises SDI, the Khalsa Council, and UI on religious matters. Gurojot Deel.
[396], Ex. 9 at 13. The Siri Sikdar Sahib/a "shall champion the spiritual and secular education of
the children of Sikh Dharma" and "shall devote time daily for meditation and prayer on behalf of
the congregations of Sikh Dharma, shall be responsible through the office of the Bhai Sahib/a for
maintaining and improving the quality of spiritual practice in Western hemisphere communities
and for inspiring and promoting devotion to Shabd Guru." Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 12.
Additionally, the 2003 SDI Bylaws call for the Siri Sikdar Sahib/a to lead annual pilgrimages
and perform outreach to other Sikh religious leaders. Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 12.
SD I's bylaws also outlined several governing boards, including an advisory board of SDI
ministers called the Khalsa Council, which advises UI "on matters of significance" to SDI, and a
board of directors called the Khalsa Council Adh Kari. Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 8.

B. SSSC
SSSC is an Oregon nonprofit religious corporation formed in 1997 "to take over the
leadership function of [Yogi Bhajan] after his death." Gurojodha Deel. [395], Ex. 3 at 30.
SSSC's purposes include overseeing the "administration and program services" of SDI and
"conduct[ing] and/or facilitat[ing] religious, charitable, and educational activities." Gurojodha
Deel. [395], Ex. 3 at 17, 20; Soni Deel. [394], Ex. C, Art. VI. Like SDI, SSSC receives a tax
exemption as "a church or a convention or association of churches." Gurojodha Deel. [395], Ex. 3
at 2, 25.
During his lifetime, Yogi Bhajan was the sole director of SSSC. Soni Deel. [394], Ex. B
(SSSC Articles of Incorporation), at 3. Following his death, a board of trustees/directors was to
govern SSSC. According to the original SSSC Articles oflncorporation, following Yogi

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

Bhajan's death or incapacity, "the directors shall be those persons designated in writing by [Yogi
Bhajan]. The written designation; and any amendment, or supplement to it, shall be dated upon
execution and shall be delivered to, and held in confidence by the attorney for the corporation
and Sikh Dharma designated in the corporation's Bylaws." Soni Deel. [394], Ex.Bat 3. The
original SSSC Bylaws designated Roy Lambert (who was a Defendant in this case until Plaintiffs
settled their claims against him) as the attorney for SSSC. Soni Deel. [394], Ex. C, Art. VI.
These disputed designations that are at the core of Plaintiffs claims in this case.
The Bylaws also outline certain job duties for the trustees:
A trustee shall perform his or her duties as a trustee including his or her duties as
a member of any committee of the board upon which the trustee may serve, in
good faith, in a manner the trustee believes to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person
would use under similar circumstances in a like position.
Soni Deel. [394], Ex. C, Art. 2 (Bylaws). The SSSC Articles outline an additional job duty for
the board: the Articles state that Yogi Bhajan would designate an individual to succeed to the
office of Siri Sikdar Sahib/a, who would also serve as a director of the SSSC board. Soni Deel.
[394], Ex.Bat 4. But if Yogi Bhajan failed to designate such an individual, the SSSC board was
to choose a new Siri Sikdar Sahib/a, with the advice of the Khalsa Council. Soni Deel. [394], Ex.
Bat 4-5.
Additionally, later amended versions of the Articles of Restatement of SSSC and the
Restated Articles of Incorporation required that SSSC board members be qualified as ministers
of Sikh Dharma and live "in a manner consistent with the teachings and values of [Yogi
Bhajan]." Soni Deel. [394], Ex. E. Although some of these documents were dated October 1-3,
2004, prior to Yogi Bhajan's death, it appears that the documents were actually created in
November 2004, after his death. Soni Deel. [394], Ex. DD.
5 - OPINION AND ORDER

After Yogi Bhajan's death and the subsequent 2012 settlement agreement, SSSC's role
within the Sikh Dharma hierarchy changed. The current SSSC board "has the authority to
appoint and remove the board members of Sikh Dharma International (SDI), which, among other
things, contains the Sikh Dharma Ministry and, through the Ministry, carries out the function of
ordaining Sikh Ministers." Gurojodha Deel. [395]

if 28. The current mission statement of SSSC2

reads:
With the guidance of God and the grace of the Guru it is the mission of the SSSC
to protect, preserve and cultivate the prosperity of the constituent community and
its assets; listen to, serve and elevate the constituent community; support the nonprofit and for profit entities and the family of constituent communities; and live to
and hold the values of the teachings of the Siri Guru Granth Sahib and the Siri
Singh Sahib Bhai Sahib Harbhajan Singh Khalsa Yogi Ji: selfless service,
compassion, kindness, honesty, integrity, trustworthiness and Guru inspired
consc10usness.
Gurojodha Deel. [395]

if 25. The current president of the SSSC board stated that board members

"act as representatives and ambassadors of Sikh Dharma. SSSC Board members, myself
included, regularly participate in outreach, interfaith, mission building, and Sikh awareness
events." Gurojodha Deel. [395] if 39. Finally, the SSSC board president describes the current
election process for SSSC as following:
For the 2012, 2015, and 2017 SSSC Board elections, the elected SSSC Board
members were elected by fellow Sikh Dharma ministers, active Khalsa Council
members, and members of the Sikh Dharma community pursuant to the terms of
the SSSC Board Election Policy. For future elections, and pursuant to a change in
the SSSC Board Election Policy, only Sikh Dharma ministers who are in good
standing will be eligible to vote for SSSC Board members.
Gurojodha Deel. [395]

if 16.

2

Plaintiffs move to strike Defendants' declarations as they pertain to the current status of SSSC, arguing they are
irrelevant. I disagree, because I conclude the current status of the boards is pertinent to the question whether relief
may be granted in this case without violating the First Amendment, as it pertains to the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine. I therefore DENY Plaintiffs' Motion [424] on these grounds.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER

C. UI
Following the death of Yogi Bhajan, SSSC became the sole member ofUI, an Oregon
nonprofit LLC formed in 2003. UI was the sole member of SDI until 2012, when SSSC assumed
this role.3 Gurujot Deel. [396], if 13; id. Ex. 3. Former attorney for Defendants (and former
Defendant) Roy Lambert testified that UI was intended to be the "ultimate decision-maker with
respect to the ... [Yogi Bhajan] community" after Yogi Bhajan's death, because Yogi Bhajan
felt that the board of SSSC was too large. Soni Deel. [394], Exh. WW at 138. To this end, Yogi
Bhajan issued a proclamation on June 30, 2004 stating:
I hereby proclaim that Unto Infinity, LLC, is the entity authorized by me to
continue to exercise the administrative authority of the office of the Siri Singh
Sahib of Sikh Dharma, once I no longer occupy that office, in all those cases
where authorization by the Siri Singh Sahib is required in the articles, bylaws, or
any contractual commitment of a Sikh Dharma affiliated organization.
Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 44.
A board of managers governs UI. The original operating agreement for UI outlined that
Yogi Bhajan would appoint the first UI board. Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 21 at 1. The original
operating agreement for UI also stated that the original agreement would be superseded upon
Yogi Bhajan' s death by the "Amended and Restated Operating Agreement." Southwick Deel.
[398], Ex. 21 at 3. The "Amended and Restated Operating Agreement" outlines certain eligibility
standards, including that a board member had to be: (1) qualified as a minister of Sikh Dharma;
(2) a member in good standing of the Khalsa Council of the Sikh Dharma; and (3) living,
practicing, and participating in the affairs of the Sikh community in a manner consistent with the
teachings and values of Yogi Bhajan. Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 22 at 3-4.

3

I note that Yogi Bhajan appeared to change his mind regarding the intended roles of SSSC and UI, and their
relationships to SDI. As of 1997, SSSC was to play the key leadership role in SDI and act as SDI's sole member. UI
then took this role in 2003. And following the settlement agreements in 2012, SSSC took over this leadership role
yet again.

7 - OPINION AND ORDER

According to the Bylaws of SDI established in December 2003, as the sole member of
SDI, UI was to perform a number of duties related to SDI and the Khalsa Council, including: (1)
approving all actions of the Khalsa Council Adh Kari; (2) electing the directors of the Khalsa
Council Adh Kari, other than the Siri Sikdar Sahib/a; (3) amending the Articles and Bylaws of
SDI; (4) approving the Executive Officers of SDI; (5) choosing the Secretary General of SDI,
who would become the new Siri Sikdar Sahib/a ifthe Siri Sikdar Sahib/a died or was
incapacitated; (6) approving the removal of employees, including the Siri Sikdar Sahib/a if the
Siri Sikdar Sahib/a died or was incapacitated; (7) appointing the members of the Khalsa Council;
and (8) "designat[ing] such other religious or administrative officials of [SDI] as it deems
appropriate; ... defin[ing] or redefin[ing] the function and scope of authority of each such
official from time to time; and ... appoint[ing] and ... remov[ing] any person from any official
position designated by it." Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 2-14. Additionally, UI played a role in
determining whether and how a new Siri Sikdar Sahib/a would assume his or her position
through a particular type ofreligious ceremony. See Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 10.

D. State Court Litigation
On September 21, 2009, several Sikh Dharma ministers and board members of Sikh
Dharma entities sued Sopurkh, Kartar, UI, SSSC, and several other defendants derivatively, on
behalf of the Sikh Dharma Community. The State of Oregon subsequently sued the same parties,
and the state court consolidated these cases. McGrory Deel. [177] Exs. 2 & 3. The state court
plaintiffs asserted numerous claims against the UI defendants, EWTC Management, and its
owners, including claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment. This
litigation culminated in a four week trial, and the state court plaintiffs prevailed on all claims.

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

McGrory Deel. [177] Ex. 4. The parties eventually reached several settlement agreements, after
which SSSC assumed UI's role as sole member of SDI. Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 3.

E. Plaintiffs' Claims to Board Membership
Plaintiffs allege that Bibiji and the three children should be on the SSSC Board and that
Bibiji should be on the UI Board. SAC [234]

ifif 24-29. They assert that, before Yogi Bhaj an' s

death, they expressed to him that they wished to become more involved in the management of
the various business entities that he controlled. See, e.g., Soni Deel. [394], Ex. NN (Ranbir Dep.)
at 60. Plaintiffs assert that Yogi Bhajan instructed defendant Sopurkh, both orally and in writing,
to add plaintiffs to the management boards of whatever business entities the family wanted. Soni
Deel. [394], Ex. NN (Ranbir Dep.) at 60-61. Sopurkh testified that Yogi Bhajan asked her to talk
to the family members about which boards they were interested in participating in. Soni Deel.
[394], Ex. RR (Sopurkh Dep.) at 40-41.
There are several documents in the record that might indicate who Yogi Bhajan intended
to be on the UI and SSSC boards. On July 10, 1997, Sopurkh emailed Yogi Bhajan and referred
to "the listing of the [SSSC] board members as [Yogi Bhajan] gave them to me." Soni Deel.
[394], Ex. I. This list of 13 names included Plaintiffs Bibiji and Kulbir, Defendant Sopurkh, four
dismissed defendants, and seven others. Id This list was faxed to Lambert on October 12, 2004,
just after Yogi Bhajan died. Id. On October 7, 1997, Yogi Bhajan signed a separate list naming
14 individuals to the SSSC board. Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 29. This list included the 13 names
from the July 1997 email and added the name Harijot Kaur Khalsa. Id. There is also an undated,
handwritten note that was signed by Yogi Bhajan and stated "Ranbit, Kamaljit, Kulbir will be
added to SSS board." Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 30. This note was faxed to Lambert on
October 12, 2004, just after Yogi Bhajan died. Id. Finally, there are "Consent Minutes" from a

9 - OPINION AND ORDER

July 2004 UI Board of Managers meeting indicating that Bibiji was elected as manager ofUI,
"effective immediately." Soni Deel. [394], Ex. M.

II.

Procedural Background
A.

2013 Motions to Dismiss and 2017 Ninth Circuit Decision

Plaintiffs originally brought claims for: (1) declaratory relief; (2) breach of fiduciary
duty; (3) fraud; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage; (6) conversion; (7) unjust enrichment; (8) RICO; (9) legal malpractice; and
(1) aiding and abetting. FAC [102]. After a 2012 round of motions to dismiss and a First
Amended Complaint (FAC), I granted Defendants' four motions to dismiss [125, 172, 178, 180]
the FAC in full on October 11, 2013, concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
derivative claims and that the direct claims failed based on res judicata, mootness, the First
Amendment's ministerial exception, Rule 9(b)'s heightened fraud standard, and/or failure to
state a claim. Minutes of Proceedings [215]; Transcript of Proceedings [220]. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. In a published opinion, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that dismissal pursuant to the ministerial exception or the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine was not warranted at the pleadings stage. Puri v. Khalsa, 844 F.3d 1152 (9th
Cir. 2017). In an accompanying unpublished memorandum disposition, the Ninth Circuit
dismissed some of Plaintiffs' claims on other grounds. Puri v. Khalsa, 674 F. App'x 679 (9th
Cir. 2017).

B.

2017 Motions to Dismiss, Motion for Reconsideration, and Partial
Settlement

In the SAC, Plaintiffs brought five claims for declaratory relief, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and
RICO/ORICO. SAC [234]. Defendants filed several Motions to Dismiss. I issued an Opinion
IO-OPINION AND ORDER

and Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. [296]. I then
denied Plaintiffs' related Motion for Reconsideration and for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Rule
54(b) [305], and granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend [301 ].
[338]. Following these Opinions and the subsequent settlement of the claims between Plaintiffs,
Lambert, and Schwabe, the following claims remain in this case:
•
•
•

Claim One (declaratory relief): direct claims against UI and SSSC by all Plaintiffs (relief
of having Bibiji placed on UI board and all Plaintiffs placed on SSSC board).
Claim Two (fraud): claim by all Plaintiffs against Sopurkh and Kmiar,
Claim Four (tortious interference): claim by all Plaintiffs against Sopurkh

C.

Motions for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the
ministerial exception, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, the statute of limitations, and
because they cannot show damages. [390]. Defendants also argue that certain of Plaintiffs'
claims are moot and that the Plaintiffs seek relief not included in the SAC. Plaintiffs move for
partial summary judgment on Claim One for Declaratory Relief and against each of Defendants'
affirmative defenses. 4 [389].

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
initial burden for a motion for summary judgment is on the moving party to identify the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once that burden
is satisfied, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, through the production of
evidence listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l), that there remains a "genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477
U.S. at 324. The non-moving party may not rely upon the pleading allegations, Brinson v. Linda Rose
4

Because I conclude the ministerial exception and the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bar review in this case, I do
not reach the parties' other arguments.

11 - OPINION AND ORDER

Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e)), or "unsupported

conjecture or conclusory statements," Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2003). All reasonable doubts and inferences to be drawn from the facts are to be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

DISCUSSION
I.

Whether the Ministerial Exception Bars Review in this Case
"The Supreme Court has long recognized religious organizations' broad right to control

the selection of their own religious leaders." Puri, 844 F.3d at 1157. Pursuant to this principle,
the Supreme Court has recognized a ministerial exception, which "precludes application of
[employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the employment relationship between a
religious institution and its ministers." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012). The ministerial exception "applies to claims that impinge on

protected employment decisions regarding a religious organization and its ministers, and when
applicable, it flatly prohibits courts from requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so." Puri, 844 F.3d at 1158 (citations and
internal quotation marks removed). In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court reasoned that judicial
review of a religious group's ministerial employment decisions would constitute "government
interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church
itself." Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. "Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted
minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment
decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church
of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs." Id. at 188.

12 - OPINION AND ORDER

Although "the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious
congregation," the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor declined "to adopt a rigid formula for
deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister." Id. at 190. Instead, the Supreme Court put
forth several guidelines for courts to consider when deciding whether the ministerial exception
applies in a given case. In Puri, the Ninth Circuit described these considerations as follows:
First, an employee is more likely to be a minister if a religious organization holds
the employee out as a minister by bestowing a formal religious title. Although an
ecclesiastical title "by itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the fact that
an employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely relevant."
A second consideration is the "substance reflected in that title," such as "a
significant degree of religious training followed by a formal process of
commissioning." Third, an employee whose "job duties reflect [] a role in
conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission" is likely to be
covered by the exception, even if the employee devotes only a small portion of
the workday to strictly religious duties and spends the balance of her time
performing secular functions. Finally, an employee who holds herself out as a
religious leader is more likely to be considered a minister.
Puri, 844 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191-93). Courts have applied the

ministerial exception to the claims of a number of different types of employees, including the
claims of the"called" teacher in Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 176; a musical director at a Catholic
church, Cannata v. Catholic Diocese ofAustin, 700 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2012); a principal of a
parochial school, Fratello v. Archdiocese ofNew York, 863 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2017); and a
Hebrew teacher at a Jewish day school, Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d
655 (7th Cir. 2018).
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit concluded, based on the pleadings alone, that the
ministerial exception does not bar review in this case. Although the court noted that "a 'mission
and purpose' of SSSC and UI is 'to benefit the Sikh Dharma community and to advance and
promote [Yogi Bhajan's] teachings,' and it is 'surely relevant' that their board members must be
ordained ministers of Sikh Dharma and must meet certain other religious criteria," the court
13 - OPINION AND ORDER

concluded that other factors outweighed these considerations. Puri, 844 F.3d at 1160. In
particular, the Ninth Circuit found it significant that the pleadings did not allege that: (1) the
board members have ministerial duties; (2) the board members are held out as religious leaders,
either by the members or their employers; or (3) that board membership required significant
religious training or requirements. Id. at 1160-61.
The Ninth Circuit also found it important that UI and SSSC are not churches, reasoning
"it is not clear that the ministerial exception could ever apply to the type of positions at issue
here. This is a dispute over seats on the boards of corporate entities that are apparently affiliated
with a church, but are not themselves churches." Id. at 1159. However, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the Supreme Court suggested "a fairly broad application of the exception" in HosannaTabor, as has the Ninth Circuit in previous cases. Id. (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 18889; Bollardv. Cal. Province of the Soc'y ofJesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Defendants argue that information outside the pleadings now shows that membership on
the UI and SSSC boards clearly qualifies for the ministerial exception. In particular, Defendants
argue that SSSC and UI are religious organizations and that board members serve as ministers,
because they hold themselves out as such and have explicitly religious duties. Plaintiffs argue
that SSSC only holds administrative authority, that board members were not required until after
Yogi Bhajan's death to be ministers, and that the UI and SSSC boards do not require any
religious training. 5 Below, I address each of Hosanna-Tabor's guidelines, the Ninth Circuit's

5

Plaintiffs also argue that the Ninth Circuit's decision is law of the case, but the Ninth Circuit clearly stated its
decision was based on the pleadings alone.

14-0PINION AND ORDER

interpretation of those guidelines in this case, and how any new evidence outside of the pleadings
may affect the ministerial exception analysis in this case. 6

A.

Whether UI and SSSC are Religious Groups

The Supreme Court referred to "religious groups" in Hosanna-Tabor, but did not offer a
specific definition of "religious group." See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (referencing
"the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and
carry out their mission"). In a recent case, the Second Circuit noted that although the Supreme
Court did not define "religious groups" in Hosanna-Tabor, "other circuits have applied the
ministerial exception in cases involving 'religiously affiliated entit[ies],' whose 'mission[s are]
marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics."' Penn v. New York Methodist Hosp., 884
F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Conlon v. Inter Varsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d
829, 834 (6th Cir. 2015)).
In this case, the Ninth Circuit determined that "[i]n assessing the responsibilities
attendant to the board positions, it is relevant that the entities involved are not themselves
churches, but rather corporate parents of a church." Puri, 844 F.3d at 1160. The Court concluded
that "SSSC's primary responsibility appears to be holding title to church property, and UI, in
addition to being the sole member of SDI-i.e., the direct corporate parent of the Sikh Dharma
church-owns and controls a portfolio of for-profit and nonprofit corporations, including a major
security contractor and a prominent tea manufacturer." Id The Ninth Circuit noted that based on
the pleadings, "UI and SSSC are not churches," even though the organizations have some
religious purposes. Id at 1160-61 (noting that "the complaint alleges that a 'mission and

6

In addressing the ministerial exception, I refer to the documents in existence at the time of the "employment
decisions" Defendants argue are "protected" by the exception. This means the 1997 SSSC documents and the 2003
UI and SDI documents. I therefore DENY as moot the parties' Motions to Strike [418, 424, 428] as they pertain to
this issue.

15 - OPINION AND ORDER

purpose' of SSSC and UI is 'to benefit the Sikh Dhmma community and to advance and promote
[Yogi Bhajan's] teachings"'). Plaintiffs argue that nothing has changed from the pleadings stage,
but Defendants argue there is new evidence showing that UI and SSSC are clearly churches or
religious groups.
There is some evidence that UI and SSSC are not churches, or at the very least, have
some secular duties. As the Ninth Circuit described, SSSC and UI hold assets and oversee
several subsidiaries, including for-profit companies like East-West Tea Company and Akal
Security. Gurojodha Deel. [395], Ex. 7. And relevant documents sometimes describe their roles
as "administrative" or overseeing the "program services" of SDI. See Southwick Deel. [398], Ex.
44; Gurojodha Deel. [395], Ex. 3 at 17.
But I conclude that evidence outside of the pleadings 7 show that SSSC and UI are
"religious groups," even if they are not churches in the traditional sense. 8 First, SSSC received a
tax exemption as a "church or a convention or association of churches." Gurojodha Deel. [395]

if 32; id.

Ex. 3. Referring to Yogi Bhajan's role as "current leader of the Sikh religion in the

Western Hemisphere," the tax documents stated SSSC was to be Yogi Bhajan's "successor, to
fulfill his leadership functions following his death." Gurojodha Deel. [395], Ex. 3 at 17, 20.
Other documents state that SSSC's purposes include "conduct[ing] and/or facilitat[ing]
religious, charitable, and educational activities." Soni Deel. [394], Ex. C, Art. VI. And according
7

The Plaintiffs agreed at oral argument that to decide whether SSSC and UI are religious groups, I should look only
to governing documents in existence at the time of the events in question, not to the declarations in the record.
Minutes [433].
8

There are several reasons why this case does not fit neatly into the precedents set by prior case law. First, it
involves a religion not within the Judeo-Christian tradition, which is most commonly addressed by the case law. But
see Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1999) (addressing the
competing claims of individuals in an ancient Sufi order). This precedent presumes there are relatively clear
distinctions between religious and secular purposes. Here, by contrast, it is by no means straightforward to
determine that, for example, running yoga clinics is a secular endeavor, instead of part of the Sikh Dharma religious
message. Additionally, this case addresses a dispute during a time when the Sikh Dharma hierarchy was evolving.
During his illness and up to the time of his death, Yogi Bhajan was in the process of creating several new structures
to replace him as the leader of Sikh Dharma in the Western Hemisphere.

16 - OPINION AND ORDER

to SSSC's 1997 Articles, the SSSC board also had the duty to choose a new Siri Sikdar
Sahib/a-one of the two religious leaders of the Sikh Dharma religion in the Western
Hemisphere-in the case that Yogi Bhajan did not choose such an individual. Soni Deel. [394],
Ex.Bat 4-5; Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 12. And SSSC was to make this decision with the
advice of the Khalsa Council Adh Kari, SDI's board of directors, and with nominations from the
Khalsa Council, SDI's ministerial board-two clearly religious bodies. Soni Deel. [394], Ex. B
at 4-5; Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 12.
Similarly, according to the 2003 SDI Amended and Restated Operation Agreement, UI
had a significant role in running the religious affairs of SDI. UI was to approve or elect nearly all
religious and administrative leaders of SDI. Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 2-14 (UI to choose the
directors of the Khalsa Council Adh Kari and the Khalsa Council, the Executive Officers of SDI,
the Secretary General of SDI, and "designat[ing] such other religious or administrative officials
of [SDI] as it deems appropriate"). UI could also remove employees, including the Siri Sikdar
Sahib/a ifthe Siri Sikdar Sahib/a died or was incapacitated. Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 2-14.
UI also had final authority over all actions of the Khalsa Council Adh Kari and could amend the
Articles and Bylaws of SDI. Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 2-14.
In my view, these documents show that although SSSC and UI do act as corporate boards
in some ways, they were also formed to perform Yogi Bhajan' s leadership role in approving
religious policy and leaders. Although both organizations perform some secular functions, they
appear to be "religiously affiliated entities" with clearly religious purposes. See Penn, 884 F.3d
at 424. Taking this information into consideration, I now address Hosanna-Tabor's other
guidelines.

17 - OPINION AND ORDER

B.

Whether the Board Members Have Formal Religious Titles

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that board members must be ministers, but concluded
that "[a]n employee's status as an ordained minister, standing alone, does not trigger the
ministerial exception when that individual is employed in a secular capacity by an entity other
than a church." Puri, 844 F.3d at I 161. I take this to mean that formal religious titles can satisfy
this first prong of the Hosanna-Tabor analysis, but do not control the outcome. Here, Plaintiffs
do not dispute that the UI Amended and Restated Operating Agreement required board members
to be qualified as Sikh Dharma ministers and included other religious qualifications. See
Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 22 at 3-4. But appears that the SSSC ministerial qualifications came
into effect immediately after Yogi Bhajan' s death and may not have applied at the time of the
"employment decision" disputed by Plaintiffs. I therefore conclude this factor weighs in favor of
applying the ministerial exception to Plaintiffs' claims against UI and against applying the
ministerial exception to Plaintiffs' claims against SSSC. 9

C.

Religious Training and Other Religious Requirements

The Ninth Circuit noted that the pleadings did not allege that board membership required
significant religious training or requirements. Puri, 844 F.3d at 1161. The Defendants do not
specifically allege that board membership requires religious training, or detail what is required to
become a minister with SDI. I therefore conclude this factor weighs against applying the
ministerial exception to Plaintiffs' claims.

9

SSSC's evolution over the past fifteen years raises the novel question of how to apply the ministerial exception to
an organization which has assumed more religious characteristics over time. I have only considered documents
describing SSSC prior to Yogi Bhajan's death in analyzing the ministerial exception, because the term "protected
employment decision" appears to apply to a particular moment in time. But doing so fails to take into account the
fact that granting a remedy to Plaintiffs regarding SSSC would affect SSSC now, a significantly religious
organization. Viewed in this light, the "formal title" factor would weigh in favor of applying the ministerial
exception to SSSC, which now requires such titles for board members.

18 - OPINION AND ORDER

D.

Job Duties

The Ninth Circuit found it significant that the pleadings did not allege that the board
members have ministerial duties. Puri, 844 F.3d at 1160. Defendants argue that "the SSSC and
UI Board positions carry a responsibility to convey the Sikh Dharma message and carry out its
mission." Def. MSJ [390] at 23. Plaintiffs argue there are no ministerial requirements or religious
job duties listed in the then-applicable 1997 Articles and Bylaws for SSSC, or in UI's governing
documents. See Soni Deel. [394], Ex. B (SSSC Articles oflncorporation); Soni Deel. [394], Ex.
C, Art. VI; Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 21at1.
In my view, the evidence not available at the pleadings stage changes considerably the
analysis of this factor. On one hand, Plaintiffs are correct that the section of the SSSC Bylaws
entitled "Duties" makes no reference to religion. See Soni Deel. [394], Ex. C, Art. 2. But on the
other hand, the boards members of SSSC and UI have some express religious duties. SSSC was
to choose a new Siri Sikdar Sahib/a, one of the two religious positions to exist after Yogi
Bhajan's death, in the event that Yogi Bhajan did not choose such an individual. Soni Deel.
[394], Ex.Bat 4-5. And as discussed above, UI had the power to choose _and remove many of
SDI's religious leaders, approve the decisions of the Khalsa Council Adh Kari, and amend the
bylaws and articles of SDI. Gurojot Deel. [396], Ex. 9 at 2-14. Furthermore, some of the
Plaintiffs testified that they were appointed to "spread the word of [Yogi Bhajan' s] mission,"
including "the word of the Holy Scripture," and "teach the Sikh way of life." Southwick Deel.
[419], Ex. 1 (Bibiji Dep.) at 59-60.
The duties of the board members do not fit neatly into case law, which often involves
religious educators. See, e.g. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192 (noting the plaintiff was
"expressly charged ... with 'lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity' and 'teach[ing]

19 - OPINION AND ORDER

faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the
symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church"'). But in my view, the board members of
UI and SSSC have important religious duties: they may choose and remove religious leaders, and
approve religious decisions and governing documents. Although the board members do not act as
teachers, they have significant religious duties that allow them to shape the future of the Sikh
Dharma religion through its religious employees, governing documents, and the decisions of its
board of directors. In the context of SSSC's and UI's leadership roles in relation to SDI, these
facts weigh strongly in favor of applying the ministerial exception to Plaintiffs' claims.

D.

Whether Board Members or the Board Hold the Members Out as
Religious Leaders

The Ninth Circuit found it significant that the pleadings did not allege that the board
members are held out as religious leaders, either by the members themselves or their employers.
Puri, 844 F.3d at 1160. However, there is evidence not available at the pleadings stage that both

the Plaintiffs and their potential "employers" viewed these positions as involving religious
leadership components. In their depositions, the Plaintiffs testified that they were appointed to
"spread the word of [Yogi Bhajan' s] mission," including "the word of the Holy Scripture," and
"teach the Sikh way oflife." Southwick Deel. [419], Ex. 1, (Bibiji Dep.) at 59-60; see also
Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 10 at 116 (Kulbir agreeing with the statement that board members
would "generally be in a position to engage in that kind of outreach to religious leaders").
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs admitted "that the members of the SSSC Board of Trustees hold
positions of leadership within the Sikh Dharma community by virtue of their position as SSSC
Trustees." Southwick Deel. [398], Ex. 1at4. In terms of the boards themselves, it is clear from
the governing documents of SSSC, UI, and SDI that the board members of SSSC and UI were to
play an important role as religious leaders, in choosing and removing subordinate religious
20 - OPINION AND ORDER

leaders, and by affecting religious policy. Given these facts, I conclude this factor weighs in
favor of applying the ministerial exception to Plaintiffs' claims.
Considering the role UI and SSSC were to play in the hierarchy of Sikh Dharma and
these four factors, I conclude the application of the ministerial exception is a close call. On one
hand, the board members of SSSC did not appear to need a religious title at the time of the
employment decision in question. And neither board appeared to require religious training.
Furthermore, this case falls outside the typical cases in which the ministerial exception applies,
which tend to involve religious educators. On the other hand, the Supreme Court suggested "a
fairly broad application of the exception" in Hosanna-Tabor. Puri, 844 F.3d at 1159 (citing

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89). I conclude the importance of each board in the religious
hierarchy of Sikh Dharma at the time Plaintiffs allege they were appointed to the board is
particularly relevant. And there were significant religious duties involved in these leadership
positions, including choosing and firing religious leaders, approving the governing documents of
SDI, and approving the actions of SD I's board of directors.
Given this religious structure and the ministerial leadership roles played by the board
members, I conclude that judicial review of the decisions to not place Plaintiffs on the UI and
SSSC boards falls within the purpose of the ministerial exception, as it would constitute
"government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of
the church itself." See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. In effect, Plaintiffs seek court
interference in the membership of the boards that choose Sikh Dharma's highest level of
leadership and exercise significant control over the direction of the Sikh Dharma religious in the
Western Hemisphere. Therefore, the ministerial exception bars review in this case.

21 - OPINION AND ORDER

II.

Whether the Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Bars Review in this Case
Because this case does not involve the typical application of the ministerial exception, I

address in the alternative whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies. The ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine is based on courts' determination that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause restricts
the government's ability to intrude into ecclesiastical matters or to interfere with a church's
governance of its own affairs." Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945. "Under this doctrine of ecclesiastical
abstention, 'a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church ... disputes so
long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters."' Puri, 844 F.ed at 1162 (quoting Jones

v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979)). But "[u]nlike the ministerial exception, which completely
bars judicial inquiry into protected employment decisions, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
is a qualified limitation, requiring only that courts decide disputes involving religious
organizations without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine." Puri, 844 F.3d
at 1164 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To this end, the Supreme Court held in

Jones that "civil comis, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution, may resolve [church property] dispute[s] on the basis of 'neutral principles of
law."' Jones, 443 U.S. at 597. The Ninth Circuit noted in this case that "we are unaware of any
authority or reason precluding courts from deciding other types of church disputes by application
of purely secular legal rules, so long as the dispute does not fall within the ministerial exception
and can be decided without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine." Puri,
844 F.3d at 1165 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a neutral-principles approach may be appropriate,
because "the plaintiffs here ask the comis to decide what amounts to a secular factual question:
under Oregon law and the secular governing documents of UI, an Oregon nonprofit limited

22 - OPINION AND ORDER

liability company, and SSSC, an Oregon nonprofit religious corporation, were the plaintiffs
elected or designated to the disputed board positions?" Id. at 1167. The Ninth Circuit noted the
Plaintiffs do not ask "for resolution of a controversy over religious doctrine. Nor do they ask
civil courts to decide whether a religious organization properly applied ecclesiastical rules in
settling a leadership dispute[.]" Id.
Defendants argue that evidence beyond the pleadings show that Plaintiffs do, in fact, ask
the court for resolution of a question of religious doctrine: whether Yogi Bhaj an' s succession
plan as to the religious leadership of the UI and SSSC boards. Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that
neutral principles can clearly resolve this issue. Given my conclusions that UI and SSSC are
religious organizations, and that board membership constitutes a religious leadership role in SDI,
I look to see how the case law that the Ninth Circuit previously distinguished from this case may
now apply to the facts of this case.
In Kedrojfv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America,
344 U.S. 94 (1952), the Supreme Court considered whether a state court could determine which
faction of the Russian Orthodox Church was entitled to the Russian Orthodox Cathedral in New
York City. Id. at 95-97. The state court applied a state law requiring that the decisions of the
American churches be authoritative. Id. at 99. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
application of the state law "displace[d] one church administrator with another" and "passe[d]
the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church authority to another." Id. at 119.
This was unconstitutional, concluded the Court, because it placed the "power of the state into the
forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment." Id. at
119. Similarly, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States ofAmerica and

Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Supreme Court considered a case in which a

23 - OPINION AND ORDER

state court reinstated a bishop because the church had failed to follow its own constitution, as
interpreted by the court. 426 U.S. at 707-08. Again the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
state court had "unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially religious
controversies." Id. at 720.
In Maktab Tarighe Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir.
1999), the Ninth Circuit considered a dispute involving corporate bodies competing over
trademarks related to a Sufi order. The Court concluded that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
did not bar review of the trademark claims in the case. Id. at 1250. But in a separate claim, the
plaintiffs asked that the defendants be enjoined "from representing that the Order ceased to exist
with the death of the Forty-First Teacher, and that they are teachers or masters of the Order." Id.
The Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he district court cannot determine by neutral principles the
legitimacy of [the religious leader's] succession; that kind of determination could only be made
by a recognized decision-making body of the Order itself." Id.
Here, as in Kedrojf, Milivojevich, and Kianfar, Plaintiffs ask the Court to adjudicate a
church leadership dispute. Like in Kedra.ff, the Plaintiffs here ask the Court to "displace[] one
church administrator with another." See 344 U.S. at 119. And although the UI and SSSC board
members are not bishops, as in Milivojevich, the board members have significant religious
leadership roles within SDI. This case is perhaps most akin to Kianfar, which also involved
competing corporate entities linked to a religious organization. The Plaintiffs ask the Court to
determine the legitimacy of the SSSC board, which was to be Yogi Bhajan's "successor, to fulfill
his leadership functions following his death," Gurojodha Deel. [395], Ex. 3 at 17, and of the UI
board, which took over Yogi Bhajan's decisionmaking role as to certain religious decisions
within SDI. In my view, this would require the Court to improperly "determine ... the

24 - OPINION AND ORDER

legitimacy of [the religious leader's] succession," because such a "determination could only be
made by a recognized decision-making body of [SDI] itself." Kianfar, 179 F.3d at 1250.
The concerns this case raises are even more apparent when considering the current status
of the boards, and SSSC in particular. SSSC's current mission statement includes an explicitly
religious purpose. See Gurojodha Deel. [395]

if 25 (SSSC to protect assets, support non-profit

and for-profit entities, and "live to and hold the values of the teachings of the Siri Guru Granth
Sahib and the Siri Singh Sahib Bhai Sahib Harbhajan Singh Khalsa Yogi Ji: selfless service,
compassion, kindness, honesty, integrity, trustworthiness and Guru inspired consciousness").
And the SSSC board now has religious duties similar to those of the original UI board.
Gurojodha Deel. [395]

if 28 ("SSSC has the authority to appoint and remove the board members

of Sikh Dharma International (SDI), which, among other things, contains the Sikh Dharma
Ministry and, through the Ministry, carries out the function of ordaining Sikh Ministers."). Board
members participate in religious outreach "as representatives and ambassadors of Sikh Dharma."
Gurojodha Deel. [395]

if 39. Finally, the current election process for SSSC requires board

members to be elected by fellow Sikh Dharma ministers, active Khalsa Council members, and
members of the Sikh Dharma community pursuant to the terms of the SSSC Board Election
Policy," but in the future, "only Sikh Dharma ministers who are in good standing will be eligible
to vote for SSSC Board members." Gurojodha Deel. [395]

if 16.

To grant plaintiffs' requested relief, this Court would have to determine the legitimacy of
Yogi Bhajan's succession. Additionally, this relief would place Plaintiffs at the helm of religious
institutions, thus displacing board members chosen by other methods. In my view, this raises a
"substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or
intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs." See Milivojevich, 426 U.S.

25 - OPINION AND ORDER

at 709. I therefore conclude the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine also bars review of the claims
in this case. 10
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
[390], DENY Plaintiffs' Motion for Paiiial Summary Judgment [389], and DENY or DENY as
moot the parties' Motions to Strike [418, 424, 428]. This case is therefore DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

¢;_

DATED this

2/:, day of April, 2018.

~-~~
Chief United States District Judge

0

Because I conclude the ministerial exception and the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bar review in this case, I do
not reach the parties' other arguments.
'

26 - OPINION AND ORDER