Coultas v. Payne et al
Filing
113
OPINION and ORDER - State Defendants' Request/Motion for Judicial Notice 106 is GRANTED. However, the court concludes Coultas's § 1983 claims against Tichenor and Payne are not Heck-barred. Therefore, the court DENIES in part State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 22 . IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of October, 2015, by United States Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
LYLE MARK COULTAS,
Civ. No. 3: l l-cv-45-AC
Plaintiff,
OPINION AND
ORDER
v.
STEVEN PAYNE, individually and in his
Official Capacity as Oregon State Crime
Laboratory Detective; CARROLL
TICHENOR, Yamhill County Judge;
DEPARTMENT OF THE OREGON
STATE POLICE; YAMHILL COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; CURT
GILBERT, individually and in his Official
Capacity as Yamhill County Jail
Commander; YAMHILL COUNTY JAIL;
RUSSEL LUDWIG, individually and in his
Official capacity as a Yamhill County
Sheriff Detective; YAMHILL COUNTY
SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; THE STATE
OF OREGON,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER - 1
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ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Lyle Mark Coultas ("Coultas") filed this lawsuit against Defendants Steven Payne,
Carroll Tichenor, the Oregon State Police ("State Defendants"), the Yamhill County District
Attorney's Office, Curt Gilbert, Yamhill County Jail, Russell Ludwig, Yamhill County Sheriff's
Department, and the State of Oregon ("County Defendants") (collectively "Defendants") for
violations of Coultas's civil rights. The court dismissed all of Coultas's claims against State
Defendants pursuant to the rule established by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994), and entered judgement in State Defendants' favor. However, on appeal, the Ninth
Circuit remanded the case to this court to consider the effect of the Ninth Circuit's subsequent
decision in Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755 (2014), on this court's Heck analysis. The parties now
have filed supplemental briefs, and State Defendants have filed a Motion for Judicial Notice in
support of their supplemental brief. The court concludes that under Jackson, Coultas's claims are
not Heck-baned, and may proceed against Defendants Payne and Tichenor.
Factual Background
Coultas was charged and convicted of child-sexual abuse and possession of child
pornography. He sought post conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel as
well as prosecutorial and investigatory misconduct. In a June 25, 2007 Opinion Letter, Senior Judge
James R. Hargreaves invalidated Coultas's conviction on the basis ofinsufficient assistance of trial
and appellate counsel. Judge Hargreaves explained:
Despite the plethora ofissues raised in the 125 page Petition, there are only a handful
of core issues that merit addressing. These fall into four general categories:
1. The handling of the issues sunounding the allegations of sexual
abuse of Petitioner's daughter that were alleged to have taken place
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in his pickup;
2. The computer report;
3. Comments on the credibility of witnesses by other witnesses;
4. Appellate counsel's failure to address the issue of the comments on the credibility
of witnesses by other witnesses as plain enor.
(Declaration of Andrew Hallman in support of Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice ("Hallman
Deel."), Ex. 7 ("Hargreaves Opinion") at 3.) Ultimately, Judge Hargreaves found that Coultas's
lawyers provided constitutionally deficient representation with regards to all four categories.
(Hargreaves Opinion at 3.) However, Coultas's other arguments for reversing his sentence went
unaddressed in the Opinion Letter. Because of the constitutional defects in Coultas's original
conviction, he was granted a new trial.
During preparation for the new trial, Coultas discovered that some of his property, which the
State had confiscated as evidence, had been destroyed.
Coultas, 2011 WL 6205911, at *2.
Moreover, Detective Russel Ludwig testified that Tichenor had instmcted him not to take notes of
witness interviews, and that witnesses' stories had changed over time. Id. Moreover, the State
conceded that it could not find child pornography on Coultas' s computer, and asse1ted a new theory
that Coultas had deleted evidence of child pornography from his computer before the State could
seize it. Id. at *I.
Before the court could conduct a new trial Coultas entered a plea agreement. (Hallman Deel.
Ex. 8.) Under the plea agreement, Coultas agreed to plead no contest to charges of attempted sexual
abuse in the first degree and attempted sexual abuse in the first degree. (Hallman Deel. Ex. 8.) In
exchange, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against Coultas and stipulated the
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following: "The Defendant may petition the Court to reduce both convictions to class A
Misdemeanors upon successful completion of the post-prison supervision, and the State will NOT
OBJECT, provided the Defendant successfully completes the required period of post-prison
supervision." (Hallman Deel. Ex. 8 at 3.) In a June20, 2008 judgment, Senior Circuit Judge Allan
H. Coon sentenced Coultas to 83 months in prison and five years of post-prison supervision " less
the term of imprisonment," but credited Coultas with eighty-three and one-half months of time
served. (Hallman Deel. Ex. 8 at 2, Ex. 9 at 2.) Coultas completed his sentence, and his convictions
were "declared and adjudged to be [] Class A misdemeanor[s] pursuant to ORS 161. 705." (Hallman
Deel. Ex. 9 at 2-3.)
Procedural Background
Coultas filed this matter against Defendants on January 13, 2011, and alleged malicious
prosecution, fraud on the court, and violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt.
Nos. 1, 8.) In a December 12, 2011 Opinion and Order, the court dismissed all of Coultas's claims
against State Defendants pursuant to the rule aiticulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Coultas v. Payne, Civ. No. 3:11-cv-45-AC, 2011WL6205911,
at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2011). In a separate Opinion and Orderissued that same day, the comtgranted
in part County Defendants' Motion for Summmy Judgment, and dismissed as untimely Coultas's
§ 1983 claims as against the County Defendants. Coultas v. Payne, Civ. No. 3: l l-cv-45-AC, 2011
WL 6205893, at* 1 (D. Or. Dec. 12, 2011). However, the court concluded there remained genuine
issues of material fact regarding Coultas' s conversion claim. Id. The County Defendants again filed,
and the court again denied, a motion for summary judgment against Coultas's conversion claim.
Coultas v. Payne, Civ. No. 3:11-cv-45-AC, 2012 WL 4324931, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 19, 2012).
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In May 2013, the court entered a Final Judgment in favor of State Defendants and the
Yamhill County District Attorney's Office on Coultas's claims. (Dkt. No. 95.) Although Coultas's
conversion claim remained, the claims on which the comt entered its appealable judgment "rest[ ed]
on distinct factual bases" compared to the live claims that remained after the court's December 12,
2011 rulings. Coultas v. Payne, No 3:11-cv-45-AC, 2013 WL 1870545, at *3 (D. Or. May 3, 2013)
(vacated and remanded by Coultas v. Payne, 586 Fed. Appx. 429, 430 (9th Cir. 2014)).
On November 18, 2014, a panel of judges from the Ninth Circuit Comt of Appeals
unanimously vacated and remanded the comt's entry ofa final judgment. Coultas, 586 Fed. Appx.
at 430. In vacating this court's judgment, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[t]he district comt did not
have the benefit of our recent decision in Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2014), when it
determined that Coultas' s § 1983 claims against the individual defendants, Steven Payne and Carroll
Tichenor, were Heck-barred." Coultas, 586 Fed. Appx. at 430. On that basis, the court of appeals
vacated in pait this court's judgment "to allow the district court to reconsider its application of Heck,
including whether Coultas' s post-conviction reliefinvalidated his initial conviction, and whether his
claims are inconsistent with his subsequent guilty plea conviction." Id. On remand, this court
ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing on the question posed by the Ninth Circuit, and
considers that briefing and considers State Defendants' Motion for Judicial Notice. (Dkt. Nos. 102,
106.)
Legal Standards
I. Motion for Judicial Notice
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the comt may take judicial notice of facts (1) that are
generally known within the comt's jurisdiction; or "(2) can be accurately and readily determined
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from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. Evrn. 20l(b). Courts
readily take judicial notice of "undisputed matters of public record, and documents on file in a
court." Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012).
II. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that complaints in federal court consist of "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... " Pleadings need
not contain detailed factual allegations, but "labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, SSO U.S. S44, SSS (2007).
However, a claim "may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [necessary] facts
is improbable," and the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Id. at SS6.
On a motion for failure to state a claim, the court is limited in the evidence it may consider.
Am. Family Ass 'n, Inc. v. City & County ofS.F., 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002). The court
may consider the pleadings themselves, exhibits that are physically attached to the complaint, and
matters of which the comt may take judicial notice. Lee v. City ofL.A., 2SO F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.
200 I). For all other factual matters, the co mt must assume all allegations in the complaint are true
and draw all "reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving patty." Holden v. Hagopian, 978
F.2d 11lS,1118 (9th Cir. 1992).
In cases involving a pro se plaintiff, the court construes the pleadings liberally and affords
the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 3S8, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). In
other words, courts hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. Sl9, S20 (1972). However, despite the comt's duty to treat pro
se complaints liberally, the court may not supply essential elements of a claim that were not pleaded.
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Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. ofAlaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Discussion
At issue are two motions, both filed by State Defendants. The first asks the court to take
judicial notice of ten documents which State Defendants use to support their argument on
supplemental briefing. The second motion asks the court to find that this co mi's December 12, 2011
Opinion and Order dismissing Coultas' s claims against Payne and Tichenor is unaffected by the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Jackson. Coultas does not oppose State Defendants' Motion for Judicial
Notice, but contends the Jackson ruling requires this court to deny State Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss on remand from the Ninth Circuit.
I. Motion for Judicial Notice
State Defendants move for judicial notice of the following state-court documents: (I) the
Oregon Judicial Information Network ("OJIN") case register for State of Oregon v. Lyle Mark
Coultas, Yamhill County Circuit Court Case No. CROl 0164 ("State v. Coultas"); (2) The OJIN case
register for Lyle Coultas v. Jean Hill, Superintendent, Snake River Correctional Institution, Postconviction Relief, Malheur County Circuit Court Case No. 06045061M ("Coultas v. Hill"); (3) the
criminal indictment for State v. Coultas; (4) the motion and order of dismissal of counts 15, 19, 20,
and 21 for State v. Coultas; (5) the sentencing order for State v. Coultas; (6) the petition for postconviction relief in Coultas v. Hill; (7) the judgement and opinion letter for Coultas v. Hill; (8)
Coultas' s affidavit and petition to enter a plea of no contest for State v. Coultas; (9) the second
amended judgment for State v. Coultas; and (I 0) the supplemental judgment for State v. Coultas.
Coultas does not oppose State Defendants' Motion.
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The comt may "take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record ... including
documents on file in federal or state courts." Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32
(9th Cir. 2012). Here, there is no question as to the accuracy and legitimacy of each of State
Defendants' proffered exhibits. Therefore, the comt grants State Defendants' Request for Judicial
Notice, and will take judicial notice of all ten documents attached to State Defendants' motion.
II. Supplemental Briefing
In Heck v. Humphrey, the U.S. Supreme Court determined a plaintiff could not succeed in
a§ 1983 claim to recover damages where the claim calls into question the validity of an outstanding
criminal conviction or sentence. 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). There, the plaintiff was convicted and
incarcerated for voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 479. During his incarceration, the plaintiff filed a
§ 1983 claim in which he alleged the prosecuting attorney and police assigned to his criminal case
destroyed evidence, used unlawful identification methods at trial, and "engaged in an 'unlawful,
unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation .... '"Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs claims
"because the issues it raised 'directly implicate the legality of [the plaintiffs] confinement."' Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Comt affirmed the district court's conclusion and held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such dete1mination, or called into
question by a federal comt's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]
Id. at 486. In disallowing § 1983 claims which call into question a valid conviction or sentence, the
Court was primarily concerned with the possibility of conflicting judgments:
This requirement 'avoids parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and
guilt and it precludes the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action after
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having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a
strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out
of the same or identical transaction."
Id. at 484. Thus, the Court directed lower comts analyzing a prisoner's§ 1983 claim to "consider
whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id. at 487.
In Jackson v. Barnes, the Ninth Circuit further explained Heck 's scope in barring a § 1983
claim. 749 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2014). There, the plaintiff was convicted of first degree mmder, but
his conviction was later reversed because evidence was introduced at his trial in violation of Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The plaintiff was retried and convicted without the use of the
tainted evidence. Jackson, 794 F.3d at 759. After the first conviction was ove1tumed, the plaintiff
filed a§ 1983 claim related to the Miranda violation. Id. The Ninth Circuit held thatthe plaintiffs
claims were not barred by the Heck doctrine because the conviction implicated by the plaintiffs §
1983 claims had already been invalidated by the comt. Id. "Therefore, a judgment in [the
plaintiffs] favor would- far from 'necessarily imply[ing]' the invalidity of his second conviction
-
not have any bearing on it." Id. Under Jackson, where the purportedly unconstitutional action
at issue in a§ 1983 claim formed the basis of a conviction which has already been invalidated by an
appeals court or during post-conviction relief, the plaintiffs claims may proceed.
In concluding as it did, the Jackson court cited with approval the Second Circuit Case
Poventudv. City ofNew York, 750 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2014). InPoventud, the plaintiff was convicted
of second degree murder after the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence. Id. at 125. A New
York state court granted the plaintiffs petition for post conviction relief and overturned the
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conviction for violating Brady v. Mwyland, 373 U.S. 83 (1961). Id. The plaintiff later pleaded
guilty to lesser charges, but brought a § 1983 claim for violation of his rights under Brady. Id. at
126. The Second Circuit held that granting the plaintiffs requested relief under§ 1983 would not
invalidate a valid conviction, because the plaintiff had been validly convicted only under the plea
agreement. Id. at 130. Thus, permitting the plaintiffs § 1983 claim to proceed would not create
inconsistent court orders or permit collateral litigation of a outstanding criminal judgment. Id.
Here, as in Jackson and Poventud, permitting Coultas's § 1983 claims to proceed would not
challenge the validity of an outstanding criminal judgment, pe1mit collateral litigation of criminal
issues, or contravene the "strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions
arising out of the same or identical transaction." Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. Coultas's convictions for
nineteen charges related to sexual abuse of a child and child pornography were overturned by Judge
Hargreaves for violation of Coultas's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Coultas's subsequent outstanding criminal conviction was based on his plea agreement, and not on
constitutionally tainted evidence.
See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001)
(constitutionally tainted evidence was not introduced against a defendants who pleaded guilty and
no contest because "[n]o evidence was inh·oduced against them .... Their convictions derive from
their pleas, not from verdicts obtained with supposedly illegal evidence.") (emphasis added).
Because Coultas's conviction derives solely from his no contest plea, his challenge in this case to
the constitutionality of the State's evidence does not implicate the validity of his 2008 conviction
under the plea agreement. Therefore, allowing Coultas to sue Payne and Tichenor for alleged
constitutional violations allegedly perpetuated during Coultas's first trial would not be inconsistent
with his outstanding criminal conviction and thus would not be inconsistent with the Supreme
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Court's holding in Heck.
State Defendants argue that the constitutionally tainted evidence at issue in this case was, in
fact, used to obtain his second conviction. Therefore, according to plaintiffs, Coultas's § 1983 claim
would call into question the validity of his second conviction under the plea agreement, and should
be Heck barred. To advance their argument, State Defendants rely primarily on Coultas' s allegation
in the Second Amended Complaint that he agreed to plead no contest to two counts of attempted
sexual assault because "Payne was prepared to go back to trial and commit perjury with his false
evidence again as he did in Plaintiffs trial and Post Conviction and so much had been done by the
defendants that Plaintiff was told by his Defense Counsel that he could not ever receive a fair trial."
(Second Am. Comp!. ii 11.) According to State Defendants, this allegation proves that the evidence
at issue was "used" in obtaining the second conviction.
The court disagrees. First, as the court has already discussed, convictions obtained from
pleas of guilty or no contest are not based on evidence, but"[t]heir convictions derive [solely] from
their pleas, not from verdicts obtained with supposedly illegal evidence." Ove, 264 F.3d at 823. The
plea agreement makes no reference to the evidence the State was prepared to introduce against
Coultas, including the evidence at issue in this matter.
Second, the pleadings and record in this case do not make clear that the computer evidence
necessarily would have been introduced against Coultas at trial to prove the crimes for which he was
ultimately convicted. To prove a defendant committed the crime of attempted sexual abuse in the
first degree, the state must demonstrate the defendant attempted, by undertaking substantial steps in
furtherance of the following elements:
(1) touch[ing] an intimate pait of the victim for the purpose of gratifying the sexual
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desire of the defendant or the victim or caused the victim to touch an intimate part
of the defendant for such purpose, ... [and (2)] the victim is less than 14 years of
age; the victim is subjected to "forcible compulsion" by the defendant; or the victim
is incapable of consent.
State v. Marshall, 350 Or. 208, 211 (2011); OR. REV. STAT.§ 163.427; see also State v. Johnson,
202 Or. App. 478, 486-87 (2005) (discussing the "substantial steps" necessary to "attempt" a crime).
The evidence at issue in this case would not be relevant to prove the elements of attempted first
degree sexual abuse. At oral argument, State Defendants argued the computer evidence would be
material to rebut certain defenses Coultas could potentially raise. State Defendants may be correct,
but the record and pleadings in this case do not definitively demonstrate that Coultas' s defenses
would necessitate the introduction of the computer evidence. Thus, constitutional challenges to the
computer evidence would not invalidate Coultas's second conviction under Heck.
State Defendants next argue that allowing Coultas's § 1983 claims to proceed would lead to
results inconsistent with Judge Hargreaves's opinion reversing Coultas's convictions. However,
Judge Hargreaves's opinion never directly addressed the constitutionality of the evidence itself, only
Coultas's lawyer's failure to obtain it during discovery. Moreover, nothing in Judge Hargreaves's
opinion relies upon the proper use of the evidence Coultas now challenges. Because Judge
Hargreaves came to no particular conclusion about the computer evidence, allowing Coultas's §
1983 claim to proceed would not be inconsistent with his opinion letter. Because Coultas's claims
are not Heck-barred, the court denies State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and will permit Coultas's
§ 1983 claims against Payne and Tichenor to proceed.
Conclusion
For the aforementioned reason, State Defendants' Motion for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.
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However, the court concludes Coultas's § 1983 claims against Tichenor and Payne are not Heckbarred. Therefore, the court DENIES in part State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED
This 9th day of October, 2015.
'
JC): V. ACOSTA
United ~Jates Magistrate Judge
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