Coultas v. Payne et al
Filing
44
OPINION and ORDER - For the reasons stated, DOJ Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 22 is GRANTED. Dated this 12th day of December, 2011, by U.S. Magistrate Judge John V. Acosta. (peg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
LYLE MARK COULTAS,
Civ. No.3: ll-cv-4S-AC
OPINION AND
ORDER
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVEN PAYNE, individually and in his
Official Capacity as Oregon State Crime
Laboratory Detective; CARROLL
TICHENOR, Yamhill County Judge;
DEPARTMENT OF THE OREGON
STATE POLICE; YAMHILL COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; CURT
GILBERT, individually and in his Official
Capacity as Yamhill County Jail
Commander; YAMHILL COUNTY JAIL;
RUSSEL LUDWIG, individually and in his
Official capacity as a Yamhill County
Sheriff Detective; YAMHILL COUNTY
SHERIFF DEPARTMENT; THE STATE
OF OREGON,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
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ACOSTA, Magistrate Judge:
Introduction
Plaintiff Lyle Mark Coultas ("Coultas") alleges due process claims against Defendants Steven
Payne ("Payne"), Carroll Tichenor ("Tichenor"), Department of the Oregon State Police ("OSP"),
Yamhill County District Attorney's Office ("the District Attorney's Office"), and the State of Oregon
("the State") (collectively "DOJ Defendants").! DOJ Defendants move to dismiss these claims for
failure to state a claim, untimeliness, Eleventh Amendment immunity, and improper service.
Background
Coultas's complaint alleges the following, which the court assumes true for purposes ofthis
motion. In the context of a custody dispute, Coultas's ex -wife framed him for crimes involving child
pornography, based on events allegedly taking place on February 4, 2001. Coultas was arrested on
March 21, 2001. Upon learning of the particulars of the charges against him, Coultas realized that
he could produce exculpatOlY evidence that would clear him with respect to certain allegations.
While in custody he attempted to produce this evidence to the court -appointed investigator assigned
to his case, at which point the evidence was intercepted by two guards who subsequently removed
the investigator from the premises and forwarded the evidence to the prosecuting attorney, Tichenor.
Upon receiving this exculpatOlY evidence, Tichenor altered the underlying allegations to strengthen
the case against Coultas, changing the dates that the alleged conduct took place. Tichenor also
removed exculpatory evidence from Coultas's residence and did not produce the evidence at trial.
Payne, a state criminal investigator, and Tichenor lied to the cOUlt about the available evidence and
! Coultas also named Curt Gilbert, Russel Ludwig, Yamhill County Jail, and the Yamhill
County Sheriff s Department as defendants, none of which is a party to this motion.
OPINION AND ORDER
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misrepresented facts to the jury with the intent to mislead the jury into believing that Coultas's
computer contained illegal pornographic content. The misrepresentations continued on November
15,2002, at which time the court ordered production of the concealed evidence, a forensic report
about Coultas's computer. Defendants Payne and Tichenor represented to the court that they had
reviewed the report and had identified activity on the dates in question. When Coultas was later
provided the report and reviewed it, it did not evidence any activity on those dates, contrary to the
in-court representations made by Payne and Tichenor. The trial court sentenced Coultas to 540
months injail.
Approximately seven years later, at a subsequent court proceeding, Peter Constantine
("Constantine"), a forensic specialist, testified that Coultas's computer had never contained the
pornography in question. The state responded with a report setting fOlih two theories to undermine
Constantine's testimony. At this point, the State changed from its initial position - that Coultas had
pornography on his computer - to a new position, that Coultas was able to erase the pornography
and avoid forensic detection of said pornography on his computer. Coultas contends that these
positions are irreconcilable. As a result of this evidence, Coultas was granted a new trial.
During preparation for the new trial, Coultas discovered that his confiscated property had
been largely destroyed. There was testimony by Detective Russel Ludwig that Tichenor had
instructed him not to take notes of witness interviews, and that the witnesses' stories had changed
overtime. Two doctors who testified against Coultas in the first trial admitted that, before trial, they
had been provided the questions they would be asked and the answers they should give at trial. They
were also instructed to destroy these instructions after trial.
Before the second trial commenced, Coultas chose to take a "no contest" plea rather than go
OPINION AND ORDER
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to trial. Coultas did so because he knew that Payne was prepared to petjure himself and present false
evidence against Coultas and defense counsel advised him that he would be unable to get a fair trial.
Coultas alleges that his rights to a fail' trial and to effective assistance of counsel were
violated under the Due Process Clause of the FOUlieenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Leg(ll St(lnd(lrd
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 8(a) governs pleadings and calls for "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
A defendant may bring a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when the plaintiff s complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, either because it (I) lacks a cognizable legal
theory; or (2) provides insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theoty. Robertson v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-534 (9th Cit'. 1984). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007), the Supreme Court addressed the pleading standard to appropriately state a claim under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Twombly emphasized the need to include sufficient facts in
the pleading to give propel' notice of the claim and its basis: "While a complaint attacked by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to
provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." fd. at 555 (brackets and
internal citations omitted). Even so, the court noted that "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof ofthose facts is improbable, and 'that a recovety is
very remote and unlikely.'" Id. at 556 (quoting Scheller v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,236 (1974».
In cases involving a plaintiff proceeding pro se, the court construes the pleadings liberally
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and affords the plaintiff the benefits of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839
F.2d 621,623 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[F]ederal coutls [are] liberally to construe the 'inatlful pleading' of pro se litigants."). In other
words, courts hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines
v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, this COUll
supplies the plaintiff with a statement of the complaint's deficiencies. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d
1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987). A pro se litigant will be given leave to amend his or her complaint
unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment.
Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623. Also, where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is granted leave
to proceed in forma pauperis, the coutl shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
the action: "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.c. §
1915(e)(2).
Discussion
L
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Section 1983 applies to the actions of persons acting under color of law. See 42 U.S.c. §
1983 (2011) (extending its protections against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia" who
deprives another of rights under the law). The Eleventh Amendment confers immunity on the state
from liability under section 1983 for damages or other retroactive relief. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d
469,472 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). This immunity extends to state agencies. See Choka
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2010) ("The Eleventh
v. McClellan, No. CV-l0 -702-S T, 2010 WL 5825522, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 28,
of relief, absent unequivocal
Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types
not be sued in their official
consent by the state." (citation omitted)). Similarly, state officials may
t a state officia
capacities for damages or other retrospective relief, because "a suit agains
her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
l in his or
against the officia l's office."
v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,
Will v. Michigan Dept. ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon
ty, however, the official
471 (1985)).2 Where a state official is sued in his or her individual capaci
qualifies as a "perso n" for purposes of section 1983 and the state is not
substituted in his or her stead.
Hq(er v. Melo, 502
Centerfor Legal Studies v. Lindley, 64 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978 (D. Or. 1999) (citing
ual capacities under section
U.S. 21, 27-29 (1991 )). Thus, state officials may be sued in their individ
1983.
DOJ Defendants argue that Coultas may not state a claim under section
of Oregon, the OSP, and the District Attorn ey's Office because they are
1983 against the state
not persons under the statute
court agrees that the state, its
and there is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. The
e from suit under Eleventh
agencies, and its officials working in their official capacities are immun
t the individual employees
Amendment immunity. However, Coultas also asserts claims agains
in
sectio n 1983 claims against
their individual capacities. The court agrees that Coultas may asseli
individual defendants in their individual capacities, which for purposes
of this motion includes only
Tichenor and Payne.
where the suit is for
A state official may be sued, however, in his or her official capacity
are not treated as actions
injunctive relief, because "'official-capacity actions for prospective relief
159, 167 n.14 (1985)).
against the state.'" ld. at n.l0 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
2
OPINION AND ORDE R
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II.
Failure to State a Claim
sOlY statements that
DO] Defendants argue that Coultas has presented only vague and conciu
he has alleged sufficient facts
are insufficient to state a cognizable legal claim. Coultas responds that
1983, in particular the right
to state claims for violations of his civil rights, enforceable via section
upon the court.
to a fair trial, to effective assistance of counsel, and a claim for fraud
n 1983.
Notably, Coultas asserts that he is not alleging any claims under sectio
its effort to construe Coulta s's pro se complaint liberally, the court choose
However, in
s to provisionally disregard
e of claims premised on
Coulta s's statement as something other than he intended. In the absenc
in federal couti. Section
section 1983, Coultas lacks a jurisdictional basis for bringing his claims
ing inmates, who suffer
1983 provides a civil enforc ement mechanism for persons, includ
state law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
constitutional injuries caused by "[alny person acting under color of
Coultas has not asserted an independent basis upon which to enforce his
federal constitutional claims
diversity and without a claim
against state actors. Furthermore, in the absence of jurisdi ction in
claims lack ajurisd
posses ssing federal subject matter jurisdiction, allY remaining state law
ictiona l
nt desire to receive a
basis in federal comi. For these reasons, and in light of Coulta s's appare
federal
ent that he is not alleging
remed y as eviden ced by his choice of forum, the court disregards his statem
claims under section 1983.
: Coulta s's ex-wife
The compl aint describes in detail the events giving rise to these claims
made threats associated with custody of their daughter; within weeks Coulta
s was accused of various
and incarcerated; Coultas
illegal actions; shortly thereafter he was arrested for said criminal acts
attempted to comm unicat e information regarding an alibi to the court -appoi
inform ation was intercepted by guards at the jail who then forwarded
OPINI ON AND ORDE R
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nted investigator but this
the information to Tichen or;
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hout Coulta s's trial and
and Tichen or concealed that and other exculpatory information throug
basis of forensic evidence;
sentencing. Seven years later, Coultas was granted a new trial on the
additional evidence of prosecutorial misconduct was revealed in prepar
ation for the second trial, but
could receive a fair trial.
Coultas nonetheless pleaded no contest because he did not believe he
factual allegations to
As the above recitation demonstrates, Coultas has set forth sufficient
state a claim or claims against DOJ Defendants, though the claims themse
lves may not be stated with
the viability of the claims
extreme clarity. Based on the allegations before it, the court considers
below.
A.
Malicious Prosecution
ous prosecution
Coultas has plead facts which, if true, could give rise to a claim for malici
3
, 510 u.S. 266 (1994), that
pursuant to section 1983. The Supreme Comt stated in Albright v. Oliver
a claim for malicious prosecution was not independently actionable under
section 1983. Id. at 270
ants
n.4. However, a claim may lie where plainti ff proves "that the defend
acted for the purpose of
of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062,
depriving him of a 'specif ic constitutional right[. ]''' Awabdy v. City
1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995» .
1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Freeman v. City o/San ta Ana, 68 F.3d
show
As such: "[T]o prevail [on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff! must
that the defendant[]
did so for the purpose of
prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that [she]
denying her equal protection or another specific constitutional right."
Meislin v. City o/Hawthorne,
v. City ofSanta Ana, 68 F.3d
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10054 (9th Cir. Cal. May 17,201 1) (Freeman
1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995» .
state law claim for malicious prosecution under Oregon law, instead
tution. Thus, any malicious
couching each of his claims as violations of the United States Consti
prosecution claim would necessarily arise under section 1983.
3 Coulta s did not asselt a
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A claim for malicious prosecution is typically lodged against a prosecuting attorney, because
"the decision to file a criminal complaint is presumed to result from an independent determination
on the part of the prosecutor, and thus, precludes liability for those who Patiicipated in the
investigation or filed a report that resulted in the initiation of proceedings." AlI'abdy v. City of
Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Smid((l' v. V(//'I1ey, 665 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th
Cir. 1981). However, other state or local officials may be liable for malicious prosecution where
they "improperly exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to him,
concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was
actively instrumental in causing the initiation oflegal proceedings." Id. (citations omitted).
Relevant to the present motion, Coultas has at least pleaded facts sufficient to state a claim
for malicious prosecution under section 1983 against Tichenor and Payne. He has alleged that
Tichenor and Payne modified the allegations against him to conform to available evidence and
concealed other evidence that would have exonerated Coultas. Even so, Coultas's claim is barred
by the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisolmlent, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid ... a [section] 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). This rule prevents a district court from entering a judgment in a
civil action that would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [aJ conviction or sentence." Id. at 487.
Furthermore, the Heck doctrine extends beyond malicious prosecution and applies to section 1983
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claims in general to the extent the validity of the conviction or sentence would be undermined by a
successful civil challenge. See Lockett v. Ericson, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18104, at *8-9 (9th Cit'.
Aug. 25, 2011 ) (distinguishing claims in which the section 1983 challenge implicates harms that are
actionable, but upon which the legality of the conviction or sentence does not depend).
Here, Coultas was granted a new trial on the basis of forensic computer evidence. However,
rather than proceed with the second trial, Coultas elected to enter a "no contest" plea. He explains
that he did not believe he could receive a fair trial in light of the willingness of certain defendants
to continue to peljure themselves and make false representations to the court. Regardless of
Coultas's reasoning in entering a "no contest" plea, the fact that Coultas remains convicted for the
crimes for which he was prosecuted prevents him from asserting claims that would necessarily
invalidate his conviction. See Jackson v. Barnes, Case No. CV 04-08017 RSWL (RZ), 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 125976 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2009) (the COUIt applied Heck where the civil rights
plaintiffhad been convicted initially, had the conviction reversed, and was re-convicted onll10st, but
not all, of the original charges, stating that although the second conviction was "slightly less
weighty," the plaintiff had failed to establish favorable termination).
Here, Coultas challenges the veracity of the underlying charges, the evidence presented at
trial, and the statements at trial of the prosecuting attorney and a state investigator. If the cOUit were
to find in Coultas's favor - that his prosecution was malicious and led to an illegitimate judgment
against him - it would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and run afoul of Heck.
Accordingly, Coultas's malicious prosecution claim under section 1983 is denied.
B.
Sixth Amendment
Coultas has alleged facts which may give rise to a section 1983 claim for violation of his
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Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, an accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to a speedy trial, an impatiial jury,
knowledge of the accusations against him, the ability to call and confront witnesses, and to assistance
of counsel in his defense. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. "These fundamental rights are extended to a
defendant in a state criminal prosecution through the Fourteenth Amendment." Herring v. Nell'
York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975). "More specifically, the right to the assistance of counsel has been
understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of counsel in defending a
criminal prosecution in accord with the traditions of the adversaty factfinding process that has been
constitutionalized in the Sixth and Foutieenth Amendments." Id. Here, Coultas alleged that he was
prevented from communicating exculpatOlY evidence to his counsel by a state actor.
That said, the court need not decide whether Coultas alleged specific facts setting forth a
scenario in which the defense was denied "the opportunity to participate fully and fairly in the
adversaty factfinding process." Id. at 858. Even if Coultas could state this claim based on the
factual allegations alleged, he could again not overcome the Heck bar to section 1983 because
success on this claim would necessarily undermine the validity of his conviction, which conviction
has not been reversed or otherwise invalidated.
C.
Fraud 0/1 the COllrt
Coultas has also alleged a claim for fraud on the court. 4
The Supreme Court has
characterized a fraud on the comi as "a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard
the public, institutions in which fraud camlOt be complacently tolerated consistently with the good
4 Although Coultas does not specifically allege fraud on the court, he Coultas mentions it in
his briefing. In light of the liberal construal of pro se pleadings, the court will address the claim as
if properly pleaded.
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order of society." Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Har(ford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944). The Ninth
Circuit interprets this somewhat more broadly than other circuits, such that "fraud upon the court
includes both attempts to subvert the integrity of the court and fraud by an officer of the court." In
re Intermagnetics America, Inc., 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should base its
analysis "not so much in terms of whether the alleged fraud prejudiced the opposing party but more
in terms of whether the alleged fraud harms the integrity of the judicial process[.]" Id at 917 (citing
Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 246). Significantly, "[t]here is no statute of limitations for fraud on
the COUlt." Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 640 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citing C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2870 at 250 (1973)).
However, even if Coultas could state this claim based on the factual allegations alleged, he
could again not overcome the Heck bar to section 1983 because success on this claim would
necessarily undermine the validity of his conviction, which conviction has not been reversed or
otherwise invalidated. See Hisel' v. Hickel, No. 95-35405,1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 27742, at *6 (9th
Cir. Oct. 23, 1996) (affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs due process claim alleging fraud on the
court as barred by Heck). Accordingly, Coultas's claim offraud on the court is dismissed as barred
by Heck.
D.
Fourteenth Amendment
In his complaint, Coultas invokes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
does not specifY in what manner his rights under that constitutional provision were violated. The
Fourteenth Amendment suppotts three kinds of claims enforceable under section 1983:
(1)
violations of other constitutional rights as defined by the Bill of Rights; (2) violations of substantive
due process; and (3) violations of procedural due process. Zinerll10n v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124
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(1990). However, as with all other of Coultas's claims under section 1983, any claim under the
FOUlieenth Amendment is barred by Heck and the court need not attempt to discern the contours of
any specific claim Coultas might have otherwise stated.
III.
Other Arguments
Defendants additionally argued that Coultas's claims were untimely and were improperly
served. In light of the cOUli's conclusion that Coultas's claims are barred by Heck, the court will not
address these additional grounds for dismissal.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, DOl Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (#22) is GRANTED.
DATED this 12th day of December, 2011.
JoHN V. ACOSTA
U it)d States Magistrate Judge
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