Sovereign et al v. Deutsche Bank et al
Filing
42
ORDER: The Court GRANTS Motion 15 to Dismiss; GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Motion to Dismiss 21 ; GRANTS the Motion 23 to Dismiss. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to file an Amended Complaint no later than 12/15/2011. The Temp orary Restraining Order is extended to 1/4/2012. Court GRANTED Motion 19 to Modify Security subject to further briefing. Defendants Supplemental showing of the fair rental value due 11/23/2011 by NOON. Plaintiffs' supplemental showing due 12 /5/2011. The hearing set for 12/1/2011 is STRICKEN. Plaintiffs response to Defendants' Motion 38 is extended to 12/15/11. Defendants' reply is due 12/29/11. Oral Argument on Defendants' Motion 38 to Vacate the TRO is SET for 01/04/2012 at 10:00 am. Signed on 11/15/2011 by Judge Anna J. Brown. See attached 18 page Opinion and Order for full text. (bb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
RICK L. SOVEREIGN and AMY J.
SOVEREIGN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK; MORTGAGEIT,
INC.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEM, a
foreign corporation;
CITIMORTGAGE, INC., a foreign
corporation; and CAL-WESTERN
RECONVEYANCE, a foreign
corporation,
Defendants.
RICK L. AND AMY J. SOVEREIGN
401 Cherry Avenue
Oregon City, OR 97045
Plaintiffs, Pro Se
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
3:11-CV-995-BR
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM D. MINER, III
BLAKE J. ROBINSON
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1300 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 2300
Portland, OR 97201-5630
(503) 241-2300
Attorneys for Defendants Deutsche Bank and
Mortgageit, Inc.
LETA E. GORMAN
Jordan Schrader Ramis PC
Two Centerpointe Drive, Sixth Floor
Lake Oswego, OR 97035
(503) 598-7070
Attorneys for Defendants Mortgage Electronic
Registration System and CitiMortgage
TIMOTHY B. HERING
Dunn Carney Allen Higgins & Tongue, LLP
851 S.W. Sixth Avenue, Suite 1500
Portland, OR 97204-1357
(503) 224-6440
Attorneys for Defendant Cal-Western Reconveyance
Corporation
BROWN, Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion (#15) to
Dismiss by Defendants Deutsche Bank (DB) and Mortgageit, Inc.;
the Motion (#21) to Dismiss, to Strike, and, in the Alternative,
to Make More Definite by Defendants Mortgage Electronic
Registration System (MERS) and CitiMortgage (CM); and the Motion
(#23) to Dismiss by Defendant Cal-Western Reconveyance
Corporation (CWRC).
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
The following facts appear in Plaintiffs’ filings and were
supplemented during the colloquies with the Court on August 31,
2011, and November 10, 2011.
On approximately January 24, 2007, Plaintiffs entered into a
refinance loan on their home, which is located at 401 Cherry
Avenue, Oregon City, Oregon, 97045.
In exchange for their
promise to pay secured by a Deed of Trust in their home (which
appears to have been recorded on January 31, 2007), Plaintiffs
accepted a loan in excess of $300,000.
The loan named MIT as the
Lender and Western Title and Escrow as Trustee and appointed MERS
as nominee of the Lender and as beneficiary of the Deed of Trust.
Although MIT is designated as the Lender in the loan documents,
Plaintiffs allege MIT did not fund the loan and was instead a
broker.
Plaintiffs assert Defendants, each of them in association
with one another, filed an illegal Notice of Default and Election
to Sell Plaintiffs' home.
Plaintiffs allege they do not owe any
obligation to any of the Defendants and that Plaintiffs have not
defaulted on the loan at issue.
In August 2010 Plaintiffs sought a loan modification with
CM.
During that process, the parties failed to reach an
agreement to restructure the loan, and Plaintiffs assert CM
instructed them to stop making payments on their mortgage.
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
On approximately March 15, 2011, MERS assigned the Deed of
Trust to CM.
That same day CM appointed CWRC as Trustee.
Both
actions were recorded in the Clackamas County records.
Plaintiffs point to indications of possible "robo-signers" or
other potentially fraudulent acts in these conveyances.
On April 7, 2011, Plaintiffs received the Notice of Default
and Election of Sale and the Trustee Notice of Sale from CWRC.
These documents also were recorded in the Clackamas County
records.
On August 17, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Verified
Complaint (#1) for Emergency Declaratory Relief seeking, inter
alia, to halt the foreclosure and sale of their home.
Although
Plaintiffs’ Complaint reads as if Plaintiffs seek to allege
claims against Defendants for breach of contract, fraud, and
violations of the Oregon Trust Deed Act, Plaintiffs clarified at
oral argument on November 10, 2011, that they seek the Court to
provide only declaratory relief and an award of costs as follows:
a.
Declare Defendant MIT is a mortgage broker and not a
Lender as depicted in the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust.
b.
Declare Defendant MIT lacks the authority to assign
Plaintiffs' loan.
c.
Declare Defendant MERS is solely a nominee; is not an
entity entitled to payment; and, therefore, is not a beneficiary.
d.
Declare Defendant MERS cannot assign Plaintiffs' Deed
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
of Trust.
e.
Declare CM is an invalid assignee respecting the
“Subject Property.”
f.
Declare CWRC is an invalid assignee respecting the
“Subject Property.”
g.
Issue an order for Plaintiffs to recover their costs.
h.
Issue an order to show cause why an evidentiary hearing
should not take place.
I.
Issue an order for “re-alignment” of the parties.
j.
Declare Plaintiffs' obligation for the loan still
exists, but the payee and the amount is unknown.
Although the nonjudicial sale of Plaintiffs' home was
originally scheduled for August 1, 2011, the parties reached an
agreement to postpone the sale to September 1, 2011.
The Court,
after a hearing, enjoined the sale of the home by issuing a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on August 31, 2011.
At the
hearing on August 31, 2011, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to post
security in the amount of $500.00, which Plaintiffs have done.
The TRO is set to expire on December 1, 2011, and the Court
previously scheduled a hearing for that date to determine whether
the TRO should be allowed to expire or should be extended.
Each Defendant has now appeared and each has filed a Motion
to Dismiss.
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
STANDARDS
I.
Motion to Dismiss.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” [Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,] 570, 127
S. Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. . . .
The plausibility standard is not akin to a
“probability requirement,” but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where
a complaint pleads facts that are “merely
consistent with” a defendant's liability, it
“stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”
Id. at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (brackets
omitted).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
See also Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555-56 (2007).
The Supreme Court further clarified in Iqbal the
requirements for a pleading to survive a motion to dismiss:
As the Court held in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, the
pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not
require “detailed factual allegations,” but
it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.
Id., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct.
2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” 550 U.S., at
555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]”
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
Id., at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
"[A] complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if,
taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, it contains
enough facts to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'”
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.
2010)(quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009), and Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570).
A pro se plaintiff's complaint “must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”
curiam).
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(per
Thus, the court must construe pro se filings liberally.
If a plaintiff fails to state a claim, “[l]eave to amend should
be granted unless the pleading ‘could not possibly be cured by
the allegation of other facts,’ and should be granted more
liberally to pro se plaintiffs.”
Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d
850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1130 (9th Cir. 2000)).
II.
Declaratory Judgments.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides in relevant part that
“[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . .
any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be sought.”
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a).
“The
limitations that Article III imposes upon federal court
jurisdiction are not relaxed in the declaratory-judgment context.
Indeed, the case-or-controversy requirement is incorporated into
the language of the very statute that authorizes federal courts
to issue declaratory relief.”
Gator.com Corp. V. L.L. Bean,
Inc., 398 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2005).
As the Supreme Court
held in MedImmune Inc. v. Genetech Inc.:
Aetna and the cases following it do not draw
the brightest of lines between those
declaratory-judgment actions that satisfy the
case-or-controversy requirement and those
that do not. Our decisions have required
that the dispute be “definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests”; and that it
be “real and substantial” and “admi[t] of
specific relief through a decree of a
conclusive character, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Id., at
240–241, 57 S. Ct. 461. In Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,
273, 61 S. Ct. 510, 85 L. Ed. 826 (1941), we
summarized as follows: “Basically, the
question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show
that there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal
interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.”
549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
The Supreme Court has emphasized the
district court’s “unique and substantial” discretion as to
whether to issue declaratory judgments.
The Court underscored
“[i]f a district court, in the sound exercise of its judgment,
determines after a complaint is filed that a declaratory judgment
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
will serve no useful purpose, it cannot be incumbent upon that
court to proceed to the merits before staying or dismissing the
action.”
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 288 (1995).
“When there is no actual controversy, the court has no discretion
to decide the case.
When there is an actual controversy and thus
jurisdiction, the exercise of that jurisdiction is discretionary.”
Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631,
634 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
MOTION (#15) TO DISMISS BY DB AND MIT
DB and MIT each contend the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’
claims against them because there is not any actual present
dispute between them and Plaintiffs over which the Court has
jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment.
MIT asserts there is not any present dispute between
Plaintiffs and MIT because MIT no longer has any interest in
Plaintiffs’ Mortgage, it is not attempting to collect on
Plaintiffs’ Promissory Note, it is not a party to the foreclosure
proceedings, and any declaration issued by the Court based on
Plaintiffs’ Complaint would not affect any legal rights between
Plaintiffs and MIT.
Thus, MIT emphasizes even though it may have
some factual role in the events that give rise to the present
litigation, there is not, in fact, any actual legal dispute
between Plaintiffs and MIT.
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
According to Plaintiffs, their recitation of fraud against
MIT arises from MIT’s alleged misrepresentations as to its
putative status as Lender in the origination of Plaintiffs’
Mortgage.
Plaintiffs, however, made clear at the hearing before
the Court on November 10, 2011, that they are not attempting to
assert a claim for fraud against MIT.
DB notes Plaintiffs’ sole allegation against it is that DB
is the parent corporation of MIT.
DB contends Plaintiffs have
not pled any legal basis on which the Court could conclude DB
should be held responsible for any liability of MIT.
DB asserts
it acquired MIT after the transaction at issue and that it did
not take any actions with respect to the loan at issue.
DB
points out that none of Plaintiffs’ exhibits mention DB and that
Plaintiffs do not allege DB ever had any interest in their
Mortgage.
Ultimately DB contends its presence is not required in
this action because the declarations sought by Plaintiffs do not
affect any obligation, interest, or right of DB.
Furthermore,
because Plaintiffs’ claim against DB would, at a minimum, depend
on a viable claim against MIT, DB argues the dismissal of MIT
should result in a dismissal of DB as well.
At oral argument on November 10, 2011, Plaintiffs were
unable to articulate a basis in law for the Court’s jurisdiction
to issue any declaration as to DB and MIT of how DB and MIT are
involved in the actual dispute about the efforts to foreclose
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs’ Mortgage.
Essentially Plaintiffs merely assert DB
and MIT are part of the factual history of Plaintiffs’ Mortgage.
Viewing this record as liberally as possible, the Court
concludes Plaintiff’ claims for declaratory relief do not
implicate any present legal interest of either DB or MIT nor have
Plaintiffs pled any basis for asserting DB’s liability for any
actions by MIT.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’
Complaint to the extent that Plaintiffs seek a declaration
against either MIT or DB.
MOTION (#21) TO DISMISS BY CM AND MERS
CM and MERS move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for
failure to state a claim and, in the alternative, request the
Court to require Plaintiffs to make their claims more definite
and certain.
In addition, CM and MERS made numerous motions to
strike evidence and allegations contained in Plaintiffs’
pleadings.
CM and MERS contend Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
that the foreclosure of their Mortgage is unenforceable on the
basis of the involvement of MERS as nominee of the lender and as
beneficiary of the Deed of Trust.
CM and MERS rely on the recent
decision by the Ninth Circuit in Cervantes v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc.:
[P]laintiffs advance a novel theory of
wrongful foreclosure. They contend that all
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
transfers of the interests in the home loans
within the MERS system are invalid because
the designation of MERS as a beneficiary is a
sham and the system splits the deed from the
note, and, thus, no party is in a position to
foreclose.
Even if we were to accept the
plaintiffs' premises that MERS is a sham
beneficiary and the note is split from the
deed, we would reject the plaintiffs'
conclusion that, as a necessary consequence,
no party has the power to foreclose. The
legality of MERS’s role as a beneficiary may
be at issue where MERS initiates foreclosure
in its own name, or where the plaintiffs
allege a violation of state recording and
foreclosure statutes based on the
designation. See, e.g., Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289,
294–97 (Me.2010)(concluding that MERS cannot
foreclose because it does not have an
independent interest in the loan because it
functions solely as a nominee); Landmark
Nat'l Bank, 216 P.3d at 165–69 (same); Hooker
v. Northwest Tr. Servs., No. 10–3111, 2011 WL
2119103, at *4 (D. Or. May 25, 2011)
(concluding that the defendants' failure to
register all assignments of the deed of trust
violated the Oregon recording laws so as to
prevent non-judicial foreclosure). But see
Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 501 (concluding that
defendants' failure to register assignments
of the beneficial interest in the mortgage
loan did not violate Minnesota recording laws
so as to prevent non-judicial foreclosure).
This case does not present either of these
circumstances and, thus, we do not consider
them.
Here, MERS did not initiate foreclosure:
the trustees initiated foreclosure in the
name of the lenders. Even if MERS were a
sham beneficiary, the lenders would still be
entitled to repayment of the loans and would
be the proper parties to initiate foreclosure
after the plaintiffs defaulted on their
loans. The plaintiffs' allegations do not
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
call into question whether the trustees were
agents of the lenders. Rather, the
foreclosures against Almendarez and Maximo
were initiated by the trustee Tiffany & Bosco
on behalf of First Franklin, who is the
original lender and holder of Almendarez's
and Maximo's promissory notes. Although it
is unclear from the pleadings who the current
lender is on plaintiff Cervantes's loan, the
allegations do not raise any inference that
the trustee Recontrust Company lacks the
authority to act on behalf of the lender.
656 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2011).
In addition to Cervantes, the Court has carefully reviewed
various decisions of other judicial officers in the District of
Oregon that relate to the role of MERS in home-mortgage loans.
The Court is satisfied, particularly in light of the dicta in
Cervantes, that there is not any current binding authority that
the mere involvement of MERS in a mortgage transaction is ipso
facto grounds for invalidating a foreclosure proceeding.
Moreover, the Court does not find any basis in Oregon law that
would prevent MERS from being appointed as a nominee of the
lender or as a beneficiary of a deed of trust.
Thus, the Court
does not find any basis to invalidate the Deed of Trust at issue
in this matter merely because the Deed of Trust appoints MERS as
the nominee of the Lender with the rights to sell or to transfer
the Mortgage without notice to the borrower and to foreclose on
the Deed of Trust.
(As noted, MERS later transferred the Deed of
Trust in Plaintiffs’ home to CM, and that transfer was recorded
in the Clackamas County records.)
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
On these facts, therefore, the
Court concludes Plaintiffs have not presently stated any basis in
law for the declarations they seek arising from the mere
involvement of MERS.
To this extent, the Court grants the Motion
to Dismiss by CM and MERS and dismisses Plaintiffs’ Complaint.1
Plaintiffs, however, also appear to invoke defenses to both
the original Mortgage transaction and to the subsequent
assignment of their Mortgage from MERS to CM as grounds for
opposing nonjudicial foreclosure by CM and CWRC.
contend, inter alia:
Plaintiffs
(1) MIT defrauded Plaintiffs in the
original loan by falsely stating it was the lender and by
arranging a loan for Plaintiffs that was to be securitized at
greater cost to Plaintiffs; (2) because MIT allegedly was not the
actual lender, it did not have the authority granted to the
lender in the Deed of Trust to assign the Mortgage or to
foreclose if a default occurred; and (3) MERS is not the actual
beneficiary of the Deed of Trust and did not have the power to
assign the Mortgage.
Although the Court concludes Plaintiffs have not stated a
claim for relief based solely on the contention that MERS cannot
lawfully be a nominee of the lender or the beneficiary of a deed
of trust, the Court cannot foreclose at this juncture the
possibility that Plaintiffs could raise a viable defense either
1
The Alternative Motion to Make More Definite and the
Motions to Strike by CM and MERS, therefore, are moot.
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
to the original Mortgage or to the assignment of the Mortgage to
CM.
Accordingly, the Court also gives Plaintiffs leave to file
an Amended Complaint no later than December 15, 2011, to state
facts that provide a legal basis for a declaration against any
Defendant that would prevent the foreclosure of their home sought
by CM.
Finally, the Court notes Plaintiffs concede they have not
pled a fraud claim, which, in turn, moots the Motion by CM and
MERS as to any such claim.
To the extent that any claim
Plaintiffs seek to replead in their Amended Complaint relies on
allegations of fraud, the Court reminds Plaintiffs that those
allegations must meet the more exacting pleading standard set out
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) or they will be
disregarded.
MOTION (#23) TO DISMISS BY CWRC
CWRC moves to dismiss Plaintiff’ Complaint on the same
grounds as CM and MERS as discussed above, and, to that extent,
the Court grants CWRC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims.
In
addition, CWRC contends Plaintiffs’ claims against CWRC are
wholly derivative of Plaintiffs’ claims against the other
Defendants in this matter and that CWRC is not necessary to
Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief.
The Court notes,
however, that Plaintiffs are challenging the Notice of Default
and Election to Sell executed by CWRC as Trustee of the Deed of
15 - OPINION AND ORDER
Trust.
As such, CWRC is a party presently restrained by the
Court’s TRO and is the Trustee over the Deed of Trust on
Plaintiffs’ home that Plaintiffs’ seek to prove is not legally
enforceable.
Accordingly, to the extent that CWRC seeks a
dismissal on grounds similar to those advanced by DB or MIT, the
Court denies CWRC’s Motion.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion (#15) to
Dismiss by DB and MIT and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ Complaint against
them.
The Court GRANTS in part the Motion to Dismiss (#21) by CM
and MERS for failure to state a claim and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’
Complaint against these Defendants.
The Court DENIES as moot the
balance of the Motion by CM and MERS.
The Court GRANTS the
Motion (#23) to Dismiss by CWRC to the extent that CWRC joins in
the Motion by CM and MERS and, therefore, DISMISSES Plaintiffs’
Complaint against this Defendant.
The Court, however,
DENIES CWRC’s Motion to the extent that CWRC seeks to be
dismissed from this matter on grounds similar to those set out by
DB and MIT.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to file an Amended
Complaint against all Defendants no later than December 15, 2011,
to allege facts that provide a legal basis for the Court to grant
their request that the Court declare the unenforceability of the
16 - OPINION AND ORDER
Mortgage and/or the subsequent assignment of their Mortgage.
Pending Plaintiffs further pleading and any additional
motions against Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, the Court
concludes it is reasonable to extend the TRO presently in effect
in this matter and hereby EXTENDS the TRO until January 4, 2012.
As set out on the record at the November 10, 2011, hearing
the Court has granted the Motion (#19) to Modify Security by CM
and MERS subject to further briefing.
In particular, the Court
directed Defendants to file a supplemental showing of the fair
rental value of Plaintiffs’ home no later than noon on November
23, 2011, and Plaintiffs’ to file their supplemental showing no
later than December 5, 2011, after which the Court will determine
the amount of security it will require Plaintiffs to pay
beginning January 4, 2012, and monthly thereafter as a condition
of any continuation of the TRO.
The Court, therefore, strikes
the hearing on December 1, 2011, that was previously scheduled
for the purpose of considering whether the TRO should be extended
or permitted to expire.
Finally, the Court notes on November 10, 2011, Defendants
CitiMortgage, Inc., and Mortgage Electronic Registration System
Inc., filed their Motion (#38) to Vacate the TRO in anticipation
of the now-stricken hearing on December 1, 2011.
In light of the
Court’s rulings herein dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint with
leave to replead; extending the TRO until January 4, 2012; and
17 - OPINION AND ORDER
striking the hearing previously set for December 1, 2011, the
Court concludes Defendants' Motion (#38) to Vacate the TRO should
be considered in light of any Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs
file because, at its heart, Defendants' Motion depends on the
likelihood of Plaintiffs' success on the merits of any
declaratory-judgment claims they can legitimately assert.
Accordingly, the deadline for Plaintiffs to file a response to
Defendants' Motion (#38) is extended to December 15, 2011, the
same deadline for Plaintiffs to file any Amended Complaint.
Defendants' reply in further support of its Motion is due no
later than December 29, 2011.
The Court will hear argument on
Defendants' Motion (#38) to Vacate the TRO on January 4, 2012, at
10:00 a.m.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 15th day of November, 2011.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States District Judge
18 - OPINION AND ORDER
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