Coleman v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
31
OPINION AND ORDER. For these reasons, the ALJ's decision that Coleman is not disabled is based on correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 02/11/2013 by Judge James A. Redden. (pvh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRJCT COURT
FOR THE DISTRJCT OF OREGON
JORDAN EDWARD COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
3:11-cv-01112 RE
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
REDDEN, Judge:
Plaintiff Jordan Coleman ("Coleman") brings this action to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner")
denying his claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). For the reasons set forth below, the
decision of the Commissioner is affi1med and this matter is dismissed.
Ill
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
I
BACKGROUND
Coleman was bom in 1982, and filed his applications for DIB and SSI benefits in January.
2008. He has a high school equivalent education, and past relevant work experience as a cashier,
cashier's assistant, certified nursing assistant, telemarketer, technical suppmt, and as a warehouse
associate Tr. 172, 174. Coleman alleges disability since November 30, 2006, due to attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), borderline personality disorder, social aiL'liet~ disorder,
and depression Tr. 167. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. A
hearing was held in November 2009. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found him not
disabled. Coleman's request for review was denied, making the ALJ's decision the final decision
of the Commissioner.
ALJ's DECISION
The ALJ found Coleman had the medically determinable severe impairments of major
depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, ADHD, and personality disordt;,r. Tr. 22.
The ALJ found that Coleman's impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the
listed impaitments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Jd.
The ALJ determined that Coleman retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to
perform a full range of work at all exertionallevels, with no public interaction and only casual
interactions with others on a routine basis, and limited to predictable, non-hazardous routines.
Tr. 24. Coleman disputes this finding.
The ALJ found Coleman was not disabled because he could perform his past relevant
work as a stock clerk. Tr. 26. Coleman disputes this finding.
Ill
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
I
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
The relevant medical evidence indicates that Coleman saw a psychiatrist in 2000, but
could not afford to continue treatment. Tr. 170. In December 2005 he requested an
antidepressant and Adderall for recunent depression, but the medical record does not reflect that
Coleman reported debilitating symptoms. Rather, he reported that he and his girlfriend had
broken up. Mayna Helman, M.D., noted that his affect was almost flat and he was disinterested.
Tr. 255. Dr. Helman prescribed Zoloft.
In June 2006 Sarah DuVal, R.N., P.M.H.N.P., noted that Coleman was unemployed and
without insurance, and prescribed Lexapro. Again, Coleman did not describe debilitating
symptoms, and he was described as"[ o]riented X3, pleasant...slumping, tired." Tr. 259. Ms.
DuVal "strongly encouraged him to resume taking an SSRI. He did well with it in the past." Id
In April2007, a few months after his alleged onset date of November 30, 2006, Coleman
began treatment with Michael Tso, M.D. Tr. 256-58. He reported multiple symptoms of
ADHD, including difficulty getting organized, listening, and being nervous in social situations.
He was working full-time as a nursing assistant, and had been off Adderall for 5-6 months. Tr.
257. Dr. Tso noted "clear evidence" of ADHD, and prescribed Adderall.
In May 2007 Dr. Tso noted that Coleman's lack of insurance and finances limited him to
a shmt acting fmm of Adderall that did not provide sufficient coverage of symptoms for an entire
workday. Dr. Tso noticed that Coleman had run out of Adderall two days prior, and was
"clearly distracted," and having a "harder time making decisions," "harder time remembering
things," and that his speech was almost tangential and his thought processes a bit disoriented. Tr.
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
256 .. Dr. Tso noted that the Adderall "is quite effective overa11." 1d Dr. Tso's records do not
reflect any reports of debilitating depression symptoms.
In March 2008 Gaty Sacks, Ph.D. reviewed the medical record and conducted a
Psychodiagnostic Examination. Tr. 287-90. Dr. Sacks noted that Coleman's social manner was
"marked by his quick speech." Tr. 288. His affect was initable and his mood labile. Coleman
rep01ied quickly and widely varying emotions. Dr. Sacks noted that it "was difficult for
[Coleman] to provide qualitative or quantitative information, especially regarding ... his
employment history and alleged ADHD symptomatology." ld. Dr. Sacks repotied that Coleman
had no trouble sitting still for the interview, and demonstrated adequate attention for simple
tasks. Reasoning and insight were limited. He complained of "an unstable self-concept and easy
boredom." Jd His speech was "excessively impressionistic and lacking in detail. His manner
was theatrical with exaggerated expression of emotion." Jd. He sometimes avoided eye contact.
Coleman described intense and unstable interpersonal relationships.
He was
unemployed, and had been fired for performance issues. Coleman reported working in fast food
restaurants, Wal Mart, and a warehouse. When asked why he left those jobs Coleman said he
'"tries [his] hardest,' but because oflack of psychoactive medications he cannot perf01m. He
explained, 'I just fail."' Tr. 289. He was taking Adderall which helped to stabilize his emotions.
Coleman reported that he got along poorly with most people, and felt anxious in crowds.
Coleman reported that he had quit using alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine three years
earlier. Tr. 289. Coleman did not describe debilitating depression symptoms, nor did he tell Dr.
Sack's that he was unable to leave his bed for days at a time. Dr. Sacks's diagnostic impression
was Personality Disorder, NOS, Borderline and Histrionic Traits, with a GAF of 60. Tr. 290.
4 - OPINION.AND ORDER
'
Coleman first asserted that he was unable to get out of bed for days at a time in Disability
Report Appeal F01m dated May 23, 2008. Tr. 220, 222.
At the November 17, 2009 hearing, Coleman was taking Celexa but did not believe it
was providing much benefit. Tr. 333. Coleman testified that he is often so depressed that he can
not get out of bed or do almost anything for three to four days at a time. Tr. 58, 220, 222.
Absenteeism contributed to the loss of many jobs, including his most recent job, where he missed
more than two days of work per month. Tr. 39, 43, 44. At the time of the hearing, Coleman was
taking two classes at a community college but missed many classes and " forgot" to show up for
one final. Tr. 51. Coleman testified that he had trouble getting organized for work, that he was
often late, and would forget key items like his identification badge. Tr. 39.
Coleman reported that he had to work at a very slow pace to avoid getting distracted and
to maintain focus. Tr. 196. He stated that he was fired from almost every job he had held
because he worked too slowly and could not finish a task within the expected time frame. Tr. 4045. He failed some of his college classes because he could not keep up with the work. Tr. 51.
Coleman testified that he cannot tolerate criticism from supervisors, and that it causes
him to be unable to perform. Tr. 48. When employed, he cannot control his emotions, keep his
composure, or remain on the job after criticism. Tr. 60. The ALJ ordered the record kept open
for the addition of another psychological assessment.
On November 24, 2009, Jeffrey Sher, Psy. D., conducted a four and a half hour long
psychological assessment. Tr. 327-33. Coleman reported treatment with Zoloft and Paxil in
about 2000, but did not like the way the drugs affected him. Tr. 329. He rep01ied that he had
sought counseling and found it unhelpful. Id.
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
Dr. Sher noted that Coleman's test results indicated "some difficulty in mental
processing ... with increased complexity of the task."· Tr. 331. Coleman showed "signs of
difficulty in concentration and attention," and obvious tension. Tr. 331, 333. He required
guidance to stay focused. Tr. 331. Asked why he could not sustain employment, Coleman stated
that it was "hard to get myself motivated I guess when I'm going through a rough spot. I stop
caring about work or anything." Tr. 327. Dr. Sher noted that Coleman appeared significantly
depressed, that he did not appear to be exaggerating or histrionic, and that he seemed defeated
and demoralized. Tr. 328.
Coleman reported that he drives his partner to work in the moming, then goes back to
bed. He often sleeps most of the day. He often lacks energy to do chores, but does some laundry
and cooking. There are times when he does not shave or shower for days. He watches television
and plays video games, but no longer enjoys drawing or music. Tr. 329.
Dr. Sher noted that Coleman was fully oriented, with adequate attention and persistence.
Tr. 330. He clearly understood the instructions and did not appear to become unduly fatigued.
He showed good persistence. Test results indicated some difficulty in mental processing with
increased complexity of the task. Tr. 331.
Dr. Sher' s diagnostic impression was Major Depressive Disorder, Recunent Moderate
Severity, Dysthmic Disorder, Moderate, and ADHD. Dr. Sher opined that depression is
Coleman's main challenge to successful employment. Tr. 333.
Ill
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6 - OPINION AND ORDER
I
DISCUSSION
Coleman contends that the ALJ ened by: (1) finding him not fully credible; (2)
improperly rejecting the opinions of examining and reviewing providers; (3) improperly
weighing lay testimony; and (4) improperly determining his RFC.
I. Credibility
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical
testimony, and for resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9'h Cir 1995).
However, the ALJ's findings must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. Reddick v. Chafer,
157 F.3d 715, 722 (9'h Cir 1998). Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant
is malingering, the Commissioner's reason for rejecting the claimant's testimony must be "clear
and convincing." I d. The ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence
undermines the claimant's complaints. Jd. The evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be
substantial. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 724. See also Holohan v. 1\yJassinari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9'h
Cir 2001). General findings (e.g., "record in general" indicates improvement) are an insufficient
basis to support an adverse credibility determination. Reddick at 722. See also Holohan, 246
F.3d at 1208. The ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific
to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony.
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9'h Cir 2002).
In deciding whether to accept a claimant's subjective symptom testimony, "an ALJ must
perfonn two stages of analysis: the Cotton analysis and an analysis of the credibility of the
claimant's testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms." [Footnote omitted.] Smolen v.
Chafer, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9'h Cir 1996).
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
Under the Cotton test, a claimant who alleges disability based on subjective
symptoms "must produce objective medical evidence of an underlying
impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged .... " Bunnell, 947 F.2d at344 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423
(d)(5)(A) (1988)); Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407-08. The Cotton test imposes
only two requirements on the claimant: (I) she must produce objective
medical evidence of an impairment or impainnents; and (2) she must
show that the impaiiment or combination ofimpahments could
reasonably be expected to (not that it did in fact) produce some degree
of symptom.
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282.
The ALJ found Coleman's allegations as to the intensity, persistence and limiting effects
of his symptoms not credible to the extent that they are inconsistent with the RFC. Tr. 24.
A. Debilitating Symptoms Are Not Supported By The Medical Record
The ALJ stated that Coleman does have mental limitations, but "his allegations of
debilitating symptoms are not suppOlied by the medical evidence of record .. " Tr. 24. It is true
that the ALJ cannot require medical evidence of the severity of a symptom. Smolen v. Chafer, 80
F.3d 1273, 1282 (9'h Cir. 1996), citing Bunnell v. Sul/ivan,947 F.2d 341, 344 (9'h Cir. 199l)(en
bane). But it is fair to say that when, as here, the claimant alleges symptoms so severe as to
cause him to be unable to get out of bed for several days at a time, but does not rep01i those
symptoms to his medical providers, an issue of credibility arises. The ALJ appropriately noted
that Coleman's allegations of debilitating symptoms are not supported by the medical evidence.
B. Failure to Seek Treatment
The ALJ noted that "despite allegations of debilitating depression, he has not sought any
therapy and there is no evidence he has ever done so, even when he was working." Tr. 24.
Coleman points out that his asse1iion that he cannot afford any additional treatment is
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
uncontested. He testified that he has had no income or health insurance since he lost his last job
on November 30, 2007, and he relies on his mother and roommate for his basic needs. Tr. 187,
208. The ALJ cannot use Coleman's poverty and lack of optimal mental health treatment to
discredit his symptom testimony. Nguyen v. Chafer, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9'h Cir. 1996).
C. Symptoms Improve with Adderall
The ALJ noted that Coleman has been prescribed Adderall for ADHD, and that Coleman
reports that "when he is on the medication he can focus and get more work done and he is
motivated." Tr. 24. The ALJ referred to a May 2007 chart note from Michael Tso, M.D. Tr.
256. Dr. Tso noted that Coleman's lack of insurance and finances limited him to a short acting
form of Adderall that did not provide sufficient coverage of symptoms for an entire workday.
Dr. Tso noticed that Coleman had mn out of Adderall two days prior, and was "clearly
distracted," and having a "harder time making decisions," "harder time remembering things," and
that his speech was almost tangential and his thought processes a bit disoriented. !d. Dr. Tso
noted that the Adderral "is quite effective overall." !d.
Coleman testified that he cannot always afford to purchase Adderall, and that he forgets
to take it in a timely manner or obtain timely refills or new prescriptions. Tr. 187,256, 56-57.
That Coleman's symptoms improve when he is on medication is not a valid reason to find him
less than fully credible.
Ill
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9 - OPINION AND ORDER
'
D. Activities of Daily Living
The ALJ stated:
Despite his mental symptoms, the claimant is able to function
independently, prepare meals, clean the house, and utilize public
transpmiation [Tr. 289]. He is attending school and
while he has done poorly in some classes, he has done well in
others [Tr. 245-46).
Tr. 25.
A claimant's daily activities can provide the basis for an adverse credibility determination
when those activities contradict other testimony or the activities meet the threshold for
transferable work skills. Orn v. As/rue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9'h Cir. 2007). Daily activities may
be grounds for an adverse credibility finding "if a claimant is able to spend a substantial pmi of
his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable
to a work setting." Fair v. Bo-wen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9'h Cir. 1989). An adverse credibility
finding based on activities may be proper "if a claimant engages in numerous daily activities
involving skills that could be transferred to the workplace." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,
681 (9'h Cir. 2005). The ALJ must make "specific findings relating to [the daily] activities" and
their transferability to conclude that a claimant's daily activities warrant an adverse credibility
detetmination. Burch, 400 F .3d at 681.
The ALJ stated that Coleman is able to function independently, citing Dr. Sacks's March
2008 repmi:
He is able to prepare simple meals. He cleans the house on his own.
He dresses, bathes, and grooms independently. He travels by bus.
Tr. 289.
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
•
The ALJ referred to Coleman's college classes, citing transcripts indicating that Coleman
passed two classes for seven credit hours in Spring tetm 2009, passed one class and failed two
classes of six credit hours in Summer tetm 2009, and was taking two classes for seven credit
hours in Fall. tetm 2009. Tr. 245-46. The ALJ is permitted to draw an adverse inference as to
Coleman's credibility because these activities are inconsistent with Coleman's alleged symptoms
and limitations.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly found that Coleman's daily activities
contradict his testimony of debilitating mental limitations, citing Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539
F.3d 1169, 1175 (9'h Cir. 2008). However, the Stubbs-Danielson comi noted that "[t]he record
reflects that the claimant has normal activities of daily living," and that the medical evidence
supported the ALJ' s determination that the claimant could perform unskilled work. Id.
Coleman testified that he is often so depressed that he can hardly get out of bed for tlu·ee
to four days at a time. Tr. 58, 220. He has been fired from multiple jobs, often for working too
slowly. Tr. 43-44. Coleman had attendance problems at work and at school. Tr. 52. He has to
work at a slow pace to maintain concentration. Tr. 196. Coleman's testimony and assertions are
not consistent with what he reported to his treating and examining providers. Tr. 256-57, 32733.
Coleman notes that the record shows he held about 18 different jobs between 2000 and
2007. Tr. 148-50, SSR 96-7p. The ALJ identified clear and convincing reasons to find Coleman
less than fully credible.
Ill
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11 - OPINION AND ORDER
II. Medical Evidence
Disability opinions are reserved for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1);
416.927(e)(1). If no conflict arises between medical source opinions, the ALJ generally must
accord greater weight to the opinion of a treating physician than that of an examining physician.
Lester v. Chafer, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In such circumstances the ALJ should also
give greater weight to the opinion of an examining physician over that of a reviewing physician.
!d. But, if two medical source opinions conflict, an ALJ need only give "specific and legitimate
reasons" for discrediting one opinion in favor of another. Id. at 830. The ALJ may reject
physician opinions that are "brief, conclus01y, and inadequately supp01ied by clinical findings."
Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).
A. Jeffrey Sher, Psy. D.
Dr. Sher completed a Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities
(Mental), and found that Coleman was "moderately" limited in his ability to "understand,
remember and cany out complex instructions and make judgements on complex work-related
decision," "to interact appropriately with supervisors," and "to respond [appropriately] to usual
work situations and [to] changes in a routine work setting." Tr. 322-23. "Moderately" is defined
as "more than a slight limitation in this area but the individual is still able to function
satisfactorily." Tr. 322.
The ALJ noted Dr. Sher's opinion, and gave it "significant weight." Tr. 25. Coleman
argues that the ALJ erred by failing to include in the RFC moderate limitations in his ability to
understand and remember complex instructions, to cany out complex instmctions, to make
judgments on complex work-related decisions, and to interact appropriately with supervisors.
12 -OPINION AND ORDER
However, by the definition supplied on the form in question, "moderately" means the individual
is still able to function satisfactorily. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by failing to include those
limitations in the RFC.
B. Dorothy Anderson, Ph.D.
In her April 2008 review, state agency psychologist Dr. Anderson completed a "Mental
Residual Functional Capacity Assessment" ("MRFCA") form in which she checked boxes
indicating that Coleman's mental impaitments impose moderate limitations in his ability to
interact appropriately with the general public, his ability to get along with co-workers or peers
without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, and his ability to set realistic goals or
make plans independently of others. Tr. 291-92. Robert Hemy, Ph.D. also reviewed the record
and agreed with Dr. Anderson. Tr. 313.
Coleman contends that the ALJ etTed by not stating "clear and convincing" or "specific
and legitimate reasons" to discount the opinions of Drs. Anderson and Hemy. The ALJ did not
mention Dr. Anderson by name, but did discuss and give "significant weight" to her report. Tr.
25. The ALJ noted that the state agency physicians found Coleman "limited in close general
public interaction but is able to get along on a casual, routine social basis ... He would do best with
predictable, nonhazardous routines." Tr. 25.
The MRFCA form lists twenty functional factors in section I. Section II provides room
for remarks, and Section III contains the actual Functional Capacity Assessment. The Social
Security Program Operations Manual Systems ("POMS") specifies that the section I of the
MRFCA "is merely a worksheet to aid in deciding the presence and degree of functional
limitations and the adequacy of documentation and does not constitute the RFC assessment." 13 -OPINION AND ORDER
Emphasis in original. Section III of the form contains the actual mental residual functional
capacity assessment. !d.
In Section III, Dr. Anderson determined that Coleman was "[n]ot significantly limited" in
the areas of 'understanding and mem01y' and in 'sustained concentration and persistence'. Tr.
293. In the area of 'social interaction,' Dr. Anderson found Coleman limited "in close, general
public interaction, but otherwise gets along on casual, routine social basis." Tr. 293. Dr.
Anderson found that Coleman would do best with "predictable, nonhazardous
(R;~:
side effects)
routines and would benefit from help setting realistic goals (voc guidance)." Id.
"Moderately limited" as used in the MRFCA f01m means that an individual's capacity to
perform the activity is impaired, but, according to the POMS, it does not mean that an individual
is precluded from performing that activity. POMS DI 24510.063. "Markedly Limited" is
checked "when the evidence supp01is the conclusion that the individual cannot usefully perform
or sustain the activity." Id.
The ALJ found Dr. Anderson's rep01i consistent with the assessment of Arthur Lewy,
Ph.D., a reviewing psychological consultant. Tr. 25, 320. Accordingly, the ALJ did not reject
medical opinions in formulating Coleman's RFC.
III. Lay Testimony
The ALJ has a duty to consider lay witness testimony. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d);
404.1545(a)(3); 416.945(a)(3); 416.913(d); Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
Friends and family members in a position to observe the claimant's symptoms and daily activities
are competent to testifY regarding the claimant's condition. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 91819 (9th Cir. 1993). The ALJ may not reject such testimony without comment and must-give.
14 -OPINION AND ORDER
•
reasons germane to the witness for rejecting her testimony. Nguyen v. Chafer, 100 F.3d 1462,
1467 (9th Cir. 1996). However, inconsistency with the medical evidence may constitute a
germane reason. Lnl'is, 236 F.3d at 512. The ALJ may also reject lay testimony predicated upon
the testimony of a claimant properly found not credible. Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 685, 694
(9th Cir. 2009).
Coleman contends that the ALJ improperly considered the lay witness statements of his
roommate, Alex Luisi. In Februaty 2008, Mr. Luisi reported that Coleman watches television,
does chores, "tries to look for work if feeling motivated but gets frustrated," has mood swings,
and has "a hard time concentrating/staying focused." Tr. 206. Mr. Luisi stated that Coleman has
trouble sleeping, he prepares simple meals, and does laund1y, cleaning, dishes and trash, and
does not socialize. Tr. 207.
The ALJ noted Mr. Luisi's statement and found him generally credible. The ALJ noted
that Coleman reported he was able to focus when on medication, Coleman had not sought
treatment for depressive symptoms, and there was no evidence of difficulty with routine social
interactions. Tr. 25.
On November 16, 2009, the day before the hearing, Mr. Luisi signed a statement in which
he asserts that Coleman is easily distracted and has trouble staying focused on simple tasks. lVfr.
Luisi stated that Coleman stays in bed or on the couch for 20 out of 24 hours a day at least
several times a month. Tr. 334. Mr. Luisi states that Coleman has appeared "stressed out most
of the time instead of just off and on, like before ... for close to a year now." !d.
The ALJ did not address Mr. Luisi's November 2009 statement. However, where lay
witness testimony does not describe any limitations not already described by the claimant, and
15 -OPINION AND ORDER
the ALI's well-supported reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony apply equally well to the
lay witness testimony, it is harmless error for the ALI to fail to discuss the lay witness testimony.
1\lolina v. As/rue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9'h Cir. 2012).
IV. Step Four and the Vocational Expert
At step four in the sequential proceedings, the claimant has the burden to prove that he
cannot perfotm his prior relevant work "either as actually performed or as generally perfmmed in
the national economy." Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9'h Cir. 2002). The ALI
detetmines if the claimant can perfmm his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv);
416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can perform such work he is not disabled and the sequential
evaluation concludes. Id. In construing step four findings, the ALJ may draw upon a vocational
expert's testimony to show that claimant can perform work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1560(b)(2); 416.960(b)(2). The ALI's questions to the vocational expert must include all
properly supported limitations. Osenbrockv. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001). The
ALI may then compare the demands of a claimant's past relevant work with the claimant's RFC
in determining whether the claimant may presently perfmm such work. SSR 82-62, "Titles II
and XVI: A Disability Claimant's Capacity to do Past Relevant Work" (available a/1982 WL
31386, at *3).
The ALI concluded that Coleman had the RFC to retmn to past relevant work as a stock clerk. Tr. 26. Coleman contends that the Vocational Expett ("VE") offered opinions that
conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), that the VE did not explain the
basis for the conflicting opinion, and that the ALJ erred by relying on the VE's testimony in
finding that Coleman could retum to work as a stock clerk.
16 -OPINION AND ORDER
The ALJ asked the VE whether a hypothetical person with the same age, education and
work experience as Coleman, and no exertionallimitations, could perform any of his past work
with "no public interaction.... But can have some casual public contact in the work place," with
"predictable, non-hazardous routines." Tr. 64. The VE testified that the stock clerk position
would be available, as it did not involve public contact. Id The ALJ found that Coleman
retained the capacity to perf01m work as a stock clerk both as he actually performed it and as it is
generally performed in the economy. Tr. 26.
Coleman described work as a "cashier associate." -Tr. 174. He described stocking
shelves and handling cash, without the use of machines, tools or equipment, and without the use
of technical knowledge or skills. He did no writing or completion of reports. Id He described
the job as "[l]ifted and moved various items," and did not supervise anyone else. Tr. 177.
The ALJ' s dete1mination that Coleman retained the capacity to return to work as a stock
clerk is supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the ALJ's decision that Coleman is not disabled is based on correct
legal standards and supp01ted by substantial evidence. The decision of the Commissioner is
affhmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this , '! day ofFebmary, 2013.
17 - OPINION AND ORDER
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