Collins-Reeser v. Commissioner Social Security Administration
Filing
18
Opinion and Order. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter. Signed on 05/02/2013 by Judge Anna J. Brown. See attached 20 page Opinion and Order for full text. (bb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
RENE COLLINS-REESER,
Plaintiff,
3:12-CV-00588-BR
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,1
Defendant.
LISA R. J. PORTER
KP Law LLC
16200 S.W. Pacific Highway
Suite H-280
Portland, OR 97224
(503) 245-6309
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1
Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security on February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin should be
substituted for Michael J. Astrue as Defendant in this case. No
further action need be taken to continue this case by reason of
the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 405.
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
S. AMANDA MARSHALL
United States Attorney
ADRIAN L. BROWN
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
(503) 727-1003
DAVID MORADO
Regional Chief Counsel
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900, M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 615-3717
Attorneys for Defendant
BROWN, Judge.
Plaintiff Rene Collins-Reeser seeks judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) in which she denied Plaintiff's applications
for
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the
Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
This Court has
jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
of the Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for SSI and
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
DIB on August 12, 2005, and alleged a disability onset date of
January 1, 1998.
Tr. 48.2
The applications were denied
initially and on reconsideration.
An Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) held a hearing on February 11, 2008.
Tr. 286-319.
hearing Plaintiff was represented by an attorney.
At the
Plaintiff and
a vocational expert (VE) testified.
The ALJ issued a decision on May 22, 2008, in which he found
Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled to
benefits.
Tr. 10-24.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(d), that
decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review.
Plaintiff
appealed the decision of the Commissioner to this Court.
On April 14, 2009, Judge Michael R. Hogan issued an Order
for Remand in which he remanded the matter for further
proceedings and directed the ALJ to
(1) update the medical record with evidence from
the treating sources, to include medical source
statements; (2) reevaluate the severity of the
plaintiffs impairments at Step Two and throughout
the sequential evaluation process, addressing
whether the plaintiffs degenerative disc disease
amounted to a severe impairment; (3) determine
whether the plaintiff is under a disability taking
into consideration all of her impairments,
including any drug addiction and alcoholism and
their materiality if the plaintiff is disabled, in
accordance with 20 C.F.R. $$404.1535,416.935;
(4) continue with Steps Three and Four of the
sequential evaluation process; and (5) if
2
Citations to the official transcript of record filed by
the Commissioner on August 21, 2012, are referred to as "Tr."
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
necessary, with the assistance of a vocational
expert, continue with Step Five of the sequential
evaluation process, propounding a hypothetical
question to the vocational expert that contains
all of the relevant limitations on the plaintiff's
ability to work.
Tr. 379-80.
On remand the ALJ conducted a hearing on October 21, 2009.3
The ALJ issued a decision on December 14, 2009, in which he again
found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not entitled
to benefits.
Tr. 561-73.
On June 21, 2011, the Appeals Council remanded the matter
for further proceedings and directed the ALJ to
[1] Further evaluate [Plaintiff's] impairments,
including drug and alcohol abuse, in accordance
with 20 CFR 416.935. As needed, the [ALJ] may
obtain testimony from a medical expert to clarify
the severity and limiting effects of [Plaintiff's]
mental impairments with and without consideration
of [Plaintiff's] substance abuse[;] [2] Give
further consideration to [Plaintiff's] maximum
[RFC] during the entire period at issue and
provide rationale [sic] with specific references
to evidence of record in support of assessed
limitations[;] . . . [and 3] Obtain supplemental
evidence from a [VE] to clarify the effect of the
assessed limitations on [Plaintiff's] occupational
base.
Tr. 577-78.
On remand the ALJ conducted a hearing on October 25, 2011.
Tr. 1022-42.
The ALJ issued a decision on December 7, 2011, in
which he found Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, is not
3
The transcript of the October 21, 2009, hearing is not in
the record.
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
entitled to benefits.
Tr. 346-65.
The ALJ's decision became the
final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's request for review.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was born on January 17, 1963.
Tr. 48.
Plaintiff
was 45 years old at the time of the first hearing, 46 years old
at the time of the second hearing, and 48 years old at the time
of the third hearing.
Tr. 357.
Plaintiff has a sixth-grade education.
Plaintiff does not have past relevant work experience.
Tr. 364.
Plaintiff alleges disability due to bipolar disorder and
epilepsy.
Tr. 48.
Except when noted, Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s
summary of the medical evidence.
After carefully reviewing the
medical records, this Court adopts the ALJ’s summary of the
medical evidence.
See Tr. 353, 358-62.
STANDARDS
The initial burden of proof rests on the claimant to
establish disability.
Cir. 2012).
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th
To meet this burden, a claimant must demonstrate her
inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
§ 423(d)(1)(A).
42 U.S.C.
The ALJ must develop the record when there is
ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for
proper evaluation of the evidence.
McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d
881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)(quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d
453, 459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision
if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
U.S.C. § 405(g).
42
See also Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence is
“relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.”
Molina, 674 F.3d. at 1110-11
(quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690
(9th Cir. 2009)).
It is more than a mere scintilla [of evidence]
but less than a preponderance.
Id. (citing Valentine, 574 F.3d
at 690).
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
resolving conflicts in the medical evidence, and resolving
ambiguities.
2009).
Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
The court must weigh all of the evidence whether it
supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision.
Ryan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
Even
when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, the court must uphold the Commissioner’s findings
if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
record.
Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).
The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner.
Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir.
2006).
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
I.
The Regulatory Sequential Evaluation
At Step One the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I), 416.920(a)(4)(I).
See
also Keyser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir.
2011).
At Step Two the claimant is not disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant does not have any medically severe
impairment or combination of impairments.
404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509,
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d
at 724.
At Step Three the claimant is disabled if the Commissioner
determines the claimant’s impairments meet or equal one of the
listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges are so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
F.3d at 724.
See also Keyser, 648
The criteria for the listed impairments, known as
Listings, are enumerated in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1 (Listed Impairments).
If the Commissioner proceeds beyond Step Three, she must
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).
The
claimant’s RFC is an assessment of the sustained, work-related
physical and mental activities the claimant can still do on a
regular and continuing basis despite his limitations.
§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).
(SSR) 96-8p.
See also Social Security Ruling
“A 'regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a
day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent schedule."
at *1.
20 C.F.R.
SSR 96-8p,
In other words, the Social Security Act does not require
complete incapacity to be disabled.
Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2011)(citing Fair
v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).
At Step Four the claimant is not disabled if the
Commissioner determines the claimant retains the RFC to perform
work she has done in the past.
416.920(a)(4)(iv).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724.
If the Commissioner reaches Step Five, she must determine
whether the claimant is able to do any other work that exists in
the national economy.
416.920(a)(4)(v).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),
See also Keyser, 648 F.3d at 724-25.
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
Here the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show a significant number of
jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th
Cir. 2010).
The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the
testimony of a VE or by reference to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines set forth in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. part 404,
subpart P, appendix 2.
If the Commissioner meets this burden,
the claimant is not disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1),
416.920(g)(1).
II.
Evaluation of Drug and Alcohol Abuse.
A claimant is not considered disabled if drug addiction or
alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination
of disability.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(J).
See also Bustamante
v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2001).
Substance abuse
is a material factor when the claimant’s remaining limitations
would not be disabling if the claimant stopped using drugs or
alcohol.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b).
If the claimant is found to be disabled and there is medical
evidence of substance abuse, the ALJ must determine whether drug
addiction or alcoholism “is a contributing factor material to the
determination of disability.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a).
To
assess the materiality of drug or alcohol abuse,
an ALJ must first conduct the five-step inquiry without
separating out the impact of alcoholism or drug
addiction. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is not
disabled under the five-step inquiry, then the claimant
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
is not entitled to benefits . . . . If the ALJ finds
that the claimant is disabled and there is medical
evidence of his drug addiction or alcoholism[,] then
the ALJ should proceed under § 404.1535 or 416.935 to
determine if the claimant would still [be found]
disabled if he stopped using alcohol or drugs.
Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 955 (internal quotation omitted).
In
effect, the ALJ must make a second five-step sequential inquiry
to “evaluate which of [the claimant’s] current physical and
mental limitations, upon which [the ALJ] based [the] current
disability determination, would remain if [the claimant] stopped
using drugs or alcohol and then determine whether any or all of
[the claimant’s] remaining limitations would be disabling.”
C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(2).
20
See also Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 955.
In such materiality determinations, the claimant bears the
burden to prove that drug addiction or alcoholism is not a
contributing factor material to the disability.
Ball v.
Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2001).
ALJ'S FINDINGS
At Step One the ALJ found Plaintiff has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since her August 12, 2005,
application date.
Tr. 352.
At Step Two the ALJ found Plaintiff has the severe
impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,
major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorder, a
seizure disorder, and ongoing amphetamine and alcohol dependence.
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 352.
The ALJ found Plaintiff's Hepatitis C and heroin abuse
in sustained remission are not severe impairments.
Tr. 352.
At Step Three the ALJ concluded Plaintiff's impairments
medically equal the criteria for Listed Impairments under
§§ 12.04, 12.06, and 12.09 of 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1.
Tr. 353.
perform light work.
The ALJ found Plaintiff has the RFC to
Tr. 355.
The ALJ found Plaintiff is limited
to unskilled work and routine tasks and should have only
"superficial interaction with co-workers."
Tr. 355.
The ALJ
found Plaintiff should not interact with the general public; work
in close cooperation or coordination with coworkers; exposure to
hazards; or climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds.
Tr. 355.
The ALJ
found Plaintiff can occasionally climb ramps and stairs and can
frequently stoop kneel, crouch, or crawl.
Tr. 355.
At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff does not have any
past relevant work experience.
Tr. 364.
At Step Five the ALJ concluded Plaintiff, in light of her
substance-abuse disorders, does not have an RFC sufficient to
perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy.
Tr. 364.
In accordance with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a) and 416.935(a),
the ALJ then performed the sequential analysis a second time.
Considering only the impairments and limitations that would
remain if Plaintiff stopped using drugs and alcohol, the ALJ
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
found Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the criteria
for any impairment in the Listing of Impairments.
Tr. 354.
The
ALJ again found Plaintiff is limited to unskilled work and
routine tasks.
Tr. 355.
The ALJ found Plaintiff should have
only "superficial interaction with co-workers" and should not
interact with the general public; work in close cooperation or
coordination with coworkers; exposure to hazards; or climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds.
Tr. 355.
The ALJ found Plaintiff
can occasionally climb ramps and stairs and can frequently stoop
kneel, crouch, or crawl.
Tr. 355.
At Step Four the ALJ concluded Plaintiff does not have any
past relevant work experience.
Tr. 364.
At Step Five the ALJ found Plaintiff would have the RFC to
make an adjustment to work in jobs that exist in the national
economy if she stopped using drugs and alcohol.
Tr. 364.
Thus,
the ALJ concluded Plaintiff is ineligible for benefits because
drug addiction and alcoholism are contributing factors material
to the determination of disability.
Tr. 365.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he (1) improperly
rejected Plaintiff’s testimony, (2) failed to order an IQ test of
Plaintiff, (3) found at Step Three that Plaintiff's impairments
did not meet or equal the criteria for any impairment in the
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
Listing of Impairments, (4) found at Step Four that Plaintiff did
not have any prior relevant work, and (5) found at Step Five that
Plaintiff could perform other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy.
I.
The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for rejecting
Plaintiff’s testimony.
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred when she failed to give
clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony.
In Cotton v. Bowen the Ninth Circuit established two
requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom
testimony:
The claimant must produce objective medical evidence
of an impairment or impairments, and she must show the impairment
or combination of impairments could reasonably be expected to
produce some degree of symptom.
Cir. 1986).
Cotton, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th
The claimant, however, need not produce objective
medical evidence of the actual symptoms or their severity.
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.
If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is not
any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the
claimant's pain testimony only if he provides clear and
convincing reasons for doing so.
Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,
750 (9th Cir. 2007)(citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
General assertions that the claimant's testimony is
not credible are insufficient.
13 - OPINION AND ORDER
Id.
The ALJ must identify "what
testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the
claimant's complaints."
Id. (quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 834).
The ALJ found if Plaintiff "stopped the substance abuse,"
her "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to produce the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff's]
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are
inconsistent with the [RFC]."
Tr. 357.
The ALJ noted the
finding of Dale Veith, Psy.D., examining psychologist, that
Plaintiff "demonstrated that she is willing to feign cognitive
problems in order to support her claim that she is disabled . . .
which makes it virtually impossible to arrive at a clinical
diagnosis."
Tr. 361, 489.
Dr. Veith noted "it appears
[Plaintiff] is feigning and/or exaggerating the severity of her
problems in an effort to avoid accepting adult responsibilities
and obtain monetary and other benefits."
Tr. 489.
The ALJ also
noted the record reflected Plaintiff was noncompliant with her
medication regimen.
In addition, Plaintiff's treating
neurologist, Gordon Banks, M.D., noted Plaintiff's epilepsy would
likely continue to persist as long as she continued to use
methamphetamine.
Tr. 358, 850.
The ALJ noted MRIs of
Plaintiff's lumbar spine showed Plaintiff had mild to moderate
degenerative arthritis, minimal spondylithesis, mild
thoracolumbar dextrocurvature, and no stenosis.
14 - OPINION AND ORDER
Tr. 358, 761.
The ALJ also noted Plaintiff has received routine, conservative
treatment for her back pain and has responded well to that
treatment.
Tr. 358-59.
On this record the Court finds the ALJ provided clear and
convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the
record for finding Plaintiff's testimony not entirely credible as
to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her
condition.
The Court, therefore, concludes the ALJ did not err
when he partially rejected Plaintiff's testimony.
II.
The ALJ did not err when he failed to order an IQ test of
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred when he failed to order a
consultative examination "focused on whether Plaintiff's
borderline IQ issue was included in Plaintiff's RFC."
Specifically, Plaintiff contends Gregory Cole, Ph.D., examining
psychologist, found Plaintiff "exhibited below average
intellectual capabilities," and the ALJ failed in "explore" those
findings.
The Commissioner bears the burden of developing the record.
Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 2001).
When
important medical evidence is incomplete, the ALJ has a duty to
recontact the provider for clarification.
§ 416.927(c)(2).
20 C.F.R.
When making disability determinations,
[i]f the evidence is consistent but we do not have
sufficient evidence to decide whether you are
disabled, or if after weighing the evidence we
15 - OPINION AND ORDER
decide we cannot reach a conclusion about whether
you are disabled, we will try to obtain additional
evidence. . . . We will request additional
existing records, recontact your treating sources
or any other examining sources, ask you to undergo
a consultative examination at our expense, or ask
you or others for more information.
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3).
The decision whether to request a
consultative examination is within the discretion of the ALJ.
See 20 C.F.R. § 919a ("A consultative examination may be
purchased when the evidence as a whole, both medical and
nonmedical, is not sufficient to support a decision on your
claim.").
Dr. Cole conducted a psychodiagnostic evaluation of
Plaintiff on January 29, 2008, and concluded Plaintiff suffered
from bipolar disorder, a panic disorder, and a history of
polysubstance abuse.
Tr. 284.
Dr. Cole noted Plaintiff had
"slightly below average immediate memory capability, and below
average delayed memory capability."
Tr. 285.
Dr. Cole noted
Plaintiff "was able to sustain simple routine tasks, and [had]
only mild problems completing a simple multiple-step task."
Tr. 285.
The ALJ gave "substantial weight" to Dr. Cole's opinion
and, as a result, limited Plaintiff to unskilled work and routine
tasks in his assessment of Plaintiff's RFC.
There is not any indication that the record related to
Plaintiff's IQ or intellectual functioning was sufficiently
ambiguous or inadequate to trigger the ALJ's duty to develop the
16 - OPINION AND ORDER
record further.
See, e.g., Coleman v. Colvin, No. 12– 35207,
2013 WL 1694757, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2013)("the ALJ had no
duty to develop the record on this point where the evidence was
not ambiguous and the record was not inadequate to allow for
proper evaluation of the evidence."); Ludwig v. Astrue, 681 F.3d
1047, 1055 n.30 (9th Cir. 2012)("'An ALJ's duty to develop the
record further is triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence
or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation
of the evidence.'” quoting Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453,
459–60 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Accordingly, the Court concludes on this record that the ALJ
did not err when he did not order a consultative examination
"focused on whether Plaintiff's borderline IQ issue was included
in Plaintiff's RFC."
III. The ALJ did not err at Step Three.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at Step Three when he found
Plaintiff's activities of daily living (ADLs) are evidence of her
ability to perform full-time work.
As noted, at Step Three the Commissioner must determine
whether a claimant’s impairments without the effects of substance
abuse meet or equal one of the listed impairments that the
Commissioner acknowledges are so severe as to preclude
substantial gainful activity.
416.920(a)(4)(iii).
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
Social Security Ruling 96-6P provides in
17 - OPINION AND ORDER
pertinent part:
[L]ongstanding policy requires that the judgment
of a physician (or psychologist) designated by the
Commissioner on the issue of equivalence on the
evidence before the administrative law judge or
the Appeals Council must be received into the
record as expert opinion evidence and given
appropriate weight.
The ALJ found at Step Three that absent the effects of drug
and alcohol abuse, Plaintiff's impairments do not medically equal
one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1.
In reaching his determination, the ALJ relied on the
medical records as well as the opinion of Julie Frederick,
Psy.D., the medical expert who testified at the October 25, 2011,
hearing.
Dr. Frederick testified at the hearing that absent the
effects of substance abuse, Plaintiff's depression and panic
disorder would not equal a Listing.
Tr. 1030.
Dr. Frederick
also testified absent the effects of substance abuse, Plaintiff's
activities of daily living are only mildly impaired; social
functioning is moderately impaired; and concentration,
persistence, and pace are moderately impaired.
Tr. 1030-31.
In addition, Plaintiff fails to point to specific evidence
in the record that establishes the requirements of the particular
Listing she claims to have met.
The Ninth Circuit has held
generalized assertions of functional problems are insufficient to
establish that a claimant meets or equals a Listing at Step
Three.
See, e.g., Reed-Goss v. Astrue, 291 F. App'x 100, 101
18 - OPINION AND ORDER
(9th Cir. 2008)("'To meet a listed impairment, a claimant must
establish that he or she meets each characteristic of a listed
impairment relevant to his or her claim.'” quoting Tackett v.
Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999)).
The Court, therefore, concludes the ALJ did not err at Step
Three when he found Plaintiff's ADLs are evidence of her ability
to perform full-time work.
IV.
The ALJ did not err at Step Four.
Plaintiff asserts "the ALJ's findings about Plaintiff's
ability to perform past relevant work is [sic] unsupported by any
evidence."
Pl.'s Reply at 6.
The ALJ, however, found Plaintiff
did not have any past relevant work.
Plaintiff does not point to
any evidence in the record that contradicts that finding.
Accordingly, the Court concludes the ALJ did not err at Step
Four when he found Plaintiff had not performed any past relevant
work.
V.
The ALJ did not err at Step Five when he found Plaintiff
could do other jobs that existed in significant numbers in
the economy.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred at Step Five when he found
Plaintiff could perform other jobs in the national economy if she
stopped abusing drugs and alcohol because the ALJ failed to
consider the limitations indicated by Plaintiff, Dr. Cole, and
"multiple assessment and medical records throughout the
Plaintiff's extensive record."
19 - OPINION AND ORDER
The Court, however, has found the ALJ properly rejected
Plaintiff's testimony in part and properly considered the opinion
of Dr. Cole.
Thus, the Court concludes the ALJ did not err at
Step Five when the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's ability to do other
jobs that exist in the national economy.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the
Commissioner and DISMISSES this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 2nd day of May, 2013.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States District Judge
20 - OPINION AND ORDER
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