Ball v. Hillsboro Municipal Court et al

Filing 32

OPINION AND ORDER. Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and I find Hillsboro Municipal court is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, I GRANT Hillsboro Municipal Courts motion for summary judgment 19 . The claims against Hillsboro Municipal Court are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed on 3/11/13 by Judge Michael W. Mosman. (dls)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
ROBERT BALL,
Plaintiff,

No. 3:12-cv-01508-MO

v.

OPINION AND ORDER

HILLSBORO MUNICIPAL COURT and
OREGON DMV,
Defendants.
MOSMAN, J.,
Defendant Hillsboro Municipal Court seeks summary judgment [19] on the two claims
brought by pro se plaintiff Robert Ball. Mr. Ball responded [25]. Hillsboro Municipal Court did
not reply. I grant Hillsboro Municipal Court’s motion for summary judgment for the following
reasons.
BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2011, Robert Ball was issued a traffic citation (#144250) for failure to use
lights under Or. Rev. Stat. § 811.520. (Def.’s Decl. in Supp. [20-1] at 1.) Mr. Ball appeared in
Hillsboro Municipal Court and entered a plea of not guilty. (Def.’s Decl. in Supp. [20] at ¶ 2.) In
a trial by affidavit, Mr. Ball requested admittance to traffic school in lieu of a violation. (Def.’s
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Decl. in Supp. [20-1] at 7–12.) Judge David M. Veverka denied Mr. Ball’s request because Mr.
Ball did not qualify for the program. (Id. [20-1] at 6; Def.’s Decl. in Supp. [20] at ¶ 5.)
Subsequently, Mr. Ball was found guilty and ordered to pay a fine. (Id. [20-1] at 3.)
On June 27, 2012, Mr. Ball was issued a second citation (#155839) for failure to carry
insurance under Or. Rev. Stat. § 806.012. (Id. [20-1] at 14.) Mr. Ball appeared before Judge
Veverka and pled not guilty. (Def.’s Decl. in Supp. [20] at ¶ 8.) Judge Veverka found Mr. Ball
guilty and ordered him to pay a fine. (Id. [20].) Mr. Ball did not request traffic school prior to or
during his trial. (Id. [20] at ¶ 10.)
Hillsboro Municipal Court offers traffic school to drivers who receive traffic citations in
limited circumstances. (Id. [20] at ¶ 6.) Traffic school is only offered to drivers between the ages
of fifteen and eighteen. (Id. [20].) Mr. Ball, at the time of filing his complaint, was fifty-nine
years-old. (Compl. [2] at 4.) The traffic school’s other eligibility requirements are not at issue.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment is a procedure which terminates, without a trial, actions
in which “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[A] party seeking summary judgment
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,
and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 n. 22 (1998).
“If the moving party meets its initial burden of showing ‘the absence of a material and
triable issue of fact,’ ‘the burden then moves to the opposing party.’” Intel Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Richards v. Neilsen
Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987)). The nonmoving party may not rest on

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conclusory allegations, Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989), but must present
“significant probative evidence.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)). Such evidence must
demonstrate “the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.
The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as
well as draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id
at 255. Furthermore, the court construes pro se pleadings liberally and affords pro se plaintiffs
the benefit of any doubt. See Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Ball alleges two counts of discrimination against Hillsboro Municipal Court for
denying individuals, age forty and older, access to traffic school. (Compl. [2] at 5–6.) The first
count concerns his first traffic citation (#144250). (Id. [2] at 5.) The second count concerns his
second traffic citation (#155839). (Id. [2] at 6.)
Mr. Ball’s reference to “age discrimination over/under 40 [years old]” leads me to
conclude that he is trying to allege claims pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. (Id.[2] at 5.) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is not applicable, however,
because Hillsboro Municipal Court was not Mr. Ball’s employer at the time of the alleged
discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66 (2000).
Construing his allegations liberally, I find that for each count there are three potential
claims. First, an equal protection claim based on the traffic school’s age restriction. Second, a
class-of-one equal protection claim alleging he was intentionally discriminated and there was no
rational basis for the discrimination. Third, a claim that Hillsboro Municipal Court is liable under

3 – OPINION AND ORDER

§ 1983 because Hillsboro Municipal Court deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
I.

Equal Protection Clause
In his first claim for relief for count one (#144250) and count two (#155839), Mr. Ball

asserts that Hillsboro Municipal Court has infringed on his equal protection rights by
discriminating against an “over 40” age class. (Compl. [2] at 3.) Hillsboro Municipal Court
contends that no fundamental right or suspect class is implicated and it had a rational basis for
restricting traffic school to fifteen to eighteen year-olds. (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. [22] at 5–8.) In
response, Mr. Ball argues that Hillsboro Municipal Court’s rational basis fails because people
issued traffic violations should be treated similarly. (Pl.’s Resp. Mem. [25] at 2.) I agree with
Hillsboro Municipal Court that rational basis is the proper scrutiny to apply and the age
restriction passes constitutional muster for both counts.
As a practical matter, Mr. Ball argues that he should have been entitled to enroll in traffic
school because he finds it difficult to pay the fines associated with both traffic citations. But the
cost of traffic school was generally comparable to the traffic citation fines. In the first count
(#144250), the cost for attending traffic school was $100.00. (Def.’s Decl. in Supp. [20] at ¶ 6.)
Mr. Ball was ordered to pay a fine of $142.00. (Def.’s Decl. in Supp. [20-1] at 3.) In the second
count (#155839), the cost for attending traffic school was $175.00. (Def.’s Decl. in Supp. [20] at
¶ 8.) Mr. Ball was ordered to pay a fine of $130.00. (Id. [20].) Nevertheless, this practical matter
is inconsequential to Mr. Ball’s equal protection claim.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in part: “. . . nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The court is required
to apply strict scrutiny to an equal protection analysis when a state action “impermissibly

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interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class.” Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). If a fundamental right or
suspect class is not implicated, the classification is subject to rational basis review. See Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). Under rational basis, the classification “is accorded a strong
presumption of validity” and must be upheld “if there is a rational relationship between the
disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at 319–20. Moreover, the
government “has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of [the]
classification.” Id. at 320. Additionally, a classification will only fail rational basis review when
it “rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
Here, strict scrutiny does not apply because Hillsboro Municipal Court’s age restriction
does not interfere with a fundamental right, nor does it discriminate against a suspect class.
There is no fundamental right to attend traffic school in lieu of paying a fine for a traffic citation.
Furthermore, Mr. Ball’s alleged over forty age class is not a protected suspect class. The
Supreme Court has held that age is not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. See
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313–14. Therefore, the proper scrutiny to analyze Mr. Ball’s alleged equal
protection claim is rational basis.
Hillsboro Municipal Court asserts that the age restriction must be upheld because it is
rationally related to the government’s interest in young drivers. The purpose of traffic school is
to afford “young, new drivers” an opportunity to “learn from their mistakes, while
simultaneously keeping their driving records clean and presumably, their parents’ insurance rates
from rising.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. [22] at 7.) Hillsboro Municipal Court contends that the age
restriction is rationally related to the government’s interest in young drivers, as follows: (1)

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Oregon law holds drivers under the age of eighteen to a different standard than adult drivers; (2)
adult drivers “are typically more experienced” and do “not have as much to learn from” traffic
school; (3) “warnings or diversion options lack the deterrent value of a violation” for adult
drivers; and (4) the program is administered by a separate entity that does not allow adult drivers
to enroll in the program. (Id. [22] at 7–8.)
I agree with Hillsboro Municipal Court that, given those conceivable reasons, there is a
rational basis for treating adult drivers differently than young drivers. A classification, such as
this one, “must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” F.C.C. v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Additionally, rational basis does not fail
simply “because in practice it results in some inequality” to adult drivers. Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
What is more, Mr. Ball’s response fails to meet his burden to negate Hillsboro Municipal
Court’s rational basis and to create a triable issue of fact. Mr. Ball challenges the rational basis
arguing that (1) the different standards are irrelevant because any driver can be in a car accident;
(2) a “traffic infraction is a traffic infraction;” and (3) traffic school is “more effective at
encouraging safe driving” than paying a fee. (Pl.’s Resp. Mem. [25] at 2–3.)
Mr. Ball’s assertions, however, do not demonstrate how the rational basis is irrelevant to
the government’s interest in young drivers. Rather, he stresses the unfairness of limiting traffic
school to young adults. Mr. Ball contends that adult drivers should be allowed to participate
because they also “make mistakes.” (Pl.’s Resp. Mem. [25] at 2–3.) In addition, he references an
adult traffic school administered by Troutdale. (Id. [25] at 3.) The equal protection clause,
however, “is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic” of classification,

6 – OPINION AND ORDER

established by the government. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 313.
Last, Mr. Ball has failed to create a triable issue of fact because he has not presented any
significant probative evidence to support his arguments. Mr. Ball’s response merely relies on
conclusory arguments and assertions. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045 (the nonmoving party may
not rest on conclusory allegations); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (on summary judgment the
nonmoving party must present significant probative evidence).
Therefore, Hillsboro Municipal Court is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both
counts under Mr. Ball’s equal protection claim because Mr. Ball failed to create a genuine issue
of material fact and the classification survives rational basis review.
II.

Class-of-One Claim
As I construe pro se plaintiff’s claims liberally, I also construe Mr. Ball’s complaint as

stating a class-of-one claim for both counts. Therefore, Mr. Ball asserts Hillsboro Municipal
Court violated his right to equal protection when he was denied traffic school while other
similarly situated drivers were permitted to enroll in traffic school. (Compl. [2] at 3.) Hillsboro
Municipal Court contends that its “traffic court policy is rationally related to the legitimate
government interest in helping young, inexperienced drivers and [Mr. Ball] can present no
evidence his motivation is simply a pretext.” (Def.’s Mem. in Supp. [22] at 10.) For the reasons
discussed below, I conclude as a matter of law that Hillsboro Municipal Court is entitled to
summary judgment on Mr. Ball’s class-of-one claim.
The Supreme Court has recognized the viability of equal-protection claims based on a
“class of one” theory. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
Under a class-of-one theory the plaintiff need not allege any “membership in a class or group.”
Id. To state a claim under this theory, the plaintiff must show he “has been intentionally treated

7 – OPINION AND ORDER

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment.” Id.
A. Similarly Situated
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. But it does keep
governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are “in all relevant respects
alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). “Evidence of different treatment of unlike
groups does not support an equal protection claim.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d
1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 2005).
In the case at bar, Mr. Ball alleges he was treated differently than other drivers who
received traffic citations. (Compl. [2] at 3–4.) There is an important distinction, however,
between Mr. Ball and the other drivers. Mr. Ball is fifty-nine years old. The drivers who are
offered traffic school are between fifteen and eighteen years old. Therefore, Mr. Ball is not
similarly situated “in all relevant respects” to the other drivers because of the disparity in age.
Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Ball, without a similarly situated
class, there is no constitutional violation of either count for Mr. Ball’s class-of-one claim.
B. Rational Basis
Disparate government treatment will survive rational basis scrutiny “as long as it bears a
rational relation to a legitimate state interest.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1240 (1997). Where the defendant asserts a rational basis for such
treatment, the plaintiff may rebut the proffered basis as pretextual. In the Ninth Circuit, “it is
clearly established that a plaintiff may pursue an equal protection claim by raising a ‘triable issue
of fact as to whether the defendants’ asserted [rational basis] . . . was merely a pretext’ for
differential treatment.” Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 945–46 (9th Cir.

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2004), overruled on other grounds, Action Apartment Ass’n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd.,
509 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1327 (9th
Cir. 1996)). Thus, a plaintiff may rebut a proffered rational basis on the grounds that the rational
basis is “objectively false,” or by proving the defendant acted with “an improper motive.” Id. at
946.
As previously addressed, Hillsboro Municipal Court demonstrated a rational basis for the
disparate treatment of adult drivers. Additionally, Mr. Ball has failed to present any material
facts to challenge Hillsboro Municipal Court’s rational basis as objectively false or support that
Hillsboro Municipal Court acted with an improper motive.
I conclude as a matter of law that the age restriction has a rational basis and that Mr. Ball
has not shown a factual issue concerning pretext. Consequently, I grant Hillsboro Municipal
Court’s motion for summary judgment on the class-of-one claim as to both counts.
III.

Liability under § 1983
Again, liberally construing Mr. Ball’s complaint, I find he has stated a Monell claim for

each count. Thus, Mr. Ball alleges that Hillsboro Municipal Court is liable under § 1983 for its
unconstitutional municipal custom that led to the deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Hillsboro Municipal Court contends that Mr. Ball failed to establish liability because he
was not deprived of a constitutional right. I agree with Hillsboro Municipal Court.
Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color
of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A municipality
may be held liable under § 1983 if the municipality is alleged to have caused a constitutional tort
through a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

9 – OPINION AND ORDER

Section 1983 also authorizes suit “for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to
governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the
body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id. at 690–91. To establish civil liability, a plaintiff
must show deprivation of a constitutional right. Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., 237 F.3d 1101,
1110 (9th Cir. 2001).
My findings above prevent Mr. Ball from satisfying a necessary element of a § 1983
claim. As previously discussed, there is no fundamental right to attend traffic school in lieu of
paying a fine.
Thus, summary judgment is granted on both counts under the § 1983 claim.
CONCLUSION
Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and I find Hillsboro Municipal
court is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, I GRANT Hillsboro Municipal Court’s motion
for summary judgment [19]. The claims against Hillsboro Municipal Court are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED this

11th

day of March, 2013.
/s/ Michael W. Mosman____
MICHAEL W. MOSMAN
United States District Judge

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