Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County et al
OPINION AND ORDER: Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 17 ; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 ). Signed on 4/11/2014 by Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart. (ST)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
Case No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST
OPINION AND ORDER
STEWART, Magistrate Judge:
This case involves the detention of plaintiff, Maria Miranda-Olivares (“MirandaOlivares”), in the Clackamas County Jail (“Jail”) based solely on a federal immigration detainer
(Form I-247) issued by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an
agency of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). The detainer indicated that ICE had
initiated an investigation to determine whether Miranda-Olivares was subject to removal from
the United States. Miranda-Olivares alleges that by keeping her in custody based on that ICE
detainer, Clackamas County (“County”) violated 42 USC § 1983 by depriving her of liberty with
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (First Claim) and her right to be free from
Another defendant, Craig Roberts, Sheriff of Clackamas County, was named as a defendant in the initial Complaint, but deleted
in the First Amended Complaint (docket #6).
1 – OPINION AND ORDER
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment (Second Claim), and also falsely imprisoned
her in violation of Oregon law (Third Claim).
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1331. All parties have consented to
allow a Magistrate Judge to enter final orders and judgment in this case in accordance with
FRCP 73 and 28 USC § 636(c) (docket #10).
Because the material facts are undisputed, the County has filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment (docket #17) on liability for all claims, and Miranda-Olivares has filed a cross Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (docket #23) on her § 1983 claims. For the reasons set forth
below, summary judgment is granted to Miranda-Olivares as to liability on the Second Claim
and granted to the County on the First and Third Claims.
On March 14, 2012, Miranda-Olivares was arrested for violating a domestic violence
restraining order and booked into the Jail. Eby Decl. (docket #19), ¶ 2 & Ex. 101. MirandaOlivares does not challenge the lawfulness of that arrest.
The County generally does not know a person’s immigration status and did not know
Miranda-Olivares’s immigration status any at time during her incarceration. Henretty Decl.
(docket #27), Ex. 6 (“Eby Depo.”), pp. 41-42, & Ex. 8, p. 2. However, it has a policy of
notifying ICE when a foreign–born person is brought to the Jail on a warrant or probable cause
charge. Id, Ex. 3, p. 2, & Ex. 5, p. 2. The County does not request that ICE issue an immigration
detainer against a person. Id, Ex. 4, p. 6.
Early the next morning on March 15, 2012, the Jail received an immigration detainer
(Form I-247) issued by ICE for Miranda-Olivares. Id, Ex. 2; Eby Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. The top of that
ICE detainer contains the following caption: “MAINTAIN CUSTODY OF ALIEN FOR A
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PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS.” Eby Decl., Ex. 102. After naming and describing
Miranda-Olivares, it states that DHS “has taken the following action related to” her with an “X”
marked in the first of four boxes 2 indicating that DHS had “initiated an investigation to
determine whether [Miranda-Olivares] is subject to removal from the United States.” Id. It
states no basis for the investigation and was not accompanied by an arrest warrant or any other
charging document. Henretty Decl., Ex. 8, p. 2. The middle of that ICE detainer states “IT IS
REQUESTED THAT YOU,” followed by six boxes with an “X” marked in the two following
Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48
HOURS, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time
when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody
to allow DHS to take custody of the subject. This request flows from
federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 287.7, which provides that a law enforcement
agency “shall maintain custody of an alien” once a detainer has been
issued by DHS. You are not authorized to hold the subject beyond
these 48 hours. As early as possible prior to the time you otherwise
would release the subject, please notify the Department . . . .
Provide a copy to the subject of this detainer . . . .
Eby Decl., Ex. 102 (emphasis in original).
When the Jail receives an ICE detainer, it holds the person subject to the detainer for up
to 48 hours, not including Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the person
would otherwise be released, even if the person posts bail. Henretty Decl., Ex. 7 (“Roberts
Depo.”), p. 10; Eby Depo., pp. 22-23. The Jail’s practice is the same whether or not the ICE
detainer is accompanied by an arrest warrant, statement of probable cause, or removal or
deportation order. Eby Depo., pp. 17-18.
The other three unchecked boxes indicate that DHS has “[i]nitiated removal proceedings and served a Notice to Appear or other
charging document,” “[s]erved a warrant of arrest for removal proceedings,” or “[o]btained an order of deportation or removal
from the United States for this person.” Eby Decl., Ex. 102.
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Although Miranda-Olivares became aware of the ICE detainer the day it was issued, she
was not provided a copy of it while she was incarcerated. Miranda-Olivares Decl. (docket #25),
¶ 8; Ceicko Decl. (docket #20), Ex. 105 (“Miranda-Olivares Depo.”), pp. 25, 29.
That same day, Miranda-Olivares was arraigned and charged with two counts of
contempt of court (ORS 33.065),3 and the judge set bail at $5,000.00. Answer (docket #7), ¶ 10;
Eby Decl., ¶ 7; Henretty Decl., Ex. 9. In order to post bail, Miranda-Olivares was required to
pay $500.00. Henretty Decl., Ex. 8, p. 5. However, the Jail holds an individual who is subject to
an ICE detainer in custody, even if the underlying state criminal charges are resolved or bail is
posted. Eby Depo., pp. 22-23, 41. Between March 16 and March 30, 2012, the Jail told
Miranda-Olivares’s sister, Laura Miranda, approximately four or five times that even if bail was
posted, Miranda-Olivares would not be released due to the ICE detainer. Laura Miranda Decl.
(docket #26), ¶¶ 4, 6; Henretty Decl., Ex. 8, p. 4. On March 16, 2012, Laura Miranda informed
Miranda-Olivares by telephone that she would not be released if she posted bail because of the
ICE detainer. Miranda-Olivares Decl., ¶¶ 5-6; Laura Miranda Decl., ¶¶ 3, 5; Henretty Decl.,
Ex. 10 (Progress Notes, March 16, 2012). On or about March 28, 2012, a sheriff’s deputy told
Miranda-Olivares directly that she would not be released if she posted bail because of the Jail
policy relating to ICE detainers. Miranda-Olivares Decl., ¶ 7; Henretty Decl., Ex. 4, p. 3
& Ex. 10, p. 2. Miranda-Olivares’s family was willing and able to pay the $500.00 bail, but did
not do so because of the statements by Jail officials. Laura Miranda Decl., ¶ 8.
Miranda-Olivares remained in custody at the Jail on the state charges until March 29,
2012, when she pled guilty to one of the charges and was sentenced to 48 hours in jail with credit
Restraining orders under the Abuse Prevention Act, ORS 107.700 et seq, are enforced through contempt proceedings under
ORS Chapter 33. See State ex rel. Hathaway v. Hart, 300 Or 231, 236-37 (1985). Contempt of court is not a “crime” in Oregon.
State v. Reynolds, 239 Or App 313, 315-16 (2010). No longer referred to as a civil or criminal charge, contempt is “categorized
by the sanction sought, either remedial or punitive.” Bachman v. Bachman, 171 Or App 665, 673 n8 (2000); see ORS 33.045.
Charges brought under ORS 33.065 involve punitive sanctions.
4 – OPINION AND ORDER
for time served and probation. Eby Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10 & Ex. 103. Consequently, at about 1:30 pm
on March 29, 2012, Miranda-Olivares would have been released from the Jail but for the ICE
detainer. Id, ¶ 12. Instead, the County held Miranda-Olivares in custody for another 19 hours
until about 8:30 am on March 30, 2012, when she was released from the Jail to the custody of
DHS agents. Id, ¶ 13.
While in custody at the Jail, Miranda-Olivares did not file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, file a Jail administrative grievance, or contact DHS regarding the issuance of the ICE
detainer. Id, ¶ 16; Miranda-Olivares Depo., pp. 29-30.
Miranda-Olivares challenges her confinement by the County from March 15 through
March 30, 2012, and specifically the County’s custom and practice of incarcerating persons who
are subject to ICE detainers after the lawful custody on state charges has ended. The County
responds that federal law requires this custom and practice because ICE detainers (Form I-247)
are issued pursuant to 28 CFR § 287.7 which, it its view, mandates the detention of a suspected
alien by a local law enforcement agency for up to 48 hours. That regulation contains the
following two relevant subsections:
(a) Detainers in general. Detainers are issued pursuant to sections 236 and
287 of the Act and this chapter 1. Any authorized immigration officer
may at any time issue a Form I–247, Immigration Detainer–Notice of
Action, to any other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency. A
detainer serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the
Department seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that
agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. The detainer
is a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the
alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in
situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either
impracticable or impossible.
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(d) Temporary detention at Department request. Upon a determination by
the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise detained by a
criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien
for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department.
However, as discussed below, neither 28 CFR § 287.7 nor the form of ICE detainer at
issue here are mandatory. As a result, the County violated Miranda-Olivares’s Fourth
§ 1983 Claims
Government conduct under the color of law that deprives a person of a constitutionallyprotected interest violates 42 USC § 1983. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir
1985). Municipalities are “persons” subject to damages liability under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 US 658 (1978); Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir 1992). A
municipality’s liability under § 1983 is established if the constitutional violation was committed
pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a “long standing practice or custom which
constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local governmental entity.” Gillette, 979
F2d at 1346-47.
Miranda-Olivares does not challenge an express policy adopted by the County. See City
of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 US 808, 823 (1985) (“the word ‘policy’ generally implies a
course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives”). Instead, she challenges
the County’s undisputed practice or custom of detaining a person based entirely on an ICE
detainer even after that person is entitled to release from custody by posting bail or resolving the
criminal charges. Based on its interpretation of the language in the ICE detainer and 8 CFR
§ 287.7, the County argues that its practice or custom does not violate either the Fourth or
6 – OPINION AND ORDER
Fourteenth Amendments because it is mandated by federal law. However, as discussed below,
the County misinterprets the nature of the ICE detainer at issue here.
ICE Detainer is Not Mandatory
The County’s case relies heavily on the theory that a municipality cannot be liable under
Monell based on a custom and practice of complying with a mandatory federal law. In support,
it points to several decisions from the federal circuits holding that a municipality is not subject to
Monell liability as a result of enforcing mandatory state law. See, e.g., Vives v. City of N.Y., 524
F3d 346, 351-52 (2nd Cir 2008) (summarizing the circuit decisions). These courts reason that a
municipality’s decision to honor the obligation to enforce a mandatory state law is not a
conscious choice. See id at 352-53, citing Tuttle, 471 US at 823 (“a policy will ordinarily be the
result of a conscious choice”). This conclusion reflects Supreme Court precedent that
“municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to
follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials
responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 483 (1986), citing Tuttle, 471 US at 823.
Although these cases address only state law, their reasoning appears to apply if a
municipality had an analogous obligation to follow federal law. Assuming, as the County
argues, that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 USC §§ 1101, et seq, occupies and
preempts the field of detaining and removing illegal aliens,4 then the INA would bar the County
from exercising any discretion on the subject. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 US 72, 79
The County argues that its response to the ICE detainer is constitutionally preempted, citing Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732
F3d 1006 (9th Cir 2013). Whitting is not applicable because it involved conflict preemption of an Arizona state statute that stood
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose of federal immigration law. Id at 1026. In contrast, the
County relies on field preemption based on the implied “federal power to determine immigration policy.” Arizona v. United
States, 132 S Ct 2492, 2498 (2012). Had ICE issued an order of removal or deportation for Miranda-Olivares, then a refusal by
the County to comply could be constitutionally preempted. That is not the situation here, however, where the ICE detainer states
only that DHS has “[i]nitiated an investigation to determine whether this person is subject to removal from the United States.”
Eby Decl., Ex. 102.
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(1990) (citation omitted) (under field preemption a “scheme of federal regulation [may be] so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it”). Under that scenario, enforcing a federal immigration policy that mandates
cooperation from local law enforcement would require no more conscious decision-making than
would be involved in enforcing a mandatory state law. However, as explained below, the federal
regulation in question, 8 CFR § 287.7, does not mandate detention by local law enforcement, but
only requests compliance in detaining suspected aliens. As the Second Circuit posited, albeit
without deciding, “if a municipality decides to enforce a statute that it is authorized, but not
required, to enforce, it may have created a municipal policy,” subjecting it to Monell liability.
Vives, 524 F3d at 353.5
In this case, any injury Miranda-Olivares suffered was the direct result of the County
exercising its custom and practice to hold her beyond the date she was eligible for release based
solely on the ICE detainer. The County argues that it had no choice because the ICE detainer
mandated her detention pursuant to 8 CFR § 287.7. In particular, it points to the directive in the
caption (“MAINTAIN CUSTODY OF ALIEN FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 48
HOURS”) and the body of the “request” stating that it “flows from federal regulation 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7, which provides that a law enforcement agency ‘shall maintain custody of an alien’ once
a detainer has been issued by DHS.” The County interprets the use of “shall” as extinguishing
any discretion by a local law enforcement agency once ICE issues the detainer.
The County finds support for its interpretation of the ICE detainer and regulation in
several district court cases. However, those cases are not persuasive. First, some of those cases
Of course, even if a municipality enforces a mandatory, but unconstitutional, state or federal law, Monell liability may attach
even though the municipality does not know that the statute is unconstitutional. Id at 350, citing Owen v. City of Independence,
Mo., 445 US 622, 650, 657 (1980) (denying municipalities the good-faith defense).
8 – OPINION AND ORDER
fail to conduct any textual analysis. See Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. Cnty.
of Sonoma, 644 F Supp2d 1177, 1206 (ND Cal 2009); Sorcia v. Smith, C/A No. 9:10-2827-JFABM, 2011 WL 5877026, at *1 (DSC Nov. 22, 2011).
Second, the majority of the cases cited by the County rely on the statutory interpretation
of Galarza v. Szalczyk, 10-CV-06815, 2012 WL 1080020, at *19 (ED Pa Mar. 30, 2012). See
Davila v. N. Reg’l Joint Police Bd., 2013 WL 5724939, at **12-13 (WD Pa 2013) (finding the
regulation to be a “directive” and then stating that “[t]he Court is not aware of, nor is the plaintiff
able to cite to, a case that has held a local government entity’s decision to rely on and comply
with this federal regulation to be unconstitutional on its face”); Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty.,
Tenn., 3-11-1168, 2012 WL 3945354, at *4 (MD Tenn Sept. 10, 2012) (“The subsection says
‘shall maintain,’ which indicates an obligation to maintain custody. For this reason, the Court
finds that the regulation is mandatory.”); Ramirez-Mendoza v. Maury Cnty., Tenn., 1:12-CV00014, 2013 WL 298124, at *8 (MD Tenn Jan. 25, 2013) (relying on the Rios-Quiroz analysis to
hold “the Defendant was not required to make an independent probable cause determination of
Plaintiff’s immigration status”). However, the Third Circuit recently reversed Galarza and
interpreted the regulation as not imposing a mandatory obligation on local law enforcement
agencies to detain suspected aliens subject to an INS detainer. Galarza v. Szalczyk, et al, No. 123991, 2014 WL 815127 (3rd Cir Mar. 4, 2014). The regulation contains two subsections.
Subsection (a) of 8 CFR § 287.7 describes the purpose of a detainer “to advise another law
enforcement agency” that DHS seeks custody and provides that it is “a request” to advise DHS
“prior to release of the alien.” The phrase “shall maintain custody of an alien” is found only in
subsection (d) regarding the length of detention. The Third Circuit concluded that “it is hard to
9 – OPINION AND ORDER
read the use of the word ‘shall’ in the timing section [(d)] to change the nature of the entire
regulation.” Id at *4.
Despite the Third Circuit’s analysis, the County argues that any interpretation that
provides local law enforcement with discretion to refuse detention upon receipt of an ICE
detainer violates the maxim requiring the court to give meaning to all provisions of the statute.
However, in the present context, this maxim cuts both ways. Interpreting “shall” in subsection
(d) to require local law enforcement to detain a suspected alien would render the repeated use of
the word “request” meaningless, while interpreting “request” in subsection (a) to apply to all the
instructions given to local law enforcement would eviscerate the common meaning of “shall.”
When read as a whole, only one interpretation of the statute is reasonable. If both “shall” and
“request” are given meaning, then a detainer issued by ICE under subsection (b) is a “request”
that local law enforcement voluntarily hold suspected aliens up to 48 hours. At least two courts
have similarly reconciled subsections (a) and (d). See Morales v. Chadbourne, et al, C.A. No.
12-301-M, 2014 WL 554478, at *17 (D RI Feb. 12, 2014) (“Subsection (d) . . . titled ‘Temporary
detention at Department request,’ comes only after subsection (a)’s ‘general’ detainer definition
as a ‘request.’”); Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 1:11-CV-00708-SEB, 2013 WL 1332158, at *3
(SD Ind Mar. 28, 2013) (“A detainer is not a criminal warrant, but rather a voluntary request”
that “automatically expires at the end of the 48-hour period.”).
An even more fundamental principle of statutory interpretation favors Miranda-Olivares.
“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fl. Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Const. Trades Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988) (citation omitted). As recognized by the
10 – OPINION AND ORDER
Third Circuit, the Tenth Amendment requires that 8 CFR § 287.7 be deemed a request. Galarza,
2014 WL 815127, at *7. It is settled that any federal action that commandeers “the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program ‘upsets the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.’” New York v.
United States, 505 US 144, 170 (1992), citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n,
Inc., 452 US 264, 288 (1981). Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has described
the only specific reference to detainers in the INA, 8 USC § 1367(d), as “requests for
information about when an alien will be released from their custody” and as one way state
officials may “assist” the federal government in the detention and removal of aliens. Arizona,
132 S Ct at 2507, citing 8 USC § 1357(d). Thus, a conclusion that Congress intended detainers
as orders for municipalities to enforce a federal regulatory scheme on behalf of INS would raise
potential violations of the anti-commandeering principle.
A non-mandatory interpretation is also consistent with the general interpretation of the
character of INS detainers in other contexts. No federal circuit court “has ever described ICE
detainers as anything but requests.” Galarza, 2014 WL 815127, at *5 (summarizing the
treatment of INS detainers in the majority of circuits). For habeas corpus purposes, the Ninth
Circuit has noted that “[t]he detainer letter itself merely advises that an investigation has been
commenced and that an order to show cause and warrant will be issued when available.” Garcia
v. Taylor, 40 F3d 299, 303 (9th Cir 1994), superseded on other grounds by 8 USC § 1252(i).
Specifically, it held that the INS detainer letter “does not limit [Bureau of Prisons] discretion.”
Id. Therefore, even a fellow federal agency “does not hold the prisoner for the INS.” Id at 304
(emphasis in original). Regardless of the context, the Ninth Circuit considers the language of the
detainer letter to be unambiguous:
11 – OPINION AND ORDER
We do not see how the detainer document can be read in any other way. It
simply expresses interest and says that the INS will (we suppose, if it
honestly can) obtain charging documents in due course. We see nothing
in the detainer letter that would allow, much less compel, the warden to do
anything but release [a detainee] at the end of his term of imprisonment.
The County seeks to distinguish Garcia because it interprets an unidentified detainer
letter (not necessarily Form I-247) and not 8 CFR § 287.7. However, the language of the
relevant regulation giving INS authority to issue detainer letters has not substantively changed
since the Ninth Circuit decided Garcia. See 53 Fed Reg 9281 (Mar 22, 1988) (containing 8 CFR
§ 242.2(a)(4) and § 287.7(a)(4)).6 Moreover, pre-2010 ICE detainers contained the word
“require” that does not appear anywhere in the current version. Galarza, 2014 WL 815127, at
*7. In any event, Garcia represents the only Ninth Circuit interpretation of congressional intent
underlying the authorization of immigration detainers.
The County also posits that consulting nonjudicial interpretations of 8 CFR § 287.7 is
unnecessary because the text is unambiguous. That assertion is clearly repudiated by the
contradictory judicial interpretations of the text. To resolve the ambiguity in the text, it is
prudent to follow the lead of Galarza and consider policy and litigation statements made by ICE,
the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) on behalf of DHS, and state Attorney Generals.
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 US 134, 140 (1944) (“the rulings, interpretations and opinions
of [the federal agency], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
§ 287.7 Detainer Provisions under section 287(d)(3) of the Act.
(a) Detainers in general. (1) Only an immigration officer as defined in section 101(a)(18) of the Act, or § 103.1(q) of this
chapter is authorized to issue a detainer. Detainers may only be issued in the case of an alien who is amenable to exclusion or
deportation proceedings under any provision of law; however, no detainer shall be issued in the case of an alien who is in the
United States without legal authority and is eligible to apply, or has applied, for legalization or special agricultural worker
status under the provisions of section 245A or 210 of the Act, unless the Service has denied, or has issued a notice of intent to
deny, the benefit applied for.
(4) Temporary detention at Service request. Upon a determination by the Service to issue a detainer for an alien not otherwise
detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed forty-eight
hours, in order to permit assumption of custody by the Service.
12 – OPINION AND ORDER
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.”).
Both internally and publically, ICE defines Form I-247 as “a notice that ICE issues to
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to inform the LEA that ICE intends to
assume custody of an individual in the LEA’s custody,” thereby serving the purpose of
“request[ing] that the LEA maintain custody of an alien who would otherwise be released for a
period not to exceed 48 hours.” Henretty Decl., Ex. 1 (ICE website) & Ex. 14 (ICE Enforcement
Interim Policy Number 10074.1). Similarly, in response to a lawsuit, the DOJ’s Office of
Immigration Litigation denied the allegations “that the regulations cited on the I-247 form, which
is a legally authorized request upon which a state or local law enforcement agency permissibly
may rely, imposes a requirement upon the LEA to detain the individual on ICE’s behalf.” Id,
Ex. 15, p. 3. Later in that same suit, the DOJ argued that that an ICE detainer does not violate
the Tenth Amendment because it is a “legally authorized request upon which a state or local law
enforcement agency may rely. It does not conscript state or local law enforcement to take any
action or administer any program.” Id, Ex. 16, p. 2 (Moreno v. Napolitano, 11-cv-5452 (ND Ill
Aug. 11, 2011) (date of case filing)).
In addition, both the Attorney Generals of Maryland and California have issued policy
statements interpreting 8 CFR§ 287.7 and defining state and local law enforcement’s duty under
Form I-247. On December 4, 2012, the California Attorney General published his opinion that
ICE detainers were “merely requests enforceable at the discretion of the agency holding the
individual arrestee” based on the non-mandatory language used in the Form I-247 and the Tenth
Amendment. Reply (docket #30), Ex. 3, p. 2. On October 31, 2013, again relying on the Tenth
Amendment, the Maryland Attorney General stated “it is my view, that the mandatory meaning
13 – OPINION AND ORDER
of the term ‘shall’ should be limited to the length of the stay” and “that the best reading of the
regulation, supported by the position of ICE, allows state and local jurisdictions to exercise
discretion when determining how to respond to individual detainers.” Id, Ex. 2, pp. 2-3.
For these reasons, this court concludes that 8 CFR § 287.7 does not require LEAs to
detain suspected aliens upon receipt of a Form I-247 from ICE and that the Jail was at liberty to
refuse ICE’s request to detain Miranda-Olivares if that detention violated her constitutional
rights. Accordingly, the County cannot avail itself of the defense that its practice and custom did
not cause the allegedly unlawful detention.
Fourteenth Amendment Claim (First Claim)
As clarified at the hearing on the motions, the First Claim alleges a violation of MirandaOlivares’s substantive, not procedural, due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
“Substantive due process refers to certain actions that the government may not engage in,
no matter how many procedural safeguards it employs.” Blaylock v. Schwinden, 862 F2d 1352,
1354 (9th Cir 1988) (citation omitted). Miranda-Olivares easily satisfies the threshold burden of
showing “a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” See Brittain v. Hansen, 451
F3d 982, 991 (9th Cir 2006). Under her allegations of extended detainment after resolution of her
state charges and without a determination of probable cause to hold her under the detainer,
Miranda-Olivares held a liberty interest in being free from incarceration. See Oviatt By and
Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir 1992), citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 US
137, 144 (1979) (finding Oregon statutes created a protected liberty interest in freedom from
incarceration without speedy pretrial procedures).
However, to establish a violation of substantive due process, a plaintiff must also prove
that the challenged government action was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
14 – OPINION AND ORDER
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 395 (1926); Patel v. Penman, 103 F3d 868, 874 (9th Cir 1996)
(citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F3d
1086, 1089 (9th Cir 2007). The standard is whether the challenged conduct “shocks the
conscience,” under which “only the most egregious executive action can be said to be ‘arbitrary’
in the constitutional sense.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 US 833, 846 (1998), abrogated
on other grounds by Saucier v. Katz, 533 US 194 (2001); see also Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City
of L.A., 729 F3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir 2013) (citation omitted).
In the Ninth Circuit, government action taken as the result of “reasonable, though
possible erroneous, legal interpretation” does not rise to the level of egregious conduct. Brittain,
451 F3d at 996. “We do not require police officers to act as legal experts to avoid violating the
Constitution.” Id. Although this court concludes that the ICE detainer is not mandatory, the
County could have reasonably reached a different conclusion. As Miranda-Olivares points out,
the County apparently did not seek legal advice from counsel or guidance from ICE before
routinely detaining persons upon receiving an ICE detainer. Had it done so, however, it still may
have concluded that the ICE detainer is mandatory, as have some district courts. Even though
the County’s interpretation is wrong, it is not necessarily unreasonable. Because the County’s
compliance with a facially valid ICE detainer issued for the Miranda-Olivares does not shock the
conscience, summary judgment is granted for the County on the First Claim.
Fourth Amendment Claim (Second Claim)
Miranda-Olivares contends that the County violated her Fourth Amendment rights both
by the refusing to release her during the two weeks when she could have posted bail and by
continuing to incarcerate her for 19 hours after her release from the state charges.
15 – OPINION AND ORDER
The County argues that Miranda-Olivares’s protection under the Fourth Amendment
ended after her arraignment. According to the County, the Fourth Amendment analysis only
applies to allegations that an individual was deprived of liberty prior to the government’s
determination of legal custody. In support, it cites the statement by the Ninth Circuit in Pierce v.
Multnomah Cnty., 76 F3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir 1996), that “the Fourth Amendment sets the
applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up
until the time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody based upon probable
cause for arrest.” Pierce, 76 F3d at 1043.
The County misinterprets Miranda-Olivares’s claim. The seizures that allegedly violated
her Fourth Amendment rights were not a continuation of her initial arrest, but new seizures
independent of the initial finding of probable cause for violating state law. By continuation of
her detention based on the ICE detainer embarked Miranda-Olivares on a subsequent and new
“prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody.” See Pierce, 76 F3d at 1042-43,
citing Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F2d 1155, 1158-60 (10th Cir 1991) (noting that “the custodial
continuum run[s] through initial arrest or seizure, post-arrest but pre-charge or pre-hearing
custody, pretrial detention, and post-conviction incarceration”). In this context, the term “reseizure” is a misnomer. The alleged violations are more aptly titled “subsequent seizures” of a
This case is similar to Vanke v. Block, Case No. CV 98-4111 DDP (SHx), 1998 US Dist
LEXIS 23488 (CD Cal 1998), in which the Los Angeles County Jail extended a detainee’s
confinement after the court had ordered his release. The court divided the reasons for extended
confinement into two categories of delays caused by: (1) administrative steps incident to release
(“administrative delays”); and (2) the County’s practice of “deferring the commencement of
16 – OPINION AND ORDER
those steps until the [County had] updated its database of wants and holds” (“investigative
delays”). Id at *3. The court determined that the detention due to investigative delays
constituted a seizure and was governed by the Fourth Amendment. Id at **32-33. It explained
that these investigative delays:
restrict the liberty of individuals after a court has either ordered their
release or concluded that the lawful authority to hold them on the case
before the court no longer exists. After receiving such an order, the
[county] may no longer treat the individual as a pretrial detainee, but as a
former detainee, over whom the [county’s] authority extends no further
than necessary to execute the court’s order directing release. The force of
a court order negating the lawful authority to hold an individual requires
that any continued detention beyond the period necessary to execute the
order be analyzed as a new arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
Id at **50-51.
Likewise here, the judge ordered the pre-trial release of Miranda-Olivares at the
arraignment upon posting of bail. It is undisputed that she could and would have posted bail but
for the County’s custom and practice of continued detention upon receipt of the ICE detainer.
Both at the arraignment (had bail been posted) and upon resolution of her state charges, the
County no longer had probable cause to justify her detention. As in Vanke, the continued
detention exceeded the scope of the Jail’s lawful authority over the released detainee, constituted
a new arrest, and must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.
Even Pierce, on which the County relies, recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s
protection is triggered by a subsequent seizure by characterizing it as a new “initial” seizure
within the traditional bounds of Fourth Amendment protections. Pierce, 76 F3d at 1043. The
Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s directed verdict for the defendant based on the fact that
the jail had seized her during the process of her release. “[A] reasonable jury could find that
although Pierce was still physically inside the detention center, she had been ‘released’ because
17 – OPINION AND ORDER
[the jail] had indicated that Pierce was free to go and by implication that the officer lacked any
further authority to detain her.” Id.
The County also argues that the Jail never effectively “released” Miranda-Olivares
because a seizure can only occur after a person is physically released from custody and taken
back into custody. In support, it cites Green v. Baca, 306 F Supp2d 903, 909 n35 (CD Cal
2004), which rejected the theory of a “constructive re-seizure” when the plaintiff’s release was
delayed due to the county not receiving the release order. This argument again reflects the
County’s misreading of Miranda-Olivares’s claim as based on a theory of prolonged detention
based on the initial seizure instead of detention based on a new seizure. Green falls into the
group of cases described in Vanke as “administrative delays” because the plaintiff alleged a
violation based on his “overdetention” or “excessive custody” springing from an existing
probable cause determination. Unlike the County’s reliance on the issuance of the ICE detainer,
there were no new grounds for arrest in Green. See id (the jail held Green under California Penal
Code § 3056: “Prisoners on parole shall remain under the legal custody of the department and
shall be subject at any time to be taken back within the inclosure [sic] of the prison.”).
Moreover, had Miranda-Olivares posted bail and attempted to walk out of the Jail, it is
undisputed that the County would have followed its custom and practice of complying with the
ICE detainer and taken her back into custody. To adopt the County’s position is to elevate form
Thus, the Fourth Amendment applies to County’s detention of Miranda-Olivares after she
was entitled to pre-trial release on bail and again after she was entitled to release after resolution
of her state charges. In order for the County to hold a person beyond the period necessary to
execute an order of legal authority to continue detention, it must meet the clearly defined
18 – OPINION AND ORDER
reasonable seizure standards of the Fourth Amendment. See Vanke, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 23488,
at *51. The Fourth Amendment requires that seizures be objectively reasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 US 386, 397 (1989) (citation omitted).
Prolonged detention after a seizure, such as full custodial confinement without a warrant, must
be based on probable cause. United States v. Ayarza, 874 F2d 647, 650 (9th Cir 1989), citing
Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491, 503 (1983). Absent probable cause, that detention was unlawful.
Miranda-Olivares was not charged with a federal crime and was not subject to a warrant
for arrest or order of removal or deportation by ICE. The County admits that Miranda-Olivares
was held past the time she could have posted bail and after her state charges were resolved based
exclusively on the ICE detainer. But the ICE detainer alone did not demonstrate probable cause
to hold Miranda-Olivares. It stated only that an investigation “has been initiated” to determine
whether she was subject to removal from the United States. See Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2509
(“Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional
concerns.”). The ICE detainer’s stated purpose of requesting the Jail to hold Miranda-Olivares
custody was “to provide adequate time for [ICE] to assume custody” of her. Therefore, it was
not reasonable for the Jail to believe it had probable cause to detain Miranda-Olivares based on
the box checked on the ICE detainer.
There is no genuine dispute of material fact that the County maintains a custom or
practice in violation of the Fourth Amendment to detain individuals over whom the County no
longer has legal authority based only on an ICE detainer which provides no probable cause for
detention. That custom and practice violated Miranda-Olivares’s Fourth Amendment rights by
detaining her without probable cause both after she was eligible for pre-trial release upon posting
19 – OPINION AND ORDER
bail and after her release from state charges. Thus, Miranda-Olivares is granted summary
judgment as to liability on the Second Claim.
False Imprisonment Claim (Third Claim)
The County seeks summary judgment against the Third Claim for false imprisonment.
Under Oregon law, a claim of false imprisonment requires proof of four elements: (1) the
defendant confined the plaintiff; (2) the defendant intended the act that caused the confinement;
(3) the plaintiff was aware of the confinement; and (4) the confinement was unlawful. Ross v.
City of Eugene, 151 Or App 656, 663, 950 P2d 372, 375 (1997). The County does not dispute
that Miranda-Olivares satisfied the first three elements, but contends that she cannot prevail
because her confinement was lawful under 8 CFR § 287.7.
It is the defendant’s burden to prove that the plaintiff’s imprisonment was lawful. Id;
Carr v. City of Hillsboro, 497 F Supp2d 1197, 1211 (D Or 2007). As explained above, the
County cannot meet that burden because its detention of Miranda-Olivares was not authorized by
the Fourth Amendment. However, the Oregon Tort Claims Act provides immunity for public
bodies and their officers from state law claims:
arising out of an act done or omitted under the apparent authority of law,
resolution, rule or regulation that is unconstitutional, invalid or
inapplicable except to the extent that they would have been liable had the
law, resolution, rule or regulation been constitutional, valid, and
applicable, unless such act was done or omitted in bad faith or malice.
Here the County was acting pursuant to an ICE detainer and federal regulation under an
erroneous belief that they provided the apparent authority to detain Miranda-Olivares. There is
no contention or evidence that the County was acting in bad faith or with malice. See Elvrum v.
Fish Comm’n, 14 Or App 1, 6, 510 P2d 593, 596 (1973) (finding that the Oregon Fish
Commission was immune from suit when taking action after seeking a legal opinion).
20 – OPINION AND ORDER
Addressing this same issue, the Multnomah County Circuit Court recently dismissed a
false imprisonment claim based on defendant’s compliance with an ICE detainer issued pursuant
to 8 CFR § 287.7. Cruz v. Multnomah Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, Multnomah County Circuit Court
Case. No. 1209-11181 (Aug. 1, 2013) (Ciecko Decl., Ex. A). After discussing the validity of the
regulation, the court ultimately concluded that it did not need to construe the regulation because
the defendant was immune from suit pursuant to ORS 30.265(6)(f). “Regardless of how a court
might construe the regulation, it is clear that when defendants held plaintiff in custody after his
arraignment, they did so under the authority of what appeared to be a mandatory directive from
federal authorities.” Id at *8. For the same reason, the County is entitled to summary judgment
on the Third Claim.
For the reasons set forth above, the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket
#17) is granted as to the First and Third Claims and denied as to the Second Claim, and MirandaOlivares’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (docket #23) is granted as to liability on the
Second Claim and denied as to the First Claim. As a result, the only issue remaining for trial is
the amount of damages Miranda-Olivares is entitled to receive for the County’s violation of her
Fourth Amendment rights.
DATED April 11, 2014.
s/ Janice M. Stewart
Janice M. Stewart
United States Magistrate Judge
21 – OPINION AND ORDER
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