Fredrickson et al v. Starbucks Corporation
Filing
51
OPINION AND ORDER. With these additional comments, I agree with Judge Hubel's Findings and Recommendation, including his disposition of defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, I ADOPT Judge Hubel's Findings and Recommendation 46 . Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand Case to State Court 27 is DENIED. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 18 is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed on 10/29/2013 by Judge Malcolm F. Marsh. (pvh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
HANNAH FREDRICKSON, ASHLEY
KRENING, and MAURIALEE BRACKE,
3:13-cv-00029-HU
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
STARBUCKS CORPORATION, a
Washington corporation,
Defendant.
JON M. EGAN
240 Sixth Street
Lake Oswego, Oregon 97034-2931
Attorney for Plaintiffs
CAROL J. BERNICK
DEREK D. GREEN
CHRISTOPHER F. MCCRACKEN
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
1300 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 2400
Portland, Oregon 97201-5630
DANIEL L. NASH
PATRICIA A. MILLETT
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
Ill
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
GREGORY W. KNOPP
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP
2029 Century Park East, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, California 90067
Attorneys for Defendant
MARSH, Judge
Magistrate Judge Hubel filed his Findings and Recommendation
on August 28,
U.S.C.
The matter is now before me pursuant to 28
2013.
636(b) (1) (B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (b).
§
a
When
party
objects
to
the
of
portion
any
Magistrate's
Findings and Recommendation, the district court must make a de novo
See 28
determination of that portion of the fvlagistrate' s report.
U.S.C.
636(b)(1)(B);
§
Commodore
v.
Corp.
Douglas
fvlcDonnell
Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
455 U.S.
denied,
930,
932
920
(9th Cir.
(1982); accord Dawson v. Marshall,
561 F.3d
Reyna-Tapia,
328 F.3d
2009); United States v.
1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane).
Plaintiffs have filed timely objections.
given the file of this case a de novo review.
write
additionally,
however,
to
address
Therefore,
I have
I find no error.
some
of
I
plaintiff's
. objections.
BACKGROUND
A brief summary of the factual and procedural background is
necessary.
Plaintiffs,
former employees of defendant Starbucks
Corporation, filed a Class Action Complaint in the Circuit Court
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
for the State of Oregon in Multnomah County on December 10, 2012,
primarily alleging that Starbucks violated various state wage and
hour statutes by improperly withholding state and federal taxes
from tips Starbucks imputed to its employees.
( #l)
Notice of Removal
Plaintiffs allege that, pursuant to company policy,
exh. 1.
Starbucks employees distribute tips left in coffee shop tip jars
Id.
among themselves based on hours worked.
Rather
instructing
than
its
employees
to
exh.
report
1 at '!['![ 5-28.
tips
the
the
employees received, plaintiff alleged that Starbucks "imputed" or
"estimated" that each of its coffee shop employees received $0.50
of tips per hour worked, and improperly withheld state and federal
taxes based on that assumption.
Id.
Based on the above, plaintiffs pled five claims for relief on
the basis that Starbucks failed to pay the applicable minimum wage,
overtime wages, wages upon termination, and agreed wages, as well
as made wrongful deductions from plaintiffs' and the class members'
Id. exh. 1 at '!['![ 40-54.
paychecks.
combination
of
attorney's fees,
54.
Finally,
requested
violated
direct
statutory
damages,
and interest.·
Each of the claims seek some
Id. exh. 1 at'!['![ 42,
the
declaration
that
by
defendant's
actions,
class
and
45,
48,
51,
plaintiffs additionally
in its Prayer for Relief,
a
damages,
penalty
an
members'
rights
injunction
were
enjoining
Starbucks from withholding state or federal taxes based on tips in
any employees' future paychecks.
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
Id. exh. 1 at 29.
On January 8,
jurisdiction
question
federal
asserting
court,
2013, defendant removed the action to federal
diversity
and
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).
On
Id.
February 7, 2013, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim
plaintiffs filed a
2013,
On March 4,
(#18).
After briefing and
(#27).
Motion to Remand Case to State Court
oral argument, Judge Hubel recommended that plaintiff's Motion to
Remand be denied and defendant's Motion to Dismiss be granted.
DISCUSSION
Judge Hubel found that· jurisdiction was proper in this court
complaint
plaintiff's
because
ultimately
See 28 U.S.C.
federal question.
raised
1340.
1331,
§§
substantial
a
I
agree.
I
appreciate, however, the substantial and difficult questions raised
by
concerning
parties
the
federal
jurisdiction,
question
and
accordingly address diversity jurisdiction under CAFA, 28 U.S.C.
§
1332(d), and the applicability of the Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28
u.s.c.
I.
§
1341.
Class Action Fairness Act Diversity Jurisdiction
CAFA provides federal courts original jurisdiction over class
.action lawsuits in which the class contains more than 100 members,
any class member
defendant,
$5,000,000.
Fire
Ins.
and
is
the
28 U.S.C.
Co.
v.
a
citizen of
aggregated
§
state
amount
in
different
controversy
from
any
exceeds
1332(d) (2) (A), (d) (5) (B), (d) (6); Standard
Knowles,
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
a
u.s.
133
s.ct.
1345,
1348
(2013).
For purposes of defining the class at this stage of the
litigation , "'class members'
who
within
fall
the
Knowles,
class.'"
1332 (d) (1) (D))
include 'persons
definition
133
S.Ct.
at
proposed or
the
of
(named or unnamed)
(quoting
1348
28
certified
U.S.C.
§
(emphasis in original) .
The only element of CAFA jurisdicti on disputed by the parties
is the amount in controvers y requireme nt.
removal
of
a
putative
class
must
action
"A defendant seeking
demonstra te,
by
a
preponder ance of evidence, that the aggregate amount in controver sy
Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility
exceeds the jurisdicti onal minimum."
Services, LLC, 728 F. 3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2013).
"[T]he amount-
in-controv ersy inquiry in the removal context is not confined to
the face of the complaint ."
Valdez v. Allstate Insurance Company,
372 F. 3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004).
In addition to the complaint ,
the court considers "facts presented in the removal petition as
well as any 'summary- judgment-t ype evidence relevant to the amount
in controver sy at the time of removal.'"
Progressiv e Specialty Ins.
Co.,
319
Id.
(quoting Matheson v.
F.3d 1089,
1090
(9th Cir.
2003)).
In its Notice of Removal, defendant alleged that plaintiff 's
Complaint ,
while asserting in its title that damages were "not
believed to exceed $5, 000, 000," in fact stated claims that amounted
to substanti ally more than $5,000,00 0.
26, exh. 1 at 2.
Notice of Removal
at~~
16-
Defendant attached a declaratio n from Adrienne
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
the division
"partner resources vice president for
a
Gemperle,
encompass ing
Oregon,"
that
attesting
time
relevant
the
during
period,- Starbucks employed 6, 028 individua ls as baristas and shift
during
the
Gemperle
Adrienne
time
relevant
(#3)
terminated
(Gemperle
Declaratio n
period.
Dec.)
employmen t
whose
individua ls
3, 335
including
superviso rs,
'll'll
at
1,
of
Ms.
13-14.
Gemperle additiona lly averred that the average wages of the 3,335
terminated employees at the time of separation was $9.77 per hour.
Id. at 'll 6.
After plaintiffs noted that Ms. Gemperle' s declaratio n did not
specify how many employees received the "imputed tips" and found
some modest discrepan cies between data summarized in Ms. Gemperle' s
declaratio n
preli tigation
and
defendant
discovery ,
declaratio n from Ms. Gemperle.
(#40)
(Gemperle Supp. Dec.).
Gemperle
explained
the
provided
defendant
data
plaintiff
to
submitted
a
in
supplemen tal
Declaratio n of Adrienne Gemperle
In her supplemen tal declaratio n, Ms.
discrepan cies
and
specified
that
5, 921
coffee shop employees received imputed tips during the relevant
time, of which 3,258 separated from Starbucks in the relevant time
period.
Id.
Starbucks argues that the size of the class and the relief
requested on each claim, including statutory penalties , establishe s
that it is more likely than not that the amount in controvers y
exceeds
$5,000,000 .
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs
respond
that
Ms.
Gemperle' s
declarations are inadmissible hearsay and otherwise unreliable, and
that
Starbucks
demonstrate
has
that
accordingly
the
failed
in
amount
to
carry
its
burden
exceeds
controversy
to
the
jurisdictional minimum.
I find that the contents of Ms. Gemperle' s declarations. are
admissible at this point of the proceedings.
A record of regularly
conducted activity is excepted from the hearsay rule if: 1)
record was made at or near the
time
by -
or
from
"the
information
transmitted by- someone with knowledge;" 2) the record was kept in
the course of a
regularly conducted activity of a business;
3)
making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 4) the
above conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or
another
qualified
witness;
and
"neither
5)
the
source
of
information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate
a lack of trustworthiness."
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
Ms. Gemperle stated that "Starbucks maintains the electronic
human resources and payroll databases" from which she obtained her
information "[i)n the regular course of business," that she is
familiar with these databases, and "regularly rel[ies] on the data
they maintain
Gemper le Dec.
in
'l[
connection
Gemper le Supp.
11;
Gemperle stated that
employment
records
Gemperle Dec.
'l[
with
she has
maintained
[her)
Dec.
"personal
'l[
'l[
2.
responsibilities."
In addition,
knowledge of
regarding
1; Gemperle Supp. Dec.
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
job
1.
Starbucks
Ms.
the
employees."
While I
have
been
acknowledge that Ms.
tailored
to
more
Gemperle' s declarations could
clearly
present
the
foundational
elements of Rule 803(6) on their face, a commonsense reading of the
declarations makes clear that the data relied upon by Ms. Gemperle
would be admissible.
(9th Cir. 2003)
See Fraser v. Goodale,
342 F.3d 1032, 1036
("At the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on
the admissibility of the evidence's form.
admissibility of its contents.
0
We instead focus on the
The human resources and payroll
).
databases cited by Ms. Gemperle are textbook examples of records of
regularly conducted activity within the hearsay exception of Rule
803(6).
I
reject
declarations
plaintiffs'
are ·unreliable;
argument
the
that
Ms.
Gemperle's
apparent discrepancies
in the
first declaration were adequately e~plained in the supplemental
declaration in such a way as to not undermine the trustworthiness
of the data relied upon by Ms. Gemperle.
Moreover, as discussed in
greater detail below, minor variations in the data would not affect
the outcome of the amount in controversy analysis.
Considering
JVls.
Gemperle's
declarations,
then,
I
find
Starbucks has established by a preponderance of the evidence that
the amount in controversy in this matter exceeds $5,000,000.
statutory
penalties
sought
are
particularly
The
significant.
Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief, which seeks unpaid wages upon
termination,
alleges that "Plaintiffs and the Class members are
entitled to collect all wages remaining due
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
.
. together with
attorney
fees
and
costs,
as
well
as
pre-
and
post-judgment
interest, and the 30 days of statutory penalty wages provided by
ORS 652.150 and ORS 652.200.u
Notice of Removal exh. 1 at 27-28.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 652.150 provides that the penalty wages for such
a violation are payment of the aggrieved employee's wages at the
.final rate of pay for eight hours per day,
up to an additional
thirty days or until the terminal wages are paid.
Based on the data provided in Ms. Gemperle's declarations, the
potential penalty wages on Claim Three alone are approximately
$7,639,358.40. 1
Although
the
court
does
not
currently
have
sufficient data to make an approximate calculation of plaintiff's
other claims for relief,
it appears all except Claim Five would
also carry significant potential penalty wages.
alleged entitlement to direct damages,
fees on each claim.
JVls.
interest,
Plaintiffs also
and attorney's
Thus, considering the information provided by
Gemperle and the remedies pled in the complaint,
1
I
have no
($9.77 x 8 x 30 x 3,258).
Ms. Gemperle stated that the
average final rate of pay for the separated employees was
approximately $9.77 per hour.
Gemperle Dec. at~ 14. The final
subset of class member employees used in this calculation was
slightly different from that for which Ms. Gemperle provided the
$9.77 value on account of the reasons provided in her
supplemental declaration.
See Gemperle Supp. Dec. at ~~ 10, 11.
For this reason, and because the terminal wage used represents an
approximation to two decimal points of the mean wage at
separation of the terminated employees, there may be some
marginal variation in the product.
I note, however, that even if
I assume that each relevant employee was terminated at the lowest
minimum wage applicable during the relevant period, the product
would still be $6,568,128 ($8.40 x 8 x 30 x 3,258).
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
trouble
concluding
that
defendant
has
carried
its
burden
of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy
is
greater
than
$5,000,000.
Subject
matter
jurisdiction is appropriate under CAFA.
II.
Tax Injunction Act
Plainti.ffs argue that, regardless of jurisdiction under CAFA
or the federal question jurisdiction statutes,
this court of subject matter jurisdiction.
the TIA deprives
The TIA mandates that
district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the
~[t]he
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such
State.n
~two
28 U.S.C.
§
1341.
In enacting the TIA, Congress expressed
closely related, state-revenue-protective objectives:
(1) to
eliminate disparities between taxpayers who could seek injunctive
relief in federal court .
and taxpayers with recourse only to
state courts, which generally required taxpayers to pay first and
litigate
later;
and
( 2)
to stop taxpayers,
with
the aid of a
federal injunction, from withholding large sums, thereby disrupting
state
government
(2004)
Tax
finances.
Thus, the
Injunction
n
~dispositive
Act's
Hibbs
v.
Winn,
542
U.S.
88,
104
question in determining whether the
jurisdictional
bar
applies
is
whether
plaintiff's action, if successful, would reduce the flow of state
tax revenue.n
Qwest Corp, v. City of Surprise, 434 F. 3d 1176, 1184
(9th Cir. 2006).
10 - OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs' suit, if successful, would not reduce the flow of
state tax revenue, and falls outside both the pain meaning and the
purpose of the TIA.
Plaintiffs' suit does not assert that their
tip income is not subject to taxation, that the state and federal
taxes at issue are invalid, or that the taxes do not apply to them.
Nor
does
plaintiffs'
suit
claim
that
Starbucks
was
legally
prohibited in general from withholding the appropriate taxes from
their tip income and forwarding it to the relevant government. 2
Rather, plaintiff's suit claims that Starbucks improperly withheld
the taxes based on its policy of "imputing" or "estimating" tips,
and seeks to recover the taxes withheld pursuant to that policy
along with statutory penalties,
interest,
and attorney's fees.
3
While this is a tax refund suit insofar as plaintiffs are seeking
2
Plaintiffs concede, for example, that Starbucks could have
withheld taxes on its employees' tips by requiring the employees
to report their tip earnings and withholding taxes based thereon.
3
Plaintiffs argue that their complaint does not seek the
refund of any withheld taxes.
To the extent this argument
affects the analysis at all, it does not withstand even a cursory
review of the complaint.
After incorporating by reference all
previous paragraphs, each of the five claims for relief pleads
that plaintiffs are entitled to direct damages.
Of the 39
paragraphs that precede plaintiffs' claims for relief, all but 10
are directly related to the policy of imputing tips and the
withholding of taxes thereby, with the majority of the remaining
paragraphs constituting class and jurisdictional allegations.
The direct damages plaintiff seeks, then, necessarily include the
wages plaintiffs' argue they were entitled to, but deprived of as
a result of the withholdings based on the imputed tips.
Postremoval disclaimers of pled remedies are irrelevant in
consideration of a motion to remand.
Sparta Surgical Corp. v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir.
1998).
11 - OPINION AND ORDER
to recover from Starbucks sums paid as taxes,
state tax revenue in any way,
income
is
taxable
in
some
inapplicable to this case,
it does not affect
as plaintiffs admit that the tip
manner.
Therefore,
the
TIA
is
and does not deprive this court of
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
With these additional comments,
Findings
and
Recommendation,
defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
I agree with Judge Hubel' s
including
his
disposition
of
Accordingly, I ADOPT Judge Hubel's
Findings and Recommendation (#46).
Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand
Case to State Court (#27) is DENIED.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim (#18) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ~ day of October, 2013.
Malcolm F. !Vlarsh
United States District Judge
12 - OPINION AND ORDER
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