Johnson v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 18

Opinion and Order: The ALJ's finding that plaintiff was not disabled under the Act is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed. Signed on 5/8/14 by Chief Judge Ann L. Aiken. (ljb)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
DOROTHEA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
Merrill Schneider
Schneider Kerr Law Offices
P.O. Box 14490
Portland, OR 97293
Attorney for plaintiff
S. Amanda Marshall
United States Attorney
Ronald K. Silver
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Ave., Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204
Nicole Jabaily
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
701 Fifth Ave., Suite 2900 M/S 221A
Seattle, WA 98104-7075
Attorneys for defendant
1 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case No. 3:13-cv-00731-AA
OPINION AND ORDER

AIKEN, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff brings

this

action seeking

judicial review of a

final decision of the Commissioner denying her applications for
supplemental security income benefits (SSI) under Title XVI of the
Social Security Act (the Act). This court has jurisdiction under 42
U.S.C.

§§

405 (g)

and 1383 (c) (3).

The Commissioner's decision is

affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On January 6, 2010, plaintiff filed an application for SSI; it
was denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr.

110-13, 118-19,

165-68. On July 7, 2011, plaintiff and a vocational expert appeared
and testified before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Tr. 41-77.
On August 26, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding plaintiff not
disabled within the meaning of the Act.
2013,

the

Appeals

Council

denied

Tr.

review,

18-40. On March 14,
rendering

the

ALJ' s

decision as the final agency decision. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff now seeks
judicial review.
Plaintiff was twenty-eight years old at the time of the ALJ's
decision, with a high school education, some college course work,
and

no

past

relevant

work.

Tr.

2 6,

32,

4 8.

Plaintiff

alleges

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disability since January 2005 due to various physical and mental
limitations. Tr. 26, 317.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is

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2 - OPINION AND ORDER

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supported by substantial evidence in the record and the correct
application of the law. Valentine v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin,
F.2d 685, 690

574

(9th Cir. 2009). "'Substantial evidence' means more

than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support

a

conclusion."

Desrosiers

v.

Sec' y

Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)

of

Health

&

Human

(internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). In determining whether substantial evidence

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supports the decision, the court must weigh "both the evidence that

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supports

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and

detracts

from

the

[Commissioner] 's

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772

conclusions."

(9th Cir. 1986). Where the

evidence "is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,"
the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld.

Burch v.

Barnhart,

400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
The

ALJ

evaluated

plaintiff's

allegation

of

disability

pursuant to the relevant sequential process. See Bowen v. Yuckert,
482. U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R.
found

that

activity"
C.F.R.
At

§

plaintiff
during the

had

not

period of

§

416.920. At step one, the ALJ

engaged

ln

"substantial

alleged disability.

Tr.

gainful
23;

20

416.920(b).
step

determinable

two,

the

ALJ

impairments

found
of

that

morbid

plaintiff

had medically

obesity,

sleep

depression, and anxiety. Tr. 23; 20 C.F.R.

§

apnea,

416.920(c). However,

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3 - OPINION AND ORDER

at step three, the ALJ found that these impairments did not meet or
equal

"one

of

[Commissioner]

a

number

of

impairments

that

the

acknowledges are so severe as to preclude gainful

activity." Tr. 23; 20 C.F.R.
At

listed

step

four,

the

§

416.920(d).

ALJ

determined

plaintiff's

residual

functional capacity (RFC) and found that plaintiff retained the RFC
to perform light work with some exertional restrictions. Tr. 25.
The ALJ also found that plaintiff could remember, understand, and
carry out simple and detailed instructions or tasks,

have brief

contact with the public, interact appropriately with coworkers, and
respond

appropriately

to

supervision.

Tr.

25;

20

C.F.R.

§

416.920(e). Based on plaintiff's limited work history, the ALJ did
not consider plaintiff's ability to perform past relevant work. Tr.
32; 20 C.F.R.

§

416.920(f).

At step five,

the ALJ found that plaintiff was capable of

performing light and unskilled work as a garment sorter and retail
marker. Tr. 32-33; 20 C.F.R.

§

416.920(g). Therefore, the ALJ found

plaintiff not disabled under the meaning of the Act. Tr. 33.
DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff argues that in determining plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ
failed

to

include the mental

steps

tasks

set

forth

by

limitation of "simple one-to-two"
two

non-examining

state

agency

psychologists. Plaintiff emphasizes that the ALJ failed to do so,
despite

placing

"great

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

weight"

on

the

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opinions

of

the

agency

psychologists and stating that their opinions were accepted. Tr.
29. Plaintiff maintains that this failure is not harmless because
the limitations found by the agency psychologists,

if accepted,

render her unable to perform the jobs identified by the ALJ.
The state agency psychologists opined that plaintiff could
perform "simple

one-to-two

step"

tasks

and was

limited in her

ability to do "more detailed" work. Tr. 29, 455, 693. Specifically,
Frank Lahman,
carry

out

Ph. D.,

simple

shows/suggests

opined that plaintiff could "remember and

one

that

to

the

two

step

commands.

[claimant]

has

a

However,

more

evidence

difficult

time

carrying out more detailed commands. Therefore, the [claimant] is
limited to simple one to two step commands in the workplace." Tr.
455. Paul Rethinger, Ph.D. also opined that plaintiff was capable
of understanding,

remembering,

and carrying out one-to-two step

tasks, but that she was "incapable of understanding, remembering,
and carrying out more detailed tasks." Tr. 693. Relying in part on
these

opinions,

understand,

the

ALJ

found

that

plaintiff

could

and carry out simple and detailed,

"remember,

but not complex,

instructions or tasks typical of occupations with an SVP of one or
two." Tr. 25. In find that the ALJ's interpretation of the medical
record is reasonable and supported by the record.
Although the ALJ accepted the opinions of the state agency
psychologists,

she

also

referenced

evidence

supportive of her RFC determination. Tr. 24,

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

in

31-32.

the

record

For example,

during a psychological assessment,

plaintiff was able to perform

mental math "very well,u was not distractible, and exhibited "goodu
task persistence. Tr. 24, 438. An examining psychologist also noted
that plaintiff could do "simple and repetitive work type tasksu and
was "likely capable of performing more difficult and complex tasks
as well although her anxiety and mood issues might interfere with
her ability to do that on a full-time basis.u Tr. 31, 676. Further,
the ALJ noted plaintiff's aunt
problem

following

attention.u

Tr.

spoken

24,

or

32,

reported that plaintiff "has no

written

192,

287.

instructionsu

In

"paying

plaintiff

2010,

or

herself

reported that she was not limited in her ability to follow written
or spoken instructions. Tr. 303.
Given this evidence of record, the ALJ's interpretation of the
medical
simple

opinions
and

and her

detailed

finding

tasks

are

that

plaintiff can carry out

reasonable.

Stubbs-Danielson

Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008)

v.

(finding the ALJ's

assessment of "simple, routine, repetitive sedentary worku to be a
sufficient translation of the medical evidence); Molina v. Astrue,
674 F.3d 1104,

1111

(9th Cir.

susceptible

more

than

to

uphold the ALJ' s
reasonably

one

findings

drawn

from

2012)

("Even when the evidence is

rational

if they are

the

record.u).

interpretation,
supported by
Thus,

the

we

must

inferences
ALJ's

RFC

determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record
and must be upheld.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER

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Consequently, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding
that plaintiff could perform simple, unskilled jobs such as garment
sorter and retail marker. See DOT 222.687-014, 209.587-034.
CONCLUSION
The ALJ's finding that plaintiff was not disabled under the
Act

is

supported

by

substantial

evidence

in

the

record.

Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

~ay

of May, 2014.

Ann Aiken
United States District Judge

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7 - OPINION AND ORDER