Patterson v. Yamhill County et al
Filing
39
Opinion and Order: The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion 29 to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Signed on 09/29/2015 by Judge Anna J. Brown. See attached 13 page Opinion and Order for full text. (bb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
SARAH JEAN PATTERSON,
Plaintiff,
3:14-cv-00501-BR
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
YAMHILL COUNTY, JAMES VANARSDEL,
and JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
LEONARD RANDOLPH BERMAN
4711 S.W. Huber Street, Suite E-3
Portland, OR 97219
(503) 516-3715
Attorney for Plaintiff
ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM
Attorney General
SETH T. KARPINSKI
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Oregon Department of Justice
1162 Court Street, N.E.
Salem, OR 97310
(503) 947-4700
Attorneys for Defendant James VanArsdel
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
BROWN, Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant James
VanArsdel’s Motion (#29) to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint.1
On July 2, 2015, the Court heard oral argument on Defendant’s
Motion and provided the parties with an opportunity to file
supplemental briefing.
After the parties submitted their
supplemental memoranda, the Court took this matter under
advisement on July 27, 2015.
For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
Motion and DISMISSES this matter with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
I.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff Sarah Jean Patterson brings this action against
Defendant James VanArsdel in his personal capacity as a Yamhill
County Circuit Court Release Assistance Officer pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges Defendant violated Plaintiff’s right to
be free from wrongful arrest and incarceration as guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when
Defendant presented an arrest warrant to the Honorable Carroll J.
Tichenor of the Yamhill County Circuit Court notwithstanding the
1
On June 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Voluntary Dismissal
(#10) of all claims against Defendant Yamhill County, and
Plaintiff dropped Defendant John Doe in her Second Amended
Complaint (#28) filed March 16, 2015.
2 - OPINION AND ORDER
fact that another judge, the Honorable Ronald W. Stone, had
earlier denied Defendant’s motion to revoke Plaintiff’s pretrial
release.
On July 28, 2014, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint (#9) on the grounds that Defendant was entitled
to absolute quasi-judicial and prosecutorial immunity or, in the
alternative, that Plaintiff failed to state a claim.
At oral
argument on October 8, 2014, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion
on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim.
The
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s (First) Amended Complaint without
prejudice and with leave to amend after limited discovery
concerning how, when, and with what mental state Defendant
presented the arrest warrant to Judge Tichenor.
On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended
Complaint.
On April 2, 2015, Defendant filed this Motion to
Dismiss.
II.
Factual Background
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (#28) and are accepted as true at this stage of
the proceedings:
On January 30, 2012, Plaintiff was arrested on charges of
theft and possession of a controlled substance.
Plaintiff
entered into a pretrial-release agreement that required her to
comply with all laws while on pretrial release.
3 - OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant was employed as the Yamhill County Circuit Court
Release Assistance Officer.
As part of his duties, Defendant was
responsible for the preparation and presentation to the court of
motions to revoke pretrial release for criminal defendants who
violated the terms of their releases.
In the event that the
court granted a motion for revocation of pretrial release,
Defendant would obtain from the court a warrant for the
violator’s arrest.
Defendant’s standard practice for filing a
motion for a warrant was to either place the motion, affidavit,
and unsigned warrant in the appropriate judge’s courthouse
mailbox; to deliver the motion, affidavit, and unsigned warrant
personally to the appropriate judge’s chambers; or, on occasion,
to present the motion in open court.
On March 17, 2012, while Plaintiff remained on pretrial
release in connection with her January 30, 2012, arrest, she was
arrested on domestic-violence charges and posted bail.
Plaintiff
was arraigned on the domestic-violence charge on March 20, 2012.
At Plaintiff’s arraignment Defendant presented to Judge Stone
(the criminal-calendar duty judge that day) a motion for
revocation of Plaintiff’s pretrial release for violation of the
pretrial-release agreement based on the January 30, 2012, theft
and controlled-substance charges.
Judge Stone denied the motion to revoke Plaintiff’s pretrial
release.
Plaintiff alleges Defendant was visibly upset after
4 - OPINION AND ORDER
Judge Stone denied the motion.
“On or about March 20, 2012,” Defendant presented to Judge
Tichenor a warrant to arrest Plaintiff.
Defendant presented the
arrest warrant to Judge Tichenor without an attached motion,
affidavit, or order.
Plaintiff, however, does not allege any
facts that describe how Defendant presented the warrant to Judge
Tichenor, whether Defendant intentionally or accidentally
presented the motion to Judge Tichenor, or when Defendant
presented the arrest warrant to Judge Tichenor relative to the
hearing before Judge Stone.
Plaintiff, however, alleges
Defendant’s wife worked as a judicial assistant to Judge Tichenor
at that time, and Defendant maintained a friendship with Judge
Tichenor.
In any event, Judge Tichenor signed the warrant.
On March 30, 2012, McMinnville police arrested and
incarcerated Plaintiff pursuant to the warrant signed by Judge
Tichenor.
Plaintiff was released on April 1, 2012, after
Defendant confirmed the warrant was defective and that Plaintiff
should not have been arrested.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint on the ground that Defendant is entitled to absolute
immunity for his actions in connection with obtaining the warrant
to arrest Plaintiff.
5 - OPINION AND ORDER
In the alternative, Defendant moves to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the ground that
Plaintiff’s factual allegations fail to state a judicialdeception claim under § 1983.
I.
Absolute Immunity
The Supreme Court has consistently accorded absolute
immunity “to judges and prosecutors functioning in their official
capacity” to ensure that judicial officers are “free to act upon
[their] own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences.”
Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916,
922 (9th Cir. 2004)(“Recognizing these considerations, courts
have extended the protections of absolute immunity to qualifying
state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
Absolute
immunity may also be extended to state officials who are not
traditionally regarded as judges or prosecutors if the functions
they perform are similar to those performed by judges or
prosecutors.
Olsen, 363 F.3d at 923.
See also Mishler v. Clift,
191 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1999).
Under certain circumstances, absolute immunity is also
extended to agency representatives performing functions
analogous to those of a prosecutor or a judge. Such
immunity assures the independent functioning of
executive officials acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity, thereby ensuring that they can exercise their
adjudicative discretion without fear of intimidation or
harassment.
Olsen, 363 F.3d at 923 (citation omitted).
Ultimately
“[i]mmunity determinations . . . rest on ‘the nature of the
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed
6 - OPINION AND ORDER
it.’”
Cruz v. Kauai Cnty., 279 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.
2002)(quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997)).
See
also KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004).
Defendant contends he is entitled to absolute immunity
because he filled either a quasi-prosecutorial or a quasijudicial role when he presented the arrest warrant to Judge
Tichenor.
Relying on Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court
for District of Nevada, Defendant argues he is entitled to
absolute immunity as a court clerk who performed a quasi-judicial
task that was an “integral part of the judicial process.”
F.2d 1385, 1390 (1987).
828
Defendant also relies on Cruz to support
his alternative position that he served a traditional
prosecutorial function by submitting the arrest warrant to Judge
Tichenor and, accordingly, is entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends Defendant is not
entitled to any form of immunity because Defendant’s “alleged
conduct was done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
A.
Absolute Immunity for Quasi-Judicial Actions
As noted, absolute immunity attaches only to tasks that “are
‘functionally comparable’ to tasks performed by judges”; i.e.,
quasi-judicial actions taken in the “‘official’s adjudicatory
role.’”
Swift v. State of California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th
Cir. 2004).
See also Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390 (noting court
7 - OPINION AND ORDER
clerks have absolute immunity “when they perform tasks that are
an integral part of the judicial process.”).
In Swift the Ninth
Circuit held the parole officer who recommended the parole board
initiate parole-revocation proceedings did not qualify for
absolute immunity because it was the board rather than the parole
officer that played the “quasi-judicial role.”
Id. at 1192.
In this case even though Defendant was employed by the
court, his function was not part of the process of adjudicating
the revocation of Plaintiff’s pretrial release nor did he serve
any adjudicatory role when he submitted the arrest warrant to
Judge Tichenor.
Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes
Defendant is not entitled to absolute immunity on the basis of
performing quasi-judicial tasks.
B.
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity
Officials serving a prosecutorial function are entitled to
absolute immunity for acts the official performs while “serving
as an advocate in judicial proceedings.”
125.
See also Cruz, 279 F.3d at 1067.
Kalina, 522 U.S. at
“When a prosecutor steps
outside of the advocate's role, however, his or her conduct is
protected by immunity only to the extent that any other
individual would be protected in performing the same function.”
Cruz, 279 F.3d at 1067.
Accordingly, prosecutors are not
entitled to absolute immunity for performing investigative
functions or when personally serving the function of a witness by
8 - OPINION AND ORDER
attesting to facts.
See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 507-10.
See also
Torres v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
Ultimately “the absolute immunity that protects the prosecutor's
role as an advocate is not grounded in any special ‘esteem for
those who perform these functions, and certainly not from a
desire to shield abuses of office, but because any lesser degree
of immunity could impair the judicial process itself.’”
522 U.S. at 127.
Kalina,
See also Slater v. Clarke, 700 F.3d 1200, 1203
(9th Cir. 2012).
When considering the scope of absolute prosecutorial
immunity, the Ninth Circuit has held a prosecutor “is entitled to
absolute immunity for his decision to file” a motion to revoke
bail “because the decision to file a bail revocation motion is a
traditional prosecutorial function.”
(emphasis in original).
Cruz, 279 F.3d at 1067 n.3
The Ninth Circuit, however, found the
prosecutor in Cruz lost the protection of prosecutorial immunity
“because he stepped outside of his prosecutorial role, and into
the role of witness, when he personally attested to the truth of
facts in the affidavit.”
Id.
As noted, even though Defendant in this case was employed by
the court, he filled a prosecutorial role when he presented the
arrest warrant to Judge Tichenor.
The action by Defendant that
Plaintiff alleges violated her constitutional rights, however,
was Defendant’s presentation of the warrant to Judge Tichenor for
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff’s arrest rather than any particular testimonial
representation made by Defendant to Judge Tichenor.
Plaintiff
alleges Defendant took this action as part of his duty to seek in
appropriate circumstances the arrest of criminal defendants who
violate the terms of their pretrial release.
Accordingly, there
is not any meaningful distinction between the actions of
Defendant in this case and a prosecutor who filed a motion to
revoke bail.
See Cruz, 279 F.3d at 1067.
The fact that Judge
Stone denied Defendant’s motion to revoke Plaintiff’s pretrial
release and the fact that Defendant then improperly presented the
arrest warrant to Judge Tichenor without an attached motion and
affidavit are only pertinent to whether Defendant properly
fulfilled his prosecutorial function, but those facts do not
change the nature of the function that Defendant performed.
Ultimately “[i]mmunity determinations . . . rest on the ‘nature
of the function performed.’”
Id. at 1067.
Pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cruz, therefore,
Defendant is absolutely immune from suit for the prosecutorial
act of presenting the arrest warrant to Judge Tichenor.
1067 n.3.
Id. at
Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes
Defendant is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, and,
therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint.
Because the Court concludes Defendant is entitled to
10- OPINION AND ORDER
absolute prosecutorial immunity, the Court need not determine
whether Plaintiff’s allegations in her Second Amended Complaint
are sufficient to state a claim for judicial deception.
II.
Leave to Amend Complaint
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides a party may
amend a pleading after a responsive pleading has been filed only
by leave of court unless the opposing party consents to the
amendment.
Rule 15(a), however, also provides leave to amend
“shall be freely given when justice so requires.”
to be applied with “extreme liberality.”
This policy is
Moss v. United States
Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court has recognized several factors that a
district court should consider when determining whether justice
requires the court to grant leave to amend.
Those factors
include
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part
of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of the amendment.
Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2003)(quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
The factor that carries the greatest weight is whether the
amendment will prejudice the opposing party.
Id.
“Absent
prejudice or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman
factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of
11- OPINION AND ORDER
granting leave to amend.”
Id.
“Delay alone is insufficient to
justify denial of leave to amend; the party opposing amendment
must also show that the amendment sought is futile, in bad faith
or will cause undue prejudice to the opposing party.”
Jones v.
Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 847 n.8 (9th Cir.1997)(citing United States
v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981)).
See also Quantum
Tech. Partners II, L.P. v. Altman Browning and Co., No. 08-CV376-BR, 2009 WL 1795574, at *19 (D. Or. June 23, 2009) (same).
The party who opposes amendment bears the burden to show
prejudice.
Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (citing DCD
Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Here the Court concludes granting Plaintiff further leave to
amend her Complaint would be futile.
At the October 8, 2014,
hearing on Defendant’s Motion (#16) to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
(First) Amended Complaint, the Court permitted Plaintiff to
engage in discovery for the purpose of developing facts
sufficient to state a claim and provided Plaintiff with an
opportunity to amend her Amended Complaint.
After engaging in discovery and amending her pleadings,
however, Plaintiff’s allegations remain insufficient to establish
that Defendant is not entitled to prosecutorial immunity, and the
record does not indicate there is any possibility that Plaintiff
could discover additional facts that would remedy the
deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
12- OPINION AND ORDER
Accordingly, on this record the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion (#29)
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and DISMISSES
with prejudice Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2015.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States District Judge
13- OPINION AND ORDER
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