Murphy v. Tuality Healthcare
Filing
40
Opinion and Order - Tuality's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 19 ) is DENIED. Murphy's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 26 ) is GRANTED. Signed on 1/15/2016 by Judge Michael H. Simon. (mja)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
JAMES M. MURPHY,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:14-cv-01498-SI
OPINION AND ORDER
v.
TUALITY HEALTHCARE,
Defendant.
James M. Murphy, 5080 Riordan Hill Road, Hood River, OR 97031. Pro se.
Connie Elkins McKelvey and Katie M. Eichner, LINDSAY HART, LLP, 1300 S.W.
Fifth Avenue, Suite 3400, Portland, Oregon 97201. Of Attorneys for Defendant.
Michael H. Simon, District Judge.
Dr. James M. Murphy (“Murphy”) brings this suit against his former employer, Tuality
Healthcare (“Tuality”), under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335. Murphy asserts that Tuality violated USERRA in
three ways by: (1) failing to reemploy Murphy after he completed his military service, in
violation of 38 U.S.C. § 4313; (2) discharging Murphy without cause within 180 days of his
military service, in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 4316; and (3) discriminating against Murphy because
of his service, in violation of 38 U.S.C. § 4311. Tuality moves for summary judgment against all
PAGE 1 – OPINION AND ORDER
of Murphy’s claims, arguing that Murphy is not entitled to USERRA’s protections because
Murphy independently contracted with Tuality and was not Tuality’s employee. Murphy crossmoves for partial summary judgment to determine his status as an employee. For the reasons that
follow, Tuality’s motion is denied and Murphy’s motion is granted.
STANDARDS
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the “movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in
the non-movant’s favor. Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257
(9th Cir. 2001). Although “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling
on a motion for summary judgment,” the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
the plaintiff’s position [is] insufficient . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252,
255 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Where parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court “evaluate[s] each
motion separately, giving the non-moving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable
inferences.” A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 790-91 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665,
674 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Cross-motions for summary judgment are evaluated separately under [the]
same standard.”). In evaluating the motions, “the court must consider each party’s evidence,
PAGE 2 – OPINION AND ORDER
regardless under which motion the evidence is offered.” Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632
F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2011). “Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial,
the moving party need only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
party’s case.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). Thereafter, the
non-moving party bears the burden of designating “specific facts demonstrating the existence of
genuine issues for trial.” Id. “This burden is not a light one.” Id. The Supreme Court has directed
that in such a situation, the non-moving party must do more than raise a “metaphysical doubt” as
to the material facts at issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.
BACKGROUND
Tuality operates Tuality Community Hospital (the “Hospital”), an acute-care hospital
located in Hillsboro, Oregon. Dkt. 20-1 at 1. Murphy is an anesthesiologist and a member of the
National Guard. In May 2008, Murphy signed a Practice Development Agreement (the “PDA”)
with Tuality under which Tuality provided Murphy with financial assistance to develop an
anesthesiology practice in Hillsboro. Dkt. 20-3. In return, Murphy worked full-time, five days a
week, at the Hospital. Dkt. 20-3 at 5. Murphy was permitted to take up to 50 working days of
vacation per year. Dkt. 20-3 at 5.
In June 2008, Murphy and Tuality entered into an Anesthesia Services Agreement (the
“ASA”) regarding his work at the Hospital. Dkt. 20-2. The ASA described Murphy as an
“independent contractor” and stated that the nature of the relationship was not that of employeremployee. Dkt. 20-2 at 1-2. Murphy was responsible for paying his own taxes, billing patients
for his services, and for collecting payment from his patients, although Tuality provided Murphy
with quarterly stipends. Dkt. 20-2 at 2, 7. Tuality provided Murphy with the equipment, supplies,
and materials necessary to perform anesthesia services. Dkt. 20-2 at 7. Murphy worked
PAGE 3 – OPINION AND ORDER
according to the schedule set by Tuality’s Medical Director, Dr. Hildebrant (“Hildebrant”).
Dkt. 20-2 at 5.
Either party could terminate the relationship under the ASA upon 90-days’ notice.
Dkt. 20-2 at 8. The ASA prohibited Murphy from providing anesthesia services at any other
hospital or facility in Washington County, Oregon, unless Tuality and Murphy entered into a
written agreement providing otherwise. Dkt. 20-2 at 2. During the period of time that Murphy
worked full-time for Tuality, he also worked for Providence Hood River Hospital in Hood River
County, Oregon. Dkt. 29-2.
On September 9, 2009, Murphy was on-call at the Hospital when he got into a physical
altercation with a colleague from the Hospital, Dr. Duran (“Duran”). Dkt. 29-1 at 3. Murphy had
consumed one or two glasses of wine shortly before the altercation. Dkt. 29-1 at 2. Murphy went
back to work at the Hospital the following day. Dkt. 20-1 at 6. The Oregon State Medical Board
(the “Board”) brought a disciplinary action against Murphy because of his use of alcohol while
he was on-call at the Hospital. Dkt. 29-1 at 3. The Board found that Murphy’s actions violated
recognized community ethical standards. Dkt. 29-1 at 11.1
In mid-September 2009, Murphy left the Hospital to serve in active duty with the
National Guard for six weeks. Dkt. 20-1 at 6. He returned to work at the Hospital on October 26,
2009. Dkt. 20-1 at 6. Murphy did not take a formal leave of absence from Tuality. Upon his
return, Murphy asked Hildebrant to adjust his schedule so that he did not work at the Hospital at
the same time as Duran. Dkt. 20-1 at 9-10. On October 28, 2009, Tuality sent Murphy a 90-day
notice letter, stating that Tuality was terminating Murphy’s employment without cause. Dkt. 201
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed this finding, holding that Murphy was
prejudiced by the Board’s failure to provide him with adequate notice of the basis for his
discipline. Dkt. 29-1 at 11.
PAGE 4 – OPINION AND ORDER
1 at 15. Murphy worked at the Hospital intermittently from the end of October 2009 through the
beginning of January 2010. Dkt. 20-1 at 6-7. Tuality revoked Murphy’s clinical privileges at the
Hospital on January 26, 2010. Dkt. 20-1 at 16.
DISCUSSION
The purposes of USERRA include the “[e]ncouragement of noncareer service in the
uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and
employment which can result from such service,” and the “[p]rohibition of discrimination
against persons because of their service in the uniformed services.” USERRA Manual, § 1:1
(2015). To affect those purposes, USERRA grants reemployment rights to employees who leave
civilian jobs to perform military service and provides for the protection of employees from
employment discrimination. Id. USERRA does not provide protections for an individual against
his or her employer if the individual is an independent contractor rather than an employee.
20 C.F.R. § 1002.44(a). Murphy and Tuality dispute whether Murphy independently contracted
with Tuality, and thus has no cause of action under USERRA, or whether he was Tuality’s
employee, and thus may invoke USERRA. Tuality also argues that the Court should not consider
Murphy’s August 12, 2015 declaration (Dkt. 29) in deciding the cross-motions for summary
judgment, asserting that it contradicts Murphy’s prior deposition testimony, contains hearsay,
and is irrelevant. Because the facts asserted in Murphy’s declaration are relevant to the parties’
cross-motions, the Court first addresses Tuality’s evidentiary objections. The Court then turns to
the issue of whether, as a matter of law, Murphy was Tuality’s employee for purposes of
USERRA.
A. Tuality’s Evidentiary Objections
Tuality argues that the Court should not consider Murphy’s declaration because it
contradicts Murphy’s prior deposition testimony and thus is a sham affidavit. The deposition was
PAGE 5 – OPINION AND ORDER
from a previous arbitration proceeding between Tuality and Murphy concerning Murphy’s debts
under the PDA that is unrelated to this case. The sham affidavit rule provides that a party cannot
manufacture an issue of fact by presenting an affidavit that contradicts prior deposition
testimony. Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts are
cautioned, however, that:
It must be recognized that the sham affidavit rule is in tension with
the principle that a court’s role in deciding a summary judgment
motion is not to make credibility determinations or weigh
conflicting evidence. Aggressive invocation of the rule also
threatens to ensnare parties who may have simply been confused
during their deposition testimony and may encourage
gamesmanship by opposing attorneys. We have thus recognized
that the sham affidavit rule “should be applied with caution.”
Id. (quoting Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1264 (9th Cir. 1993). The sham
affidavit rule requires (1) that the court make a factual finding that any alleged contradiction
between a proffered affidavit and prior testimony is actually a sham, and (2) that the
contradiction is clear and unambiguous. Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 998-99.
The sole prior deposition testimony Tuality relies on is as follows: “Q. Were you an
employee of Tuality? A. [Murphy] No, sir.” Dkt. 20-1 at 3. This testimony is a legal conclusion.
Additionally, this testimony does not conflict with Murphy’s declaration in this case, which sets
forth the underlying facts regarding the nature of Murphy’s relationship with Tuality. Thus, the
Court does not find Murphy’s declaration to be a sham affidavit.
Tuality additionally argues that Murphy’s declaration contains hearsay and focuses on
information that is irrelevant to the question of whether he was Tuality’s employee. Tuality,
however, does not identify any specific paragraph or statement that supposedly contains hearsay.
The Court considers Tuality’s objection as to relevancy to be duplicative of the summary
judgment standard. See Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D.
PAGE 6 – OPINION AND ORDER
Cal. 2006) (noting that “objections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, speculative,
and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the
summary judgment standard itself[.]”). The Court has reviewed the evidence and the parties’
arguments under the appropriate summary judgment standard. The Court does not consider
inadmissible evidence in deciding the cross-motions for summary judgment.
B. Whether Murphy is an Employee under USERRA
Congress intended that USERRA “would define ‘employee’, in the same expansive
manner as under the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . . and the issue of independent contractor
versus employee should be treated in the same manner as under the Fair Labor Standards Act.”
H.R. Rep. No. 103-65(l), at 2454 (1993). Thus, a court may look to Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) case law for guidance when considering whether an individual is an independent
contractor or employee for purposes of USERRA. See Evans v. MassMutual Fin. Grp., 856 F.
Supp. 2d 606, 609 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Though the case law on this issue in the USERRA context
is sparse, cases interpreting analogous provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . are relevant
in this regard.”); USERRA Manual § 2:13 (“In enacting USERRA, Congress expressed an intent
that the issue of whether a person is an independent contractor or employee be decided in the
same manner as under the FLSA.”).2
2
Tuality argues that the Court should look to Title VII cases that consider whether
anesthesiologists are independent contractors or employees for guidance in this case.
Specifically, Tuality asserts that the Court should consider the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in
Vakaharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 190 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 1999), and Alexander v. Rush N.
Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996), where the Seventh Circuit uses a similar test in
the independent contractor versus employee analysis as that set forth in USERRA’s regulations
at 20 C.F.R. § 1002.44. In support of the proposition that the Court can consider Title VII cases
in determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or employee under USERRA,
Tuality quotes the Supreme Court’s statement in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 417
(2011), that USERRA is “very similar to Title VII.” The Staub Court, however, made this
statement when comparing USERRA’s provision describing when an employer engages in
prohibited conduct to a nearly identical provision in Title VII. Id. at 416-17. Thus, the Staub
PAGE 7 – OPINION AND ORDER
“The FLSA’s definition of employee has been called the ‘broadest definition that has
ever been included in any one act.’” Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945)). Under the FLSA, the
“common law concepts of ‘employee’ and ‘independent contractor’ are not conclusive
determinants of the FLSA’s coverage.” Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754
(9th Cir. 1979). Rather, the Ninth Circuit applies the “economic realities” test, under which
“employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to
which they render service.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S.
126, 130 (1947)). Under the economic realities test, the existence of a contract describing an
individual as an independent contractor is not a dispositive or controlling consideration. See
Real, 603 F.2d at 755 (“Economic realities, not contractual labels, determine employment status
for the remedial purposes of the FLSA.”).
Courts in the Ninth Circuit consider six factors in determining whether an individual is an
independent contractor or employee under the economic realities test:
1) The degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner
in which the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged employee’s
opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials
required for his task, or his employment of helpers; 4) whether the
service rendered requires a special skill; 5) the degree of
permanence of the working relationship; and 6) whether the
service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s
business.
Court did not suggest that the independent contractor versus employee analysis in USERRA is
the same as that used in Title VII. Indeed, in Leramo v. Premier Anesthesia Med. Grp., 2011 WL
2680837 (E.D. Cal Jul. 8, 2011), another Title VII case discussed by Tuality, the Eastern District
of California stated that Vakharia and Alexander “apply only to Title VII claims.” Id. at *10.
Thus, in determining whether Murphy is an employee under USERRA, the Court follows
Congress’s guidance and considered the issue within the FLSA framework, rather than the Title
VII context.
PAGE 8 – OPINION AND ORDER
Perez v. Oak Grove Cinemas, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1242 (D. Or. 2014) (quoting Donovan v.
Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981)).3 No single factor is dispositive; rather,
whether an individual is an employee under this inquiry “depends ‘upon the circumstances of the
whole activity.’” Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1371 (quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,
331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947)).
1. Right to Control
Courts generally consider the degree of supervision an alleged employer has over an
individual in determining the extent of the alleged employer’s right to control the individual,
although the fact that an individual is not supervised in detail at all times does not necessarily
mean the individual is an independent contractor. See Chao v. Westside Drywall, Inc., 709 F.
Supp. 2d 1037 (D. Or. 2010). “‘Control is only significant when it shows an individual exerts
such a control over a meaningful part of the business that she stands as a separate economic
entity.’” Mathis v. Housing Auth. of Umatilla Cnty., 242 F. Supp. 2d 777, 783 (D. Or. 2002)
(quoting Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., Inc., 527 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (5th Cir.)). Murphy asserts
that Tuality would schedule him to a hospital room, that he could not self-refer patients, and that
he had to accommodate the surgeon’s preferences when providing anesthesia services. Dkt. 29
3
USERRA’s regulations provide a nearly identical six-factor test to be used when
determining whether an individual is an independent contractor or employee:
(1) The extent of the employer’s right to control the manner in
which the individual’s work is to be performed; (2) The
opportunity for profit or loss that depends upon the individual’s
managerial skill; (3) Any investment in equipment or materials
required for the individual’s tasks, or his or her employment of
helpers; (4) Whether the service the individual performs requires a
special skill; (5) The degree of permanence of the individual’s
working relationship; and, (6) Whether the service the individual
performs is an integral part of the employer’s business.
20 C.F.R. § 1002.44(b). No single factor is dispositive. Id. § 1002.44(c).
PAGE 9 – OPINION AND ORDER
at 3-4. Additionally, under the ASA, Murphy was required to “respond to the directives” of
Tuality’s Medical Director. Dkt. 20-2 at 5.
Tuality also exercised a great deal of control over Murphy’s work schedule, which
supports finding an employer-employee relationship. See Evans, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 610. The
ASA required Murphy to work full-time at the Hospital for at least 42 weeks per year according
to the schedule set by Hildebrant. Murphy also had to receive permission from Hildbrant to
adjust Murphy’s schedule. Further, under the ASA, Murphy was required to attend regular
anesthesia and surgical services meetings. Dkt. 20-2 at 4. This factor weighs in favor of finding
an employee relationship.
2. Opportunity for Profit or Loss
The fact that Murphy did not receive a salary tends to support a finding that Murphy was
an independent contractor. See Chao, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. Murphy was responsible for
billing patients for his anesthesia services and for collecting his payment.
Murphy, however, was not free to charge whatever he chose to charge. The ASA required
that Murphy’s rates generally conform to those of other anesthesiologists in the Portland area.
Dkt. 20-2 at 7. Additionally, the ASA required Murphy to join the Tuality Health Alliance,
which set fee limits for anesthesiologists. Dkt. 20-2 at 4; Dkt. 29 at 3. Murphy also asserts that
Tuality dictated which room he would provide services in, regardless of who the patient was or if
they had insurance, and that he was not permitted to self-refer patients. Dkt. 29 at 3-4.
Furthermore, Tuality paid Murphy quarterly stipends, and provided financial assistance to
Murphy under the PDA.
Although Murphy did work at Providence Hood River Hospital, he did so on his own
time while also working full-time at the Hospital. An individual may work for more than one
entity and still be considered an employee for purposes of the economic realities test. Smith v.
PAGE 10 – OPINION AND ORDER
City of Phx., 2015 WL 6811660, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2015). Thus, this factor weighs slightly
in favor of finding that Murphy was an independent contractor, and not an employee.
3. Investment in Equipment or Materials
Under the ASA, Tuality provided Murphy with the vast majority of the equipment and
supplies used by Murphy and all of the support staff. This factor weighs in favor of finding that
Murphy was an employee.
4. Special Skill
The parties do not dispute that anesthesia requires a special skill. The fact that an
individual has technical skills, however, does not necessarily indicate that they are an
independent contractor; rather, courts also look to whether technical skills are used in an
independent manner. Chao, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1065; see also Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr.
Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that although plaintiff welders were highly
skilled and were not told by defendant how to complete a particular weld, they were told by the
defendant where and when to weld, and thus did not exercise their skills in an independent
manner). Murphy, like other anesthesiologists who worked for Tuality, worked at the Hospital
and according to the schedule provided for him by Hildebrant. Thus, Murphy did not use his
anesthesia skills in an independent manner. This factor weighs slightly in favor of finding that
Murphy was an employee.
5. Permanence of the Relationship
The ASA permitted each party to terminate the agreement without cause upon 90-days’
notice, which is a fact that tends to support a finding that Murphy was an independent contractor.
Moba v. Total Transp. Servs., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1265 (W.D. Wash. 2014) (finding that a
contract which gives either party the power to terminate the agreement upon written notice
weighs in favor of independent contractor status). The ASA, however, was subject to automatic
PAGE 11 – OPINION AND ORDER
renewal, Dkt. 20-2 at 8, which weighs in favor of finding that Murphy was Tuality’s employee.
See Donovan, 656 F.2d at 1372 (“[T]rue independent contractors have a fixed employment
period . . . .”). Additionally, the purpose of the PDA was to aid Murphy in establishing an
anesthesiology practice, and Murphy worked full-time for Tuality for more than a year. The
intent to enter into a long-term relationship also tends to indicate that this was an employeremployee relationship. See Evans, 856 F. Supp. 2d at 610. Overall, this factor weighs slightly in
favor of finding that Murphy was an employee.
6. Integral Part of Tuality’s Business
“This factor turns on whether the service the worker performs is integral to the business,
not on whether a worker is individually integral.” Chao, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. The parties do
not dispute that the provision of anesthesiology services is an integral part of Tuality’s business.
Thus, this factor weighs in favor of finding an employee relationship.
7. Analysis
Tuality argues that the Court should consider Murphy’s prior positions and
representations in analyzing whether he was an independent contractor. For example, in
July 2009, Murphy completed an Oregon Practitioner Credentialing Application in which he
stated that he was a solo practitioner and did not list Tuality as an employer. Dkt. 20-6 at 9.
Additionally, during the Board’s disciplinary proceeding, Murphy asserted that Tuality’s bylaw
prohibiting the consumption of alcohol while on call did not apply to him because it only applied
to employees. Dkt. 20-7 at 9. Tuality also points to the fact that the ASA defines Murphy’s
position as that of an independent contractor.
An individual’s subjective intent, however, is not determinative in the economic realities
analysis under FLSA, and, by extension, under USERRA. See Real, 603 F.2d at 755 (“[t]he
subjective intent of the parties to a labor contract cannot override the economic realities . . . .”).
PAGE 12 – OPINION AND ORDER
Even an individual who desires to be an independent contractor can still be found to be an
employee under the law based on the economic realities test. Mathis, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 785-86.
For that reason, “contractual intention is not a dispositive consideration” in the independent
contractor versus employee analysis. Id. at 785 (citing cases). Accordingly, facts which indicate
a desire on the part of Murphy to be an independent contractor do not alter the economic realities
of his relationship with Tuality. See id. at 786 (“[T]he issue of [the plaintiff’s] desire to be an
independent contractor does not alter the economic reality that she was an employee.”).
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Tuality, the economic realities of the
relationship between Murphy and Tuality show that Murphy was Tuality’s employee for the
purposes of USERRA. Murphy worked full-time for Tuality at the Hospital for more than a year
under a schedule provided by Tuality’s Medical Director. In exchange, Tuality paid Murphy
quarterly stipends and provided Murphy with financial assistance. Although Murphy did some
work for another medical institution during this time, he could not provide anesthesia services in
Washington County without first entering into an additional written agreement with Tuality
permitting such an arrangement. Given the “expansive manner” in which Congress intended the
term “employee” to be construed under USERRA, H.R. Rep. No. 103-65(l), at 2454, the Court
finds as a matter of law that Murphy was Tuality’s employee for purposes of this statute.
CONCLUSION
Tuality’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 19) is DENIED. Murphy’s cross-motion
for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 26) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 15th day of January, 2016.
/s/ Michael H. Simon
Michael H. Simon
United States District Judge
PAGE 13 – OPINION AND ORDER
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?