Moreno v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER. Because the Commissioner's decision is based on proper legal standards and supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED and this case is DISMISSED. See formal OPINION AND ORDER. Signed on 4/6/2016 by Judge Ann L. Aiken. (rh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

ARTURO MORENO,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

Bruce Brewer
Law Offices of Bruce W. Brewer, PC
P.O. Box 421
West Linn, OR 97068
Attorney for plaintiff
Billy J. Williams
Janice E. Hebert
United States Attorney's Office
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204-2902
Heather L. Griffith
Social Security Administration
Office of the General Counsel
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900 MIS 221A
Seattle, WA 98104-7075
Attorneys for defendant
1 - OPINION AND ORDER

Case No. 3:14-cv-01984-AA
OPINION AND ORDER

AIKEN, Judge:
Plaintiff Arturo Moreno seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's decision denying
his application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act.
This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). Because the Commissioner's decision is
based on proper legal standards and supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's
decision is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on July 5, 2011 alleging disability
beginning May 29, 2009. Tr. 85, 142. Following a denial of benefits, plaintiff requested a
hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).

On May 31, 2013, an ALJ determined

plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 8-25. The Appeals Council then denied plaintiffs request for
review. Tr. 7. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The reviewing court shall affirm the Commissioner's decision if the decision is based on
proper legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson -v. Comm 'r for Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.
2004). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

In reviewing the

Commissioner's alleged errors, this Court must weigh "both the evidence that supports and
detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusions." J\!fartinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th
Cir. 1986). Variable interpretations of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner's
interpretation is rational. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).

2 - OPINION AND ORDER

When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we
must defer to the ALJ's conclusion. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198 (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53
F.3d 1035, 1041 (9!h Cir. 1995)).

A reviewing court, however, "cannot affirm the

Commissioner's decision on a ground that the Administration did not invoke in making its
decision." Stout v. Comm 'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted). Finally, a court may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an elTor that is
harmless. Id. at 1055-56. "[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon
the party attacking the agency's determination." Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ etTed by: (1) finding his symptom testimony not credible; (2)
discounting the opinions of Dr. Lisa Sprague, M.D., and physician's assistant certified ("PAC")
Jackai Yip; (3) discounting lay opinion evidence from his former employer, Ted Schopf; and (4)
relying on vocational expert (VE) testimony because the hypothetical presented to the VE did not
reflect all his limitations that were supported by the record. Pl.' s Br. 4-19.

I.

Plaintiffs Credibility
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding his subjective testimony not credible

because the ALJ "did not specify what testimony was not credible" and "did not identify the
evidence that undermined [his] complaints." Id. at 11, 16-17. Plaintiff also argues that he could
not afford medical care and, therefore, "the dearth of medical evidence after [he] lost his
insurance was used elToneously by the ALJ." Id. at 14.
The ALJ found plaintiffs statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of his symptoms "not entirely credible," in part, because his activities of daily living
(ADL) showed fewer limitations than alleged. Tr. 15. In so finding, the ALJ noted plaintiffs

3 - OPINION AND ORDER

statements that walking, using the bathroom, and working in the yard cause back pain and,
specifically, that walking ten to fifteen minutes "would cause a spasm the next day" and that
walking around the block caused left-sided sciatica. Id. Moreover, the ALJ noted that plaintiff
"described pain from standing or sitting for a prolonged period" and that plaintiff claimed his
lifting was so limited that picking up a carton of milk required the use of both hands. Id. The
ALJ contrasted plaintiffs statements with plaintiff's ADLs from the record, which include doing
stretching exercises, going for walks, cooking, cleaning, reading, doing laundry, washing dishes,
driving, shopping, managing his funds, playing catch with his grandson for fifteen minutes
before needing to take a break, mowing and raking the yard, and caring for a dog. Id. The ALJ
also noted plaintiffs testimony that he "looked for work in 2010, 2011, and recently." Id.
The ALJ also found plaintiffs symptom testimony not credible because his treatment had
been "minimal, conservative, and routine." Id. In so finding, the ALJ noted that plaintiffs file
lacked medical records "from 2009 or 2010, the first eighteen months after the alleged onset
date" and that in 2008, the year leading up to his alleged disability onset date, plaintiff was
reportedly "doing well" with stretches and exercises, was not limping, and had told Dr. John
Alferes, M.D., that he had pain flares rarely and was planning a trip to Texas to visit family. Id.
(citing Tr. 244). The ALJ added that in 2011, plaintiff treated his back pain conservatively with
ice and heat and that vocational rehabilitation wrote that he "had no disability that would prevent
employment." Id. The ALJ also noted a medical report from 2012, where plaintiff assessed his
back pain at two out of ten and reportedly managed this pain with ibuprofen and by using
marijuana at night to sleep. Tr. 16 (citing Tr. 277, 283, 296-98). The ALJ further noted that
plaintiff did not obtain a medical marijuana card until January 2012 and that in 2013, he declined
physical therapy and muscle relaxers. Id. (citing Tr. 288-90, 301).

4 - OPINION AND ORDER

When a claimant has medically documented impairments that could reasonably be
expected to produce some degree of the symptoms complained of, and the record contains no
affirmative evidence of malingering, "the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about the
severity of ... symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so."
Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). A general

assertion that the claimant is not credible is insufficient; the ALJ must "state which ... testimony
is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible." Dodrill v. Shalala,
12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). The reasons proffered must be "sufficiently specific to permit
the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's
testimony." Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted).
The ALJ may consider objective medical evidence and the claimant's treatment history,
as well as any unexplained failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment.
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. The ALJ may also consider the claimant's daily activities, work

record, and the observations of physicians and third parties with personal knowledge about the
claimant's functional limitations.

Id.

Further, when a claimant's daily activities "are

transferable to a work setting" or "contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment,"
performance of those activities may serve as a basis for discrediting a claimant.

~Molina

v.

Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012). If the "ALJ's credibility finding is supported by

substantial evidence in the record, [the court] may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).

Here, the ALJ provided several specific, cogent reasons to supp01i his adverse credibility
finding. First, the ALJ observed that plaintiff's ADLs were more extensive than the limitations
he claimed. The ALJ contrasted plaintiff's statements that he gets pain from standing or sitting

5 - OPINION AND ORDER

for a prolonged period, needs two hands to lift a milk carton, gets sciatica from walking around
the block, and gets spasms the following day if he walks for ten to fifteen minutes, with evidence
from the record that plaintiff goes for walks, plays catch with his grandson for fifteen minutes,
mows and rakes the yard, does stretching exercises, cooks, cleans, does laundry, washes dishes,
drives, shops, .cares for a dog, and searches for work.
Second, the ALJ noted that plaintiffs file was devoid of medical records from the first
year and a half after his alleged disability onset date. Although plaintiff cannot be denied
benefits for failing to obtain treatment that would ameliorate his condition if he cannot afford
that treatment, Gamble v. Chater, 68 F .3d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1995), the ALJ did not rely solely
the dearth of plaintiffs medical evidence in reaching his adverse credibility finding. Rather, the
ALJ noted that plaintiffs records from the year prior to his alleged disability onset date, as well
as the records from 2012 and 2013, the period subsequent to plaintiff resuming medical
treatment, revealed that plaintiff was able to treat his pain, which he rated at only a two out of
ten, with minimal and conservative treatment methods, such as ice, heat, ibuprofen, and
marijuana at night as a sleep aid. The ALJ further noted that plaintiff rejected physical therapy
and muscle relaxers and did not obtain his medical marijuana card until January 2012, over two
and a half years into his alleged disability period.

Finally, the ALJ noted that vocational

rehabilitation opined in 2011 that plaintiff had no disability that would prevent employment.
While variable interpretations of this evidence may exist, the ALJ' s analysis was
nonetheless reasonable, such that it must be upheld. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198. In sum, the
ALJ identified which of plaintiffs subjective symptom statements he found not credible and
provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting those
statements. As such, the ALJ's credibility finding is affirmed.

6 - OPINION AND ORDER

II.

Credibility of Dr. Sprague and Ms. Yip's Opinions
On April 10, 2013, plaintiffs treating medical providers, Dr. Lisa Sprague, M.D., and

Jackai Yip, PAC, submitted an attorney supplied questionnaire about plaintiffs residual
functional capacity (RFC). Tr. 235, 305-09. On that questionnaire, Dr. Sprague and Ms. Yip
opined that plaintiff could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, sit fewer
than six of eight hours, and stand and walk less than two of eight hours. Id. They opined that
plaintiff would need to alternate between sitting and standing throughout the workday and that he
would develop stiffness and discomfort if he stood twenty minutes or longer. Id. They further
opined that plaintiff could only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and could never do other
postural activities.

Id.

They added that plaintiff could nave no exposure to extreme cold,

wetness, vibration, fumes, or hazards, should avoid concentrated exposure to noise, and would
miss at least five work days per month. Id. They noted that they had seen plaintiff since October
2012, but opined that the limitations they endorsed applied as of May 2009. Id.
The ALJ gave Dr. Sprague and Ms. Yip's opinions "little weight," because: (1) their
treating records do not support the limitations on standing, walking, sitting, and postural
movement; (2) they failed to explain how the limitations they endorsed could apply as of May
2009 when neither of them saw plaintiff until October 2012, plaintiffs file does not contain
records from 2009 or 2010, and plaintiffs records from 2011 and after show only conservative
treatment; and (3) it appears they based at least some of their responses on plaintiffs subjective
statements. Tr. 16.
Additionally, the ALJ summarized the conflicting medical opm10ns of consultative
examiner, Angela Jones, M.D., and non-examining reviewer, Neal Bemer, M.D., who both
opined that plaintiff was limited to "medium" work, could lift 25 pounds frequently and 50

7 - OPINION AND ORDER

pounds occasionally, and should be limited to "occasional" stooping. Tr. 16-17 (citing 74-83,
271-76). The ALJ found that Dr. Jones' opinion, which added that plaintiff had a "normal, slow
gait," but no limitations in sitting, standing, or walking, was due "great weight," because it was
based on a "thorough examination," was "fully explained," and was "consistent with the treating
evidence." Id. at 16-17 (citing 271-76). Moreover, the ALJ found that Dr. Berner's opinion,
which added that plaintiff should only occasionally climb, crawl, and stoop was due "significant
weight" because it was consistent with the other evidence in the record. Id. (citing Tr. 74-83).
Plaintiff argues that ALJ failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by
substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Sprague and Ms. Yip's opinions because: (1) their opinions
were consistent with his x-rays from 2005, 2006, and 2011, as well as his treating medical
records, including his musculoskeletal evaluations from October 2012 and January 2013 where
he complained his back pain "was aggravated by bending or twisting, and relieved while lying
flat"; (2) his refusal of physical therapy and muscle relaxers was not a valid reason to the reject
Dr. Sprague and Ms. Yip's opinions; and (3) they were qualified to render an inference as to his
disability onset date because they had his treatment records from 2005, which substantiate that
his impairments and pain symptoms we_re present prior to his alleged disability onset date. PL' s
Br. 4, 7-11 (citing Tr. 68, 79, 271-76, 300).
There are three types of medical opinions in social security cases: those from treating,
examining, and non-examining doctors. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The
ALJ may reject the uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining physician by providing
clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81
F.3d at 830-31; Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043.

If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is

contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and

8 - OPINION AND ORDER

legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d
1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). "The ALJ can meet this burden
by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,
stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Nfagallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747,
751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Although the contrary opinion of a non-treating medical
expert does not alone constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting a treating or examining
physician's opinion, it may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other
independent evidence in the record. Id.
It is well-established that "the ALJ need not accept the opm10n of any physician,
including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by
clinical findings." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; see also Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th
-

Cir. 1996) (ALJ may "permissibly reject . . . check-off reports that [do] not contain any
explanation of the bases of their conclusions"). Further, "[a] conflict between treatment notes
and a treating provider's opinions may constitute an adequate reason to discredit the opinions of a
treating physician or another treating provider." Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.
2014). See also }.;Jolina, 674 F.3d at 1111-12 (recognizing that a conflict with treatment notes is
a germane reason to reject a treating physician's assistant's opinion); Valentine v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a conflict with treatment notes is

a specific and legitimate reason to reject treating physician's opinion). Finally, evidence from
"other sources," including physician's assistants, may be used to show the severity of a
claimant's impairments and how they affect his ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). In
order to reject evidence from "other sources," the ALJ must give germane reasons for doing so.
}.;Jolina, 674 F.3d at 1111.

9 - OPINION AND ORDER

Here, as an initial matter, all of plaintiff's treatment notes from the Multnomah County
Health Department were signed by Ms. Yip only and not Dr. Sprague. Tr. 300-02, 310-11. Dr.
Sprague and Ms. Yip, however, both signed the attorney supplied questionnaire that included
clauses stating that a "treatment relationship" existed with plaintiff from October 23, 2012,
through the date the questionnaire was signed on April 10, 2013, and that "[m]y signature below
confirms that the information on this document reflects my clinical judgment, independent of the
patient's own self-assessment." Tr. 309. Accordingly, this Court finds that Dr. Sprague was a
"treating" medical provider and that both Dr. Sprague and Ms. Yip's opinions were formulated
independent of plaintiff's subjective complaints. Further, according to the regulation,s, the ALJ
was not obligated to consider the records from Ms. Yip, a physician's assistant, as a medical
source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a). Therefore, the ALJ needed only to provide germane reasons
to reject Ms. Yip's opinion.

Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. Moreover, because Ms. Yip and Dr.

Sprague's opinions were contradicted by the opinions of Drs. Jones and Bemer, the specific and
legitimate standard applies to Dr. Sprague's opinion. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. The Court finds
that the ALJ met these standards here for several reasons.
First, the ALJ provided a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and of the
conflicting medical opinion of Dr. Jones, who had the opportunity to examine plaintiff, and
whose opinion the ALJ gave great weight to. Although the ALJ's reliance on Dr. Jones' contrary
opinion does not alone constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Sprague's
"treating" medical opinion, it provides a germane reason for rejecting Ms. Yip's "other source"
opinion. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218. Moreover, because Dr. Jones' opinion was consistent with
Dr. Bemer's independent opinion, who the ALJ gave significant weight to, this Court finds that

10 - OPINION AND ORDER

the~ALJ's

reliance on these two conflicting opinions constitutes substantial evidence in support

of his finding that Dr. Sprague's opinion was not credible. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751.
Second, the ALJ found that Ms. Yip and Dr. Sprague's treating records do not support the
limitations they endorsed in plaintiffs RFC questionnaire. This Court agrees. Ms. Yip and Dr.
Sprague saw plaintiff only twice for his alleged back pain prior to completing the RFC
questionnaire and the chart notes from both visits reveal only normal objective findings. 1
Specifically, the objective findings in the chart notes from plaintiffs first visit on October 23,
2012, reveal that he had a normal gait, no paraspinal muscle spasms or palpitations, his ability to
bend, rotate, and extend in every direction was "intact," he a strength rating of five out of five
bilaterally, a pain rating of three out of ten, negative test results for radicular pain in a straight leg
raise test, his sciatica was "subsided," and he "refused physical therapy or muscle relaxant for
pain." Tr. 301. The chart notes from plaintiffs second visit on April 10, 2013, the morning the
RFC questionnaire was completed, reveal that plaintiff was "A&O [alert and oriented] in NAD
[no acute distress], was sitting comfortably, well-appearing, [and] well-developed." Tr. 310.
Accordingly, because Ms. Yip and Dr. Sprague's treatment notes from both visits reveal
normal objective findings, this Court finds that the ALJ reasonably concluded Dr. Sprague and
Ms. Yip's treatment notes do not support the limitations they endorsed in the RFC. As such, this
was an adequate reason for the ALJ to discredit the opinions of Ms. Yip and Dr. Sprague.
Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1161; Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111-12; Valentine, 574 F.3d at 692-93.

Finally, the ALJ found that Dr. Sprague and Ms. Yip provided no explanation to support
their conclusion that plaintiff was disabled as of May 29, 2009, despite having not seen plaintiff
1

As stated above, plaintiffs subjective complaints were properly discredited by the ALJ and Ms.
Yip and Dr. Sprague also confirmed their RFC assessments were made independent of plaintiffs
subjective complaints. As such, this Court is unpersuaded by plaintiffs argument that Ms. Yip
and Dr. Sprague's RFC assessment was substantiated by his subjective complaints.
11 - OPINION AND ORDER

until October 2012. This omission is particularly troublesome here due to the absence of medical
records from 2009 and 2010. Moreover, although plaintiff asserts that his records from 2005
prove that his impairments and pain symptoms were present prior to his alleged disability onset
date, critically, those same records also substantiate that he was still working in 2005 and for
another four years thereafter, and that in 2005 he was able to take a trip to Japan that he
reportedly "enjoyed," "but with pain." Tr. 235-36.
Although plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ's interpretation of the medical record, "[w]hen
the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, we must defer to
the ALJ's conclusion." Batson., 359 F.3d at 1198. Accordingly, because Dr. Sprague and Ms.
Yip failed to provide explanations for their conclusions that plaintiff was disabled three and a
half years before ever meeting him, and because there were no medical records available to
support their conclusions from the first eighteen months after plaintiffs alleged disability date,
this Court finds the ALJ did not err by rejecting Dr. Sprague and Ms. Yip's RFC. Thomas, 278
F.3d at 957; Crane, 76 F.3d at 253. Moreover, although plaintiff correctly asserts that his refusal
of physical therapy and muscle relaxers was not a valid reason to the reject Dr. Sprague and Ms.
Yip's opinions, because the ALJ also provided several specific and legitimate reasons supported
by substantial evidence for rejecting Dr. Sprague's opinion, and several germane reasons for
rejecting Ms. Yip's opinion, this Court finds the ALJ's error harmless. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054.
As such, the ALJ's credibility finding with regard to Ms. Yip and Dr. Sprague is affirmed.
III.

Rejection of Lay Testimony
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ neglected to consider the lay opm10n of Ted Schopf,

plaintiffs manager from 1999 to 2009. Pl.' s Br. 7. Mr. Schopf wrote a letter on plaintiffs
behalf on April 9, 2013, stating that floor sales clerks, such as plaintiff, "seldom have the

12 - OPINION AND ORDER

opportunity to sit down on the job, even when cashiering" and "often ... need to lift and carry
more than fifty pounds." Tr. 154. Mr. Schopf wrote that upon returning to work in 1999 after
undergoing lower back surgery, he allowed plaintiff to work at a "reduced standard of
efficiency," take additional breaks beyond those normally provided in the morning, at lunch, and
in the afternoon, assisted him with lifting and carrying merchandise, and exempted him from the
"heavier aspects" of warehouse work. Id.

Mr. Schopf concluded that it eventually became

"more difficult" to accommodate plaintiffs needs for restrictions to perform his. "rather
physically demanding job." Id.
The ALJ considered the Mr. Schopf s opinion and found that although he opined that
plaintiff required accommodations for his alleged disability, plaintiffs "medical providers gave
only mild work-related limitations while [he] was employed." Tr. 15. The ALJ specifically
noted that in January 2006, Dr. Claudia Martin, M.D., opined that plaintiff should not work long
shifts, but that she did not limit his weekly work hours. Id. (citing Tr. 248). The ALJ added that
in all the years since then, "no provider [has] updated this restriction." Id. Finally, the ALJ
noted that a vocational rehabilitation counselor opined in September 2011 that plaintiff had no
disability that would prevent employment and that in 2010, 2011, and recently, plaintiff testified
that he looked for work. Id. (citing Tr. 33, 277).
Lay testimony regarding a claimant's symptoms or how impairment affects the ability to
work is competent evidence that an ALJ must take into account. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. The
ALI must provide "reasons germane to each witness" in order to reject such testimony. Id.

(citation and internal quotation omitted). Inconsistency with medical evidence is a valid reason
to discount lay statements. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218.

13 - OPINION AND ORDER

Here, the ALJ discounted Mr. Schopfs opinion because the medical reports from that
time period revealed only mild limitations and, notably, because no doctor limited plaintiffs
weekly work hours.

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218. Moreover, the ALJ noted that in 2011, a

vocational rehabilitation counselor opined that plaintiff had no disability that would prevent
employment. Finally, the ALJ noted that plaintiff was seeking employment during the relevant
time period. Accordingly, this Court finds that the ALJ provided several germane reasons for
discounting Mr. Schopfs opinion. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1114. As such, the ALJ's finding with
regard to Mr. Schopfs opinion is affirmed.
IV.

ALJ's Reliance on VE Testimony
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the VE's testimony that he could

perform other jobs in the national economy because the hypothetical presented to the VE did not
reflect all his limitations that were supported by the record. Pl.'s Br. 19. Specifically, plaintiff
argues that because the ALJ improperly rejected his symptom statements, as well as the opinions
of Dr. Sprague, Ms. Yip, and Mr. Schopf, the hypothetical question posed to the VE did not
reflect all his limitations and, therefore, "had no evidentiary value." Id.
The ALJ found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform "medium work" with the
additional limitations that he must never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and that he can only
occasionally stoop, kneel, crawl, crouch, or climb ramps and stairs. Tr. 14.
The RFC is the maximum a claimant can do despite his limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545, 416.945. In determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider limitations imposed by all
of a claimant's impairments, even those that are not severe, and evaluate "all of the relevant
medical and other evidence," including the claimant's testimony. SSR 96-8p, available at 1996
WL 374184.

The ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in the medical testimony and

14 - OPINION AND ORDER

translating the claimant's impairments into concrete functional limitations in the RFC. StubbsDanielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008).

Only limitations supported by

substantial evidence must be incorporated into the RFC and, by extension, the dispositive
hypothetical question posed to the VE. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1163-65 (9th Cir.
2001).
As discussed above, the opinions of plaintiff, Dr. Sprague, Ms. Yip, and Mr. Schopf were
properly discredited by the ALJ. Accordingly, plaintiffs argument, which is contingent upon a
finding of harmful error in regard to the aforementioned issues, is without merit. Bayliss, 427
F.3d at 1217-18; Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175-76. The ALJ's RFC is upheld.
CONCLUSION
Because the Commissioner's decision is based on proper legal standards and supported
by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED and this case is
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED

this~~ of April 2016.

~~

Ann Aiken
United States District Judge

15-0PINION AND ORDER