Gakuba v. Hollywood Video, Inc. et al
Filing
76
Opinion and Order. The Court GRANTS Illinois Attorney General Madigans Motion to Dismiss 47 , GRANTS U.S.Attorney General Lynchs Motion to Dismiss 57 , and DISMISSES all claims as to Attorneys General Madigan and Lynch without prejudice to Plaintif fs prosecution of his related claims in Gakuba v. OBrien, 12-cv-7294, in the Northern District of Illinois. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), the Court also ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing no later than October 28, 2015, as to why the remaining claims against Hollywood Video, Inc., should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to effectuate service. In addition, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion 53 for Summary Judgment as moot as to Attorneys General Madigan and Lynch and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion as premature as to Hollywood Video, Inc. Signed by Judge Anna J. Brown. See attached 19 page Opinion and Order for full text. (bb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
PETER GAKUBA,
Plaintiff,
v.
HOLLYWOOD VIDEO, INC., aka
Movie Gallery, dba Hollywood
Video/Movie Gallery Customer
Service; LORETTA LYNCH, in her
official capacity as United
States Attorney General; LISA
MADIGAN, in her official capacity
as Illinois Attorney General,
Defendants.
PETER GAKUBA
Robinson Correctional Center
13423 E. 1150th Ave.
Robinson, IL 62454
Plaintiff, Pro Se
1 - OPINION AND ORDER
3:15-cv-00496-BR
OPINION AND ORDER
BILLY J. WILLIAMS
Acting United States Attorney
KEVIN C. DANIELSON
Assistant United States Attorney
1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600
Portland, OR 97204
(503) 727-1000
Attorneys for Defendant Loretta Lynch, U.S. Attorney
General
SUNIL S. BHAVE
Illinois Attorney General’s Office
100 W. Randolph, 13th Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 814-4550
Attorney for Defendant Lisa Madigan, Illinois Attorney
General
BROWN, Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Illinois
Attorney General Lisa Madigan’s Motion (#47) to Dismiss and
Defendant U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch’s Motion (#57) to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction.
For the reasons that follow,
the Court GRANTS Illinois Attorney General Madigan’s Motion to
Dismiss, GRANTS U.S. Attorney General Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss,
and DISMISSES all claims as to Attorneys General Madigan and
Lynch without prejudice to Plaintiff’s prosecution of his related
claims in Gakuba v. O’Brien, 12-cv-7294, in the Northern District
of Illinois.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m),
the Court also ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause no later than
October 28, 2015, why his remaining claims against Hollywood
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Video, Inc., should not be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to effectuate service.
In addition, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion (#53) for Summary Judgment as moot as to
Attorneys General Madigan and Lynch and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion
as premature as to Hollywood Video, Inc.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (#30), attached documents, and materials
subject to judicial notice and are accepted as true at this stage
of the proceedings:
On November 3 and 4, 2006, Illinois State Police (ISP)
working in conjunction with special agents from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were conducting a criminal
investigation regarding allegations of sexual abuse of M.S., a
minor, in Rockford, Illinois.
M.S. alleged a man sexually abused
him in a Marriott hotel room and that the man had three movies
("Scary Movie 1," "Scary Movie 2," and "Scary Movie 3") rented
from a local Hollywood Video store in Rockford.
Based on information received from M.S., the officers
located the hotel and room in which M.S. alleged he was sexually
abused.
Officers spoke to the hotel clerk who indicated that
room was rented by Plaintiff Peter Gakuba.
In addition, M.S.
described to officers the vehicle that his alleged abuser drove.
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Officers identified a vehicle matching that description outside
of the Marriott hotel.
After the officers obtained Plaintiff's name from the hotel
clerk and located the automobile matching M.S.'s description
outside of the Marriott, the ISP officers contacted Hollywood
Video and asked who rented "Scary Movie 1," "Scary Movie 2," and
"Scary Movie 3."
Hollywood Video employees reported to the
officers that Plaintiff rented those movies.
ISP officers did
not have any warrant or court order authorizing them to obtain
records of Plaintiff's movie rentals.
ISP officers searched Plaintiff's hotel room with the
consent of the Marriott, but without any warrant or Plaintiff's
consent.
After searching the hotel room, ISP officers arrested
Plaintiff.
During his state-court criminal proceeding Plaintiff moved
to suppress evidence under both the Fourth Amendment and the
Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2710, based on
the officers obtaining information concerning his movie rentals
from Hollywood Video and the warrantless entry into Plaintiff's
hotel room.
The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion based on
the VPPA and suppressed information received from the Hollywood
Video, but the court denied Plaintiff's motion based on the
Fourth Amendment and the warrantless entry into his hotel room.
Plaintiff alleges he became aware of the VPPA and
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constitutional violations in 2011 during the pendency of his
state criminal proceedings.
In addition to his state-court criminal action, Plaintiff
has filed several lawsuits regarding alleged constitutional and
statutory violations implicated by the officers' actions during
the investigation.
One of these actions, Gakuba v. O’Brien,
12-cv-7294 (N.D. Ill.), remains ongoing.
In that case Plaintiff
brought 157 claims against various law-enforcement and private
defendants (including Hollywood Video) arising from the
investigation and his arrest.
In many of those claims Plaintiff
alleges the defendants violated the VPPA and Plaintiff’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiff filed that action on
September 12, 2012.
Here Plaintiff asserts four claims:
Claim One, Plaintiff
contends Defendants violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments when the investigating officers obtained
protected speech material from Hollywood Video; Claim Two,
Plaintiff alleges the law-enforcement Defendants and Hollywood
Video violated Plaintiff's rights under the VPPA when the
officers obtained information about the movies that Plaintiff
rented from Hollywood Video; Claim Three, Plaintiff asserts a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for "conspiracy" as a result of
Hollywood Video providing Plaintiff's personally identifiable
information to the law-enforcement Defendants; and Claim Four,
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Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim for "supervisor liability"
against Defendants because the alleged misconduct was carried out
pursuant to the policies and practices of the United States
Department of Justice and the Illinois Attorney General.
ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL MADIGAN’S MOTION (#47) TO DISMISS
Illinois Attorney General Madigan moves to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint on the basis that this Court
does not have personal jurisdiction over her, and, in any event,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.
I.
Standards
A.
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The party seeking to invoke the personal jurisdiction of the
federal court has the burden to establish that the Court has
jurisdiction.
Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557
F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977).
See also MGA Entertainment,
Inc. v. Innovation First, Inc., 525 F. App’x 576, 577 (9th Cir.
2013).
When “a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack
of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.”
Schwarzenegger
v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004).
“The court may consider evidence presented in affidavits to
assist it in its determination and may order discovery on the
jurisdictional issues.”
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Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922
(9th Cir. 2001)(citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assoc.,
Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)).
If the court makes a jurisdictional decision based only on
pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties and does not
conduct an evidentiary hearing, “the plaintiff need make only a
prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the
motion to dismiss.”
Doe, 248 F.3d at 922 (quoting Ballard v.
Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)).
When determining
whether the plaintiff has met the prima facie showing, the court
must assume the truth of uncontroverted allegations in the
complaint.
Ochoa v. J.B. Martin and Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d
1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002).
When the court rules on a
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff's version
of the facts, unless directly contravened, is taken as true, and
the court must resolve factual conflicts in the parties'
affidavits in the plaintiff's favor.
Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins.
Serv., Inc. v. Bell & Clements LTD, 328 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.
2003).
B.
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).
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Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,
A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.
Id. at 556.
“The plausibility standard
is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 546).
When a complaint is based on facts that are
“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557).
See also Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555-56.
The court
must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and construe
them in favor of the plaintiff.
Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 859
(9th Cir. 2013).
The pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.”
U.S. at 555).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
See also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
A complaint also does not
suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further
factual enhancement.”
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Id. at 557.
"In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally
consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits
attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to
judicial notice."
Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th
Cir. 2007)(citing Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F. Supp. 2d
1198, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2004)).
A court, however, "may consider a
writing referenced in a complaint but not explicitly incorporated
therein if the complaint relies on the document and its
authenticity is unquestioned."
Id. (quoting Parrino v. FHP,
Inc., 146 F.3d 699,706 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute on
other grounds as stated in Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676
(9th Cir. 2006)).
A pro se plaintiff's complaint "must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
construe pro se filings liberally.
Thus, the court must
If a plaintiff fails to state
a claim, "[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the pleading
'could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts,'
and should be granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs."
Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)).
II.
Discussion
As noted, Illinois Attorney General Madigan moves to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against her on the grounds that this Court
9 - OPINION AND ORDER
does not have personal jurisdiction over her, and, in the
alternative, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which
relief can be granted.
A.
Personal Jurisdiction
“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining
the bounds of their jurisdiction over [defendants].”
v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014).
Daimler AG
“Oregon law authorizes
personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent
permitted by the United States Constitution.”
Ranza v. Nike,
Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015)(citing Or. R. Civ. P.
4).
The Court, therefore, must inquire whether the exercise of
jurisdiction over Illinois Attorney General Madigan “‘comports
with the limits imposed by federal due process.’”
Ranza, 793
F.3d at 1068 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 793).
“For the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, due process requires that the defendant ‘have certain
minimum contacts’ with the forum state ‘such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”
Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
“ The
strength of contacts required depends on which of the two
categories of personal jurisdiction a litigant invokes:
jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.”
specific
Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068.
“Specific jurisdiction exists when a case ‘aris[es] out of
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or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum.’”
Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)).
Specific
jurisdiction, therefore, “is ‘specific’ to the case before the
court,” because it “‘depends on an affiliation between the forum
and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an
occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore
subject to the State's regulation.’”
Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1068
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846, 1851 (2011)).
General jurisdiction, on the other hand, “permits a court to
hear ‘any and all claims’ against a defendant, whether or not the
conduct at issue has any connection to the forum.”
Ranza, 793
F.3d at 1068 (quoting Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062,
1066 (9th Cir. 2014)).
A district court has general jurisdiction
over the defendant if the plaintiff shows the defendant has
“substantial” or “continuous and systematic” contacts with the
forum state.
Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163,
1171 (9th Cir. 2006)(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
466 U.S. at 415).
This standard is “fairly high” and requires
the contacts to be of the kind that approximates physical
presence within the state.
Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc.,
341 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003)(internal citations omitted).
Pertinent factors are whether the defendant “makes sales,
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solicits or engages in business, serves the state's markets,
designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, has
employees, or is incorporated [in the state]."
Gator.Com Corp.,
341 F.3d at 1076-77 (quotation omitted).
After reviewing the record, the Court concludes the
allegations against Illinois Attorney General Madigan in
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are insufficient to
establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction over
her.
As a state official in Illinois, there is not any evidence
in the record that demonstrates Illinois Attorney General Madigan
had such substantial or continuous and systematic contacts with
the State of Oregon to establish general personal jurisdiction in
this Court.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations fall well short of
establishing that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction
over Illinois Attorney General Madigan.
The only allegation in
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint that relates to any
Defendant’s contact with the State of Oregon is the fact that
Hollywood Video was headquartered here at the time that the
investigation occurred.
Although “[a] single forum state contact
can support jurisdiction if “the cause of action
. . . arise[s]
out of that particular purposeful contact of the defendant with
the forum state,” there is not any indication that the ISP
officers’ single, highly attenuated contact with the State of
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Oregon was purposeful.
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme
Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2006).
In summary, the Court concludes on this record that it does
not have personal jurisdiction over Illinois Attorney General
Madigan, and, therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims
against Illinois Attorney General Madigan.
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL LYNCH’S MOTION (#57) TO DISMISS
As noted, U.S. Attorney General Lynch moves to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against her pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
I.
Standard
When deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may consider
affidavits and other evidence supporting or attacking the
complaint's jurisdictional allegations.
944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005).
Autery v. U.S., 424 F.3d
The court may permit discovery to
determine whether it has jurisdiction.
Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys.
Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977).
See
also Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th
Cir. 2003).
As noted, when the court “receives only written
submissions, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing
of jurisdiction.”
Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284
F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
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II.
Discussion
U.S. Attorney General Lynch contends Plaintiff’s claims
against her must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to
identify any valid waiver of sovereign immunity.
A.
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Standard
“As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit
unless it waives such immunity.”
Chadd v. United States, 794
F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015).
The test for waiver of
sovereign immunity is a “stringent one.”
Hypolite v. Cal. Dep’t
of Corr., 585 F. App’x 628, 628 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 675-78 (1999)).
“[A] waiver of sovereign immunity must
be ‘unequivocally expressed in statutory text.’”
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1448 (2012).
F.A.A. v.
Sovereign immunity may not
be impliedly or constructively waived, and courts must “indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver.”
Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. at 678-82 (waivers of sovereign immunity must be
“unmistakably clear”).
Furthermore, “any legislative waiver of
immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign and
‘not enlarged beyond what the language requires.’”
Munoz v.
Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2010)(quoting United States v.
Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992)).
B.
Claim One - First and Fourteenth Amendments
In Claim One Plaintiff contends U.S. Attorney General Lynch
14- OPINION AND ORDER
violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights when the ISP officers
obtained Plaintiff’s “personally identifiable information” from
Hollywood Video.
In the absence of a specific statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity, the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity
for constitutional claims.
78 (1994).
F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-
See also James v. United States, 467 F. App’x 611,
612 (9th Cir. 2012).1
Here, Plaintiff has not identified any
valid waiver of sovereign immunity as to Claim One.
Moreover, amendment of Plaintiff’s Claim One would be
futile.
Plaintiff lacks standing to maintain Claim One for
prospective relief because there is not a “sufficient likelihood
that he will again be wronged in a similar way”; i.e., the record
does not include any plausible allegation that demonstrates a
reasonable likelihood that the government will again illegally
obtain Plaintiff’s “personally identifiable information” from a
movie-rental retailer.
U.S. 95, 111 (1983).
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
See also Brown v. Oregon Dep’t of
Corrections, 751 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2014).
In addition, any reformation of Plaintiff’s Claim One for
damages would be futile.
1
Even assuming Plaintiff could amend
In addition, the Court notes Plaintiff does not allege any
action taken by U.S. Attorney General Lynch or any other federal
officer in connection with the inquiry to Hollywood Video
concerning Plaintiff’s movie-rental records.
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Claim One to state a cause of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), against newly-named individual-capacity defendants, such
a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.
“The
statute of limitations for a Bivens action is defined by the
relevant state's personal injury statute.”
F. App’x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2011).
Yasin v. Coulter, 499
Both Oregon and Illinois have
a two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.
See Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-202; Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1).
Plaintiff alleged in his Second Amended Complaint that he
discovered the facts that gave rise to his claims in 2011, which
was more than three years before Plaintiff filed this action.
The statute of limitations, therefore, expired on any potential
Bivens claim.
Accordingly, on this record the Court dismisses Claim One as
to U.S. Attorney General Lynch.
C.
Claim Two
As noted, in Claim Two Plaintiff alleges U.S. Attorney
General Lynch violated the VPPA when the ISP officers obtained
Plaintiff’s movie-rental records from Hollywood Video without a
warrant.
The VPPA provides:
“A video tape service provider who
knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable
information concerning any consumer of such provider shall be
16- OPINION AND ORDER
liable to the aggrieved person.”
18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).
Videotape service providers may disclose such personally
identifiable information to a law-enforcement agency pursuant to
a warrant, a grand-jury subpoena, or a court order.
2710(b)(2)(C).
Id. at §
The VPPA authorizes a cause of action for “[a]ny
person aggrieved by any act of a person in violation of this
section may bring a civil action in a United States district
court.”
Id. at § 2710(c)(1).
There is not any language in the VPPA, however, that waives
the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims under the VPPA,
and Plaintiff has failed to identify any valid waiver of
sovereign immunity as to Claim Two.
Moreover, amendment of Claim
Two would be futile for the same reasons as Claim One.
Accordingly, on this record the Court concludes it does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Claim Two
against U.S. Attorney General Lynch under the VPPA, and,
therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Claim Two as to U.S.
Attorney General Lynch.
C.
Claims Three and Four
As noted, in Claims Three and Four Plaintiff brings claims
against U.S. Attorney General Lynch under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for
“conspiracy” to obtain Plaintiff’s movie-rental records in
violation of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the VPPA and for “supervisor liability” as a result of U.S.
17- OPINION AND ORDER
Attorney General Lynch’s personal knowledge, facilitation, and
approval of a pattern and practice of the officers’ allegedly
unconstitutional conduct.
An action against federal officials who are not acting under
color of state law, however, cannot be brought under § 1983, but
instead are properly raised as Bivens actions.
Hydrick v.
Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 940 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012).
As noted,
however, Plaintiff’s claims under Bivens are barred by the
statute of limitations.
Accordingly, on this record the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s
Claims Three and Four as to U.S. Attorney General Lynch.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff filed this action on March 25, 2015.
Although
more than 120 days have elapsed since Plaintiff filed this
action, Plaintiff has not yet effectuated service on Defendant
Hollywood Video, Inc.
Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(m), the Court directs Plaintiff to show good
cause in writing no later than October 21, 2015, as to why this
action should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
serve Hollywood Video, Inc.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Illinois
18- OPINION AND ORDER
Attorney General Madigan’s Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS U.S.
Attorney General Lynch’s Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSES all
claims as to Attorneys General Madigan and Lynch without
prejudice to Plaintiff’s prosecution of his related claims in
Gakuba v. O’Brien, 12-cv-7294, in the Northern District of
Illinois.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), the
Court also ORDERS Plaintiff to show cause in writing no later
than October 28, 2015, as to why the remaining claims against
Hollywood Video, Inc., should not be dismissed without prejudice
for failure to effectuate service.
In addition, the Court DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion (#53) for Summary Judgment as moot as to
Attorneys General Madigan and Lynch and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion
as premature as to Hollywood Video, Inc.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2015.
/s/ Anna J. Brown
ANNA J. BROWN
United States District Judge
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