Callaghan v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 21

Opinion and Order - Callaghan's assignment of error cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED. Signed on 4/26/2016 by Judge Robert E. Jones. (ecp)

IN THE UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
Portland Division

PATRICK CALLAGHAN,
Plaintiff,

v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,

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3:15-CV-00531-JO

OPINION AND ORDER

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JONES, J.,
Plaintiff Patrick Callaghan appeals the Commissioner's decision denying his application for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and Title XVI of the
Social Security Act.

The cou1t has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

I AFFIRLV! the

Commissioner's decision.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Callaghan filed concurrent applications under Title II and Title XVI, alleging disability
beginning March 2010 due to a combination of anxiety, depression, obesity, and back problems.
Admin. R. 18-19. The ALJ applied the five-step analysis outlined in the regulations to dete1mine
whether Callaghan was disabled. Admin. R. 17-18. The ALJ found that Callaghan's symptoms of
depression and anxiety adversely affected his ability to work. Admin. R. 21. The ALJ determined
that, despite these impairments, Callaghan retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to
perfo1m a range of work at all exertional levels with limitations on interacting with the public,
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working as part of a team, and interacting with coworkers and supervisors. Admin. R. 20. The ALJ
also found that Callaghan possessed the necessaiy concentration, persistence, and pace for simple
tasks in unskilled and low semi-skilled jobs but should avoid complex tasks. Admin. R. 20. The
vocational expert ("VE") testified that a person with Callaghan's RFC could perform the
requirements of unskilled occupations such as room cleaner, hand packager, and small products
assembler that represent over 1.75 million jobs in the national economy. Admin. R. 23-24.
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Callaghan was not disabled. Admin. R. 24.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on the proper legal
standards and the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Batsonv. Comm 'ro/Soc. Sec. Admin., 359F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). Under
this standard, the Commissioner's factual findings must be upheld if supp01ied by inferences
reasonably drawn from the record even if evidence exists to support another rational interpretation.

Batson, 359 F.3d at, 1193; Andrews v. Shala/a, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION

I.

Claims of Error

The claimant bears the burden of showing that the ALJ ened and that any enor was harmful.

kfcLeodv. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-87. Callaghan contends the ALJ improperly discounted the
lay statements of his ex-wife Jewel Callaghan, without articulating sufficient reasons. Callaghan
contends this enor was harmful because it led the ALJ to elicit testimony from the VE with
hypothetical assumptions that did not accurately reflect all of his limitations and to conclude
enoneously that he could perfonn the occupations identified by the VE.

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II.

Lay Witness Statement

Ms. Callaghan, provided a written third party function report in suppo1t of Callaghan's
disability claim. She said that Callaghan suffered from depression and anxiety, sleeping problems,
medication side effects, and difficulty concentrating, remembering details, staying on task, and
interacting with others. Admin. R. 242-48. Ms. Callaghan reported that Callaghan went groce1y
shopping, perfotmed household chores, prepared food, cleaned dishes, and washed laundry. Admin.

R. 243-45.
The ALJ considered Ms. Callaghan's report and his RFC assessment reflects the limitations
she described regarding Callaghan's problems interacting with others and maintaining concentration
and persistence. The ALJ found that the report deserved little weight to the extent she claimed
Callaghan had functional limitations exceeding the RFC assessment. Admin. R. 22. An ALJ must
consider the statements of a lay witness, and must give reasons germane to the witness in order to
discount them. Valentine v. Comm'r ofSoc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). An
ALJ need not clearly link the reasons to his determination that the lay witness testimony should be
discounted, as long as he notes ge1mane reasons somewhere in the decision and they are supported
by substantial evidence. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). For example, when the
lay witness's statements are similar to the claimant's subjective statements, then an ALJ's reasons
for discrediting the claimant are also germane to the lay witness. Valentine, 574 F.3d. at 694.
Here, Ms. Callaghan's statements regarding Callaghan's impaitments are essentially the same
as Callaghan's subjective complaints. Callaghan alleged severe depression and anxiety, diminished
concentration, and difficulty interacting socially. Admin. R. 234-35, 238-40. In discounting the
credibility of Callaghan's claims of ongoing debilitating mental limitations, the ALJ found that many

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of Callaghan's difficulties derived from tempormy situational stressors, that his mental impahments
improved, and that his reported daily activities were inconsistent with the debilitating limitations he
alleged. Admin. R. 21-22. Callaghan does not challenge the ALJ's credibility determination in this
appeal and did not identify any en-or in the ALJ' s analysis.
Ms. Callaghan's statements about depression, anxiety, concentration, and social function
closely resembled the subjective statements Callaghan made which the ALJ discounted. Admin. R.

234-35, 238-40, 242, 246-48. The ALJ'srationale for discounting Callaghan's subjective statements
applied equally to Ms. Callaghan's function repo1t. Each of his reasons for discounting Callaghan's
credibility was also germane to Ms. Callaghan. Valentine, 574 F.3d. at 694.
In addition, the ALJ found Ms. Callaghan's statements internally inconsistent. For example,
Ms. Callaghan said Callaghan was depressed, anxious, and withdrawn and had great difficulty
interacting with others. She said that he had difficulty concentrating, handling money, and suffered
from memo1y loss and dizziness as side effects from his medication. Admin. R. 242, 245-4 7. When
describing his activities, however, Ms. Callaghan said he had ongoing relationships, could
independently care for himself, prepare meals, perform household chores, and interact with others
sufficiently to cany out transactions while shopping in public. Admin. R. 244-45. Callaghan could
concentrate on flight simulation computer games, pay his own bills, and manage his bank account.
In addition, despite the alleged side effects of his medications, he declined to change when health
care providers offered alternatives, suggesting the side effects were not as bothersome as Ms.
Callaghan asse1ted. Admin. R. 21, 240, 386.
The ALJ found Ms. Callaghan's description of Callaghan's activities inconsistent with her
asse1tion that his limitations were so debilitating that he could not perform any work. The activities

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suggested he could engage in limited interactions with the public and coworkers and could maintain
concentration, persistence and pace perfo1ming simple tasks in unskilled or low semiskilled work.
Admin. R. 20, 244, 309-10, 313-20. Such inconsistencies provide a reasonable basis to discount the
statements of a lay witness. Carmickle v. Comm 'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 11"55, 1164 (9th Cir.
2008).
Finally, even ifthe ALJ e!Ted in evaluating the credibility of Ms. Callaghan's lay witness
statements, the error was haimless. A reviewing court may not reverse an ALJ' s decision for
harmless enor and the claimant has the burden to establish the e1rnr and to show it was harmful.
Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (an e!Tor is harmless if, looking at the record
as a whole, the e!Tor does not alter the outcome of the case); Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162-63 n. 4
(an e1rnr is haimless if the ALJ's determination remains supported despite the error). Here, the ALJ
incorporated the limitations Ms. Callaghan described into his RFC assessment. The ALJ restricted
the RFC assessment to work performed primarily alone, with limited public contact and limited
interactions with coworkers and supervisors. The VE identified unskilled occupations involving
simple tasks which have lesser demand for mental functions such as concentration, memory,
persistence, and so fmih. Admin. R. 20, 23-24. Accordingly, even if the ALJ had fully credited Ms.
Callaghan's statements, the statements would not establish limitations in excess of those in the RFC
assessment. In other words, the limitations Ms. Callaghan described would not preclude Callaghan
from performing the activities required in the occupations identified by the VE. Callaghan has
simply failed to establish any harmful error in the ALJ' s evaluation of Ms. Callaghan's statements
orinhisreliance on the VE's testimony. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.
2008).

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CONCLUSION
Callaghan's assignment of en-or cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the Commissioner's
final decision is AFFIRMED.
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DATED this % day of April, 2016.

Robe1
Unite

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::JD es, Senior Judge
tates District Court