Nyberg v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC

Filing 36

OPINION & ORDER. Nyberg's Motion 30 is granted and denied as follows: 1. The Motion is denied with respect to the First, Fourth, and Seventh Affirmative Defenses. 2. The Motion is granted with respect to the Third, Fifth, and Thirteent h Affirmative Defenses, and those defenses are dismissed without prejudice. 3. The Motion is granted with respect to the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Affirmative Defenses, and those defenses are dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, PRA is ordered to file an amended answer within 10 days of the date of this Opinion and Order. Signed on 6/2/2016 by Magistrate Judge Paul Papak. (gw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
KIRK J. NYBERG,
Plaintiff,
3: 15-cv-01175-PK
v.

OPINION & ORDER
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES,
LLC,
Defendant.

PAP AK, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Kirk J. Nyberg brings this action against Defendant Portfolio Recovery
Associates, LLC ("PRA"), asserting claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"). Now before the court is Nyberg's Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings Against PRA's Affirmative Defenses (#30) ("Nyberg's Motion"). For the reasons
provided below, Nyberg's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND
PRA filed suit against Nyberg in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, County of
Washington, on June 25, 2014, seeking to collect amounts allegedly due on Nyberg's Capital
One Bank (USA), N.A. ("Capital One") credit card. That lawsuit will hereinafter be referred to
as Nyberg I. PRA alleged in its complaint in Nyberg I that Nyberg failed to dispute monthly bills
he received from Capital One, thereby establishing an account stated in the amount of $834.25,
which Nyberg failed to pay. On November 25, 2014, Nyberg !was dismissed without prejudice
for failure to prosecute.

OPINION &

ORDER~P AGE

1

Nyberg filed his initial Complaint (#1) in this action on June 25, 2015. He then filed a
First Amended Complaint (#24) on January 15, 2016. The First Amended Complaint is now the
operative pleading. Nyberg contends that PRA violated the FDCP A by filing Nyberg I.
Ny berg's FDCP A claim consists of the following four counts: (1) PRA falsely alleged in its
complaint in Nyberg I that it had an account stated, (2) PRA filed Nyberg I in an effort to
sidestep the statute oflimitations and "other defenses" that arose out of the cardholder agreement
between Nyberg and Capital One, (3) PRA's claims in Nyberg I were barred by the applicable
statute of limitations, and (4) PRA overstated the debt owed by Nyberg. Am. Comp!.

iii! 31-34

(#24).
PRA filed its Answer to Nyberg's First Amended Complaint (#26) [hereinafter Answer]
on February 5, 2016. PRA's Answer contains fourteen affirmative defenses. Nyberg now moves
for judgment on the pleadings as to each affirmative defense. See Answer 5-8 (#26).

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) governs motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Rule 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings." "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the
moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact
remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw .... However,
judgment on the pleadings is improper when the district comt goes beyond the pleadings to
resolve an issue; such a proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary
judgment." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th
Cir.1989) (citations omitted). "In evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
allegations of the non-moving party are credited as true, whereas those allegations of the moving

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 2

party which have been denied are deemed false for purposes of the motion." John Doe 310 v.
Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, No. 3: 13-CV-822-PK, 2014 WL 1668151, at *2 (D. Or. Apr.
25, 2014) (citation omitted).
An answer must "state in short and plain terms" the defenses to each claim asserted

against the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(l)(A). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c),
an "affirmative defense is a defense that does not negate the elements of the plaintiffs claim, but
instead precludes liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiffs claim are proven." Barnes
v. AT & T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F.Supp.2d 1167, 1171-72 (N.D.

Cal.2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). An affirmative defense is
sufficiently pled if it gives the plaintiff "fair notice of the defense." Wyshak v. City Nat. Bank,
607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979).
DISCUSSION

Below, I analyze Nyberg's Motion as to each of PRA's affirmative defenses, separately.
Before doing so, however, I must resolve two preliminary matters: (1) whether I should construe
Nyberg's Motion as a motion to strike, and (2) whether the pleading standard set forth in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
applies to affirmative defenses.
PRA urges the court to construe Nyberg's Motion as a motion to strike and deny it as
untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(±)(2), which requires motions to strike to be
filed within 21 days after service of the challenged pleading. Nyberg captions his Motion as a
"MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AGAINST PORTFOLIO RECOVERY
ASSOCIATES LLC'S AFFIRMATfV:E DEFENSES." He also sets forth the legal standard for
motions for judgment on the pleadings in his moving papers. In his Reply (#34), Nyberg

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 3

reiterates that is Motion is one for judgment on the pleadings. I therefore construe Nyberg's
Motion accordingly.
The parties also dispute whether the pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal
applies to affirmative defenses. Nyberg argues that the standard is applicable, and PRA argues
that it is not. I agree with Nyberg.
"Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, the majority of district courts
addressing the issue have required affirmative defenses to meet the heightened pleading standard
dictated by the Supreme Comt in Twombly and Iqbal." Hayden v. United States, No. 3:14-CV1060-AC, 2015 WL 350665, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 26, 2015) (collecting cases); see also Gessele v.
Jack in the Box, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-960-ST, 2011WL3881039, at *1-2 (D. Or. Sept. 2, 2011)
(discussing disagreement among judges within this comt and other district courts within the
Ninth Circuit as to whether the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard applies to affirmative
defenses). Although the state of the law on the issue is cunently in flux, I agree with Judge
Acosta's recent conclusion in Hayden v. United States that the Twombly and Iqbal pleading
standard applies to affirmative defenses. See 2015 WL 350665, at *2-6. Judge Accosta's
conclusion is supported by an extensive, well-reasoned analysis. See id. at *2-6. Rather than
rehash that analysis here, I incorporate it by reference into this Opinion and Order.
The pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal requires PRA's affirmative
defenses to contain more than a mere "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a defense.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the affirmative defenses must be supported by factual
allegations that make the defenses "plausible" on their face. See id. at 547. I now proceed to
analyze each of PRA's affirmative defenses against that plausibility pleading standard.

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 4

I.

First Affirmative Defense---Failure to State a Claim

PRA's First Affirmative Defense is pied in its entirety as follows:
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to State a Claim)
The allegations of the F AC fail to state a claim against PRA upon which relief can
be granted.
Answer 5 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's First
Affomative Defense because, when read along with the general denial in PRA's Answer, the
defense is redundant. Nyberg also contends that PRA was required to plead facts showing that
Nyberg failed to state a claim for relief. In response, PRA notes that the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) and 12(h)(2) expressly permit paities to plead failure to state a claim for relief in
a responsive pleading.
Nyberg is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's First Affirmative
Defense. This court has previously recognized that failure to state a claim for relief is a negative
defense, not an affomative defense. See Gessele, 2011WL3881039, at *2 (citation omitted).
Unlike affirmative defenses, negative defenses typically do not have to be pied to avoid waiver.
See, e.g., John Doe 310 v. Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, No. 3: l 3-CV-822-PK, 2014 WL
1668151, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2014). However, as PRA accurately notes, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure expressly permit parties to plead failure to state a claim for relief in a responsive
pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. l 2(b ), (h)(2). Indeed, Rule 12(h)(2) makes clear that a defendant
waives the defense if it does not raise it through a motion, responsive pleading, or amended
pleading. Here, PRA chose to raise the defense in its responsive pleading rather than by motion.
The fact that PRA alleges both a general denial and failure to state a claim for relief does
not entitle Nyberg to judgment on the pleadings. See John Doe 310, 2014 WL 1668151, at *3-4

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 5

(declining to grant plaintiff judgment on the pleadings as to the defendant's Seventh Affirmative
Defense, even though the defense was a negative defense that was preserved by the defendant's
general denial). Nor was PRA required to plead any facts showing that Nyberg failed to state a
claim for relief. See Gessele, 2011WL3881039, at *3 ("In response to an initial complaint, an
affirmative defense based on failure to state a claim may be alleged in a conclusory fashion.").
Consequently, Nyberg is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's First Affomative
Defense.
II.

Second Affirmative Defense-Statute of Limitations/Laches
PRA's Second Affirmative Defense is pled in its entirety as follows:
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Statute of Limitations/Laches)
The purported claims set forth in the FAC are baned in whole or in pa:ti by the
applicable statutes of limitation and/or the equitable doctrine of !aches.

Answer 6 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Second
Affirmative Defense because Laches is an equitable defense, and as such, fails as a matter of law
against Nyberg's FDCP A claim. Nyberg fmther argues that PRA's Second Affirmative Defense
fails as a matter of law because it does not allege the applicable statute of limitations or facts
demonstrating that Nyberg failed to bring this action within the limitations period. Nyberg also
contends that he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Second Affomative
Defense because it alleges both the statute of limitations and !aches, and therefore, the pleading
fails to give Nyberg fair notice of the defense.
PRA's opposition to Nyberg's Motion does not contain any responsive argument
regarding PRA's Second Affirmative Defense. Consequently, Nyberg is entitled to judgment on

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 6

the pleadings as to that defense. See, e.g., Engle v. Liberty Nlut. Fire Ins. Co., 402 F. Supp. 2d
1157, 1160 (D. Haw. 2005) (granting unopposed motion for partial judgment on the pleadings).
III.

Third'Affirmative Defense-Bona Fide Error
PRA's Third Affirmative Defense is pied in its entirety as follows:
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Bona Fide Error)
To the extent that any violation oflaw occurred, which PRA expressly denies,
said violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the maintenance by PRA of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid any such error.

Answer 6 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Third
Affomative Defense because PRA failed to allege any facts to support the defense, and
consequently, the pleading fails to give Nyberg fair notice of the defense. Nyberg further argues
that because PRA's Third Affirmative Defense essentially alleges mistake, PRA was required to
plead the defense according to the heightened particularity pleading standard provided by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). In response, PRA argues that it is not required to plead
any facts in support of its Third Affirmative Defense, let alone facts sufficient to satisfy the
heightened pleading standard provided by Rule 9(b ).
Nyberg is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Third Affirmative Defense.
The defense contains nothing more than a bare-bones recitation of the statutory defense. See 5
U.S.C.A. § 1692k(c) ("A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this
subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error."). I reject PRA's contention that it is not required to
plead any facts supporting its bona fide error affirmative defense. As explained above, PRA

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 7

must plead its defenses with enough factual detail to give Nyberg "fair notice" of the defenses.
Fair notice demands something more than a bare-bones recitation of the elements of a defense.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). 1 Indeed, at
least two district courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that the FDCP A bona fide error
affirmative defense is subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard. See Youssofi v. Allied
Interstate LLC, No. 15CV2197-GPC(JLB), 2016 WL 29625, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016)

(collecting cases from other district courts); Nguyen v. HOVG, LLC, No. 14CV837 BTM RBB,
2014 WL 5361935, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) (citations omitted). Consequently, Nyberg is
entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Third Affirmative Defense.

IV.

Fourth Affirmative Defense-No Willful Conduct
PRA's Fourth Affirmative Defense is pled in its entirety as follows:
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(No Willful Conduct)
PRA acted in good faith at all times in its dealings with Plaintiff, and if any
conduct by PRA is found to be unlawful, which PRA expressly denies, such
conduct was not willful and should not give rise to liability.

Answer 6 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's
Fourth Affirmative Defense because the FDCPA is a strict liability statute. In response, PRA
argues that its Fourth Affirmative Defense is proper because state of mind is relevant to damages
under the FDCP A.

1

PRA cites Saeedi v. lvf.R.S. Associates, 2007 WL 1875975, at* 1 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2007) for
the proposition that it does not need to plead a factual basis for its bona fide error affirmative
defense. However, Saeedi was decided just after Twombly and does not cite to it. Therefore, I
find the case unpersuasive and decline to adopt its reasoning or holding.
OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 8

I agree with PRA. As Nyberg concedes, state of mind is relevant to damages under the
FDCP A. When determining the amount of statutory damages, the court must consider, among
other things, "the extent to which the debt collector's noncompliance was intentional." 2 15 U.S.C.

§ 1962k(b)(1 ). Consequently, Nyberg is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's
Fourth Affirmative Defense. See also John Doe 310, 2014 WL 1668151, at *3 ("[T]here is no
impropriety in pleading a negative defense, however superfluous it may be to do so.").

V.

Fifth Affirmative Defense-Failure to Mitigate
PRA's Fifth Affirmative Defense is pied in its entirety as follows:
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Failure to Mitigate)
Plaintiff, although under a legal obligation to do so, has failed to take reasonable
steps to mitigate any alleged damages that he may have and is therefore barred
from recovering damages, if any, from PRA.

Answer 6 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Fifth
Affirmative Defense because PRA failed to allege any facts in support of the defense. In
response, PRA argues that pied a sufficient factual basis in support of its Fifth Affirmative
Defense.
I agree with Nyberg. PRA failed to plead a single fact supporting its Fifth Affirmative
Defense. Consequently, Nyberg is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to that defense. See,

e.g., Hayden, 2015 WL 350665, at *6 ("All defenses asserted by the [defendant] must be
"factually plausible." Thus, in pleading its affirmative defenses, the [defendant] should identify
the actors and, to the extent possible, the acts and omissions relied upon for its enumerated
defenses.").

2

Nyberg seeks to recover statutory damages on his FDCPA claim. See Am. Comp!.

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 9

iJ 35 (#24).

VI.

Sixth Affirmative Defense-Waiver
PRA's Sixth Affirmative Defense is pled in its entirety as follows:
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Waiver)
Plaintiff has waived his rights, if any, to recover the relief he seeks in the F AC
based upon his own conduct and admissions with respect to the financial
obligation at issue.

Answer 6 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Sixth
Affirmative Defense because, under the Ninth Circuit's holding in Clark v. Capital Credit &

Collection Service 460 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), Nyberg cannot waive the FDCPA
protections that form the basis of his claim. In response, PRA argues that FDCP A protections
can be waived.
I agree with Nyberg. Nyberg alleges that PRA violated the FDCPA's prohibitions against
debt collection through harassment or abuse, false or misleading statements, and unfair or
unconscionable means. See Am. Comp!.

ilil 31-34 (#24).

The Clark court made clear that

consumers cannot waive those FDCP A prohibitions. After explaining that "waiver is not
appropriate when it is inconsistent with the provision creating the right sought to be secured," the
court stated "what should be obvious: a consumer's consent carmot waive protection from the
practices the FDCP A seeks to eliminate, such as false, misleading, harassing or abusive
communications. Permitting such a waiver would violate the public policy goals pursued by the
FDCPA." Clark, 460 F.3d t 1170-71 n.5 (citations omitted). Consequently, PRA's Sixth
Affomative Defense fails as a matter oflaw, and Nyberg is entitled to judgment on the pleadings
as to that defense.

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 10

VII.

Seventh Affirmative Defense--Good Faith
PRA's Seventh Affirmative Defense is pied in its entirety as follows:
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Good Faith)
PRA has, at all material times with respect to Plaintiff, acted in good faith in an
effort to comply fully with all relevant federal and state laws.

Answer 7 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Seventh
Affirmative Defense because: "If the defense is maintained then PRA cannot object on the basis
of privilege to plaintiffs inquiry as to what PRA believed the state of the law was and how it
attempted to comply with the law." Plf.'s Mot. 9 (#30). As with PRA's Fourth Affirmative
Defense, Nyberg argues once again that the FDCP A is a strict liability statute, and as a result,
good faith is irrelevant. Although PRA opposes Nyberg's strict liability argument as set forth
above, it does not respond to Nyberg's argument regarding privilege.
Notwithstanding PRA's failure to respond to Nyberg's privilege argument, I cannot
conclude that Nyberg is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on PRA's Seventh Affirmative
Defense. As explained above, I am prohibited from going beyond the pleadings in ruling on
Nyberg's Motion. See Hal Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550 (citations omitted). The privilege
issue Nyberg raises is beyond the pleadings and more appropriately addressed through a motion
to compel. Additionally, I have already rejected Nyberg's strict liability argument for the reasons
provided above. Consequently, Nyberg is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's
Seventh Affirmative Defense. See also John Doe 310, 2014 WL 1668151, at *3 ("[T]here is no
impropriety in pleading a negative defense, however superfluous it may be to do so.").

VIII.

Eighth Affirmative Defense--Unclean Hands
PRA's Eighth Affirmative Defense is pied in its entirety as follows:

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 11

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Unclean Hands)
The allegations in the FAC and relief requested are, on information and belief,
barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of unclean hands.
Answer 7 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Eighth
Affirmative Defense because unclean hands is an equitable defense, and therefore, it is
inapplicable to Nyberg's FDCP A claim. In response, PRA argues that unclean hands is a proper
defense to an FDCP A action. In supp01i, PRA relies on cases holding that unclean hands is a
proper defense to actions for Lanham Act violations, patent infringement, and violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
Unclean hands is not a proper defense to an FDCP A claim. See JvlcCabe v. Crawford &
Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (citing Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 591-96
(7th Cir. 1998)). It is well-settled that unclean hands is an equitable defense. See, e.g.,

Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the defense has
been extended to statutory claims for patent infringement and violations of the Lanham Act and
the ADA, the FDCP A is distinguishable from those statutes. The FDCP A focuses primarily (if
not exclusively) on the conduct of the debt collector. Consequently, whether an FDCPA plaintiff
has unclean hands is irrelevant to the defendant's liability for violating the statute. See i\fcCabe,
272 F. Supp. 2d at 749 (citing Keele, 149 F.3d at 591-96). Nyberg is therefore entitled to
judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Eighth Affirmative Defense.

IX.

Ninth Affirmative Defense-Equitable Indemnity
PRA's Ninth Affirmative Defense is pled in its entirety as follows:
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Equitable Indemnity)

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 12

To the extent that Plaintiff has suffered any damage as a result of any alleged act
or omission of PRA, which PRA expressly denies, PRA is entitled to equitable
indemnity according to comparative fault from other persons and/or entities
causing or contributing to such damages, if any.
Answer 7 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Ninth
Affirmative Defense because equitable indemnity and comparative negligence are not proper
defenses to an FDCP A claim. In response, PRA argues that the defense is applicable because it
would negate or reduce the actual damages alleged by Nyberg.
I agree with Nyberg. Equitable indemnity and comparative fault are not defenses to an
FDCPA claim. See Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Grp., P.C., No. l l-CV-03323-LHK, 2012
WL 1029425, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012); Scott v. Fed. Bond & Collection Serv., Inc., No.
10-CV-02825-LHK, 2011WL176846, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011). Consequently, Nyberg is
entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Ninth Affirmative Defense.

X.

Tenth Affirmative Defense-Standing
PRA's Tenth Affirmative Defense is pled in its entirety as follows:
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Standing)
Plaintiff has not suffered any injury as a result of PRA's alleged conduct and
therefore lacks standing to sue.

Answer 7 (#26). Nyberg contends that he is "at a loss for how standing is an issue." Plf.'s Mot.
11 (#30). In response, PRA argues that Nyberg will be unable to prove that he suffered actual
damages, and his claim for statutory damages will fail as well. As a result, PRA argues, Nyberg
will be unable to establish that he suffered an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing.
PRA's Tenth Affirmative Defense fails as a matter of law. The Supreme Court recently
reiterated the three elements that form the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing:

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 13

"The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339, 2016 WL 2842447, at *5 (U.S. May 16, 2016)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff
must show that he or she suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is 'concrete and
particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."' Id. at *6 (citation
omitted).
Nyberg's claim that PRA attempted to collect a debt in violation of the FDCPA by filing
Nyberg 1 sufficiently alleges that he suffered a concrete, paiiicularized injury. See Tourgeman v.
Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Spokeo, 2016 WL
284 244 7, at *5 ("Where, as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must "clearly ...
allege facts demonstrating" each element [of standing]." (alteration in original) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975))). It is undisputed that PRA initiated Nyberg 1 against Nyberg.
See Answer if 22 (#26). Consequently, Nyberg is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to
PRA's Tenth Affirmative Defense.
XI.

Eleventh Affirmative Defense--First Amendment
PRA's Eleventh Affirmative Defense is pled in its entirety as follows:
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(First Amendment)
PRA's conduct is protected under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Plaintiffs proposed interpretation of provisions of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act must be rejected as it would place an umeasonable
restraint upon PRA's First Amendment rights, thereby raising serious
constitutional issues.

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 14

Answer 7 (#26). Nyberg argues that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's
Eleventh Affirmative Defense because PR.A failed to identify the protected speech it engaged in.
In response, PRA argues that it has a First Amendment right to pursue litigation against
consumers who do not fulfill their financial obligations.
PRA's Eleventh Affirmative Defense fails as a matter of law. As explained above, the
essence ofNyberg's FDCP A claim is that PRA violated the statute by filing its complaint in

Nyberg I. PRA does not cite any authority in support of its argument that it has a First
Amendment right to pursue litigation against consumers who do not fulfill their financial
obligations. Although Nyberg likewise fails to cite any authority on point, I was able to find
several cases addressing the issue. All of those decisions support the conclusion that the First
Amendment does not confer a right upon debt collectors to petition courts in a manner that
violates the FDCPA. See Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 616 (6th Cir.
2009) ("[T]he First Amendment does not shield lawyers engaged in litigation from FDCPA
liability."); Consumer Fin. Prat. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, P. C., 114 F. Supp.
3d 1342, 1359-61 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (collecting cases holding that the First Amendment does not
provide a defense against FDCPA claims); lvfarie v. Legal Express, Ltd., No. C-15-3977 MMC,
2015 WL 7454147, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2015) ("[U]nder federal law, the 'Noerr-Pennington
doctrine,' which requires federal statutes be construed to 'avoid burdening conduct that implicates
the protections afforded by the [First Amendment's] Petition Clause,' is not a defense to an
FDCP A claim ... based on the defendant's having made false statements in connection with a
court proceeding." (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Reyes v. Kenosian & Miele, LLP,
619 F. Supp. 2d 796, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (rejecting "Defendants' assertion that the First
Amendment, as a matter of law, protects the filing of a state court complaint from the reach of

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 15

the FDCPA"); see also Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2010)
("[A] complaint served directly on a consumer to facilitate debt-collection efforts is a
communication subject to the requirements of [15 U.S.C.] §§ 1692e and 1692f.").
Consequently, Nyberg is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Eleventh
Affirmative Defense.

XII.

Twelfth Affirmative Defense-Apportionment
PRA's Twelfth Affirmative Defense is pled in its entirety as follows:
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Apportionment)
Without admitting that any damages exist, if damages were suffered by Plaintiff
as alleged in the F AC, those damages were proximately caused by and
contributed by persons other than PRA. The liability, if any exists, of PRA and/or
any responsible parties, named or unnamed, should be apportioned according to
their relative degrees of fault, and the liability of PRA should be reduced
accordingly.

Answer 8 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Twelfth
Affirmative Defense because it is not a proper defense to an FDCP A claim. In response, PRA
argues that apportionment is a proper defense to an FDCP A claim.
I agree with Nyberg. Apportionment is not a proper defense to an FDCP A claim. See

Perez, 2012 WL 1029425, at *11. Consequently, Nyberg is entitled to judgment on the
pleadings as to PRA's Twelfth Affirmative Defense.

XIII.

Thirteenth Affirmative Defense-Supervening Cause
PRA's Thirteenth Affirmative Defense is pied in its entirety as follows:
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Supervening Cause)

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 16

The causes of action in the FAC are barred, in whole or in part, to the extent that
any injury or loss sustained was caused by intervening or supervening events over
which PRA had or has no control.
Answer 8 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's
Thi1teenth Affirmative Defense because PRA failed to allege any facts in support of the defense.
Nyberg fiuther argues that the supervening cause defense is inapplicable to the FDCP A. In
response, PRA argues that its supervening cause defense is applicable to Ny berg's FDCP A claim
because it will bar or limit the amount of actual damages Nyberg seeks to recover under that
claim.
PRA's Thiiteenth Affirmative Defense is deficient because it fails to give Nyberg fair
notice of the defense. In Perez v. Gordon & Wong Law Group, the United States District Comt
for the Northern District of California struck an identical affirmative defense.3 As the comt
explained:
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that none of the affirmative defenses are pied with
sufficient particularity to give Plaintiff fair notice of the grounds for the asserted
defense. [An] illustrative example is the tenth affirmative defense, "supervening
cause," which reads in its entirety: "The causes of action in the Complaint are
barred, in whole or in part, to the extent that any injury or loss sustained was
caused by intervening or supervening events over which Defendants have or have
no control." Answer at l 0. Defendants fail to allege any actual intervening or
supervening events on which they base their affirmative defense. All of the
affirmative defenses are similarly deficient. Without these basic factual
allegations, Plaintiff cannot ascertain the grounds for Defendants' various
affirmative defenses and is thus deprived of fair notice.
2012 WL 1029425, at* 10. I am persuaded by the reasoning of the Perez court. Consequently,
Nyberg is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's Thirteenth Affirmative Defense.

XIV.

Fourteenth Affirmative Defense-Setoff
PRA's Fourteenth Affirmative Defense is pied in its entirety as follows:

3

Notably, the defendant in Perez was represented by the same firm that represents PRA in this
action.
OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 17

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
(Set-off)
To the extent that Plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages, which PRA denies,
PRA is entitled to a setoff in the amount of Plaintiffs unpaid financial obligation.
Answer 8 (#26). Nyberg argues he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to PRA's
Fourteenth Affirmative Defense because set off is an equitable doctrine that cannot be asserted as
an affirmative defense to an FDCP A claim. In support, Nyberg cites Reed v. Global Acceptance

Credit No. C-08-01826-RMW, 2008 WL 3330165, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008), wherein the
United States District Comi for the N01ihem District of California suggested that setoff could not
be asserted as a defense or counterclaim to an FDCPA claim because it would be "contrary to the
established policies of [the J FDCP A."
PRA's opposition to Nyberg's Motion does not contain any responsive argument
regarding PRA's Fomteenth Affirmative Defense. Consequently, Nyberg is entitled to judgment
on the pleadings as to that defense. See, e.g., Engle, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 (granting
unopposed motion for partial judgment on the pleadings).
XV.

Leave to Amend
PRA moves the court for leave to amend its Answer in the event any of its affirmative

defenses are found to not be properly pied. As explained above, with the exception of the First
Affirmative Defense (failure to state a claim), Fomih Affirmative Defense (no willful conduct),
and Seventh Affirmative Defense (good faith), all of PRA's affirmative defenses are improperly
pled.
Although Rule 12(c) is silent as to leave to amend, courts have discretion to grant a Rule
12(c) motion with leave to amend. See Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945
(C.D. Cal. 2004). Additionally, courts "should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed.

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 18

R. Civ. P. l 5(a)(2). Courts consider the following factors in adjudicating motions to amend: (1)
undue prejudice to the opposing party, (2) undue delay, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by previous amendments, (4) bad faith, (5) dilatory motive, and (6) futility of the proposed
amendment. See lvfoore v. Kayport Package Krp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted).
Because PRA's opposition to Nyberg's Motion does not contain any responsive argument
regarding the Second and Fourteenth Affirmative Defenses, I find that an amendment of those
defenses would be futile. Consequently, those defenses will be dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, for the reasons provided above, PRA's Sixth Affirmative Defense (waiver), Eighth
Affirmative Defense (unclean hands), Ninth Affirmative Defense (equitable indemnity), Tenth
Affirmative Defense (standing), Eleventh Affirmative Defense (First Amendment), and Twelfth
Affirmative Defense (apportionment) are also futile. Those defenses will therefore be dismissed
with prejudice as well.
That leaves the Third Affirmative Defense (bona fide error), Fifth Affirmative Defense
(failure to mitigate) and Thirteenth Affirmative Defense (supervening cause). Nyberg initially
argued that PRA should not be granted leave to amend those defenses because he would be
prejudiced by his inability to conduct additional discovery on the amended defenses prior to June
2, 2016 discovery deadline that is currently in place in this matter. However, I have since
extended the discovery deadline. Consequently, PRA will be granted leave to amend its Third,
Fifth, and Thirteenth Affirmative Defense.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided above, Nyberg's Motion (#30) is granted and denied as follows:

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 19

1. The Motion is denied with respect to the First, Fourth, and Seventh Affinnative
Defenses.
2. The Motion is granted with respect to the Third, Fifth, and Thirteenth Affirmative
Defenses, and those defenses are dismissed without prejudice.
3. The Motion is granted with respect to the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Affirmative Defenses, and those defenses are
dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, PRA is ordered to file an amended answer within 10 days of the date of this
Opinion and Order.

Dated this 2nd day of June, 2016.

OPINION & ORDER-PAGE 20